

GAP.9

Osnabrück 2015

**Philosophie
zwischen Lehnstuhl und Labor /**

**Philosophy
between Armchair and Lab**

Osnabrück, 14.–17. September 2015

Veranstalter

Gesellschaft für Analytische
Philosophie e.V. &
Institut für Kognitionswissenschaft der
Universität Osnabrück

Lokale Organisation

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Herstellung

mentis Verlag GmbH
Eisenbahnstr. 11
48143 Münster
www.mentis.de
Auflage: 550

Umschlaggestaltung

Malwin Béla Hürkey

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www.gap9.de

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Dr. Gabriele Heinen-Kljajić

Geleitwort

Im Jahr ihres 25jährigen Bestehens veranstaltet die Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie gemeinsam mit der Universität Osnabrück den 9. Internationalen Kongress der Analytischen Philosophie. Das Veranstaltungsthema ›Philosophie zwischen Lehnstuhl und Labor‹ ist als Hinweis darauf zu verstehen, dass die Philosophie sich nicht von der Praxis trennen lässt. Das interdisziplinäre Tagungsprogramm zeigt deutlich, dass die Philosophie nicht im Elfenbeinturm des theoretischen Diskurses verharrt, sondern sich den Fragen des Lebens annimmt. Dass dieser Kongress an der Universität Osnabrück stattfindet, ist auch ein Beweis für die erfolgreiche Arbeit des Instituts für Kognitionswissenschaft, in dem Forschungsfelder wie zum Beispiel Neurobiopsychologie, Computerlinguistik und Künstliche Intelligenz mit philosophischen Fragestellungen interdisziplinär verknüpft werden.

Die besondere wissenschaftliche Qualität der Tagung gab auch den Ausschlag für eine finanzielle Förderung durch das Niedersächsische Ministerium für Wissenschaft und Kultur im Rahmen des Programms »Pro*Niedersachsen – Wissenschaftliche Veranstaltungen«. Ziel des Programms ist die Vernetzung von Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftlern, die Unterstützung des Austauschs von Forschungsergebnissen und die Entwicklung neuer Forschungsperspektiven.

Die gezielte Förderung geisteswissenschaftlicher Fragestellungen ist ein besonderes Anliegen der Landesregierung. Die Geisteswissenschaften sind für die Gesellschaft von großer Bedeutung. Die Analyse historischer, kultureller, geistiger und sozialer Zusammenhänge fördert das Verständnis für die Vergangenheit, schärft den Blick auf die Gegenwart und gibt Impulse für die künftige Entwicklung moderner Gesellschaften. Die Themenbreite des Kongresses – von der Religionsphilosophie über die Wissenschaftstheorie bis hin zur Politischen Philosophie zeigt deutlich, wie die philosophische Wissenschaft mit den gesellschaftlichen Herausforderungen verbunden ist.

Als Schirmherrin danke ich den Veranstalterinnen und Veranstaltern für ihr Engagement bei der Vorbereitung und Durchführung dieser renommierten internationalen Tagung. Schließlich wünsche ich allen Teilnehmerinnen und Teilnehmern einen interessanten Kongress und erkenntnisreiche Gespräche – auf dass sich zahlreiche neue wissenschaftliche Impulse für die analytische Philosophie ergeben.

Dr. Gabriele Heinen-Kljajić
Niedersächsische Ministerin für Wissenschaft und Kultur



Dr. Gabriele Heinen-Kljajić

Greeting

In the year of its 25th anniversary, the German Society for Analytical Philosophy (GAP) is holding the 9th International Congress on Analytical Philosophy together with Osnabrück University. The theme of the Congress, ›Philosophy between the Armchair and the Laboratory‹, is meant to indicate that philosophy is inseparable from practice. The interdisciplinary conception of the Congress program clearly demonstrates that philosophy is not about staying seated in the ivory tower of theoretical discourse, but that it addresses the issues of (real) life. The decision to hold the Congress at Osnabrück University is proof, too, of the successful job done at its Institute of Cognitive Science, which combines, on an interdisciplinary basis, research fields such as Neurobiopsychology, Computer Linguistics, and Artificial Intelligence with philosophical questions.

It was indeed the special scientific quality of the Congress that brought about the decision by the Ministry of Science and Culture of Lower Saxony to provide funding for it within the scope of the ›Pro*Niedersachsen – Wissenschaftliche Veranstaltungen‹ program (support program for scientific events staged in Lower Saxony). The goals pursued by the program include establishing networks that link scientists with one another, supporting the exchange of research findings, and developing new research perspectives.

Support measures specifically tailored to the needs of research in the Humanities constitute a special concern of the federal state government. The Humanities are of great significance to society. The analysis of historical, cultural, intellectual, and social contexts and correlations promotes appreciation of the past, sharpens up perceptions of the present, and provides impulses for the future development of modern societies. The wide range of topics addressed at the Congress – from religious philosophy and the theory of science to political philosophy – unmistakably illustrates the ways in which philosophical science is linked with the challenges of society.

In my function as patron of the Congress, I would like to thank the organizers for preparing and executing this renowned international Congress with commitment and enthusiasm. I will conclude by wishing all participants an interesting Congress as well as informative and insightful discussions. May the Congress come up with numerous scientific impulses for Analytical Philosophy.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, which appears to read "G. Heinen-Kljajić". The signature is fluid and cursive.

Dr. Gabriele Heinen-Kljajić
Niedersächsische Ministerin für Wissenschaft und Kultur



Wolfgang Griesert

Geleitwort

Ein ›Grußwort‹ für eine Philosophen-Tagung? Schon das ist wahrlich eine Herausforderung für einen Oberbürgermeister! Ein ›Grußwort‹ für einen Kongress der analytischen Philosophie ist aber nahezu eine Unmöglichkeit – ist doch das Risiko ziemlich groß, dass es seziert und analysiert wird, dass es als Beispiel dafür herangezogen wird, dass der Grüßende sich nicht darüber klar geworden ist, was er sagt, wenn er grüßt: Er, nämlich der Grüßende, also ich, der Oberbürgermeister der Stadt Osnabrück, hätte vorher alle Unklarheiten beseitigen müssen, um den Gästen auf Augenhöhe zu begegnen. Hätte ich aber diesen hohen Erwartungen entsprechen wollen, hätte vermutlich die Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie ihren Kongress ohne ein Grußwort der Friedensstadt Osnabrück stattfinden lassen müssen: Die hohen Ansprüche hätten mir durchaus die Sprache verschlagen können.

Das hätten die Gäste vermutlich verkraftet, wäre aber doch ein Akt der Unhöflichkeit gewesen. Diesen Vorwurf hätte ich mir von den Veranstaltern nur ungern machen lassen wollen. Und so ignoriere ich die Hürden der analytischen Philosophie und heiße Sie als Gäste in Osnabrück einfach herzlich willkommen. Ich wünsche der größten internationalen Philosophietagung in Deutschland in diesem Jahr einen anregenden Verlauf in der angenehmen Atmosphäre der Friedensstadt Osnabrück. Ich hoffe, dass Sie sich hier wohlfühlen.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'W. Griesert'.

Wolfgang Griesert
Oberbürgermeister



Wolfgang Griesert

Greeting

Writing a ›greeting‹ for a philosophy congress? This by itself would have been quite a challenge for a mayor! A ›greeting‹ for the International Congress of the Society for Analytical Philosophy is therefore almost impossible—especially given the risks that it will be dissected and analyzed—that it will be taken as evidence that the person who is greeting is not quite sure of what to say. In order to be on par with you, the person who presents the greeting (that is me, the senior mayor of Osnabrück) would have had to dissolve all obscurities. If it had been my intention to fulfill these high expectations, the Congress of the Society for Analytical Philosophy would have had to manage without a word of welcome by the city of Osnabrück. The high demands could have rendered me almost speechless.

While the participants would have been likely able to cope without a greeting, it would have been a gross dis-courtesy and I would not have liked to be reproached by the organizers for this failure. So I ignore the barriers of Analytical Philosophy and welcome you cordially as our guests. I wish you an exciting and inspiring participation in one of the biggest International Congress for Analytical Philosophy in Germany and a pleasant stay in Osnabrück – the city of peace. I hope that you feel comfortable in our city.

Wolfgang Griesert
Oberbürgermeister



Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Lücke

Geleitwort

Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,

im Namen der Universität Osnabrück begrüße ich Sie zum 9. Internationalen Kongress der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie. Es ist das erste Mal, dass diese bedeutende internationale Philosophietagung, die größte in Deutschland in diesem Jahr, an einer niedersächsischen Universität stattfindet. Das ist für uns eine Ehre und ich freue mich, dass wir in diesem Jahr Ihr Gastgeber sein dürfen.

Als mittelgroße Universität in Deutschland mit über 13.000 Studierenden deckt die Universität Osnabrück ein breites Spektrum von Studiengängen und Fachdisziplinen ab. Ein besonderes Merkmal bildet die Verknüpfung verschiedener Wissenschaftszweige in Forschung und Lehre. Insbesondere Einrichtungen wie das fachbereichsübergreifende, interdisziplinäre Institut für Kognitionswissenschaft (IKW), das im Juni 2001 gegründet wurde und in diesem Jahr GAP.9 ausrichtet, tragen zur überregionalen Bedeutung der Universität bei und ziehen Studierende aus der ganzen Welt nach Osnabrück.

Ich freue mich, dass auch im Rahmen von GAP.9 Teilnehmerinnen und Teilnehmer aus insgesamt 23 verschiedenen Ländern in Osnabrück zusammenkommen. Entsprechend dem Titel der Veranstaltung ›Philosophie zwischen Lehnstuhl und Labor‹ wird in den Vorträgen und Kolloquien inhaltlich die gesamte Bandbreite der analytischen Philosophie abgedeckt, um auf diese Weise eine systematische Auseinandersetzung mit philosophischen Fragen zu ermöglichen. Im Gegensatz zu den vorangegangenen GAP-Kongressen sind in diesem Jahr die Themenfelder noch stärker differenziert. Unter anderem wurden die zuvor immer zusammengefassten Bereiche der Religionsphilosophie und der Ästhetik nun in zwei Komplexe unterteilt. Ebenso bilden die oftmals auf den vergangenen Tagungen miteinander verbundenen Themenfelder Logik und Wissenschaftstheorie zwei separate Bereiche. Nicht zu Letzt sind die einzelnen Fachgebiete aus der praktischen Philosophie deutlich aufgefächert, um auf diese Weise einen optimalen Einstieg in die inhaltliche Tiefe zu ermöglichen. Neu ist zudem der interdisziplinäre Ansatz, der es ermöglicht, in andere Fachrichtungen hineinzuwirken: Erstmals in der Geschichte der GAP-Kongresse wurden mehrere Kolloquien zusammen mit anderen nahestehenden Fachgesellschaften, der Gesellschaft für Kognitionswissenschaft, der Akademie für Ethik in der Medizin und der Gesellschaft für Wissenschaftsphilosophie organisiert, um die fruchtbare Vernetzung der Fachkulturen auf diese Weise voranzutreiben.

Auch in diesem Jahr steht der GAP-Kongress ganz im Zeichen der Nachwuchsförderung. Er bietet jungen aufstrebenden Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftlern nicht nur die Möglichkeit der Vernetzung und des Austauschs mit renommierten, etablierten Forscherinnen und Forschern ihrer Fachgebiete, sondern wartet auch mit verschiedenen Preisen auf, die sich explizit an Nachwuchswissenschaftlerinnen und Nachwuchswissenschaftler richten. Ein besonderes Augenmerk wurde zudem auf die Frauenförderung gelegt: Aus diesem Grund haben sich die Veranstalter in diesem Jahr entschieden, für die Hauptvorträge drei renommierte Forscherinnen einzuladen, um auf diese Weise ausgezeichnete Frauen deutlich zu platzieren und der Vielzahl an teilnehmenden Nachwuchswissenschaftlerinnen Vorbilder zu geben. Dieses Bestreben entspricht auch dem Anspruch der Universität Osnabrück, die Chancengleichheit zu fördern.

Die Philosophie hat die abendländische Kultur maßgeblich mitgeprägt und sollte auch in Zukunft einen wichtigen Platz in unserer Gesellschaft haben. Dass insbesondere der Sektor der analytischen Philosophie im deutschen Sprachraum wächst, belegt die große Interesse an der Veranstaltung und die hohe Zahl an Einreichungen für Vorträge und Poster in diesem Jahr. Für die Osnabrücker Philosophie ist dies eine große Anerkennung und wirft zugleich ein Licht auf ihre bedeutsame Rolle an der Universität Osnabrück und die fruchtbare Kooperation mit dem renommierten Institut für Kognitionswissenschaft.

Mein besonderer Dank gilt der Arbeitsgruppe Philosophie des Geistes und der Kognition des Instituts für Kognitionswissenschaft der Universität Osnabrück, die gemeinsam mit dem Vorstand der GAP den Kongress organisiert haben. Insbesondere möchte ich Herrn Prof. Achim Stephan und Prof. Sven Walter danken, die federführend und mit großem Engagement die Planungen koordiniert haben.

Ich wünsche Ihnen eine spannende und inspirierende Tagung und einen angenehmen Aufenthalt in Osnabrück.

Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Lücke
Präsident der Universität Osnabrück



Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Lücke

Greeting

Ladies and Gentlemen,

on behalf of Osnabrück University, I wish to welcome you to GAP.9, the 9th International Congress of the Society for Analytical Philosophy (GAP). This is the first time that this significant international congress on Philosophy, the biggest being held in Germany this year, is taking place at a university in Lower Saxony. We feel greatly honored, and I am pleased that we have been granted the opportunity to be your host this year.

A medium-sized university in Germany with over 13,000 students, Osnabrück University covers a broad spectrum of degree programs and specialized disciplines. The combination of various branches of science in research and teaching represents a special feature of this endeavor. In particular, institutions such as the interdisciplinary Institute of Cognitive Science (IKW), which was founded in June 2001 and is organizing GAP.9 this year, contribute to the significant role played by Osnabrück University beyond regional borders, attracting students from all over the world to Osnabrück. IKW's work cuts across various schools of the University.

I am pleased that the GAP.9 Congress, too, is assembling participants from a total of 23 countries in Osnabrück. With regard to content, the congress lectures and colloquiums will cover the full range of analytical philosophy, which is in keeping with the title of the Congress, namely ›Philosophy between the Armchair and the Laboratory‹; by doing so, they will make it possible for philosophical questions to be dealt with systematically. This year's Congress will present a much more strongly differentiated picture of its thematic fields than in the past. To mention just a number of examples: religious philosophy and esthetics, which in the past were always subsumed under one broad field, have now been broken down into two complex areas. Similarly, logic and the theory of science, frequently combined in previous congresses, now form two different areas. The individual specialist areas of practical philosophy have not least been subdivided into various subject areas, the aim being to permit optimum access to the depths of the content addressed. The interdisciplinary approach, which will open up prospects of impacting on other subject areas, represents a further new development: for the first time in the history of GAP Congresses, several colloquiums designed to promote the fruitful linking of disciplinary cultures have been organized with the cooperation of related professional organizations, the *German Society for Cognitive Science* (GK), the *German Academy for Ethics in Medicine* (AEM), and the *Gesellschaft für Wissenschaftsphilosophie* (Society for the Philosophy of Science).

This year, too, the development of young scholars will be the overriding focus of the GAP Congress. The Congress will not only offer young ambitious scientists prospects for networking and engaging in exchange with renowned and established researchers in their respective fields; it will also have various awards in store explicitly addressed to young scientists. Moreover, special emphasis has been laid on supporting and promoting women: it is for this reason that the Congress organizers have decided to invite three renowned female researchers to deliver keynote lectures, thus seeking to put women of excellence unequivocally on the agenda and to provide the large number of female participants at the Congress with role models. This endeavor is in keeping, too, with the mission to promote equal opportunities which Osnabrück University has set itself.

Philosophy has played a crucial part in shaping Western culture, and is expected to occupy an important position in our society in future as well. The great interest shown in the Congress event and the large number of this year's submissions for lectures and posters testify to the fact that the analytical philosophy sector, in particular, is on the rise in the German-speaking world. This is a huge recognition of Philosophy in Osnabrück which, at the same time, sheds light on its significant role at Osnabrück University and its fruitful cooperation with the renowned Institute of Cognitive Science.

My special thanks go to the working group on the Philosophy of the Mind and Cognition at the Institute of Cognitive Science of Osnabrück University, which organized the Congress in collaboration with the GAP Board of Directors. I would particularly like to thank Professor Achim Stephan and Professor Sven Walter, who directed the coordination of the planning endeavors with much commitment and enthusiasm.

I wish you an exciting and inspiring Congress and a pleasant stay in Osnabrück.

Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Lücke
Präsident der Universität Osnabrück



Prof. Dr. Achim Stephan



Prof. Dr. Sven Walter

Geleitwort

Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen,

seien Sie uns als Teilnehmerinnen und Teilnehmer herzlich willkommen zum neunten Internationalen Kongress der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie, die damit in Osnabrück zugleich ihr 25-jähriges Bestehen begeht und feiert. Besonders willkommen heißen wir unseren diesjährigen Frege-Preisträger, Herrn Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Spohn. Sehr herzlich begrüßen wir auch die Träger des Wolfgang-Stegmüller-Preises und des Ontos-Preises sowie ihre Stifter, Frau Margret Stegmüller und Herrn Dr. Rafael Hüntelmann vom de Gruyter-Verlag.

Der diesjährige Kongresstitel »Philosophie zwischen Lehnstuhl und Labor« unterstreicht einen zweifachen Anspruch an die Philosophie, nach dem eine »reine« oder »wissenschaftsferne« Philosophie, die ihrer begriffsanalytischen Arbeit kein *fundamentum in re* zu geben vermag, ebenso wenig ersprießlich ist, wie eine »philosophiefreie« Wissenschaft, die ihre begrifflichen Grundlagen nicht reflektiert. Philosophische Relevanz zeichnet sich durch eine Verknüpfung beider Aspekte aus. Ein starkes Zeugnis für die Umsetzung jenes Anspruchs geben insbesondere drei transdisziplinäre Kolloquien, die wir erstmals gemeinsam mit anderen, uns nahestehenden Fachgesellschaften organisiert haben – mit der *Akademie für Ethik in der Medizin*, der *Gesellschaft für Kognitionswissenschaft* und der *Gesellschaft für Wissenschaftsphilosophie*. Auch laden wir Sie erstmals zu einigen, auch philosophisch spannenden Experimenten ein, an denen Sie während des Kongresses teilnehmen können. Neben diesen Neuerungen bietet der Kongress die bewährte große Plattform zur Präsentation neuer philosophischer Überlegungen und zukunftsweisender Perspektiven. Seine internationale Bedeutung und Sichtbarkeit unterstreichen Teilnehmerinnen und Teilnehmer aus mehr als zwanzig Nationen, die ihre Gedanken und Überlegungen in über 270 Vorträgen und über 50 Postern zur Diskussion stellen werden.

Wir danken der Schirmherrin des Kongresses, Frau Ministerin Dr. Gabriele Heinen-Kljajic, dem Niedersächsischen Ministerium für Wissenschaft und Kultur, der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft, der Universität Osnabrück und allen weiteren Förderern für ihre finanzielle und logistische Unterstützung des Kongresses, ohne die wir ihn nicht in dieser Form hätten organisieren und gestalten können. Ein besonderer Dank geht an die große Zahl ehrenamtlicher Unterstützer, die unter anderem vierzig für den Stegmüllerpreis nominierte Arbeiten in Buchlänge studiert und bewertet haben, die über vierhundertfünfzig Abstracts für Vorträge und Poster gesichtet und beurteilt haben und während des Kongresses als Sektionsleiter und Chairs für uns alle da sind. Dieser Dank ist uns besonders wichtig, da das damit anerkannte Engagement in eine Zeit fällt, in der so viel evaluiert wird wie noch nie zuvor. Das nicht so leicht messbare ehrenamtliche Engagement für die Wissenschaft und insbesondere für unsere Nachwuchswissenschaftlerinnen und Nachwuchswissenschaftler bleibt in der Regel unberücksichtigt, es steigert also nicht den eigenen Marktwert. Doch davon leben wir. Umso größer ist unser Dank.

Mit den besten Wünschen für einen anregenden und fruchtbaren GAP.9-Kongress,

Prof. Dr. Achim Stephan
Präsident der GAP und lokaler Ausrichter

Prof. Dr. Sven Walter
Geschäftsführer der GAP und lokaler Ausrichter



Prof. Dr. Achim Stephan



Prof. Dr. Sven Walter

Greeting

Dear ladies and gentlemen, dear colleagues,

a cordial welcome to you, our guests, the participants of the ninth international congress of the German Society for Analytic Philosophy, the GAP. It is our pleasure to be your host during this week in Osnabrück, where we also commemorate the 25th anniversary of the GAP. In particular, we are happy to welcome Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Spohn, the recipient of this year's Frege award, the recipients of this year's Wolfgang Stegmüller andontos award as well as the donors of these awards, Ms. Margret Stegmüller and Dr. Rafael Hüntelmann from the publishing house de Gruyter.

The title of the GAP.9 congress, »Philosophy between Armchair and Lab«, reflects our conviction that any kind of »pure« philosophy, so detached from the empirical sciences that it cannot give its conceptual analyses a *fundamentum in re*, would be no more desirable than the opposite extreme, the attempt to do science in a »philosophy-free« way, without reflecting on its conceptual foundations. Philosophers and empirical scientists alike should rather strive for a fruitful combination of both aspects. That this goal can actually be reached is demonstrated, among other things, in three transdisciplinary colloquia that have, for the first time, been organized in cooperation with other societies – the *Academy for Ethics in Medicine*, the *Cognitive Science Society* and the *Society for the Philosophy of Science*. Moreover, it is our pleasure to invite you, again for the first time, to spend your spare time during the congress participating in a range of psychological and neuroscientific experiments. Apart from these novelties, GAP.9 provides the usual opportunities for presenting your philosophical work and developing pioneering theories. Our guests from more than twenty different countries who present their philosophical work in more than 270 talks and 50 posters amply demonstrate the international visibility, appeal and impact of the GAP congress as a platform for fostering and maintaining an exchange of philosophical ideas.

We would like to thank our patroness, Dr. Gabriele Heinen-Kljajic, the Ministry of Science and Culture in Lower Saxony, the German Research Foundation, the University of Osnabrück and all other partners for their financial and logistic support, which has made this congress possible. We are particularly indebted to the many unpaid volunteers among our colleagues who have, among other things, not only read and assessed about forty book-length nominations for the Stegmüller award but also more than 450 submissions for papers and posters, who have organized the review process, are in charge of the thirteen sections or will chair the sessions. At a time where we are all evaluated and controlled more than ever, we feel the need to emphasize our gratitude for your commitment, your dedication, and your willingness to invest considerable time and energy into an event like this, not the least for the benefit of our talented, young up-and-coming colleagues. This kind of work is hardly quantifiable and thus usually ignored when it comes to your »market value«. But it is part of what makes our profession possible. All the greater, therefore, is our gratefulness.

With the best wishes for a successful and inspiring GAP.9 congress,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Achim Stephan'.

Prof. Dr. Achim Stephan
President of the GAP and local organizer

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Sven Walter'.


Prof. Dr. Sven Walter
Executive secretary and local organizer

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
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Veranstaltungsorte / conference venues


Lageplan Innenstadt / site map downtown campus




Detailplan Gebäude 11, Erdgeschoss / detailed map building 11, ground floor




Detailplan Gebäude 11, 1. Stock / detailed map building 11, 1st floor




Detailplan Gebäude 11, 2. Stock / detailed map building 11, 2nd floor



Detailplan Gebäude 15, Erdgeschoss / detailed map building 15, ground floor



Detailplan Gebäude 15, 1. Stock / detailed map building 15, 1st floor



Aussteller / exhibitors

Die folgenden Verlage präsentieren während GAP.9 ihr Sortiment im Foyer von Gebäude 15:

The following publishers are presenting their books during GAP.9 in the foyer of building 15:

Brill | Rodopi – www.brill.com

de Gruyter Verlag – www.degruyter.com

Klostermann Verlag – www.klostermann.de

mentis Verlag – www.mentis.de

Metzler Verlag – www.metzlerverlag.de

Oxford University Press – www.oup.com

Reclam Verlag – www.reclam.de

Springer Verlag – www.springer.com

Suhrkamp Verlag – www.suhrkamp.de

Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft – www.wbg-wissenverbindet.de

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Die Ausrichtung von GAP.9 wurde ermöglicht durch die finanzielle Unterstützung der folgenden Organisationen und Einrichtungen:

GAP.9 has been made possible by the financial support of the following organizations and institutions:

Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) / German Research Foundation

Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie (GAP) / German Society for Analytic Philosophy

Institut für Kognitionswissenschaft, Universität Osnabrück (IKW) /

Institute of Cognitive Science, Osnabrück University

Ministerium für Wissenschaft und Kultur des Landes Niedersachsen (MWK) /

Ministry of Science and Culture, Lower-Saxony

Springer Verlag / Springer Publishinghouse

Universität Osnabrück / Osnabrück University

Universität Osnabrück, Forschungspool / Osnabrück University, Research Pool

Universitätsgesellschaft Osnabrück / University Society Osnabrück

DFG Präsentation / DFG presentation

Mittwoch, 16.09.2015, 12.15–13.30 Uhr / Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 12:15 p.m.–1:30 p.m.
15/E27

Ziel dieser Veranstaltung ist es, über die Fördermöglichkeiten der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) speziell im Bereich der Philosophie zu informieren. Dr. Matthias Kiesselbach (DFG-Fachreferent, Philosophie) und Prof. Dr. Elke Brendel (Mitglied des DFG Fachkollegiums Philosophie) werden u. a. erläutern, welche Förderlinien sich für welche Forschungsvorhaben eignen, wie die Prozesse der Beantragung, Begutachtung und Auswahl philosophischer Forschungsprojekte ablaufen und welche Kriterien hierbei wichtig sind. Zudem sollen über mögliche Forschungstrends und Forschungsperspektiven bei der Förderung philosophischer Projekte durch die DFG diskutiert werden.

Laborerfahrung zwischen den Lehnstühlen / lab experience between the armchairs

During the GAP.9 conference, current and former colleagues from the Institute of Cognitive Science offer the opportunity to participate in experimental lab studies with philosophical impact. It is planned to present first results during the party on Thursday evening.

The Value of Life – Do Abstract Considerations Generalize to Real Life with Time Constraints?

conducted by Gordon Pipa and Peter König (University of Osnabrück)

time and place: further information at the conference venue

Each of our decisions translates to the relative evaluation of options. These range from small personal decisions like the choice of beverage for dinner to big decisions that affect other people as well. The classic trolley dilemma (Foot 1967) carries this to extremes. Lives are matched versus another. As the term ›dilemma‹ suggests, despite realms of abstract considerations no consensus is and probably cannot be reached. Despite this unsatisfactory state of affairs, the rapid progress of technology puts this question on the top of agenda. The increasing number of autonomous agents perform decisions of ever increasing scope. Specifically the advent of self-driving cars will potentially replace a substantial fraction of the 1 billion cars presently existing worldwide within a few years. Thus, even low probability situations with difficult decisions like the trolley dilemma to be made by the autonomous agent will occur on a regular basis.

These developments force us to take abstract ethical considerations performed at leisure time to the real world and explicitly instruct the autonomous agents on an ethical rule set. Step number one is to determine how humans decide on such abstract problems at leisure time compared to real world situations and under time pressure. Here we compare ethical decisions akin to the trolley dilemma in a racetrack context. Each decision leads to the sacrifice of a person/animal/object to save another person/animal/object. We apply a 2x2 design: The problem is either visualized using state of the art 3D virtual reality or in a classical abstract setting with text information. Furthermore, subjects perform decisions either at leisure time or under severe time pressure not allowing cognitive deliberation. Data analysis is based on logistic regression resulting in an interval scale quantifying the value of life.

These data allow us to answer a set of questions: »Do human estimates of value of life follow a simple linear scale?«, »Do ethical judgments generalize to realistic real world scenarios?« and »Do ethical judgments generalize to decisions under time pressure«. As a corollary, is it ethical to implement in autonomous agents abstract human decisions or human decisions in the respective situation? Would autonomous agents then be the more ethical agents?

Experimental Philosophy Study

conducted by Andreas Bunge (University of Nottingham)

In recent years, empirical approaches to philosophy have gained momentum. Philosophers increasingly pay attention to empirical findings that may inform their theorizing. Some philosophers, so called experimental philosophers, have even started to conduct their own experiments. A very common approach is to use surveys to examine people's responses to philosophical thought experiments.

At this GAP conference, you have the chance to learn more about experimental philosophy and to participate in a survey study. You can find our booth in the foyer of building 15. Filling in the survey takes only about 2 minutes. Preliminary results of this study will be presented at the event ›Philosophy Rocks‹ and final results will be distributed via the GAP newsletter.

GAP.9 im / GAP.9 at the



Hasestraße 71, 49074 Osnabrück

Reservierung / reservation: ++49 (0)541 23777

Montag, 14.09.2015, 22.30 Uhr / Monday, September 14, 2015, 10:30 p.m.

Leviathan (Russland 2014, 141 Min.)

mit englischen Untertiteln / with english subtitles

Kommentar und Moderation der anschließenden Diskussion: Jonas Klein (Berlin)

Regie: Andrej Swjaginzew

Darsteller: Alexei Serebrjakow, Wladimir Wdowitschenkow, Elena Lyadova

Zu seiner Oscar-nominierten, großen russischen Tragödie, die sich zu einer wahnwitzigen Farce steigert, ließ sich Regisseur Andrej Swjaginzew nach eigener Aussage vom Buch Hiob inspirieren. Anhand der intimen Geschichte einer Familie und ihrem verzweiferten Kampf gegen korrupte Politiker zeichnet er mit spürbarer Wut ein spektakuläres Sittengemälde von Russland.

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 22.30 Uhr / Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 10:30 p.m.

Being in the World (USA 2010; 81 Min.)

englische Fassung mit deutschen Untertiteln / english version with German subtitles

Kommentar und Moderation der anschließenden Diskussion: Philipp Haueis (Berlin)

Regie: Tao Ruspoli

Darsteller: Hubert Dreyfus, Hiroshi Sakaguchi, Manuel Molina

Was bedeutet es, etwas wirklich zu können? Meister auf ihrem Gebiet überlegen nicht erst, sondern tun instinktiv das Richtige zur richtigen Zeit auf die richtige Art und Weise. Begleiten Sie den Philosophen Hubert Dreyfus und eine ganze Generation durch ihn inspirierter Kollegen auf eine faszinierende Gedankenreise. Überall auf der Welt gibt es Menschen, die uns zeigen, wie wir vom sturen Regelbefolgen zum tatsächlichen Können gelangen, wie wir Meister auf dem Gebiet der Kunst, des Handwerks oder des Sports werden.

Mittwoch, 16.09. 2015, 22.30 Uhr / Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 10:30 p.m.

Her (USA 2013; 126 Min.)

englische Fassung mit deutschen Untertiteln / english version with German subtitles

Kommentar und Moderation der anschließenden Diskussion: Tarek Besold (Osnabrück)

Buch und Regie: Spike Jonze

Darsteller: Joaquin Phoenix, Amy Adams, Rooney Mara, Scarlett Johansson

Getaucht in warmes Licht und voller expressiver Farben erzählt Spike Jonze, der schon mit so originellen Filmen wie *Being John Malkovich* und *Adaptation* zu begeistern wusste, eine Liebesgeschichte aus nicht allzu ferner Zukunft. Ein notorischer Melancholiker kauft sich in seiner Tristesse ein neu entwickeltes, hochintelligentes Computersystem, klein wie ein Smartphone und ausgestattet mit der Stimme Scarlett Johanssons. Aus anfänglicher Skepsis wird tiefe Zuneigung, denn jene künstliche Intelligenz ist in der Lage, sich durch Erfahrungen selbst zu erschaffen und ein eigenes Bewusstsein zu entwickeln. Pointierte und sensible Drehbuch-Arbeit (wofür es den Oscar gab!) trifft auf eine traumhafte Bildgestaltung – Jonze hinterfragt auf treffliche Weise unsere Vorstellungen von Liebe und Intimität im Zeitalter der sozialen Medien.

Zweiter Studierendenkongress für Philosophie / Second Student Conference in Philosophy

Die Bundesfachschaftentagung Philosophie und die Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie richten gemeinsam den Zweiten Studierendenkongress für Philosophie aus. Die folgenden Vorträge und Poster dieses Kongress sind unter der Sigle »S« in das Programm von GAP.9 integriert.

The German Student Association and the German Society for Analytic Philosophy jointly organize and host the Second Student Conference in Philosophy. The following talks and posters of this conference are integrated into the program of GAP.9, indicated by »S«.

Vorträge / talks	Bleisch, Dorothee <i>Können Konsequentialisten Freunde sein?</i>	Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 16.00 Uhr, 15/E28 Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 4:00 p.m., 15/E28
	Fischer, Enno <i>Welche Rolle spielt der Begriff der Kausalität in der Physik?</i>	Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 15.15 Uhr, 15/E28 Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 3:15 p.m., 15/E28
	Fox, Philip <i>The Subjective Incoherence Argument Against Parfit's Agony Argument</i>	Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 10.30 Uhr, 15/E28 Thursday, September 17, 2015, 10:30 a.m., 15/E28
	Horig, Benjamin <i>The Conjunction Fallacy, Belief and Inference to the Best Explanation</i>	Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 11.15 Uhr, 15/E28 Thursday, September 17, 2015, 11:15 a.m., 15/E28
	Kirfel, Lara <i>Fallacious Minds</i>	Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 10.30 Uhr, 15/E28 Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 10:30 a.m., 15/E28
	Lang, Lukas <i>The Incredible Gunk</i>	Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 9.00 Uhr, 15/E28 Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 9:00 a.m., 15/E28
	Mattner, Cosima <i>Selbst</i>	Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 9.00 Uhr, 15/E28 Thursday, September 17, 2015, 9:00 a.m., 15/E28
	Piwonka, Marius <i>Konstitutivistische Begründung moralischer Verpflichtung</i>	Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 9.45 Uhr, 15/E28 Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 9:45 a.m., 15/E28
	Poth, Nina L. <i>A Solution to the Complex First Paradox</i>	Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 13.30 Uhr, 15/E28 Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 1:30 p.m., 15/E28
	Privitera, Johanna <i>How to Account for our Duties in Rescue Cases</i>	Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 9.45 Uhr, 15/E28 Thursday, September 17, 2015, 9:45 a.m., 15/E28
	Rueger, Korbinian <i>The Close Enough View in Distributive Ethics and its Alleged Violation of Two Dominance Principles</i>	Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 14.15 Uhr, 15/E28 Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 2:15 p.m., 15/E28
Poster / posters	Bunkenborg, Francesca <i>How to Understand Process Requirements of Rationality</i>	P S.1
	Faust, Michele <i>Wie ein Dispositionalismus bezüglich Handlungserklärungen und Gründen den Streit zwischen Kausalisten und Antikausalisten in der neueren Handlungstheorie schlichten könnte</i>	P S.2
	Heil, Roman <i>Meaning The Same: Churchland On Meaning Similarity</i>	P S.3
	Salimkhani, Kian <i>On the Fundamentality of Space-Time</i>	P S.4
	Schmidt, Sebastian <i>Warum es keinen Schleier der Wahrnehmung gibt</i>	P S.5

Gesamtübersicht

	Montag, 14.09.2015	Dienstag, 15.09.2015	Mittwoch 16.09.2015	Donnerstag, 17.09.2015
			Sektionsvorträge 8.15–9.00 Uhr	
9 Uhr			Sektionsvorträge 9.00–9.45 Uhr	Sektionsvorträge 9.00–9.45 Uhr
10 Uhr	Konferenzbüro 11/E08A	Kolloquien 4, 5, 6 parallel 9.00–12.00 Uhr	Sektionsvorträge 9.45–10.30 Uhr	Sektionsvorträge 9.45–10.30 Uhr
11 Uhr	geöffnet 11.00–19.00 Uhr Dienstag bis Donnerstag 8.30–17.00 Uhr	15/128 15/E07 15/E16	Sektionsvorträge 10.30–11.15 Uhr	Sektionsvorträge 10.30–11.15 Uhr
12 Uhr			poster session 11.15–12.15 Uhr 11/Foyer	Sektionsvorträge 11.15–12.00 Uhr
13 Uhr	Verlagsausstellung geöffnet 14.00–17.00 Uhr Dienstag – Donnerstag 9.00–17.00 Uhr 15/Foyer	Mittagspause 90 Minuten	Mittagspause 75 Minuten DFG Präsentation 15/E27	Mittagspause 90 Minuten
14 Uhr		Sektionsvorträge 13.30–14.15 Uhr	Sektionsvorträge 13.30–14.15 Uhr	
15 Uhr	Kolloquien 1, 2, 3 parallel 14.00–17.00 Uhr	Sektionsvorträge 14.15–15.00 Uhr	Sektionsvorträge 14.15–15.00 Uhr	Kolloquien 7, 8, 9 parallel 13.30–16.30 Uhr
16 Uhr	15/128 15/E07 15/E16	15 Minuten Pause	15 Minuten Pause	15/128 15/E07 15/E16
		Sektionsvorträge 15.15–16.00 Uhr	Sektionsvorträge 15.15–16.00 Uhr	
		Sektionsvorträge 16.00–16.45 Uhr	Sektionsvorträge 16.00–16.45 Uhr	
		15 Minuten Pause	15 Minuten Pause	30 Minuten Pause
17 Uhr	30 Minuten Pause	Hauptvortrag Erkenntnis Lecture Lackey 17.00–18.30 Uhr 11/E08	Frege-Preis-Vortrag Spohn 17.00–18.00 Uhr 11/E08	Schlussvortrag Nida-Rümelin 17.00–18.30 Uhr 11/E08
18 Uhr	Eröffnung 11/E08		15 Minuten Pause	best poster award
	Verleihung des Stegmüller- und ontos- Preises best paper award 15 Minuten Pause	poster session und Erkenntnis Empfang 18.30–19.30 Uhr 15/Foyer		
19 Uhr	Eröffnungsvortrag Meyer 19.00–20.30 Uhr 11/E08		Frege-Preis-Kolloquium Blackburn, Cartwright 18.15–20.15 Uhr 11/E08	
20 Uhr		Mitgliederversammlung 19.30 Uhr 15/E07		
21 Uhr	Empfang 20.30 Uhr 11/Foyer			Party: „Philosophie rockt!“ 20.00 Uhr Lagerhalle
22.30 Uhr	GAP.9 im Filmtheater Hasetor	GAP.9 im Filmtheater Hasetor	GAP.9 im Filmtheater Hasetor	

comprehensive overview

	Monday, September 14, 2015	Tuesday, September 15, 2015	Wednesday, September 16, 2015	Thursday, September 17, 2015
			section talks 8:15 a.m.–9:00 a.m.	
9 a.m.			section talks 9:00 a.m.–9:45 a.m.	section talks 9:00 a.m.–9:45 a.m.
10 a.m.	conference office 11/E08A	colloquia 4, 5, 6 in parallel 9:00 a.m.–noon	section talks 9:45 a.m.–10:30 a.m.	section talks 9:45 a.m.–10:30 a.m.
11 a.m.	open 11:00 a.m.–7:00 p.m. Tue – Thu 8:30 a.m.–5:00 p.m.	15/128 15/E07 15/E16	section talks 10:30 a.m.–11:15 a.m.	section talks 10:30 a.m.–11:15 a.m.
			poster session 11:15 a.m.–12:15 p.m. 11/Foyer	section talks 11:15 a.m.–noon
noon	book exhibition			
1 p.m.	open 2:00 p.m.–5:00 p.m. Tue – Thu 9:00 a.m.–5:00 p.m. 15/Foyer	lunch 90 minutes	lunch 75 minutes DFG presentation 15/E27	lunch 90 minutes
2 p.m.		section talks 1:30 p.m.–2:15 p.m.	section talks 1:30 p.m.–2:15 p.m.	
3 p.m.	colloquia 1, 2, 3 in parallel 2:00 p.m.–5:00 p.m.	section talks 2:15 p.m.–3:00 p.m.	section talks 2:15 p.m.–3:00 p.m.	colloquia 7, 8, 9 in parallel 1:30 p.m.–4:30 p.m.
		15 min break	15 min break	
4 p.m.	15/128 15/E07 15/E16	section talks 3:15 p.m.–4:00 p.m.	section talks 3:15 p.m.–4:00 p.m.	15/128 15/E07 15/E16
		section talks 4:00 p.m.–4:45 p.m.	section talks 4:00 p.m.–4:45 p.m.	
		15 min break	15 min break	30 min break
5 p.m.	30 min break	2 nd keynote lecture Erkenntnis Lecture Lackey 5:00 p.m.–6:30 p.m. 11/E08	Frege award lecture Spohn 5:00 p.m.–6:00 p.m. 11/E08	3 rd keynote lecture Nida-Rümelin 5:00 p.m.–6:30 p.m. 11/E08
6 p.m.	opening 11/E08		15 min break	
	Stegmüller and ontos award best paper award			best poster award
	15 min break	poster session and Erkenntnis reception 6:30 p.m.–7:30 p.m. 15/Foyer	Frege award colloquium Blackburn, Cartwright 6:15 p.m.–8:15 p.m. 11/E08	
7 p.m.	1 st keynote lecture Meyer 7:00 p.m.–8:30 p.m. 11/E08			
8 p.m.		member's assembly 7:30 p.m. 15/E07		
9 p.m.	reception 8:30 p.m. 11/Foyer			party: "Philosophy rocks!" 8:00 p.m. Lagerhalle
10:30 p.m.	GAP.9 at the Filmtheater Hasetor	GAP.9 at the Filmtheater Hasetor	GAP.9 at the Filmtheater Hasetor	

Neue Bücher Theoretische Philosophie



Achim Stephan/Sven Walter (Hrsg.)
Handbuch Kognitionswissenschaft
2013, XIII, 582 Seiten, geb. € 69,95
ISBN 978-3-476-02331-5

Dieses Handbuch stellt nach einer Einführung in die Ursprünge der Kognitionswissenschaft deren Teildisziplinen vor und beleuchtet die verschiedenen Strukturmodelle kognitiver Systeme, die die Geschichte der Kognitionswissenschaft geprägt haben. Der Hauptteil widmet sich in innovativen integrativen Beiträgen den Grundlagen von kognitiven Leistungen wie Erinnerung, Lernen, Planen, Wahrnehmung oder Sprache, sowohl im Hinblick auf uns Menschen als auch in künstlichen Systemen wie Computern oder Robotern. Das Handbuch schließt mit einem Ausblick auf neuere, zukunftsweisende Strömungen, z.B. kognitive Poetik, Neuroökonomie oder Neuroethik.

Aus dem Inhalt:

Ursprünge und Anfänge der Kognitionswissenschaft • Teildisziplinen • Strukturen kognitiver Systeme • Kognitive Leistungen • Neuere Entwicklungen




Johannes Hübner
Einführung in die theoretische Philosophie
2015, 336 Seiten, € 24,95
ISBN 978-3-476-02439-8

Existenz, Wissen und Sprache sind die Kernthemen der theoretischen Philosophie, die in den Disziplinen Metaphysik, Erkenntnistheorie, Sprachphilosophie und Philosophie des Geistes behandelt werden. In vier umfangreichen Kapiteln gibt der Autor eine grundlegende und anschauliche Einführung in die genannten Disziplinen, erklärt die wichtigsten Begriffe, erläutert zentrale Fragestellungen und diskutiert einschlägige Positionen und Argumente.

Aus dem Inhalt:

Einleitung • Erkenntnistheorie • Sprachphilosophie • Metaphysik • Philosophie des Geistes



Nikola Kompa (Hrsg.)
Handbuch Sprachphilosophie
2015, VI, 441 Seiten, geb. € 99,95
ISBN 978-3-476-02509-8

Wie hängt Sprache mit dem Denken zusammen? Ermöglicht oder verhindert sie es, die Wahrheit zu erfassen? Welche Rolle spielt sie für die zwischenmenschliche Kommunikation? – Dieses Handbuch skizziert die Wurzeln der Sprachphilosophie in Antike und Mittelalter, stellt zentrale Strömungen vor (Strukturalismus, Phänomenologie, Pragmatismus etc.) und beschreibt grundlegende Ausdrücke sowie ihre Funktionen (Proposition, Kennzeichnung, Eigennamen etc.). Im Zentrum des Bandes stehen bedeutungstheoretische Ansätze der analytischen Sprachphilosophie, der heute vorherrschenden Herangehensweise. Weitere Kapitel beschreiben zentrale Merkmale der Sprache (Analytizität, Normativität, Kompositionalität, Konventionalität, Vagheit, Metaphorik etc.).

Aus dem Inhalt:

Einleitung • Historische Stationen • Ausdrücke und ihre Funktion • Analytische Sprachphilosophie • Merkmale der Sprache • Schnittstellen • Anhang

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und C. E. Poeschel Verlag GmbH
Werastraße 21-23, 70182 Stuttgart
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J.B. METZLER

Montag, 14. September 2015 / Monday, September 14, 2015

Kolloquium 1 / Colloquium 1 14.00–17.00 Uhr 2:00 p.m.–5:00 p.m. 15/128 Selbst- und Fremdverstehen	Kolloquium 2 / Colloquium 2 14.00–17.00 Uhr 2:00 p.m.–5:00 p.m. 15/E07 Philosophy in the Face of Peer-Disagreement	Kolloquium 3 / Colloquium 3 14.00–17.00 Uhr 2:00 p.m.–5:00 p.m. 15/E16 Does Metaethics Rest on a Mistake?
17.30–18.00 Uhr 5:30 p.m.–6:00 p.m.	Eröffnung / opening 11/E08	
18.00–18.45 Uhr 6:00 p.m.–6:45 p.m.	Verleihung des Wolfgang-Stegmüller- und ontos-Preises / Wolfgang Stegmüller and ontos award best paper award 11/E08	
19.00–20.30 Uhr 7:00 p.m.–8:30 p.m.	Eröffnungsvortrag / keynote lecture 11/E08	
20.30 Uhr 8:30 p.m.	Empfang / reception 11/Foyer	
22.30 Uhr 10:30 p.m.	GAP.9 im / GAP at the Filmtheater Hasetor (Seite/page 20)	

Dienstag, 15. September 2015 / Tuesday, September 15, 2015

Kolloquium 4 / Colloquium 4 9.00–12.00 Uhr 9:00 a.m.–noon 15/128 Meta²physics: Analytic versus Naturalized Metaphysics	Kolloquium 5 / Colloquium 5 9.00–12.00 Uhr 9:00 a.m.– noon 15/E07 Logical Pluralism and the Status of Logic	Kolloquium 6 / Colloquium 6 9.00–12.00 Uhr 9:00 a.m.– noon 15/E16 Imagination and Fiction
12.00–13.30 Uhr noon–1:30 p.m.	Mittagspause / lunch	
13.30–14.15 Uhr 1:30 p.m.–2:15 p.m.	Sektionsvorträge / section talks siehe Übersicht / see schedule	
14.15–15.00 Uhr 2:15 p.m.–3:00 p.m.	Sektionsvorträge / section talks siehe Übersicht / see schedule	
15.00–15.15 Uhr 3:00 p.m.–3:15 p.m.	Pause / break	
15.15–16.00 Uhr 3:15 p.m.–4:00 p.m.	Sektionsvorträge / section talks siehe Übersicht / see schedule	
16.00–16.45 Uhr 4:00 p.m.–4:45 p.m.	Sektionsvorträge / section talks siehe Übersicht / see schedule	
16.45–17.00 Uhr 4:45 p.m.–5:00 p.m.	Pause / break	
17.00–18.30 Uhr 5:00 p.m.–6:30 p.m.	Hauptvortrag / keynote lecture Erkenntnis Lecture 11/E08	
18.30–19.30 Uhr 6:30 p.m.–7:30 p.m.	poster session und Erkenntnis Empfang / poster session and Erkenntnis reception 15/Foyer	
19.30 Uhr 7:30 p.m.	Mitgliederversammlung / member's assembly 15/E07	
22.30 Uhr 10:30 p.m.	GAP.9 im / GAP at the Filmtheater Hasetor (Seite/page 20)	

Mittwoch, 16. September 2015 / Wednesday, September 15, 2015

8.15–9.00 Uhr 8:15 a.m.–9:00 a.m.	Sektionsvorträge / section talks siehe Übersicht / see schedule
9.00–9.45 Uhr 9:00 a.m.–9:45 a.m.	Sektionsvorträge / section talks siehe Übersicht / see schedule
9.45–10.30 Uhr 9:45 a.m.–10:30 a.m.	Sektionsvorträge / section talks siehe Übersicht / see schedule
10.30–11.15 Uhr 10:30 a.m.–11:15 a.m.	Sektionsvorträge / section talks siehe Übersicht / see schedule
11.15–12.15 Uhr 11:15 a.m.–12:15 p.m.	poster session 15/Foyer
12.15–13.30 Uhr 12:15 p.m.–1:30 p.m.	Mittagspause / lunch DFG Präsentation / DFG presentation, 11/E08
13.30–14.15 Uhr 1:30 p.m.–2:15 p.m.	Sektionsvorträge / section talks siehe Übersicht / see schedule
14.15–15.00 Uhr 2:15 p.m.–3:00 p.m.	Sektionsvorträge / section talks siehe Übersicht / see schedule
15.00–15.15 Uhr 3:00 p.m.–3:15 p.m.	Pause / break
15.15–16.00 Uhr 3:15 p.m.–4:00 p.m.	Sektionsvorträge / section talks siehe Übersicht / see schedule
16.00–16.45 Uhr 4:00 p.m.–4:45 p.m.	Sektionsvorträge / section talks siehe Übersicht / see schedule
16.45–17.00 Uhr 4:45 p.m.–5:00 p.m.	Pause / break
17.00–18.00 Uhr 5:00 p.m.–6:00 p.m.	Frege-Preis-Vortrag / Frege award lecture 11/E08
18.00–18.15 Uhr 6:00 p.m.–6:15 p.m.	Pause / break
18.15–20.15 Uhr 6:15 p.m.–8:15 p.m.	Frege-Preis-Kolloquium / Frege award colloquium 11/E08
22.30 Uhr 10:30 p.m.	GAP.9 im / GAP at the Filmtheater Hasenator (Seite/page 20)

Donnerstag, 17. September 2015 / Thursday, September 17, 2015

9.00–9.45 Uhr 9:00 a.m.–9:45 a.m.	Sektionsvorträge / section talks siehe Übersicht / see schedule	
9.45–10.30 Uhr 9:45 a.m.–10:30 a.m.	Sektionsvorträge / section talks siehe Übersicht / see schedule	
10.30–11.15 Uhr 10:30 a.m.–11:15 a.m.	Sektionsvorträge / section talks siehe Übersicht / see schedule	
11.15–12.00 Uhr 11:15 a.m.–noon	Sektionsvorträge / section talks siehe Übersicht / see schedule	
12.00–13.30 Uhr noon–1:30 p.m.	Mittagspause / lunch	
Kolloquium 7 / Colloquium 7 13.30–16.30 Uhr 1:30 p.m.–4:30 p.m. 15/128 Medical Ethics: Can the Moral Philosopher Help?	Kolloquium 8 / Colloquium 8 13.30–16.30 Uhr 1:30 p.m.–4:30 p.m. 15/E07 Whither Conceptual Analysis?	Kolloquium 9 / Colloquium 9 13.30–16.30 Uhr 1:30 p.m.–4:30 p.m. 15/E16 Varieties of Explanation
16.30–17.00 Uhr 4:30 p.m.–5:00 p.m.	Pause / break	
17.00–18.30 Uhr 5:00 p.m.–6:30 p.m.	Schlussvortrag / keynote lecture best poster award 11/E08	
20.00 Uhr 8:00 p.m.	Party: „Philosophie rockt!“ / party: “Philosophy rocks!” Lagerhalle	

Freitag, 18. September 2015 / Friday, September 18, 2015

9.30.–18.00 Uhr 9:30 a.m.–6:00 p.m.	Workshop <i>Logical and Metaphysical Perspectives on Grounding</i> 15/133
10.00–18.00 Uhr 10:00 a.m.–6:00 p.m.	Workshop <i>Tiefe Meinungsverschiedenheiten</i> 15/131
9.30–16.30 Uhr 9:30 a.m.–4:30 p.m.	Workshop <i>Material Metaphysics</i> 15/105
10.00–17.30 Uhr 10:00 a.m.–5.30 p.m.	Workshop <i>Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? Dynamic and Pragmatic Aspects of Conditionals</i> 15/111

Samstag, 19. September 2015 / Saturday, September 19, 2015

9.00–12.30 Uhr 9:00 a.m.–12.30 p.m.	Workshop <i>Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? Dynamic and Pragmatic Aspects of Conditionals</i> 15/111
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Hauptvorträge (Übersicht) / keynote lectures (overview)

Hauptvorträge	K	keynote lectures
Montag, 14.09.2015 19.00–20.30 Uhr 11/E08	Kirsten Meyer <i>Future Generations: A Challenge for Contemporary Ethics</i>	Monday, September 14, 2015 7:00 p.m.—8:30 p.m. 11/E08
Dienstag, 15.09.2015 17.00–18.30 Uhr 11/E08	Jennifer Lackey <i>Group Assertion</i>	Tuesday, September 15, 2015 5:00 p.m.—6:30 p.m. 11/E08
Donnerstag, 17.09.2015 17.00–18.30 Uhr 11/E08	Martine Nida-Rümelin <i>Freedom and the Phenomenology of Agency</i>	Thursday, September 17, 2015 5:00 p.m.—6:30 p.m. 11/E08

K

Meyer

**Future Generations:
A Challenge for Contemporary Ethics**

Kirsten Meyer
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Climate Change is both an immediate problem as well as a threat to future generations. How much weight should we put on future interests in our climate policies? Nuclear waste and other numerous toxins we produce will also affect future generations. Does the risk of contamination to persons thousands of years from now call for specific measures? To put it more generally: What do we owe to persons that will live on this planet in the future?

An obvious answer seems to be that we should not *harm* these persons. This answer, however, has raised serious doubts. Though it may seem obvious that we harm them with various activities, this assumption proves to be problematic upon closer inspection. Derek Parfit thoroughly discussed this problem in his *Reasons and Persons*. Referred to as the »Non-Identity-Problem«, it has since then sparked a vivid debate among philosophers and it presents a difficult problem for contemporary ethics.

This talk is divided into two parts. First, I will briefly explain the Non-Identity Problem, then discuss some of the solutions presented in the literature, and finally show a way to avoid the problem. In the second part I will then argue that the content of our duties towards future generations should be determined by an egalitarian approach. I will point out why a sufficientarian approach is insufficient and defend the egalitarian approach against common objections, such as the objection that egalitarians must, pro tanto, approve of »levelling down«.

I will argue that we wrong future generations by denying them things that they would need as much as we do. A good example for this is an environment that does not threaten their health. In addition to these minimal requirements, however, stronger egalitarian demands can be justified. If our use of natural resources is likely to diminish the well-being of future persons (for example, because biodiversity is reduced), this is morally objectionable on egalitarian rather than on sufficientarian grounds.

K

Nida-Rümelin

Freedom and the Phenomenology of Agency

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Traditionally it has been assumed that there is a potential (real or only apparent) conflict between freedom and determinism. I will argue that the conflict arises not only for (free) action, but already at the level of simple active behavior which can be ascribed to many animals and does not in general count as action. There is a fundamental distinction to be made between active behavior and things we passively undergo. Our understanding of that distinction has its origin, or so will be argued, in the phenomenology of agency. What it is to bring something about in an active manner will be introduced as the veridicality condition for certain familiar agentive experiences. The view will be defended that being active, so understood, is to be a causal origin in a sense similar to the one at issue in so-called agent causation theories. This account of being active (where being active is a necessary but not sufficient condition for action) can be seen to be useful for the solution of well-known puzzles about human freedom. For instance, the account can help to see how free action is compatible with predictability (while nonetheless being incompatible with microphysical causal determination) and how there can be a contrasting explanation for a person's action in cases where—given all relevant pre-conditions—more than one course of action was genuinely open to the agent.

K


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Group Assertion

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In this paper, I provide the framework for an account of group assertion. On my view, a group's asserting cannot be understood merely in terms of features that take place at the level of its members, such as their offering individual assertions. Instead, it is the group itself that asserts. A central virtue of my account is that it appreciates the unique relationship that exists between most groups and their spokespersons, as well as the subtle and complex interactions made possible by that relationship, such as the possibility that what a group asserts may come apart from what its individual members assert. In these ways, my view provides the basis not only for understanding how groups are responsible for their linguistic behavior, but also for determining when it is appropriate to trace this responsibility to the individual members of the group and the spokespersons who represent them.


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
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Preisverleihungen (Übersicht) / award ceremonies (overview)

Montag, 14.09.2015 18.00–18.45 Uhr 11/E08	Wolfgang-Stegmüller-Preis / Wolfgang Stegmüller award Laudationes Preisträger / awardees Vuko Andric <i>The Act-Consequentialist Criterion of Rightness</i> Katharina Felka <i>Talking about Numbers: Easy Arguments for Mathematical Realism</i> Susanne Mantel <i>Acting for a Normative Reason: A Competence Account</i> Barbara Vetter <i>Potentiality</i> ontos-Preis ontos award Christian Loew <i>Causation and other Asymmetries in Time</i> best paper award	Monday, September 14, 2015 6:00 p.m.—6:45 p.m. 11/E08
Mittwoch, 16.09.2015 17.00–17.15 Uhr 11/E08	Frege-Preis / Frege award Laudatio: Hans Rott Preisträger / awardee: Wolfgang Spohn	Wednesday, September 16, 2015 5:00 p.m.—5:15 p.m. 11/E08
Donnerstag, 17.09.2015 17.00 Uhr 11/E08	best poster award	Thursday, September 17, 2015 5:00 p.m. 11/E08

Frege-Preis-Kolloquium (Übersicht) / Frege award colloquium (overview)

Frege-Preis-Kolloquium	F	Frege award colloquium
Mittwoch, 16.09.2015 17.00—20.15 Uhr 11/E08	Hans Rott Laudatio Wolfgang Spohn <i>How the Modalities Come to Inhere in the World</i> Nancy Cartwright <i>How We Find Modalities in the World</i> Simon Blackburn <i>Generalized Pragmatism</i>	Wednesday, September 16, 2015 5:00 p.m.—8:15 p.m. 11/E08

Frege-Preis-Kolloquium (Abstracts) / Frege award colloquium (abstracts)

F Spohn

How the Modalities Come to Inhere in the World

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The title question will be answered by arguing that those modalities are projections or objectivizations of our epistemic constitution and thus by Humean projectivism à la Simon Blackburn. Hence, a comprehensive counter-program to David Lewis' program of Humean supervenience will be designed. Indeed, my projectivism will go beyond Blackburn's. I will explain: (1) Already the basic fact that the world is a world of *states of affairs* is due to the nature of our epistemic states. (2) Objects (and properties and relations), which figure in states of affairs and from which *metaphysical modality* originates, are something we constitute according to our ontological policies. (3) *Correspondence truth* is an objectivization of epistemic or pragmatic truth. (4) *Causation* is an objectivization of our conditional beliefs. And (5), if there is time, *nomicity* is a special way of generalizing epistemic attitudes. This covers the basic metaphysical and natural modalities. I will try to convey that talking of projection or objectivization is not just metaphorical, but constructively realizable. And in so doing, I think to fully maintain my sense of realism, as does Blackburn.

F Cartwright

How We Find Modalities in the World

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Perhaps we do read modalities into the world, as Spohn proposes. But it seems a long way round to get them since they are otherwise easy to come by. Sometimes just by looking. Consider causality: as Elizabeth Anscombe remarked, we can see the cat lapping up the milk. Sometimes it takes serious scientific endeavour. Consider powers: the long history of successes of Newtonian mechanics assures us that massive objects have the power to attract other masses with a force proportional to Gmm/r^2 .

In the first part of this response I shall suggest that the need for Spohn's elegant construction depends on simultaneously wanting too much and trusting too little. On the one hand, he wants a range of possibility that is ungrounded in the real world. It is true that it has long been possible that Wolfgang might come to have a daughter. But, as the Barcan formulae suggest, that is all there is to the shorthand claim that he has possible daughters. There are not, as my mother believed, tiny babies sitting in heaven waiting to be delivered, maybe some to the Spohn family. On the other hand, I shall argue, he trusts too little, from the first en-

terprise where he asks why it is so natural to conceive the world as made up of objects with properties but rejects the common sense answer, »Because that's the way the world is and we are pretty good, at this level, at seeing it as it is«. In the second part I shall illustrate that just this is so with respect to causes and powers.

My starting point is the »Stanford School« view that our philosophical account of the world should allow us to make sense of the methods of science. That's how I find modalities there in the world with no need to be projected on to it. But then it seems I presuppose that we can generally trust to our well-honed scientific methods. So perhaps Spohn will object that I trust too much.

F Blackburn

Generalized Pragmatism

Simon Blackburn
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Naturally I am delighted to find Professor Spohn as optimistic as I am about the prospects of an alliance between a fundamentally pragmatic and in a sense psychological understanding of modality and normativity on the one hand, and the propositions that we use to communicate such ideas on the other hand. This is a notable contribution to crossing what I once called "Frege's abyss", the difficulty Frege emphasised between purely expressive language and genuinely propositional language. It respects the expressive function, without casting doubt or scepticism on the realist-sounding result. I have worked on this project for many years, and it is gratifying to find others stepping up to the problem. In this talk I will raise the question, also raised by Professor Spohn, of the prospects for a more generalised pragmatism, going beyond the obviously normative and obviously pragmatic, as was suggested by Bob Brandom and Huw Price.

Kolloquien (Übersicht) / colloquia (overview)

Selbst- und Fremdverstehen: Philosophische und kognitionswissenschaftliche Untersuchungen	K1	Montag, 14.09.2015, 14.00–17.00 Uhr Monday, Sept 14, 2015, 2:00 p.m.–5:00 p.m. 15/128
Philosophy in the Face of Peer-Disagreement	K2	Montag, 14.09.2015, 14.00–17.00 Uhr Monday, Sept 14, 2015, 2:00 p.m.–5:00 p.m. 15/E07
Does Metaethics Rest on a Mistake? Anti-Archimedanism and the Conception of Metaethics	K3	Montag, 14.09.2015, 14.00–17.00 Uhr Monday, Sept 14, 2015, 2:00 p.m.–5:00 p.m. 15/E16
Meta ² physics: Analytic versus Naturalized Metaphysics	K4	Dienstag, 15.09.2015, 9.00–12.00 Uhr Tuesday, Sept 15, 2015, 9:00 a.m.–noon 15/128
Logical Pluralism and the Status of Logic	K5	Dienstag, 15.09.2015, 9.00–12.00 Uhr Tuesday, Sept 15, 2015, 9:00 a.m.–noon 15/E07
Imagination and Fiction	K6	Dienstag, 15.09.2015, 9.00–12.00 Uhr Tuesday, Sept 15, 2015, 9:00 a.m.–noon 15/E16
Medical Ethics: Can the Moral Philosopher Help?	K7	Donnerstag, 17.09.2015, 13.30–16.30 Uhr Thursday, Sept 17, 2015, 1:30 p.m.–4:30 p.m. 15/E07
Whither Conceptual Analysis?	K8	Donnerstag, 17.09.2015, 13.30–16.30 Uhr Thursday, Sept 17, 2015, 1:30 p.m.–4:30 p.m. 15/128
Varieties of Explanation	K9	Donnerstag, 17.09.2015, 13.30–16.30 Uhr Thursday, Sept 17, 2015, 1:30 p.m.–4:30 p.m. 15/E16

Kolloquien (Abstracts) / colloquia (abstracts)

K1

*in Kooperation mit / in cooperation with
Gesellschaft für Kognitionswissenschaft*

Selbst- und Fremdverstehen: Philosophische und kognitions- wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen

Montag 14.09.2015, 14.00–17.00 Uhr, 15/128
Monday, September 14, 2015, 2:00 p.m.–5:00 p.m., 15/128

Unsere menschliche Natur ist essentiell mit der Fähigkeit verbunden, mit anderen zu kommunizieren und zu interagieren. Es liegt nahe anzunehmen, dass sich auch zentrale Kulturleistungen, also Wissenschaft, Kultur und Technik, nur auf der Grundlage unserer sozial kognitiven Fähigkeiten herausgebildet haben. Bei näherer Betrachtung hängen diese sozial kognitiven Leistungen aber nicht nur von der Fähigkeit ab, andere Personen zu verstehen, sondern auch sich selbst zu verstehen. Dabei geht es im Kern um die Fähigkeit zum Selbst-Fremd-Austausch (Interaktion) und die Fähigkeiten des »Selbstverstehens« und des »Fremdverstehens« im Sinne des Zuschreibens von mentalen Phänomenen.

Ziel des Symposiums ist es, die Fähigkeit des Fremdverstehens adäquat zu analysieren, wobei wir zu zeigen versuchen, dass das Fremdverstehen wesentlich mit dem Selbstverstehen verknüpft ist und beide unverzichtbar sind, wenn es zur sozialen Interaktion kommt.

Aus philosophischer Sicht gibt es eine umfangreiche Debatte zum Verstehen anderer Personen, die ihren Ausgangspunkt im Streit zwischen Theorie-Theorie und Simulationstheorie hat. Da beide Theorien das Fremdverstehen nur aus der Perspektive eines unbeteiligten Beobachters analysieren (»offline«), ist die Interaktionstheorie entwickelt worden, die die tatsächlich aktuell stattfindende Interaktion (»online«) als eine wesentliche Form sozialen Verstehens mit einbezieht. Diese Theorien berücksichtigen bisher aber zu wenig die schon vorhandenen Hintergrundinformationen über andere Personen. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird u.a. die Personenmodelltheorie vorgestellt, die dieses und andere Defizite klassischer Theoriebildung zu bereinigen versucht. Neben der Frage, welche Theorie das Verstehen anderer Personen am besten einfangen kann, ist auch zu erörtern, in welchem Maße das Fremdverstehen von einem Selbstverstehen, also einem selbstbewussten Erfassen eigener Zustände, abhängig ist und umgekehrt. Dazu verbinden wir philosophische, psychologische und neurowissenschaftlichen Vorträge zum Selbst- und Fremdverstehen.

Organisation / organization: **Albert Newen, Kai Vogeley**

14.00–14.25 Uhr 2:00 p.m.–2:25 p.m.	Albert Newen (Bochum) Einleitung: Sich selbst und andere verstehen im Rahmen der Personenmodelltheorie
14.25–15.00 Uhr 2:25 p.m.–3:00 p.m.	Karsten Stüber (College of the Holy Cross) Sich in Ihrem Innern wie Spiegel zueinander verhalten
15.00–15.35 Uhr 3:00 p.m.–3:35 p.m.	Gottfried Vosgerau (Düsseldorf) Ist Selbstverstehen eine Voraussetzung für Fremdverstehen?
15.35–16.10 Uhr 3:35 p.m.–4:10 p.m.	Hannes Rakoczy (Göttingen) Zur frühkindlichen Entwicklung von (impliziter und expliziter) Theory of Mind
16.10–16.35 Uhr 4:10 p.m.–4:35 p.m.	Kai Vogeley (Köln) Abschluss: Varianz der sozialen Informationsverarbeitung in der Psychopathologie
16.35–17.00 Uhr 4:35 p.m.–5:00 p.m.	allgemeine Diskussion

K1 Newen

**Sich selbst und andere verstehen im Rahmen
der Personenmodelltheorie**

Albert Newen
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Wie verstehen wir andere Personen? Es wird argumentiert, dass weder die Theorie-Theorie noch die Simulationstheorie und auch nicht die Interaktionstheorie eine adäquate theoretische Beschreibung liefern. Die alternative Theorie lautet, dass das Verstehen anderer ganz wesentlich auf dem Anwenden von Personenmodellen basiert, die wir von Einzelpersonen (Vater, Tochter, Arbeitskollegin, etc.) oder von typischen Gruppen (wie Studierende, Manager, Sportlehrer) bilden. Ein Personenmodell ist eine Einheit von Eigenschaften, die wir mit einer Person (oder Gruppe) aufgrund unserer Erfahrung verbinden. Unser Verstehen anderer Personen ist vor allem ein Anwenden von Personenmodellen. Diese liegen entweder implizit vor (Personenschemata) oder explizit (Personenbilder). Darüber hinaus wird kurz skizziert, dass unser Selbstverstehen ganz wesentlich von dem Fremdverstehen geprägt ist. Das Selbstverstehen stützt sich wesentlich auf ein Personenmodell von mir selbst (= Selbstmodell), welches ebenfalls implizit (Selbstschema) oder explizit (Selbstbild) vorliegen kann. Es werde einige Beispiele vorgetragen, die aufzeigen, dass die so erweiterte Personenmodelltheorie explanatorisch fruchtbarer ist als die bisherigen Theorieansätze.

K1 Rakoczy

**Zur frühkindlichen Entwicklung von
(impliziter und expliziter) Theory of Mind**

Hannes Rakoczy
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Entwicklungspsychologische Kognitionsforschung ist jahrzehntelang davon ausgegangen, dass Kinder die Grundzüge unseres erwachsenen Begriffssystems mentaler Zustände (»Theory of Mind«) mit etwa vier Jahren erwerben, eng verbunden mit der Entwicklung komplexer sprachlicher Fähigkeiten. Neuere Forschung mit weniger verbal-expliziten Methoden legt jedoch nahe, dass bereits Säuglinge im ersten Lebensjahr mentale Zustände anderer repräsentieren. Wie lassen sich diese beiden Forschungslinien miteinander vereinbaren?

In meinem Vortrag werde ich neue Forschungsergebnisse präsentieren und diskutieren, die dafür sprechen, dass eine 2-System-Theorie der Theory of Mind (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009) die scheinbar widersprüchlichen Befunde am besten integrieren machen kann: Menschen verfügen über zwei verschiedene Arten von Prozesse der Repräsentation mentaler Zustände: System 1 entwickelt sich früh und funktioniert weitgehend unabhängig von Sprache, weist aber klare repräsentationale Signaturlimits auf (es können nur einfache relationale Einstellungen zugeschrieben werden). System 2 hingegen entwickelt sich später, in Abhängigkeit von Sprachentwicklung, und erlaubt das flexible Operieren mit vollen Begriffen propositionaler Einstellungen.

K1 Stüber

**Sich in Ihrem Innern wie Spiegel
zueinander verhalten**

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Im Rahmen der gegenwärtigen Diskussion über die Funktion der Spiegelneuronen und der Debatte über die Strukturen der Alltagspsychologie und der sozialen Kognition wird der Vortrag die Angemessenheit der weitverbreiteten Spiegelmetapher und der Rede von einer inneren Imitation für unsere Konzeption des Fremdverstehens überprüfen und bedingt verteidigen. Meiner Ansicht nach ist die Fähigkeit, sich im Inneren als Spiegel zu verhalten, für das Fremdverstehen auf zwei Ebenen unterschiedlich kognitiver Komplexität zentral: Sie erlaubt es uns, den Körper des Anderen und seine Bewegungen als Etwas uns sehr Vertrautes wahrzunehmen und, darauf aufbauend, erlaubt unsere Fähigkeit der imaginären Perspektivübernahme, den Anderen als eine Person zu verstehen, die aus Gründen handelt.

Allerdings ist man sich in der gegenwärtigen Diskussion im Gegensatz zu den Sentimentalisten des 18ten Jahrhunderts nicht immer vollständig allen Implikationen dieser Einsicht bewusst. Wie schon David Hume und Adam Smith richtig erkannt haben, wirkt sich unsere Fähigkeit, den Anderen im Inneren zu spiegeln, auch auf unser Selbstverständnis aus. Adam Smith hat deswegen auch Recht, diese Einsicht für eine philosophische Konzeption der Grundlagen der Moral zu verwenden.

K1 Vogeley

**Varianz der sozialen Informationsverarbeitung
in der Psychopathologie**

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Scheinbar mühelos verschaffen wir uns in einem »Augenblick« einen ersten Eindruck von der inneren Verfassung anderer Personen. Diese Leistung des »Mentalisierens«, die auf Prozessen der Eindrucksbildung (impression formation) und der Personenwahrnehmung (person perception) beruht, erlaubt uns, das Verhalten anderer Personen zu erklären oder vorherzusagen und etabliert damit eine »Alltagspsychologie«. Wir begegnen im Alltag aber nicht nur Personen, sondern auch Dingen oder Gegenständen, deren Verhalten in einer Art »Alltagsphysik« durch das Einwirken äußerer physikalischer Kräfte, aber nicht über das innere Erleben erklärbar wird. Einsichtnahmen in das Fremdpsychische lassen sich mit geeigneten Versuchsbedingungen und unter Anwendung von funktioneller Hirnbildgebung auch auf einer neuronalen Ebene systematisch untersuchen. Untersuchungen zur nonverbalen Kommunikation mit einem besonderen Schwerpunkt auf menschlichem Blickverhalten zeigen, dass im Wesentlichen zwei verschiedene neurale Systeme beteiligt sind. Dabei handelt es sich zum einen um das sogenannte Spiegelneuronensystem (*mirror neuron system*), das stärker auf bewegungsbezogene Signale fokussiert ist und eine vergleichsweise frühe Verarbeitungsstufe sozialer Signale darstellt, die mit der Detektion befasst ist. Dieses Netzwerk wird zum anderen ergänzt durch das sogenannte soziale neurale Netzwerk (*social neural network*), das stärker auf die innere Verfassung von Personen gerichtet ist und eine vergleichsweise späte Verarbeitungsstufe sozialer Signale darstellt, die mit der Evaluation befasst ist. Untersuchungen an Personen mit hochfunktionalem Autismus oder Asperger-Syndrom zeigen eine Minderaktivierung insbesondere des auf die Evaluation gerichteten sozialen neuronalen Netzwerks und bestätigen damit die Schwächen der sozialen Interaktion und Kommunikation.

K1 Vosgerau

**Ist Selbstverstehen eine Voraussetzung
für Fremdverstehen?**

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In der Debatte um die Fähigkeit des Fremdverstehens wird häufig implizit vorausgesetzt, dass 1) Fremdverstehen auf Selbstverstehen beruhen würde, und 2) die Fähigkeit des Selbstverstehens unproblematisch sei. In wieweit beide Voraussetzungen zutreffen, ist wiederum abhängig davon, was unter »Fremdverstehen« verstanden wird. In diesem Vortrag wird dafür argumentiert, dass sowohl Selbst- als auch Fremdverstehen im engeren Sinne Kategorisierungen voraussetzen, die unabhängig von einer Selbst-Fremd-Unterscheidung erfolgen. Daher, so wird weiter argumentiert, ist es plausibel anzunehmen, dass auf dieser Grundlage gleichzeitig das Selbst- und Fremdverstehen ausdifferenziert wird, ohne dass das eine Voraussetzung für das andere wäre. Weiterhin wird dargelegt, dass viele Phänomene, wie z.B. gemeinsames Handeln (*joint action*) ohne Fremdverstehen im engeren Sinne erklärt werden können.

K2

**Philosophy in the Face of
Peer-Disagreement**

Montag 14.09.2015, 14.00–17.00 Uhr, 15/E07
Monday, September 14, 2015, 2:00 p.m.–5:00 p.m., 15/E07

Disagreement shows up almost everywhere in our life. Whenever we meet colleagues, friends or strangers and we talk to each other, it usually won't be long until we disagree on a certain topic. We disagree, for instance, on the content of an ordinary visual experience, on the division of a collective bill in a restaurant, on the location of a certain bookstore in downtown, but also on more complicated matters such as art, politics, religion and philosophy. Some of these disagreements can be dissolved rather quickly by correcting easily detectable er-

rors or mistakes, but some of them seem to be rather stable. Among the most stable disagreements are disagreements in philosophy.

The epistemology of disagreement pays attention to all kinds of different cases in ordinary life, in theoretical domains and in philosophy itself. In the colloquium the focus lies on the epistemic significance of disagreement for the discipline of philosophy. The following three basic questions will be analyzed and discussed. First, in which sense does disagreement matter to philosophy? Second, what characterizes disagreement in philosophy? And third, what are the consequences of disagreement for philosophy?

Organisation / organization: **Thomas Grundmann, Dirk Koppelberg**

14.00–14.15 Uhr 2:00 p.m.–2:15 p.m.	Thomas Grundmann (Cologne) Introduction
14.15–14.45 Uhr 2:15 p.m.–2:45 p.m.	Brian Frances The Epistemically Troubling Philosophical Survey
14.45–15.00 Uhr 2:45 p.m.–3:00 p.m.	discussion
15.00–15.05 Uhr 3:00 p.m.–3:05 p.m.	<i>short break</i>
15.05–15.35 Uhr 3:00 p.m.–3:35 p.m.	Dirk Koppelberg (Berlin) Does Disagreement in Philosophy Lead to Skepticism?
15.35–15.50 Uhr 3:35 p.m.–3:50 p.m.	Discussion
15.50–16.05 Uhr 3:50 p.m.–4:05 p.m.	<i>coffee break</i>
16.05–16.35 Uhr 4:05 p.m.–4:35 p.m.	Jennifer Lackey (Northwestern) Experts and Peer Disagreement
16.35–16.50 Uhr 4:35 p.m.–4:50 p.m.	discussion
16.50–17.00 Uhr 4:50 p.m.–5:00 p.m.	general discussion

K2 Frances

The Epistemically Troubling Philosophical Survey

Bryan Frances

I analyze the 2009 PhilPapers survey. The analysis strongly suggests that a very low percentage of our definite beliefs in the philosophical theses we debate are true. In turn, that suggests we should suspend judgment on those beliefs once we are aware of the considerations of this paper. I consider and reject several ways of trying to resist the epistemic conclusion; I also compare this result to the Preface Paradox.

K2 Koppelberg

**Does Disagreement in Philosophy
Lead to Skepticism?**

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Disagreement is ubiquitous in our life. In science it is often regarded as a precondition of progress. In philosophy, however, many epistemologists regard disagreement not as a sign of possible progress but as a route to skepticism. How is this difference between the role of disagreement in science and philosophy possible and how can it be explained? What kind of disagreement is supposed to lead to the alleged skeptical consequences? And what kind of epistemic principles are used to argue that a certain kind of peer disagreement in philosophy leads to skeptical conclusions with regard to the cognitive enterprise of philosophy?

In my talk I'll try to answer these leading questions by looking somewhat closer to the crucial presuppositions and the epistemic principles which are involved in the basic arguments from peer disagreement to skepticism. The basic charge leveled against conciliationism is that it leads to skepticism. To examine this charge I will especially look somewhat closer at the relevant peerhood presupposition and I will analyze the role of the independence principle and the uniqueness thesis. In this connection I plan to discuss the views of Sanford Goldberg, Thomas Grundmann and Hilary Kornblith. I'll try to show that a disagreement-based skepticism with regard to philosophy is not inevitable.

K2 Lackey

Experts and Peer Disagreement

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It is often argued that widespread disagreement among epistemic peers in a domain threatens expertise in that domain. This is taken to lead to a fairly robust form of skepticism: there are no experts in areas rife with peer disagreement, such as philosophy, religion, and politics. In this paper, I will sketch two different conceptions of expertise: what I call the expert-as-authority and the expert-as-advisor models. While it is standard for philosophers to understand expertise as authoritative, such an approach renders the problem posed by widespread peer disagreement intractable. I will argue, however, that there are independent reasons to reject both this model of expertise and the central argument offered on its behalf. I will then develop an alternative approach—one that understands expertise in terms of advice—that not only avoids the problems afflicting the expert-as-authority model, but also has the resources for a much more satisfying response to the problem of widespread peer disagreement.

K3

**Does Metaethics Rest on a Mistake?
Anti-Archimedeanism and the
Conception of Metaethics**

Montag 14.09.2015, 14.00–17.00 Uhr, 15/E16
Monday, September 14, 2015, 2:00 p.m.–5:00 p.m., 15/E16

What does it mean to do metaethical research? The orthodox answer is clear: Doing metaethics amounts to taking up a non-moral standpoint outside of ethics from which to investigate the metaphysical, epistemological, semantic and psychological foundations of moral practice. Anti-Archimedeanism—most prominently Ronald Dworkin and Matthew Kramer—disagree. Contrary to this traditional understanding, they submit that there are no external, Archimedean standpoints from which to develop metaethical theories that owe nothing to the moral verdicts which they aim to investigate. Rather, allegedly second-order, metaethical theses must themselves be understood as substantive, first-order moral claims. One alleged consequence of this view is that moral realism and constructivism must be conceived as

moral doctrines; another is that error-theories and expressivism are to be discarded as internally unstable. Hence, if anti-Archimedeanism proved to be right, morality would in a very important sense be self-supporting, in that moral discourse could neither be vindicated nor debunked from the outside. Given this considerable shake-up in our orthodox conception of metaethics that anti-Archimedeanism appears to entail, philosophers have, quite understandably, reacted to its theses with a significant sense of unease and incredulity. The purpose of this colloquium, therefore, is to subject anti-Archimedeanism and its implications to closer scrutiny. It does so by bringing together three talks which range from firm endorsement of anti-Archimedeanism to staunch criticism, which consider its limitations as well as its strengths, and lay bare how defences of moral objectivity as well as scepticism might fare against an anti-Archimedean background.

Organisation / organization: **Christine Tiefensee**

14.00–14.50 Uhr 2:00 p.m.–2:50 p.m.	Christine Tiefensee (Frankfurt) Find the Mistake—In Search of a Systematic Approach to Anti-Archimedeanism
14.50–15.50 Uhr 2:50 p.m.–3:50 p.m.	Michael Smith (Princeton) Constitutivism as an Archimedean Point
15.50–16.00 Uhr 3:50 p.m.–4:00 p.m.	<i>coffee break</i>
16.00–17.00 Uhr 4:00 p.m.–5:00 p.m.	Matthew Kramer (Cambridge) There's Nothing ›Quasi‹ about Quasi-Realism: Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine

K3 Kramer

**There's Nothing ›Quasi‹ about Quasi-Realism:
Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine**

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This paper takes as its point of departure an article published by Michael Smith in the 2010 volume of the *BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW*. That article responds to Ronald Dworkin's critique of the error theory of morality and his critique of expressivism. Although this paper will seek to explain why Smith's responses to those critiques are misconceived, it will also criticize Dworkin in some respects. While I largely agree with Dworkin's conclusions about the error theory, I will contend that his argument against it moves too quickly. Some further argumentation is needed, which this paper will endeavor to provide. In the second half of the paper, I will move even further away from Dworkin. Although he was right to maintain that expressivism as he understood it is a moral doctrine, there is an alternative version of expressivism that is not in itself such a doctrine. In maintaining as much, I will neither be siding with Smith nor be retreating in any other way from the view—which I share with Dworkin—that meta-ethical matters are ethical matters (usually at very high levels of abstraction). There will be no such retreat, because expressivism properly understood is not about morality but is instead about the empirically observable practices of moral discourse. It is a philosophical account of the pragmatics of such discourse. Accordingly, it is entirely consistent with moral realism as a moral doctrine.

K3 Smith

Constitutivism as an Archimedean Point

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Anti-Archimedeanism is the view that there is no external standpoint on our ordinary ways of talking about things that provides us with some special purchase on the subject matter of those ordinary ways of talking. In the case of ethics, for example, there is no special set of questions, *metaethical questions*, the answers to which would lead us to conclude that there is no ethical subject matter, either because of all the ordinary ethical claims we make are false (nihilism) or because the ethical claims we make aren't in the business of being either true or false (expressivism). On close inspection, according to the anti-Archimedean, answering metaethical questions requires us to take a stand on all sorts of first-order ethical issues, so the very attempt to find an Archimedean point simply confirms the truth of anti-Archimedeanism. I disagree. Not only do answers to metaethical questions provide us with a much-needed Archimedean perspective on first order ethical claims, a perspective from which we can remain neutral on first-order ethical claims, we can, when we adopt this Archi-

medean perspective, figure out which first-order ethical claims are true and we can see why they are true. I argue for the truth of these claims by discussing the constitutivist's distinctive answers to metaethical questions.

K3 Tiefensee

**Find the Mistake:
In Search of a Systematic Approach
to Anti-Archimedeanism**

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According to philosophical lore, metaethics ›is not a substantive theory of what's right and wrong, what's good and bad, and what makes it that way‹. It attempts to see moral judgements from the outside and examines them ›rather than making them and propounding them‹ (Gibbard 2003). According to anti-Archimedeanism, this orthodox understanding of metaethics is fundamentally mistaken: there are no external, distinctly philosophical questions that are ›about moral judgment without themselves calling for moral judgment‹ (Dworkin 2011). This is a bold thesis. In this paper, I shall seek to put it to the test by pursuing two objectives. Firstly, I will examine if there are any general, systematic arguments that can support anti-Archimedeanism. Secondly, I will envisage which specific structure of anti-Archimedeanism this systematic approach would suggest. Based on Hume's law and a minimalist theory of truth, I will argue that the best that anti-Archimedeanism can hope for is to establish anti-Archimedeanism as a local position. However, despite failing as a global movement, anti-Archimedeanism might still come with a sting in the tail: metaethics might indeed rest on a mistake, but not where anti-Archimedeanism locate it.

Meta²physics: Analytic versus Naturalized Metaphysics

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 9:00–12.00 Uhr, 15/128
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 9:00 a.m.–noon, 15/128

The goal of this colloquium is to explore the relation between science and metaphysics and to shed light on the methods and potential of analytic and naturalized metaphysics.

Traditionally, metaphysics has been seen as the inquiry into what lies behind or comes before experience, yet, which nonetheless concerns the fundamental structure of reality. However, because metaphysical claims seem not to be empirically testable, the meaningfulness of metaphysics has been contested ever since the classical empiricists, culminating in 20th century logical empiricism which denounced metaphysics as nonsensical altogether. Logical empiricism is also one of the forebears of modern philosophy of science; yet, ironically, some present day philosophers of science have again turned emphatically towards metaphysical reasoning and propose grand (speculative) systems in order to answer questions like what is a law of nature, what are natural kinds, what is causation, etc.

In the last decades analytic metaphysics has come under fire again and has been critically evaluated. Philosophers have started to debate which kind of metaphysics is and which is not allowed. The relationship between metaphysics and science plays a special role in this debate. In fact, more than a few philosophers today believe that science provides the safest guide to modern metaphysics. Some even go so far as to claim that metaphysics should be naturalized. On the other hand, science and scientific reasoning themselves sometimes

seem to be in need of support from metaphysical reasoning.

The colloquium focusses on the particular interconnections between metaphysics and science and critically assesses the sources, methods, and guidelines that are proposed as being acceptable for metaphysics in recent literature. Particular questions of interest are:

- In the face of scientific advances, is it still reasonable to be concerned with metaphysical questions? Are philosophical discussions of composition, parthood, and persistence worthwhile, or is preoccupation with such topics empty and sterile?
- What, if anything, can science contribute to metaphysics? Which metaphysical issues find counterparts in science? Are all metaphysical debates resolvable by appeal to science? If not, what characterizes the debates that are?
- Which special sciences can metaphysicians draw upon, and which should be employed (e.g. fundamental physics, social science, linguistics)? Is the prevalence of physical theories in current attempts at establishing a naturalistic metaphysics justifiable?
- What, if anything, does metaphysics contribute to science? Does science profit from metaphysical reflection? Is metaphysics helpful with respect to the proper interpretation of scientific theories? Is it necessary to this task? What kinds of metaphysical claims does science support?
- What, if any, is the legitimate role of appeal to intuitions in metaphysical method? What kinds of intuitions should be employed, everyday intuitions or intuitions that derive from scientific (linguistic) practice?

Organisation / organization: **Julia F. Göhner, Holger Lyre, Thomas Reydon, Oliver R. Scholz, Markus Schrenk**

9.00–9.10 Uhr 9:00 a.m.–9:10 a.m.	Holger Lyre (Magdeburg) / Markus Schrenk (Düsseldorf) Introduction
	Tobias Rosefeldt (Berlin)
9.10–9.45 Uhr 9:10 a.m.–9:45 a.m.	The Linguistic Turn Commentary: Julia F. Göhner (Münster)
9.45–9.55 Uhr 9:45 a.m.–9:55 a.m.	discussion
9.55–10.05 Uhr 9:55 a.m.–10:05 a.m.	<i>coffee break</i>
10.05–10.40 Uhr 10:05 a.m.–10:40 a.m.	Katherine Hawley (St. Andrews) Social Metaphysics and Social Science Commentary: Oliver R. Scholz (Münster)
10.40–10.50 Uhr 10:40 a.m.–10:50 a.m.	discussion
10.50–11.00 Uhr 10:50 a.m.–11:00 a.m.	<i>coffee break</i>
11.00–11.35 Uhr 11:00 a.m.–11:35 a.m.	Steven French (Leeds) Toying with the Toolbox: How Metaphysics Can (Still) Make a Contribution Commentary: Barbara Vetter (Berlin)
11.35–11.45 Uhr 11:35 a.m.–11:45 a.m.	discussion
11.45–12.00 Uhr 11:45 a.m.–noon	afterthoughts

K4 French

**Toying with the Toolbox: How Metaphysics
Can (Still) Make a Contribution**

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Current analytic metaphysics has recently suffered a ›bad press‹, with claims that it is, at best, out of touch with modern physics, at worst, actually in conflict with the latter (Callender 2011, Ladyman and Ross 2007). While agreeing with some of these claims, Kerry McKenzie and I have suggested that metaphysics may still be of service by providing a kind of ›toolbox‹ of devices, moves and manoeuvres that philosophers of science can avail themselves of in order to help provide an interpretation of theories in fundamental physics (French and McKenzie 2012). In subsequent work we have explored the viability of our position in the face of concerns that it is inherently unstable (French and McKenzie forthcominga) and in the context of a specific set of examples concerning dispositionalism (French and McKenzie forthcomingb). In the latter case in particular, we argued that ›standard‹ dispositional accounts simply cannot be sustained in the context of modern physics but that certain ›non-standard‹ views may provide the resources to help explicate the sense in which physics may be regarded as ›modally informed‹.

Here I wish to further extend that exploration by drawing on that latter case study in order to consider the implications of our view both with regard to the overall relevance of metaphysics given advances in science and for the prospects of a naturalised metaphysics more generally.

K4 Hawley

Social Metaphysics and Social Science

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When we step back and think about the relationship between science and metaphysics, paradigmatically we think about physics, and we think about the metaphysics of space, time, and material existence quite generally. But metaphysical questions also arise in connection with biological, psychological and social entities, in realms investigated by the various special sciences. What is the relationship between scientific and metaphysical investigation in these domains?

In this paper I discuss this question in the context of social groups, looking in particular at identity conditions for social groups, and at the relationship between groups and their members. What can general metaphysical discussion of parthood, composition and persistence tell us about such issues? And how does such metaphysical discussion interact with (a) social scientific theories and (b) our intuitions about social groups?

K4 Rosefeldt

The Linguistic Turn

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Metaphysicians who conceive of their project as being in continuity with the sciences usually have a post-linguistic-turn attitude towards their own discipline: They think that ›real‹ metaphysics is concerned directly with the world and should bother as little about the semantics of the sentences by which we speak about the world as physics or chemistry does. I think that there are certain parts of metaphysics where this attitude is mistaken and in which the investigation of language should play an essential role. This does not mean however that this investigation cannot be scientific. The science by which it should be guided is the science of language, i.e. linguistics. In my talk I want to follow the new general trend of applying results from linguistics to philosophical debates and show some of its applications in the realm of ontology.

K5

Logical Pluralism and the Status of Logic

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 9.00–12.00 Uhr, 15/E07
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 9:00 a.m.–noon, 15/E07

In the past few years, within the philosophy of logic, there's been a rise in interest in the status and metaphysics of logic. Advocates of pluralism regarding logical consequence (e.g. Beall and Restall 2006) argue that there can be more than one correct explication of the

logical consequence relation for a language, while logical monists hold that there is only one consequence relation which is determined by the meanings of the logical constants in the public language (Williamson 2013). In this colloquium we will explore motivations for pluralism as well as consequences that such a view has for epistemology.

Organisation / organization: **Elke Brendel, Daniel Cohnitz**

9.00–9.10 Uhr 9:00 a.m.–9:10 a.m.	Elke Brendel (Bonn) / Daniel Cohnitz (Tartu) Introduction
9.10–10.00 Uhr 9:10 a.m.–10:00 a.m.	Gillian Russell (Chapel Hill) Could there Be <i>no</i> Logic?
10.00–10.50 Uhr 10:00 a.m.–10:50 a.m.	Francesco Berto (Amsterdam) Positive and Negative Modalities
10.50–11.00 Uhr 10:50 a.m.–11:00 a.m.	<i>coffee break</i>
11.00–11.50 Uhr 11:00 a.m.–11:50 a.m.	Ole Hjortland (Bergen) Logical Pluralism and Epistemic Pluralism
11.50–12.00 Uhr 11:50 a.m.–noon	general discussion

K5 **Berto**

Positive and Negative Modalities

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A *positive* modality, p , is one that pushes entailment forward: if A entails B , then pA entails pB . In philosophical logic we have been studying positive modalities for decades, turning questions about the meaning, or meanings, of expressions like »possibly«, »knows that«, or »always in the past«, into questions concerning restricted quantifiers over points in frames (worlds, or worlds-at-times, etc.), and accessibilities between such points. »When you know, do you know that you know?« and »If A is logically necessary, is this fact logically necessary too?« both became »Is accessibility transitive?« for the respective modals.

A negative modality, n , is one that turns entailment backwards: if A entails B , then nB entails nA . Negative modalities have received much less attention than positive ones in the philosophical literature. This talk investigates how we can interpret negative modals, too, as restricted quantifiers over points in frames. The questions we can ask about the relevant accessibilities form an interesting landscape, where the differences between classical, intuitionistic, relevant, and quantum logics come to the fore in a unified framework.

K5 **Hjortland**

Logical Pluralism and Epistemic Pluralism

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Beall and Restall's (2000;2006) logical pluralism requires that permissible consequence relations have a normative force. If a relation is a consequence relation between premises and conclusion, it must yield norms for rational belief. But if there are distinct, and equally correct, consequence relations, do they yield distinct, and equally correct, epistemic norms? Can the resulting norms be in conflict? We provide a framework for understanding the normative force of a number of consequence relations, and argue that logical pluralism entails an epistemic pluralism. We then compare the result with the type of normative logical pluralism outlined in Field (2009).

K5 **Russell**

Could there Be no Logic?

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Logical pluralists and monists disagree about how many correct logics there are; the pluralists say there are many, the monists that there is only one. But could it turn out that there is no correct logic? This paper develops the argument for what I'll call *logical nihilism* by presenting new counterexamples to laws sometimes thought to be quite safe—such as conjunction elimination and identity. Then it argues on general methodological grounds that the best response to this nihilist threat is to relinquish commitment to complete generality in logic.

Kolloquien (Abstracts) / colloquia (abstracts)

K6

Imagination and Fiction

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 9.00–12.00 Uhr, 15/E16
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 9:00 a.m.–noon, 15/E16

The colloquium comprises three talks on issues concerning fiction and the role and nature of imagination in creating and understanding fiction.

Organisation / organization: **Magdalena Balcerak Jackson, Julia Langkau**

9.00–9.05 Uhr 9:00 a.m.–9:05 a.m.	Introduction
9.05–10.00 Uhr 9:05 a.m.–10:00 a.m.	Gregory Currie (York) What Is True, and what Is True-in-fiction
10.00–10.05 Uhr 10:00 a.m.–10:05 a.m.	<i>break</i>
10.05–11.00 Uhr 10:05 a.m.–11:00 a.m.	Amy Kind (Claremont McKenna College) The Myth of Imaginative Resistance
11.00–11.05 Uhr 11:00 a.m.–11:05 a.m.	<i>break</i>
11.05–12.00 Uhr 11:05 a.m.–noon	Robert Hopkins (New York University) Expression in Collingwood, Synthesis in Imagination and the Problem of Narrative Art

K6 Currie

What Is True, and what Is True-in-fiction

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There is no such person as Sherlock Holmes and what Doyle says about him in the stories is false. But those things are, we generally say, true-in-the-fiction. But what does that mean? I argue that truth-in-fiction is the wrong notion to concentrate on; we need instead the more general idea of something being true-according-to-a-representation. This is more general because it applies equally to fiction and to non-fiction and indeed to representational systems to which the fiction/nonfiction distinction does not apply. It has the further advantage that it discourages us from thinking of fictions as special places where things are true, though they are not actually true. I illustrate some of the advantages of thinking in terms of true-according-to, especially when it comes to understanding desires and emotions in fictional contexts.

K6 Hopkins

Expression in Collingwood, Synthesis in Imagination and the Problem of Narrative Art

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Collingwood's account of expression in art offers many attractions. Part of the reason for its present neglect is that it is taken in isolation from the philosophy of mind that grounds it. Collingwood conceives of the mind on three levels: ›mere feeling‹, ›consciousness‹ and ›intellect‹. Expression involves the move between the first and second: we become conscious of emotions that we previously felt without knowing. The result is a form of understanding of our feelings distinct from that offered by the intellect, which last involves in bringing them under concepts. What is this process and what form of understanding does it produce? In answering, I both draw on and deviate from Collingwood, in suggesting that the process is synthesis in imagination, and the product is analogous to the understanding of worldly objects that perception offers.

If this is expression, how is it furthered by making and appreciating art? The appeal to imaginative synthesis allows us to answer some of the most important challenges to Collingwood's account. There has been much scepticism both about whether the account can give a proper place to the work, and about whether it can, as Collingwood desires, treat expression in artist and audience as on a par. Provided we treat the work, not as a mere aid to inner expressive processes, but as offering the material for the synthesis in imagination that constitutes expression, both challenges can be met. But how can a work be analogous to the ›mere feeling‹ involved in expression as originally conceived? This problem is particularly acute for those works, such as those with

narrative structure, which are grasped conceptually. In tentatively exploring some responses, I consider further deviations from the letter of Collingwood's account, hoping to preserve both its spirit and appeal.

K6 Kind

The Myth of Imaginative Resistance

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According to the so-called puzzle of imaginative resistance, our engagement with fiction presents us with a puzzling asymmetry between our ability to imagine deviant factual claims and our ability to imagine deviant moral claims. When we engage with a work of fiction, we are able to imagine all sorts of fantastical things—that there is an inhabited planet called ›Vulcan,‹ that hobbits exist, that we can fly on broomsticks, and so on. We do not resist imagining any of these things, despite the fact that they are counter to our beliefs about the world. But should the work of fiction make a moral claim that is counter to our beliefs about the world, matters are allegedly different; it's claimed that we experience resistance, resistance we don't feel when encountering non-morally deviant claims, when a work of fiction presumes, for example, that practices like female infanticide or slavery are morally acceptable. Many philosophers working on the imagination have recently tried to explain our resistance in such cases. Is it that we can't imagine such things? Or just that we are not willing to? And how can we explain the asymmetry between the moral and the non-moral cases? To my mind, however, it is not clear that the phenomenon of resistance is as widespread as is commonly supposed, and insofar as there is such a phenomenon, it is not clear that there is really any kind of a striking asymmetry between the moral and non-moral domains. In short, I argue in this paper that imaginative resistance is largely a myth, and its mythic status is one that's been propagated by a misguided conception of the role of imagination in our engagement with fiction.

K7	<i>in Kooperation mit / in cooperation with Akademie für Ethik in der Medizin</i>
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Medical Ethics: Can the Moral Philosopher Help?

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 13.30–16.30 Uhr, 15/E07
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 1:30 p.m.–4:30 p.m., 15/E07

The theme of the colloquium is adopted from the title of an article by Richard Hare, published in 1977, where he addressed the question whether and in which way moral philosophers can contribute to the solution of problems in medical ethics. Richard Hare himself was confident that his version of utilitarianism could be of help. Yet, utilitarianism has difficulties of its own, particularly in bioethics. Moreover, other prominent normative theories apparently are built on shaky philosophical groundings, too. So we are still confronted with the question on which ethical foundation we should ground moral advice.

Underlying various theoretical attempts to apply ethical theory to practical biomedical issues there are more general meta-ethical and action-theoretical concerns. What kind of help could be expected from philosophers at all? Will there be universal moral principles, which have to be obeyed in all possible cases? Or are we left with mere *prima facie* principles, leaving open to the agent all the interesting questions as to how and when they are to be applied? Are philosophers of help merely as authors, or could they also be interpreters of rules, or counselors with respect to the individual case in question? What are the possible consequences of these issues for moral philosophy in general? Is the future of moral philosophy dependent on its being practically helpful? Or is there a place for ethics beyond any application?

These are the questions that define the topic of the colloquium, which is a joint project of the German Society for Analytic Philosophy (GAP) and of the Academy for Ethics in Medicine (AEM).

Organisation / organization: **Thomas Schramme, Ralf Stoecker**

13.30–14.00 Uhr 1:30 p.m.–2:00 p.m.	David Archard (Belfast) Moral Expertise, Moral Autonomy and Democratic Legitimacy
14.00–14.30 Uhr 2:00 p.m.–2:30 p.m.	Ruth Chadwick (Cardiff) Getting Ethics: Prospects for Harmony in Biomedical Ethics
14.30–15.00 Uhr 2:30 a.m.–3:00 p.m.	Thomas Schramme (Hamburg) Why Medical Ethics Needs More Philosophy – but Maybe Less Moral Philosophy
15.00–15.30 Uhr 3:00 p.m.–3:30 p.m.	<i>coffee break</i>
15.30–15.45 Uhr 3:30 p.m.–3:45 p.m.	Ralf Stoecker (Bielefeld) short introduction into the discussion
15.45–16.30 Uhr 3:45 p.m.–4:30 p.m.	discussion

K7 Archard

Moral Expertise, Moral Autonomy and Democratic Legitimacy

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Philosophers are, in general, skeptical about the idea of moral expertise. The orthodox view is that, even if moral expertise exists (and it may be exercised principally or exclusively by moral philosophers) there are good moral reasons not to do what the moral expert commends.

I shall address five matters. First, I shall offer a conceptual map, configured by a number of interwoven distinctions, of moral expertise. Second, I distinguish between moral expertise in personal matters and in the domain of public policy making. Third, I say something about the relationship between the exercise of expertise and democratic governance. Fourth, I disarm the main arguments against a limited exercise of moral expertise, attending particularly to the deference worry that moral judgements ought to be transparent to those who make them. Fifth, I explain why the distinction between deference to moral expertise in the public domain and in personal matters is an important one, and how deference in the former to experts does not impugn democratic legitimacy.

K7 Chadwick

**Getting Ethics:
Prospects for Harmony in Biomedical Ethics**

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It has become normal, in the UK at least, to describe the process of submitting research for ethical review as ›getting ethics‹. This paper will argue that it is becoming increasingly common that people fail to ›get‹ ethics in another sense – that of appreciating what is involved, not only in biomedical ethics. In political and social contexts the ethical aspects of situations are sometimes overlooked or marginalised: there is arguably an ethical equivalent of being ›tone deaf‹. In biomedical ethics, however, while there is widespread appreciation of the fact that ›matters of life and death‹ have ethical dimensions, the nature and value of the academic field remains controversial. The role of Philosophy within the field has come under criticism both for the way in which it asks and answers questions and for claiming a monopoly on the answering of those questions. In order to promote harmony in place of discord, it is important to disentangle the particular contribution philosophical ethics has to make to biomedical ethics, and the possibility of productive working with other disciplines. The subject matter of biomedical debate concerns matters that affect all human beings, touching on human identity as a living being. It is therefore vital that we ›get‹ it.

K7 Schramme

Why Medical Ethics Needs More Philosophy – but Maybe Less Moral Philosophy

Thomas Schramme
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Medical ethics has come a long way since its foundation as a professional academic endeavour starting roughly in the 1970ies. At the beginning many philosophers assumed that issues in so-called applied ethics merely awaited the clever application of normative theories, such as utilitarianism, in order to be solved. But this model of ›ethical engineering‹ (A. Caplan) has failed. Since then medical ethics has become a sub-discipline in its own right, with all beneficial and detrimental consequences, such as canonical literature, professionalization, and a pragmatic outlook. Yet there is still the unresolved issue what exactly would qualify philosophers more than representatives of any other discipline to contribute to resolving issues in medical ethics. Much of this debate focuses on the specific capacities of moral philosophers, such as analytical skills and familiarity with normative theories. The recent discussion also addresses traditional problems such as the possibility of moral knowledge.

In my talk I will also aim at providing an argument as to why philosophy is strongly needed to improve the state of medical ethics, but I will locate such necessity rather outside the area of *moral* philosophy. What is needed, I will claim, is an improved understanding of the relation between theory and practice, about the way theories are developed, and what the purposes of theorizing are in the first place. These are topics that are usually discussed in the philosophical areas of epistemology and philosophy of science. So I conclude that medical ethics needs more philosophy, but not more moral philosophy.

K8

Whither Conceptual Analysis?

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 13.30–16.30 Uhr, 15/128
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 1:30 p.m.–4:30 p.m., 15/128

Conceptual analysis is one of philosophy's classic methods, arguably practiced already in Plato's early dialogues. Even many contemporary debates, for example, about knowledge, free will, or causality, are hardly conceivable without some amount of conceptual analysis. Its venerable history and enduring importance notwithstanding, conceptual analysis has also been attacked from various directions in recent decades. Beginning with Quine's attack on analyticity, continuing with the rise of semantic externalism, and culminating most recently in the experimental philosophy movement, many contemporary philosophers were eager to proclaim the death of conceptual analysis—prematurely, as it now seems. For one, conceptual analysis may have survived simply because of the lack of compelling alternatives. For example, although naturalists have suggested to

study philosophical phenomena by scientific means, they have so far failed to offer a widely accepted replacement for conceptual analysis in a number of key philosophical debates. Moreover, conceptual analysts have answered many of the most pressing challenges with innovative theoretical tools, such as the Carnap-Lewis-Ramsey method for analyzing interrelated concepts, or two-dimensional semantics as a way to accommodate semantic externalist intuitions. So is the method of conceptual analysis in better shape today than ever? What speaks against this overly optimistic attitude is the fact that, in recent years, even well-known proponents of conceptual analysis have suggested revisionary accounts of this method, or adopted a deflationary attitude towards its results. Against this background, it seems like a good moment again to take stock and reexamine the method of conceptual analysis, and to ask: what might happen to this time-honored method in 21st century analytic philosophy?

Organisation / organization: **Joachim Horvath, Jens Kipper**

13.30–13.35 Uhr 1:30 p.m.–1:35 p.m.	Jens Kipper (Cologne) Welcoming & Introduction
13.35–14.30 Uhr 1:35 p.m.–2:30 p.m.	Frank Jackson (Australian National University / Princeton) Three Grades of Involvement in Conceptual Analysis
14.25–15.10 Uhr 2:25 p.m.–3:10 p.m.	Amie Thomasson (Miami) Is Metaphysical Work Conceptual Work? (and What Kind of Conceptual Work Is It?)
15.10–15.20 Uhr 3:10 p.m.–3:20 p.m.	<i>coffee break</i>
15.20–16.05 Uhr 3:20 p.m.–4:05 p.m.	Stephen Yablo (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) A Posteriori Conceptual Necessities
16.05–16.30 Uhr 4:05 p.m.–4:30 p.m.	Chair: Joachim Horvath (Cologne) roundtable discussion

K8 Jackson

Three Grades of Involvement in Conceptual Analysis

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und / and
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Conceptual analysis isn't the exploration of some mysterious realm populated by things called ›concepts‹, with the aim of finding their structure—whatever that might come to. It is part and parcel of the business of making sense of the complex world we occupy. For an important part of that process is finding the right, a priori determined properties in terms of which to frame our explanations and predictions. The three grades relate to the extent to which we are able to articulate which properties do the a priori determining. I start by discussing some easy examples from science before turning to famously hard examples from the philosophical literature like personal identity and knowledge. I conclude by reviewing what our discussion teaches us about the value of conceptual analysis.

K8 Thomasson

**Is Metaphysical Work Conceptual Work?
(and What Kind of Conceptual Work Is It?)**

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Serious metaphysicians think of themselves as making discoveries about what really exists, and about the persistence conditions or modal properties of things of various sorts. But formidable epistemic problems arise in figuring out how we are supposed to come to know the relevant ontological and modal facts—or why the standard methods of metaphysicians should be thought of as suited for revealing the hidden metaphysical truth.

Deflationists who are suspicious of the pretensions of serious metaphysics have suggested that many metaphysical disputes can be understood as merely verbal disputes (resolvable just by determining who is speaking English) or as resolvable ›easily‹ via conceptual analysis or a straightforward combination of empirical and conceptual work. The deflationary views enable us to avoid the epistemic problems of serious metaphysics and achieve methodological clarity. Yet they are often rejected on grounds of being unable to make sufficient sense of what disputants in metaphysical debates are doing. Moreover, many accuse them of failing to account for the felt depth, importance, and worldly orientation even of classic debates in metaphysics, and rendering metaphysics a trivial or parochial exercise.

I will suggest here a different way of understanding metaphysical work as conceptual work. For, I will argue, many debates in metaphysics may be understood as involved in what David Plunkett and Tim Sundell have

called ›metalinguistic negotiation‹. This view enables us to make far better sense of what disputants in many metaphysical debates are up to, and gives a better model of what is going on in metaphysical disputes than the verbal disputes idea does. Moreover, this view respects the sense that at least many traditional metaphysical debates are deep, important, and world-oriented. Nonetheless, it enables us to retain the epistemic and methodological attractions of the deflationary approach.

The upshot will be a broader picture of ways metaphysical work can be conceived of as conceptual work—giving us a better view of what metaphysics can legitimately do and how we can do it, while avoiding the obscurities of serious metaphysics.

K8 Yablo

A Posteriori Conceptual Necessities

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Can there be conceptually necessary truths that require experience to confirm? One purported example is *The figure defined by [such and such an equation] is oval* (Yablo 2002). Another is *10 inches exceeds 25 centimeters* (Williamson 2007). These are a posteriori even if one can verify them ›in the head‹, since the discovery method involves running perceptual capacities off-line on mental models. It may be objected that some such off-line exercises seem relatively a priori. Consider, for instance, working through a diagrammatic proof of the Pythagorean Theorem in ›the mind's eye‹. Why would some mind's eye exercises seem more a priori than others? And why do some sense modalities seem better-suited to providing a priori knowledge than others? If we can make a priori discoveries with the mind's eye, why not the mind's ear, or nose?

K9

Varieties of Explanation

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 13.30–16.30 Uhr, 15/E16
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 1:30 p.m.–4:30 p.m., 15/E16

The topic of explanation has long been a focus of philosophical attention. As even a cursory look at the literature reveals, talk of different *kinds* of explanations abounds in philosophy—we find reference to *scientific* explanation, *causal* explanation, *teleological* explanation, *functional* explanation, *conceptual* explanation, *metaphysical* explanation, *program* explanation, *mechanistic* explanation ... to name but a few. Moreover, these dif-

ferent labels are often associated with quite different sets of properties. This obviously raises the question of what, if anything, the relevant phenomena have in common—what makes them all kinds of *explanation*? This colloquium will attempt to contribute to the investigation of this question. It will focus on two kinds of explanation: *causal explanation*, and so-called *metaphysical explanation*. The colloquium will bring together leading researchers from both the philosophy of science and metaphysics, and thereby foster a discussion which is so far underdeveloped.

Organisation / organization: Miguel Hoeltje, Raphael van Riel

13.30–13.35 Uhr 1:30 p.m.–1:35 p.m.	Introduction
13.35–14.30 Uhr 1:35 p.m.–2:30 p.m.	Michael Strevens (New York University) A Unified Framework for Explanation
14.30–14.35 Uhr 2:30 p.m.–2:35 p.m.	<i>break</i>
14.35–15.30 Uhr 2:35 p.m.–3:30 p.m.	Benjamin Schnieder (Hamburg) ›Because‹
15.30–15.35 Uhr 3:30 p.m.–3:35 p.m.	<i>break</i>
15.35–16.30 Uhr 3:35 p.m.–4:30 p.m.	Jonathan Schaffer (Rutgers) Causal, Metaphysical, and Mathematical Explanation: Towards Unification

K9 Schaffer

**Causal, Metaphysical, and Mathematical
Explanation: Towards Unification**

Jonathan Schaffer
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There is a standard story about the classic deductive-nomological account of explanation, on which that account faced counterexamples because it failed to require a directed connection from explanans to explanandum. Causal accounts of explanation were said to resolve such counterexamples by requiring a directed connection of causation. Yet not all explanation is causal explanation. For instance, one might explain why a system has certain chemical properties at a given time in terms of its physical properties at that time. This is a style of explanation that turns on a different sort of directed connection, namely grounding (the higher-level features of the system are grounded in its lower-level features). It is natural to try to liberalize causal accounts of explanation to include grounding as a second sort of directed connection. But two questions arise. First, what do causation and grounding have in common, that other directed connections lack, that give those two relations the special ability to back explanation? Second, can this picture be extended to the case of mathematical explanation, where it is not obvious that there is any directed connection available to back explanation?

K9 Schnieder

›Because‹

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In the talk, I explore the connection between two projects: Stating the semantics of ›because‹-statements and giving a theory of explanation.

K9 Strevens

A Unified Framework for Explanation

Michael Strevens
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
I propose a unified framework for explanation in any field of inquiry: science, mathematics, metaphysics, moral thinking, history, law, art criticism, and more. Any domain in which explanation is possible has its own perhaps proprietary kind of dependence relation; the goal of explanation is to abstract from the relevant network of dependence just those features that made or make a difference to the explanandum's holding. The framework is introduced in the familiar context of causal explanation; examples of mathematical and moral explanation are then developed.

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


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
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
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
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15/115 Chair: Hufendiek, Rebekka	Schlicht, Tobias <i>Subjective Character</i>	
15/131 Chair: Grüne, Stefanie	Wüstholtz, Florian <i>De Se Beliefs: Troubles with Self-Ascription</i>	
6 Erkenntnistheorie / epistemology		
11/213 Chair: Ernst, Gerhard	Dinges, Alexander <i>Skeptical Pragmatic Invariantism: Good, but Not Good Enough</i>	
11/214 Chair: Feldbacher, Christian	Fischer, Eugen <i>Submarine Iceberg Epistemology: Or, Experimental Philosophy 2.0</i>	
8 Ästhetik / aesthetics		
15/105 Chair: Fischer, Christoph	Schmalzried, Lisa Katharin <i>Beauty and the Sensory-Dependence-Thesis</i>	
10 Normative Ethik / normative ethics		
11/115 Chair: Wessels, Ulla	Albertzart, Maike <i>Group Agency without Moral Agency</i>	
11 Metaethik, Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie / metaethics, action theory and decision theory		
15/113 Chair: Köhler, Sebastian	Heinzelmann, Nora <i>Moral Conflicts as Conflicts of Judgement</i>	
13 Geschichte und Methode der Analytischen Philosophie / history and methods of analytic philosophy		
11/211 Chair: Roski, Stephan	Claas, Jan <i>Bolzano und die Unerklärbarkeit der Beziehung zwischen Begriffen und ihren Gegenständen</i>	Rohr, Tabea <i>Frege über das Verhältnis von Arithmetik und Geometrie</i>
S Zweiter Studierendenkongress für Philosophie / Second Student Conference in Philosophy		
15/E28	Lang, Lukas <i>The Incredible Gunk</i>	

Sektionsvorträge (Übersicht) / contributed section talks (overview)

Mittwoch, 9.45–10.30 Uhr
Wednesday, 9:45 a.m.–10:30 a.m.

Mittwoch, 10.30–11.15 Uhr
Wednesday, 10:30 a.m.–11:15 a.m.

1	Sprachphilosophie / philosophy of language	
11/215 Chair: Kompa, Nikola	Nimtz, Christian <i>A Pragmatic Argument for Neo-Descriptivism</i>	Milne-Plückebaum, Daniel <i>Where Does the Actually Existent Golden Mountain Actually Exist?</i>
2	Metaphysik und Ontologie / metaphysics and ontology	
15/E27 Chair: Werner, Jonas	Hoffmann-Kolss, Vera <i>On a Sufficient Condition for Hyperintensionality</i>	Patrone, Fabio <i>Against Naturalistic Perdurantism</i>
3	Logik / logic	
11/116 Chair: Wansing, Heinrich	Verdeé, Peter <i>Understanding Scientific Dialectics by Means of Adaptive Logics</i>	Liefke, Kristina / Werning, Markus <i>Evidence for Single-Type Semantics: An Alternative to e/t-Based Dual-Type Semantics</i>
4	Wissenschaftstheorie / philosophy of science	
15/111 Chair: Menke, Cornelis	Fahrbach, Ludwig <i>IBE and Bayesianism: A Couple in Harmony</i>	Dziurosz-Serafinowicz, Patryk <i>A Resiliency-Based Approach to Chance</i>
15/133 Chair: Kästner, Lena	Büter, Anke <i>Psychiatric Classification between Science and Practice</i>	Kornmesser, Stephan <i>Frame-basierte Repräsentation operationalisierter Begriffe</i>
15/134 Chair: Näger, Paul	Henschen, Tobias <i>Ceteris Paribus Conditions and the Interventionist Account of Causality</i>	Held, Carsten <i>What Is a Ceteris Paribus Law?</i>
5	Philosophie des Geistes und der Kognition / philosophy of mind and cognition	
15/114 Chair: Gauker, Christopher	Staudacher, Alexander <i>A Problem with the Epistemic Conception of Hallucination</i>	Schulte, Peter <i>Perceiving the World Outside: A New Causal-Teleological Account of Perceptual Content</i>
15/115 Chair: Hufendiek, Rebekka	Musholt, Kristina <i>What Is at Stake in the Mindreading Debate?</i>	Moore, Richard <i>Is Gricean Communication a Form of Joint Action?</i>
15/131 Chair: Grüne, Stefanie	Brandl, Johannes <i>How to Acquire a Self-concept? In Defence of the Linguistic View</i>	Sattig, Thomas <i>Memory, Reflexivity, and Personal Identity: Does the Lockean Tradition Rest on a Mistake?</i>
6	Erkenntnistheorie / epistemology	
11/213 Chair: Ernst, Gerhard	Haverkamp, Nick <i>Williamson on Mathematical Knowability</i>	Dahlback, Morten L. <i>Epistemic Decision Theory and Higher-Order Evidence</i>
11/214 Chair: Feldbacher, Christian	Croce, Michel <i>Expert-oriented Abilities vs Novice-oriented Abilities: An Alternative Account of Epistemic Authority</i>	Weber, Marc Andree <i>Peer Disagreement with Seemingly Irrational Peers</i>
8	Ästhetik / aesthetics	
15/105 Chair: Fischer, Christoph	Réz, Anna / Bárány, Tibor <i>You Shouldn't Like This: A Novel Account of Personal Taste</i>	McGuiggan, James Camien <i>A Problem with Abstraction in Understanding the Effect of Morals on Aesthetic Value</i>
10	Normative Ethik / normative ethics	
11/115 Chair: Wessels, Ulla	Seidel, Christian <i>Risking Compliance and Discounting Risks of Harm: Re-Assessing the Idea of a ›Chain of Obligations‹</i>	Wündisch, Joachim <i>Territorial Rights and Climate Change</i>
11	Metaethik, Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie / metaethics, action theory and decision theory	
15/113 Chair: Köhler, Sebastian	Blum, Christian <i>Zur Verteidigung des Wertpluralismus gegen den Unvergleichbarkeitseinwand</i>	Messerli, Michael <i>Unvergleichbarkeit und Rationalität</i>
13	Geschichte und Methode der Analytischen Philosophie / history and methods of analytic philosophy	
11/211 Chair: Roski, Stephan	Lötscher, Pascale Anna <i>Hilbert's Rescue of Mathematics</i>	Reichold, Anne <i>Peter Strawsons Analyse reaktiver Haltungen im Kontext der Oxford Philosophy</i>
S	Zweiter Studierendenkongress für Philosophie / Second Student Conference in Philosophy	
15/E28	Piwonka, Marius <i>Konstitutivistische Begründung moralischer Verpflichtung</i>	Kirfel, Lara <i>Fallible Minds</i>

Sektionsvorträge (Übersicht) / contributed section talks (overview)

Mittwoch, 13.30–14.15 Uhr Wednesday, 1:30 p.m.–2:15 p.m.		Mittwoch, 14.15–15.00 Uhr Wednesday, 2:15 p.m.–3:00 p.m.
2	Metaphysik und Ontologie / metaphysics and ontology	
15/E27 Chair: Jaster, Romy	Krämer, Stephan <i>On the Granularity of Ground</i>	Werner, Jonas <i>Bootstrapping and Contingent Grounding</i>
3	Logik / logic	
11/116 Chair: Dutilh-Novaes, Catarina	Shramko, Yaroslav <i>A Modal Translation for Dual-Intuitionistic Logic</i>	Wansing, Heinrich <i>On Split Negation, Falsification, and Verification</i>
4	Wissenschaftstheorie / philosophy of science	
15/133 Chair: Kaiser, Marie I.	Krödel, Thomas <i>Causal Modelling and Mental Causation</i>	Meyer, Thomas <i>Schließt der kausale Interventionismus eine kausale Wirksamkeit des Mentalen aus?</i>
5	Philosophie des Geistes und der Kognition / philosophy of mind and cognition	
15/115 Chair: Newen, Albert	Gauker, Christopher <i>The Role of Inner Speech in Metacognitive Awareness of Success in Categorization</i>	Michel, Christoph <i>Attitudes and Norms of Rationality</i>
15/131 Chair: Schulte, Peter	Störzinger, Tobias <i>Was ist ›analytische Metakognition?‹ – Gegen das Modell des ›evaluativen Abgleichs‹ und für ein Modell des ›inneren Begründens‹</i>	Fricke, Martin <i>Three Transparency Theories of Self-Knowledge: Moran, Byrne and Fernández</i>
15/134 Chair: Brandl, Johannes	Grüne, Stefanie <i>A Master-Argument for Representationalism?</i>	Smortchkova, Joulia <i>Extending the Reach of Perceptual Content</i>
6	Erkenntnistheorie / epistemology	
11/213 Chair: Schmechtig, Pedro	Bewersdorf, Benjamin <i>Conceptual Learning and Bayesian Epistemology</i>	Briesen, Jochen <i>Bayesianismus und Evidentielle Eindeutigkeit</i>
11/214 Chair: Vetter, Barbara	Flowerree, Amy / Kruse, Andrea <i>How to Be an Epistemic Consequentialist (Or, how We Learned not to Be a Mad Mad Dog Reliabilist)</i>	Feldbacher, Christian <i>Epistemic Normativity of Social Reliabilism</i>
8	Ästhetik / aesthetics	
15/105 Chair: Langkau, Julia	Bahr, Amrei <i>Was ist ein Artefakt?</i>	Fischer, Christoph <i>Absicht und Kreation: Gibt es nicht-intendierte Artefakte?</i>
9	Angewandte Ethik / applied ethics	
11/215 Chair: Hallich, Oliver	Schmidt-Petri, Christoph <i>Persistenz, Tod und die Dead Donour Rule</i>	Witt, Karsten <i>Praktisch tot</i>
10	Normative Ethik / normative ethics	
11/115 Chair: Wündisch, Joachim	Dufner, Anette <i>Der Prioritarismus: eine distributions-sensitive Form des Konsequentialismus?</i>	Višak, Tatjana <i>Happiness: A Mere Instrumental Prudential Good?</i>
11	Metaethik, Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie / metaethics, action theory and decision theory	
15/111 Chair: Schmidt, Thomas	Köhler, Sebastian <i>Expressivism, Belief, and All That</i>	Schwind, Philipp <i>Ethical Intuitionism and the Linguistic Analogy</i>
15/113 Chair: Kieseewetter, Benjamin	Schulz, Moritz <i>Fundamental Desire and Belief</i>	Fischer, Stefan <i>What is Promoting a Desire?</i>
15/114 Chair: Gertken, Jan	Kietzmann, Christian <i>Zwei Konzeptionen des geteilten Handelns</i>	Kasman, Tobias <i>Können Kollektivakteure Subjekte einer kantianischen Ethik sein?</i>
12	Politische Philosophie, Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie / political philosophy, philosophy of law and social philosophy	
11/211 Chair: Dietrich, Frank	Mildenberger, Carl David <i>Externalities and Market Exchange</i>	Wollner, Gabriel <i>Morally Bankrupt: International Financial Governance and the Ethics of Sovereign Default</i>
S	Zweiter Studierendenkongress für Philosophie / Second Student Conference in Philosophy	
15/E28	Poth, Nina L. <i>A Solution to the Complex First Paradox</i>	Rueger, Korbinian <i>The Close Enough View in Distributive Ethics and its Alleged Violation of Two Dominance Principles</i>

Sektionsvorträge (Übersicht) / contributed section talks (overview)

Mittwoch, 15.15–16.00 Uhr
Wednesday, 3:15 p.m.–4:00 p.m.

Mittwoch, 16.00–16.45 Uhr
Wednesday, 4:00 p.m.–4:45 p.m.

1	Sprachphilosophie / philosophy of language	
15/114 Chair: Nimtz, Christian	Felka, Katharina <i>On Easy Arguments for the Existence of Numbers</i>	Fraissler, Hannes <i>Informativity and Schmididentity</i>
2	Metaphysik und Ontologie / metaphysics and ontology	
15/105 Chair: Wildman, Nathan	Jaskolla, Ludwig / Gierstl, Ludwig <i>Within the Internal World. Why Panpsychism Trumps Neutral Monism</i>	Hörzer, Gregor <i>Zombies Threaten the Contingency of Physicalism and Dualism</i>
15/E27 Chair: Jaster, Romy	van Riel, Raphael <i>Relation Tracking Accounts of Explanation and the Semantics of ›Because‹</i>	Balcerak Jackson, Brendan <i>Semantics as a Guide to Ground</i>
3	Logik / logic	
11/116 Chair: Dutilh-Novaes, Catarina	Stern, Johannes <i>A New Norm for Truth</i>	Reinmuth, Friedrich <i>Assumptions and Reasons</i>
4	Wissenschaftstheorie / philosophy of science	
15/133 Chair: Kaiser; Marie I.	Brooks, Daniel <i>Avoiding the Supervenience Trap: Causal Exclusion and Interventionist Solutions to Higher-Level Causation</i>	Eronen, Markus <i>Defending the Interventionist Solution to the Exclusion Problem</i>
15/134 Chair: Friederich, Simon	Menke, Cornelis <i>Das Innovationsproblem: Kuhn'sche und pragmatistische Lösungsansätze</i>	Leuschner, Anna <i>Social Exclusion despite Methodological Criteria: On Biases in Scientific Quality Evaluation</i>
5	Philosophie des Geistes und der Kognition / philosophy of mind and cognition	
15/115 Chair: Newen, Albert	Brüssel, Peter <i>On the Rationale of Reverse Inference in Neuroscience</i>	Matthiessen, Hannes Ole <i>Perspektivische Wahrnehmung, Repräsentationalismus und die Geometry of Visibles</i>
15/131 Chair: Schulte, Peter	Bohl, Vivian <i>The Blind Spot in Social Cognition Research: Social Relationships</i>	Hufendiek, Rebekka <i>Why a Theory of Emotions Needs a Concept of Representation</i>
6	Erkenntnistheorie / epistemology	
11/213 Chair: Schmechtig, Pedro	Eder, Anna-Maria <i>Getting Rid of Ideal Agents</i>	Betz, Gregor <i>The Veritistic Merit of Doxastic Conservatism in Belief Revision</i>
11/214 Chair: Vetter, Barbara	Backmann, Marius <i>The Metaphysics of Induction</i>	Koscholke, Jakob <i>Carnap's Relevance Measure as Probabilistic Measure of Coherence</i>
9	Angewandte Ethik / applied ethics	
11/215 Chair: Laimann, Jessica	Tarkian, Tatjana <i>Der Begriff des Todes als Clusterbegriff</i>	Muders, Sebastian <i>Menschenwürde: intrinsisch, inhärent, absolut?</i>
10	Normative Ethik / normative ethics	
11/115 Chair: Wündisch, Joachim	Henning, Tim <i>Kant's Ethics and the Problem of Maxim Fiddling</i>	Roadevin, Cristina <i>In Defence of Elective Forgiveness</i>
11	Metaethik, Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie / metaethics, action theory and decision theory	
15/111 Chair: Schmidt, Thomas	Huppert, Benjamin <i>Inconsistency in Relevance-Based Evolutionary Debunking Arguments</i>	Bratu, Christine / Dittmeyer, Moritz <i>Weil die Regeln es fordern? Kritik des Konstitutivismus</i>
15/113 Chair: Kieseewetter, Benjamin	Koch, Felix <i>Voluntarism and Practical Deliberation</i>	Altehenger, Hannah <i>The Real Advantage of a Divided Mind Account of Self-Control</i>
12	Politische Philosophie, Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie / political philosophy, philosophy of law and social philosophy	
11/211 Chair: Dietrich, Frank	Urban, Konrad <i>Global and Local Exclusivity in Intellectual Property</i>	Shnayderman, Ronen <i>Overall Freedom-Measurement and Evaluation</i>
S	Zweiter Studierendenkongress für Philosophie / Second Student Conference in Philosophy	
15/E28	Fischer, Enno <i>Welche Rolle spielt der Begriff der Kausalität in der Physik?</i>	Bleisch, Dorothee <i>Können Konsequentialisten Freunde sein?</i>

Sektionsvorträge (Übersicht) / contributed section talks (overview)

Donnerstag, 9.00–9.45 Uhr Thursday, 9:00 a.m.–9:45 a.m.		Donnerstag, 9.45–10.30 Uhr Thursday, 9:45 a.m.–10:30 a.m.	
1 Sprachphilosophie / philosophy of language			
15/114 Chair: Kompa, Nikola	Prien, Bernd <i>Robert Brandom on Rational Rectification and the Objective Validity of Inferences</i>	Bouche, Gilles <i>Ein Beweis dafür, dass Sprache singuläre Termini und Prädikate enthalten muss</i>	
2 Metaphysik und Ontologie / metaphysics and ontology			
15/105 Chair: Hoffmann-Kolss, Vera	Wörner, David <i>Relative Identity and the Semantics of Proper Names</i>	Mayr, Erasmus <i>The Individuation of Processes</i>	
15/E27 Chair: Roski, Stefan	Diehl, Catharine <i>Fineness of Grain and Grounding: A Lewisian Account?</i>	Wildman, Nathan <i>For Contingent Necessity-Makers</i>	
3 Logik / logic			
11/116 Chair: Shramko, Yaroslav	Dutilh-Novaes, Catarina <i>A Dialogical Analysis of Structural Rules</i>	French, Rohan <i>Structural Reflexivity and the Semantic Paradoxes</i>	
4 Wissenschaftstheorie / philosophy of science			
15/133 Chair: Harbecke, Jens	Durán, Juan <i>Varying the Explanatory Span: Scientific Explanation in Computer Simulations</i>	Haas, Gordian <i>Fleshing out Quineian Empiricism</i>	
15/134 Chair: Held, Carsten	Boge, Florian <i>On the Epistemic Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics</i>	Müller, Thomas <i>Thermodynamics and Statistical Mechanics: A Difference of Sorts</i>	
5 Philosophie des Geistes und der Kognition / philosophy of mind and cognition			
15/115 Chair: Hofmann, Frank	Dellantonio, Sara / Pastore, Luigi <i>Abstractness Reconsidered. The Internal Grounding of the Human Conceptual System</i>	Drozdewska, Anna / Sartenaer, Olivier <i>Does Synchronic Causation Save the Mental from Exclusion?</i>	
15/131 Chair: Sattig, Thomas	von Maur, Imke <i>The Epistemic Goal and Value of Emotions</i>	Marchi, Francesco <i>Cognitive Penetration and Emotion Recognition</i>	
6 Erkenntnistheorie / epistemology			
11/213 Chair: Eder, Anna-Maria	Dorsch, Fabian <i>The Phenomenal Presence of Reasons</i>	Schmitz, Michael <i>Does Experience Provide Reasons for Belief?</i>	
11/214 Chair: Kruse, Andrea	Lawler, Insa <i>Knowledge-Why Revisited</i>	Schmechtig, Pedro <i>Wissen-wie, kognitive Leistungen und epistemische Werte</i>	
9 Angewandte Ethik / applied ethics			
11/215 Chair: Tarkian, Tatjana	Schnüriger, Hubert <i>Die gegenwärtigen Rechte in der Zukunft lebender Personen</i>	Omerbasic, Alina <i>Der Schädigungsbegriff in der ethischen Debatte um die Reproduktionsmedizin</i>	
10 Normative Ethik / normative ethics			
11/115 Chair: Pfannkuche, Walter	von Wedelstaedt, Almut <i>Keine Geschichte(n) für Theorien narrativer Identität</i>	Blöser, Claudia / Stahl, Titus <i>Fundamental Hope and Practical Identity</i>	
11 Metaethik, Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie / metaethics, action theory and decision theory			
15/111 Chair: Gertken, Jan	Padel, Stephan <i>When Two People Quarrel, the Objectivist Rejoices? Why Our Intuitions towards Moral Disagreement Don't Favor Objectivism</i>	Sticker, Martin <i>Taking an Agent's Global Outlook Seriously: A Conciliatationist Response to Peer Disagreement Does not Lead to Skepticism in Ethics</i>	
15/113 Chair: Schulz, Moritz	Menges, Leonhard <i>How Blameworthiness Requires Wrongness</i>	Lumer, Christoph <i>Unconscious Motives and Actions: Responsibility and Agency</i>	
12 Politische Philosophie, Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie / political philosophy, philosophy of law and social philosophy			
11/211 Chair: Dietrich, Frank	Müller-Salo, Johannes <i>Was ist Gewalt? Eine begriffliche Analyse</i>	Wendt, Fabian <i>Zum Verhältnis von Frieden und Gerechtigkeit</i>	
S Zweiter Studierendenkongress für Philosophie / Second Student Conference in Philosophy			
15/E28	Mattner, Cosima <i>Selbst</i>	Privitera, Johanna <i>How to Account for our Duties in Rescue Cases</i>	

Sektionsvorträge (Übersicht) / contributed section talks (overview)

Donnerstag, 10.30–11.15 Uhr
Thursday, 10:30 a.m.–11:15 a.m.

Donnerstag, 11.15–12.00 Uhr
Thursday, 11:15 a.m.–noon

1	Sprachphilosophie / philosophy of language	
15/114 Chair: Kompa, Nikola	Schieder, Jakob <i>Necessity in Virtue of Meaning</i>	Doerge, Friedrich Christoph <i>Much Ado about Performatives</i>
2	Metaphysik und Ontologie / metaphysics and ontology	
15/105 Chair: Hoffmann-Kolss, Vera	Kitsik, Eve <i>Can Philosophical Ontology Be Practically Significant?</i>	Vogt, Lisa <i>A Problem for Bird's Dispositional Essentialism</i>
15/E27 Chair: Roski, Stefan	Kitamura, Naoaki <i>Defending Priority Views from the Gunk/Junk Argument</i>	Pleitz, Martin <i>Metaphysical Foundationalism and the Paradoxes of Non-Well-Foundedness</i>
3	Logik / logic	
11/116 Chair: Shramko, Yaroslav	Stei, Erik <i>Logical Pluralism and the Argument from Incoherence</i>	Strößner, Corina <i>The Normativity of Probability and Logic; Or: The Difference Between Lotteries and Books</i>
4	Wissenschaftstheorie / philosophy of science	
15/133 Chair: Harbecke, Jens	Starzak, Tobias <i>Morgan's Canon—Interpretation and Justification</i>	Mantzavinos, Chrysostomos <i>Explanatory Progress</i>
15/134 Chair: Held, Carsten	Friebe, Cord <i>Leibniz-Prinzip, Tropen-Ontologie und die Quantenmechanik</i>	Friederich, Simon <i>Symmetries and the Identity of Physical States</i>
5	Philosophie des Geistes und der Kognition / philosophy of mind and cognition	
15/115 Chair: Hofmann, Frank	Baumgartner, Michael / Wilutzky, Wendy <i>Mutual Manipulability and the Extension of Cognition</i>	Michels, Robert <i>One-Dimensional versus Two-Dimensional Zombies</i>
15/131 Chair: Sattig, Thomas	Newen, Albert <i>What Is an Emotion?</i>	Müller, Jean Moritz <i>How to Think of Emotions as Evaluative Modes</i>
6	Erkenntnistheorie / epistemology	
11/213 Chair: Eder, Anna-Maria	Müller, Andreas <i>Reasons-Factualism and Rationality without Reasons</i>	Berghofer, Philipp <i>Justification First!</i>
11/214 Chair: Kruse, Andrea	Löwenstein, David <i>Analyzing >to know how to< and Explaining Intelligent Practice</i>	Wieben, Jan <i>Practical Knowledge: Between Thought and Practice</i>
9	Angewandte Ethik / applied ethics	
11/215 Chair: Witt, Karsten	Klonschinski, Andrea <i>Das disability adjusted life year im Rahmen des Global Burden of Disease Projekts – Eine Kritik seiner Aussagekraft und normativen Relevanz</i>	Lyreskog, David M. / Nagel, Saskia K. <i>The Possibilities and Limitations of Motivation Enhancing Drugs</i>
10	Normative Ethik / normative ethics	
11/115 Chair: Pfannkuche, Walter	Bratu, Christine <i>Personale Selbstachtung</i>	Berninger, Anja <i>Warum Manieren wichtig sind</i>
11	Metaethik, Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie / metaethics, action theory and decision theory	
15/111 Chair: Gertken, Jan	Rechenauer, Martin / Roy, Olivier <i>A Formal Approach to Consensus in Discourse Ethics</i>	Gaus, Simon <i>Was ist mentale Inkonsistenz?</i>
15/113 Chair: Schulz, Moritz	Čeč, Filip / Malatesti, Luca <i>Self-knowledge and Moral Responsibility: The Case of Psychopathy</i>	Wagner, Verena <i>On why Indeterminism Matters for Compatibilism</i>
12	Politische Philosophie, Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie / political philosophy, philosophy of law and social philosophy	
11/211 Chair: Dietrich, Frank	Wallimann-Helmer, Ivo <i>The Ultimate Purpose of Social Equality</i>	
S	Zweiter Studierendenkongress für Philosophie / Second Student Conference in Philosophy	
15/E28	Fox, Philip <i>The Subjective Incoherence Argument Against Parfit's Agony Argument</i>	Horrig, Benjamin <i>The Conjunction Fallacy, Belief and Inference to the Best Explanation</i>

Sektionsvorträge (Abstracts) / contributed section talks (abstracts)

10

Albertzart

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 9.00 Uhr, 11/115
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 9:00 a.m., 11/115

Group Agency without Moral Agency

Maïke Albertzart

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Private business corporations and other organisations are often treated as appropriate objects of moral blame in public discourse. According to authors like Peter French, Christian List and Philip Pettit, such talk of a group's moral responsibility is to be taken literally: Groups can constitute group agents that are appropriate subjects of moral responsibility. I argue that although groups can form intentional, rational agents, they fail to be appropriate subjects of moral responsibility in the cases where holding them responsible has been claimed to be of normative significance.

Due to their internal decision procedures some groups can develop »minds of their own« (Pettit 2003). Proponents of group responsibility believe that assigning such group agents the status of moral agents is of moral importance, because a failure to do so would »lead to a deficit of responsibility« in cases where none of the group's members are fully morally responsible for a harm caused by the group (List and Pettit 2011: 165). However, given methodological individualism, a group agent's capacities—including its moral capacities—will have to be explicable in terms of its members' capacities. In the cases at issue the group agent's alleged moral capacities are not explicable in terms of those of its members because, by definition, the group's members are unable to make full use of their moral capacities. The group agent will thus be unable to fill the gap in responsibility.

Moreover, even in cases where a group's members are fit to be held fully morally responsible, the group agent does not automatically inherit the full-fledged moral agency of its members. Group agents are created for specific purposes and these purposes determine the principles of their willing. A group agent's internal decision procedures, and hence its judgements and actions, are confined to those that serve its designated purposes. Accordingly, a group agent has access only to those moral capacities of its members that are in line with its internal decision structure.

This conclusion does not need to lead to a deficit in responsibility. I will offer an alternative, individualistic solution for bridging the alleged responsibility gap.

11

Altehenger

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 16.00 Uhr, 15/113
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 4:00 p.m., 15/113

The Real Advantage of a Divided Mind Account of Self-Control

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Self-control is needed in order to bring it about that we act in accordance with our normative judgment when being tempted to engage in a course of action incompatible with that judgment. One of the most interesting issues in the philosophical debate on self-control concerns the question of whether adequately accounting for self-control requires the postulation of mental divisions. While Chandra Sripada has recently defended an affirmative answer to that question, others, e.g. Alfred Mele, have criticized this claim. In my talk I will argue that the divided mind account has an important advantage that has not yet been sufficiently emphasized: unlike other prominent accounts of self-control, such as the account defended by Mele himself, it can meet an explanatory challenge that is central to theorizing about self-control. Roughly, this challenge is as follows: how can one explain that tempted agents sometimes are sufficiently motivated to exercise self-control in order to resist temptation while at the same time being most motivated to succumb to temptation?

In a first step, I will discuss the explanation put forward by Mele which crucially relies upon factors such as focus of attention and mode of representation. I will argue that this explanation is deeply problematic. First, a closer look at the attentional condition of tempted agents reveals that it lacks explanatory power. Second, it has the implausible implication of making our capacity for self-control too fragile. In a second step, I will turn to the divided mind account of self-control. One of its basic contentions is the claim that the exercise of self-control is an action that is exclusively available to one part of the divided mind. I will argue that in virtue of this claim the divided mind account can successfully address the explanatory challenge at issue while portraying our capacity for self-control as sufficiently robust.

6

Backmann

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 15.15 Uhr, 11/214
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 3:15 p.m., 11/214

The Metaphysics of Induction

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In my talk, I will investigate the question whether the ontological view that there are necessary connections has an influence on the solubility of the problem of induction.

Inductive inferences need to be justified because they are ampliative, i.e. the content of the conclusion goes beyond the content of the premises. Finding such a justification for inductive inferences constitutes the *old*

problem of induction. Independent from this, there is the ontological debate whether there are necessary connections or whether there is just a »[...] vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one little thing and then another« (Lewis 1986, ix-x). This debate has become important for the old problem of induction since some necessitarian authors like David Armstrong claimed that they could solve the old problem. The general idea is that if there is a necessary connection between F and G, we are justified in inferring that future or unobserved Fs will also be Gs, since they simply could not be otherwise.

I will argue for the claim that attempts to justify induction by introducing necessary connections fail: they do not *justify* induction, but try (and fail) to *dissolve* the problem by reducing certain ampliative inferences to deductive ones. If it is necessary that all Fs are Gs, the inference to the fact that future or unobserved Fs will be Gs is not inductive anymore. To make matters worse, we still need an ampliative inference to discover that there even is a necessary connection between F and G. This inference again needs to be justified.

Moreover, I argue that Necessitarians and Humeans seem to employ different standards for what counts as a justification of induction: The necessitarians seem to seek to eliminate the ampliative step, whereas the non-necessitarians seek to demonstrate why certain ampliative inferences are successful. It seems unlikely that necessitarian demands for a justification will ever be met.

References

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Badenhop

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 14.15 Uhr, 15/113
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 2:15 p.m., 15/113

Nonconceptualism and the Conceptual Nature of Valuation

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While recent contribution on evaluative and moral sense perception approach the issue in a conceptualist framework, theorists of perception and emotion like S. Döring, M. Johnston, C. Tappolet or M. Tye assume the existence of *nonconceptual evaluative content*. In my talk, I will argue that there is no such content. Three plausible versions of nonconceptualism can be found in the literature: nonconceptual content can either be representationally basic content, innate content or a content for the complete characterization of which a thinker does not possess all necessary concepts. In none of these three frameworks evaluative content will ever come out as nonconceptual. Evaluative representations cannot be basic because this would conflict with the supervenience of the evaluative on the non-evaluative, as well as with the hypothetical generalizations, and systems of values in which these representations must be embedded. Second, evaluative representational capacities might be innate. But the claim of innateness is inadequate to support the nonconceptualist claim, since any nativism about valuation must, for reasons of symmetry, be a *concept nativism*. Third, state nonconceptualism for valuation is plausible but as it is not a thesis

about content cannot support the initial existential claim. Furthermore, if nonconceptualism about valuation is reformulated as a state view its theoretical purpose will be undermined.

Since nonconceptual evaluative content is impossible, I will finally propose to understand the content of evaluative experience as one, which is partially constituted by evaluative concepts in their *intuitional form*. This is a more viable way to capture some of the background assumptions behind the false nonconceptualist claim.

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Bahr

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 13.30 Uhr, 15/105
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 1:30 p.m., 15/105

Was ist ein Artefakt?

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Ohne Artefakte ist Kultur nicht denkbar – Artefakte sind wesentliche Elemente der Kunstwelt, aber etwa auch der Technik und der Wissenschaft. Die Beantwortung der Frage, was Artefakte auszeichnet, kann uns daher nicht nur zu einem besseren Verständnis künstlerischer Phänomene verhelfen, sondern darüber hinaus auch erhel- len, was Kunstwerke und ihre Instanzierungen mit technischen Innovationen oder wissenschaftlichen Theorien gemein haben. Eine überzeugende Definition des Ausdrucks »Artefakt« lässt sich somit nicht nur für die Kunst- und Kulturphilosophie, sondern ganz allgemein für die Kunst- und Kulturwissenschaften fruchtbar machen.

In der Philosophie ist bereits eine Reihe von Vorschlägen für die Definition von »Artefakt« vorgelegt worden. Einer signifikanten Anzahl von Definitionsvorschlägen zufolge zeichnen sich Artefakte jedenfalls dadurch aus, dass es sich bei ihnen um Gegenstände handelt, die absichtsvoll und für das Erfüllen einer Funktion produziert worden sind. In dieser Charakterisierung sind vier Bedingungen enthalten: Die *Arbeitsergebnisbedingung*, die *Gegenstandsbedingung*, die *Intentionsbedingung* und die *Funktionsbedingung*.

Mein Beitrag hat zum Ziel, im Rahmen einer Prüfung der Notwendigkeit dieser vier Bedingungen für den Artefaktstatus von Entitäten Anforderungen an eine überzeugende Definition des Ausdrucks »Artefakt« herauszuarbeiten und auf deren Grundlage eine eigene Definition zu entwickeln. Der Beitrag gliedert sich in zwei Teile. Der erste Teil ist der Diskussion der vier Bedingungen gewidmet: Ich zeige zunächst auf, warum es als plausibel erscheint, diese Bedingungen als für den Artefaktstatus notwendig aufzufassen. Dann hinterfrage ich ihre Notwendigkeit, indem ich jeweils einen Einwand gegen sie vorbringe. Jeden Einwand unterziehe ich schließlich einer kritischen Prüfung, wobei ich die Einsichten, die sich aus der Prüfung ergeben, abschließend in Form von Desiderata für eine Definition von »Artefakt« festhalte. Im zweiten Teil des Beitrags dienen mir die Desiderata zur Entwicklung einer eigenen Definition des Ausdrucks »Artefakt«. Ich zeige, inwiefern die Arbeitsergebnisbedingung, die Gegenstandsbedingung und die Intentionsbedingung einer Modifikation bedürfen, und lege dar, warum es vor dem Hintergrund des vierten Desiderats als sinnvoll erscheint, die Funktionsbedingung durch eine allgemeinere Bedingung zu ersetzen, nämlich die *Merkmalsbedingung*.

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Balcerak Jackson, Brendan

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 16.00 Uhr, 15/E27
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 4:00 p.m., 15/E27

Semantics as a Guide to Ground

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Does empirical work in truth-conditional compositional semantics for natural language have anything to contribute to the construction of a metaphysical theory of what grounds what? This paper argues that it does, in at least three ways. First, natural language semantics regularly identifies and explains patterns of entailment that hold just by virtue of the compositional structures of the sentences involved. These go far beyond the familiar patterns of logical entailment, but I argue that they constrain theories of ground in much the same way. Thus natural language semantics helps shape what Kit Fine calls the »impure logic of ground.« Next, I argue that the meaning-specifying theorems of an empirically adequate semantics impose a second range of constraints: if semantics shows us that sentence *S* is true if and only if *p*, then this must be captured by an adequate theory of ground via the relationship between whatever it posits as grounds for the fact that *S* and whatever it posits as grounds for the fact that *p*. Since meaning-specifying theorems frequently invoke entities such as events, degrees, possible worlds, and times, the constraints in this class include substantive ontological constraints. This leads to a third way in which semantics constrains theories of ground, since an adequate theory must capture the characteristics of the entities that are presupposed by the linguistic explanations that invoke them—how finely individuated they are, how they are related, and so on. To ground the existence of events (degrees, possible worlds, etc.) in the sense demanded by semantics simply is to ground the existence of entities that are characterized by the role given to them in semantic explanations. Thus grounding metaphysicians must not only pay attention to what semanticists say about the truth conditions of various kinds of constructions, they must also pay attention to how semanticists explain a potentially wide range of linguistic phenomena. If the arguments of this paper are correct, even pure metaphysicians of the neo-Aristotelian sort must be guided by the workings of natural language.

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Balcerak Jackson, Magdalena

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 13.30 Uhr, 15/115
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 1:30 p.m., 15/115

**My Imagining of Being Another:
What Imagination Teaches Us about
the Mineness of Experience**

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When we undergo conscious experiences such as perceptions, emotions, bodily sensations or certain forms of

conscious thought, we experience these states from a first-person perspective as our own. They exhibit mineness. Mineness is a basic phenomenal feature of mental states that is inextricably linked to their peculiar perspectival nature. An intuitive idea that seems suitable to capture this elusive but central feature of conscious experience is the following: Mental states or attitudes exhibit mineness because they are constitutively *about oneself* (under a specific mode of presentation). This idea comes in two basic variants: as a *self-representational view*, and as a *de se view*. In this talk, I argue that this type of approach to the mineness of conscious experience is mistaken. The strategy of the paper is to expose the deficits of the current views by analyzing a specific kind of conscious experience: imagining being another. The paper also suggests an alternative view of the mineness of conscious experience that is based on the representation of specific phenomenal modes of presentations of properties: the *phenomenal property profile view*.

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Baumann

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 14.15 Uhr, 11/115
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 2:15 p.m., 11/115

Die Unterbestimmtheit normativer Moraltheorien

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In der normativen Ethik lassen sich zwei scheinbar unversöhnliche Tendenzen beobachten. Einerseits findet sich eine andauernde Pluralität von Moraltheorien, die dem Lehrbuchverständnis zufolge in direktem theoretischem Widerspruch zueinander stehen. Andererseits scheint es jedoch oftmals so, als ob ein weitgehender Konsens zwischen den Vertretern dieser verschiedenen Theorien möglich ist, soweit es um die moralische Beurteilung konkreter Einzelfälle geht. Die aktuelle Debatte um die sogenannte *Konsequentialisierung moralischer Theorien* weist gar auf die Möglichkeit einer kompletten Übereinstimmung bezüglich der deontischen Einzelfallurteile verschiedener moraltheoretischer Strömungen hin. Wie lässt sich dieser widersprüchliche Befund erklären?

Das Ziel des Vortrages ist es, eine bislang nicht berücksichtigte Erklärung für diesen Befund zu präsentieren: Die Idee der *Unterbestimmtheit normativer Moraltheorien durch unsere deontischen Einzelfallurteile*. Das Phänomen, wonach die Wahl zwischen sich ausschließenden Theorien durch das Total der Daten nicht hinreichend determiniert ist, Theorien folglich *logisch inkompatibel und empirisch äquivalent* sein können, wird in der Wissenschaftstheorie seit geraumer Zeit angeregt diskutiert. Ich argumentiere, dass in der normativen Ethik ein strukturell ähnlich gelagertes Phänomen zu beobachten ist, welches den anfänglich festgestellten widersprüchlichen Befund erklären kann.

Dabei skizziere ich zunächst die Ergebnisse der Konsequentialisierungs-Debatte und weise deren Standardinterpretation, wonach alle Moraltheorien unter den Schirm des Konsequentialismus fallen, zurück. Stattdessen argumentiere ich, dass die Ergebnisse auf eine strukturelle Analogie zwischen Ethik und Wissenschaft hindeuten: so wie die Wahl zwischen widersprüchlichen wissenschaftlichen Theorien durch das Total der Daten nicht hinreichend bestimmt sein kann, so können auch

theoretisch inkompatible Moraltheorien durch unsere deontischen Einzelfallurteile unterbestimmt sein. Schliesslich interpretiere ich diesen Befund und deute an, inwiefern die normative Ethik von der Debatte in der Wissenschaftstheorie profitieren kann.

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Baumgartner / Wilutzky

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 10.30 Uhr, 15/115
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 10:30 a.m., 15/115

**Mutual Manipulability and the
Extension of Cognition**

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For years, the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) has been prominently debated in the philosophy of mind. Although both proponents and opponents of HEC seek to grant each other as many of their respective metaphysical assumptions as possible, the debate is stuck in an argumentative stalemate, where each side simply presumes a *mark of the cognitive* that the other ultimately rejects. In order to pave a way out of this gridlock, Kaplan (2012) suggests to turn the argumentative focus away from the mark of the cognitive to the *mark of constitution*. He argues that Craver's (2007) mutual manipulability account (MM) of constitution can be called upon as a neutral arbiter that allows for an empirical assessment of HEC, which Kaplan hypothesizes to be favorable for HEC.

This paper explores the prospects of Kaplan's proposal. We find that MM indeed has far-reaching implications for HEC, which however run contrary to Kaplan's conjectures. MM conceptually ties constitutional dependencies to the possibility of idealized experiments, which we show to be unrealizable, in principle, for cognitive processes and their putative physical realizers. Consequently, rather than empirically supporting HEC, MM reduces HEC to absurdity on pure conceptual grounds. The same *reductio* argument, however, applies to the position of those opponents of HEC who contend that cognition is exclusively constituted by intracranial processes. We argue that, as a consequence of MM, cognitive processes are realized neither inside nor outside of the brain. Thus, only dualists and eliminativists might have a genuine interest to make recourse to MM. By contrast, these consequences of MM might also be considered to be too sweeping, and thus to reduce MM to absurdity rather than HEC. In the end, independently of the preferred target of the *reductio* argument presented in this paper, Kaplan's project fails. The question whether cognition can be constituted by extracranial processes must be tackled by means of metaphysical argumentation or pragmatic considerations involving, for example, conceptual coherence or explanatory power.

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Beck

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 16.00 Uhr, 11/215
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 4:00 p.m., 11/215

Korporative Scheinheiligkeit

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Zumindest in der Selbstdarstellung von Unternehmen hat das Menschenbild des *homo oeconomicus* mittlerweile gründlich ausgedient. Selbst die rücksichtslosesten Firmen können es sich heutzutage im wortwörtlichen Sinn nicht mehr leisten, sich als indifferent gegenüber drängenden sozialen und ökologischen Fragen darzustellen. Dass sich die Rede von *Corporate Social Responsibility* (CSR) mittlerweile einer großen Beliebtheit in der Wirtschaftswelt erfreut, ist andererseits aber noch kein Beweis dafür, dass Unternehmen auch tatsächlich in einem ähnlichen Ausmaß zu moralisch besseren »Mitbürgern« geworden sind, wie es bisweilen mit dem verwandten Konzept der *Corporate Citizenship* suggeriert wird. Es wird vielmehr immer öfter der Vorwurf der Scheinheiligkeit gegenüber Unternehmen laut. Demnach geben insbesondere große Konzerne zwar vor, sich an moralischen Werten zu orientieren, handeln aber in Wahrheit durch und durch eigeninteressiert und scheuen auch nicht vor der Verletzung derjenigen Normen zurück, an denen ihnen vorgeblich etwas liegt. Doch welche Rückschlüsse lassen sich aus der Praxis korporativer Scheinheiligkeit für die Frage ziehen, ob und was wir von Unternehmen als immer auch gewissen wirtschaftlichen Zwängen unterworfenen Akteure fordern dürfen? Dieser Frage gehe ich in meinem Vortrag näher nach. Dabei werde ich in einem ersten längeren Schritt zunächst darlegen, was unter korporativer Scheinheiligkeit genauer zu verstehen ist. In einem zweiten Schritt werde ich zeigen, dass Urteile über korporative Scheinheiligkeit jedoch keineswegs mit der These von Unternehmen als notwendiger Weise egoistischen Akteuren verbunden sein müssen. Dieser zurückzuweisenden These zufolge sind Unternehmen zwangsläufig scheinheilig, um sowohl dem moralischen Erwartungsdruck aus der Gesellschaft als auch dem Imperativ der Maximierung des eigenen Nutzens zu entsprechen. Obwohl sowohl korporative Scheinheiligkeit als auch das ihr zugrunde liegende sozial- und umweltschädigende Verhalten von Unternehmen weit verbreitet sind, ist korporative Integrität als deren positives Gegenstück weder ein an sich unerreichbares Ideal noch ein auf einem Trugschluss basierendes Konzept.

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Becker

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 15.15 Uhr, 11/213
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 3:15 p.m., 11/213

A New Doxastic ›Should‹

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This paper argues that there is a sense of the doxastic ›should‹ that has been neglected in normative epistemology: the collective sense. In the literature on epistemic norms, we can find much about the justification norm (Feldman 2000, Kornblith 2001, Gibbons 2013) or the knowledge norm (Williamson 2000, Sutton 2005, Bird 2007). They concern which doxastic attitude a subject should adopt in light of his or her evidence, i.e., in the *subjective* sense of the doxastic ›should‹. Furthermore, several authors defend the truth norm for belief (Wedgwood 2002, Gibbard 2005, Engel 2007). It articulates what one should believe in light of the facts, that is, in the *objective* sense of the doxastic ›should‹. The collective doxastic ›should‹, on the other hand, expresses which doxastic attitude a subject *S* should adopt in light of the combined evidence of (i) the speaker, i.e., of the person who utters a sentence like ›*S* should adopt doxastic attitude *D* to proposition *P*‹, and (ii) the subject *S* the speaker talks about. That the doxastic ›should‹ can carry a collective sense is indicated by the fact that it seems to be the sense of ›should‹ we often employ when epistemically advising others. I defend this claim against the possible objection that the ›should‹ used in epistemic advising is actually the subjective or the objective ›should‹. Finally, I give two reasons why epistemologists should care about the collective sense of the doxastic ›should‹. First, being aware of this ambiguity of the doxastic ›should‹ helps avoiding confusions. For example, Turri (2012) presents a ›puzzle‹, which, as I argue, just hinges on Turri wrongly interpreting the collective doxastic ›should‹ for the subjective ›should‹. Second, investigating the collective doxastic ›should‹ contributes to better understanding what good epistemic advice is.

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Behrendt

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 15.15 Uhr, 15/111
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 3:15 p.m., 15/111

Supererogation—A Challenge for Reason-Fundamentalism?

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It is the purpose of this paper to argue for two distinct standards of normativity, which are irreducible to one another. I will give an illustrative example to show that the normative foundation of moral obligations is not simply reducible to the reasons someone has. Considering the example of supererogatory acts, it seems plausible that one can fail doing what one has morally decisive reasons to do without being morally blameworthy.

That is, one can do something wrong as measured by the standards of rationality and at the same time perfectly conform to moral standards. Then, the wrongness at question is entirely different from the wrongness seen from a moral point of view. If this is correct, we have to deal with at least two distinct concepts of wrong and thus two different normative standards of accuracy related to it.

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Berghofer

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 11.15 Uhr, 11/213
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 11:15 a.m., 11/213

Justification First!

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My paper addresses the relation between justification and evidence and my objective is threefold. First, I want to show that Williamson's famous equation $E = K$ fails; secondly, I shall contend that evidence does not consist of facts (true propositions); and thirdly, I shall argue that evidence consists of mental states. Williamson holds the view that one's evidence only includes the facts (true propositions) one knows and that it is evidence what justifies belief. This thesis has provoked considerable opposition and many counterexamples have been given. In the spirit of Williamson, Littlejohn has recently proposed that one's evidence includes *p* only if *p* is true. This view is implied by Williamson's thesis, but it is a much weaker claim and much more difficult to refute. Powerful examples against Williamson's $E = K$ are cases of knowledge from falsehoods. Littlejohn contends that such cases might reveal that Williamson's equation fails, but he insists that his own view remains unharmed. I will show that cases of knowledge from falsehoods refute Williamson and that Littlejohn's view only remains unharmed if we separate evidence from justification in some important manners. My main argument against Littlejohn is the new evil demon problem. The discussion of this problem does not straightforwardly reveal that Littlejohn's conception of evidence is wrong, but we will see that such a conception can only be defended if one is willing to admit that evidence is justificatorily impotent. Finally, I will argue that the foregoing suggests that evidence consists of mental states. I will make a case for phenomenal dogmatism, according to which certain experiences are an immediate source of justification simply due to their specific phenomenal character.

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Berninger

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 11.15 Uhr, 11/115
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 11:15 p.m., 11/115

Warum Manieren wichtig sind

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Manieren und Höflichkeit spielen in der aktuellen analytischen Ethik kaum eine Rolle. Eine wichtige Ausnahme bildet hier die Position von Sarah Buss (Buss, 1999). Diese argumentiert dafür, dass Manieren bzw. die damit verbundenen höflichen Verhaltensweisen als Ausdruck von Respekt anzusehen und deshalb moralisch von Bedeutung sind.

In meinem Vortrag möchte ich ebenfalls dafür argumentieren, dass Manieren ethisch relevant sind. Im Gegensatz zu Buss werde ich jedoch die Überzeugung vertreten, dass wir Höflichkeit nicht als Ausdruck von Respekt auffassen sollten. Die Relevanz von Manieren muss also anders begründet werden. Im Anschluss an neuere Interpretationen der Konfuzianischen Ethik (Ames, 2011) werde ich dafür argumentieren, dass Manieren als zentraler Baustein zur Erfüllung von ethisch relevanten Rollen zu verstehen sind.

Ich werde mein Argument in vier Schritten entwickeln: Beginnen werde ich mit einer kurzen Charakterisierung des Gegenstands. Dabei werde ich aufzeigen, dass es vielfach schwer ist, Regeln für höfliches Verhalten zu formulieren. Aus dieser Schwierigkeit werde ich zwei Eigenschaften von Manieren ableiten: Feinkörnigkeit und Abhängigkeit von Situationen und dem Verhältnis zu den jeweils involvierten Personen. In einem zweiten Schritt werde ich die Gründe für die Ablehnung von Manieren als Gegenstand der Ethik entwickeln. Ich werde hier insbesondere die Behauptungen zurückweisen, dass Manieren rein konventionelle Regeln darstellen und dass Höflichkeit nichts anderes als eine gesellschaftliche Fassade darstellt, die uns keine Informationen über die ›wirklichen Einstellungen‹ von Personen geben. In einem dritten Schritt werde ich Buss' Position genauer betrachten. Dabei werde ich herausarbeiten, dass Manieren nicht (wie Buss vorschlägt) als Ausdruck von Respekt verstanden werden können. Ich werde hier insbesondere auf Fälle verweisen, in denen Personen sich zwar Respekt, aber keine Höflichkeit schulden. Dies wäre aber verwunderlich, wenn es sich bei Höflichkeit lediglich um einen Ausdruck von Respekt handeln würde. In einem letzten Schritt werde ich dann meine eigene Position entwickeln. Zentral wird hier insbesondere die Vorstellung sein, dass Manieren eine wichtige Rolle bei der Erfüllung von ethisch relevanten Rollen (Freundschaft, familiäre Beziehungen, berufliche Beziehungen) spielen. Diese Position ist durch den Konfuzianismus inspiriert, zugleich wird hier aber auch jüngeren Entwicklungen in der Ethik Rechnung getragen, die familiären und freundschaftlichen Beziehungen wieder mehr Gewicht verleihen wollen.

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Betz

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 16.00 Uhr, 11/213
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 4:00 p.m., 11/213

The Veritistic Merit of Doxastic Conservatism in Belief Revision

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There are at least two ways in which epistemic agents can be conservative in belief revision: (A) all novel beliefs acquired through evidential learning are entailed by the evidence and prior beliefs (cf. AGM axiom K*3); (B) when contracting their beliefs, agents attempt to give up as few beliefs as possible. This paper presents a model for assessing the veritistic merit of type-B conservatism while assuming that agents are type-A conservative. The basic idea is that epistemic agents choose a new belief set in light of (i) the alternative belief sets' degree of justification and (ii) their content loss compared to the old belief set. Different parametrizations of this choice function correspond to different doxastic strategies, whose veritistic merit can be assessed. The paper brings together work on verisimilitude and belief revision, ideas from Spohn's ranking theory, and argumentation-theoretic models of debate dynamics.

6

Bewersdorf

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 13.30 Uhr, 11/213
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 1:30 p.m., 11/213

Conceptual Learning and Bayesian Epistemology

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When a child is born, it does not know whether the moon is made of cheese or stone. It does not know this for two reasons. The first reason is that it lacks factual knowledge about the moon. The second reason is that it does not even possess the conceptual resources necessary to form beliefs about the moon. When the child grows up, it will both learn the relevant facts and the necessary concepts. Bayesian epistemology offers a successful and well explored account of factual learning. Conceptual learning, however, is not as thoroughly investigated from a Bayesian perspective.

In this paper I discuss several problems that arise when we combine conceptual and factual learning. To illustrate these problems, I introduce a simple account of conceptual learning for the Bayesian framework. I show that it leads to a number of counterintuitive results in cases in which an agent does not only acquire conceptual information but learns facts as well. In these cases the simple account violates a version of the principle of language invariance and the principle of commutativity, allows for cases in which learning facts has no influence on the agent's degrees of belief and in which learning facts can lead to the agent losing conceptual information. I show that these problems are no artifacts of the simple account, but arise as well for more general

accounts of conceptual learning, like the account proposed by Jon Williamson (2003).

I argue that these problems originate from representing conceptual learning by a change of the agent's present degrees of belief. They can be addressed by representing conceptual learning by a change of the agent's initial or a priori belief state and representing factual learning by conditionalizing this modified a priori belief state.

References

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S

Bleisch

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 16.00 Uhr, 15/E28
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 4:00 p.m., 15/E28

Können Konsequentialisten Freunde sein?

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Dies ist die zentrale Frage meines Vortrages. Ich möchte diese Frage untersuchen, weil sich hinter der Frage eine gängige und scheinbar schlagkräftige Kritik an konsequentialistischen Moraltheorien verbirgt.

Zur Klärung dieser Frage, nehme ich als Erstes grundlegende begriffliche Untersuchungen bzgl. »Freundschaft« und »Konsequentialismus« vor. Unter »Freundschaft« verstehe ich eine spezielle, nicht-instrumentelle Beziehung, in der es nicht ausschließlich um Nutzen geht. Vielmehr sollen sich Freunde direkt um das Wohl ihrer Freunde sorgen und direkt durch dieses motiviert sein. Eine solche Motivation wird als »de re Motivation«, d.h. als Motivation aus der Sache heraus bezeichnet. Unter einem »Konsequentialisten« verstehe ich eine Person, die eine bestimmte konsequentialistische Moraltheorie für wahr hält und motiviert ist, entsprechend dieser Theorie zu handeln. Konsequentialisten sollen demnach motiviert sein, das konsequentialistisch Richtige zu tun, was auch immer es ist. Eine solche Motivation bezeichnet man als »de dicto Motivation«.

Im Hauptteil meines Vortrages greife ich nun diese wichtigen motivationalen Anforderungen der Freundschaft bzw. des Konsequentialismus heraus und untersuche, inwiefern diese beiden Anforderungen miteinander vereinbar sind. Konsequentialisten scheinen demnach keine Freunde sein zu können, weil sie stets nur um die Maximierung des unparteiischen Guten besorgt sind und somit nicht die für Freundschaft angemessene Motivation aufweisen können. Ich möchte diesen Einwand entkräften, indem ich zeige, dass dies nur eine mögliche Art ist, auf die Konsequentialisten motiviert sein können. Darüber hinaus möchte ich zeigen, dass auch, wenn man davon ausgeht, dass Konsequentialisten immer direkt konsequentialistisch motiviert sind, keine prinzipielle Unvereinbarkeit zwischen der für Freundschaft erforderlichen und der konsequentialistischen Motivation besteht.

10

Blöser / Stahl

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 9.45 Uhr, 11/115
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 9:45 p.m., 11/115

Fundamental Hope and Practical Identity

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In this paper, we discuss the question of what exactly constitutes the value of hope. Central to our account is the claim that hope is responsive to reasons. In order to elucidate what hope is, it is necessary to explain to what kind of reasons hope is responsive to and what the norms are that distinguish rational from irrational hopes. In her recent account, Adrienne Martin spells out the relevant practical norms as »norms of rational end-promotion«. We argue that this instrumentalist account fails to capture the value of hope. By contrast, we suggest that the value of hope is founded on its role for the practical identity of the person. In the cases of *fundamental hope*, agents may have reasons not to lose hope, because their hopes are constitutive for a central aspect of their practical identities. Without their hopes, they would have to give up a perspective on reality, which would mean giving up aspects of their identity that are (it is presumed) intrinsically valuable to them and not just valuable as a means for realizing other ends. If hope is constitutive of intrinsically valuable aspects of practical identity, hope is itself intrinsically valuable, or, to put it another way, hope is rational in virtue of its constitutive role for the identity of the person. Such an analysis also correctly describes the fundamental norms to which attitudes of hope are to be held responsible and thus what it is to hope. Building on Korsgaard's and Taylor's theories of identity and practical rationality, we maintain that we can explain what reasons persons have for keeping up the hopes connected to their identities and what reasons they have to give up hope—allowing also for tragic cases in which holding on to hope is both rationally indispensable and deeply irrational.

11

Blum

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 9.45 Uhr, 15/113
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 9:45 a.m., 15/113

Zur Verteidigung des Wertpluralismus gegen den Unvergleichbarkeitseinwand

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Der Wertpluralismus besagt, dass es eine Vielzahl fundamentaler, nicht weiter ableitbarer Werte gibt, die in konkreten Situationen konfliktieren können, indem sie inkompatible Handlungsalternativen favorisieren (siehe u.a. Berlin 1969, Stocker 1990, Crowder 2002). Er richtet sich gegen wertmonistische Ansätze, wie etwa den Eu-

dämonismus oder die moore'sche Ethik, die nur einen fundamentalen Wert (z.B. Glück oder das Gute) postulieren bzw. dafür argumentieren, dass alle übrigen Werte aus diesem einen Wert abgeleitet werden können.

Innerhalb der axiologischen Debatte wird konzediert, dass der Wertpluralismus intuitiv plausibel ist: Er erklärt das Auftreten genuiner moralischer Konflikte, in denen Akteure einen Handlungsgrund zugunsten eines distinkten anderen Grundes zurückstellen müssen und dabei einen moralischen Verlust erleiden, der durch den positiven Ertrag ihrer Handlung nicht kompensiert wird. Gegen den Wertpluralismus wird seitens wertmonistischer Theoretiker der so genannte *Unvergleichbarkeits-einwand* vorgebracht (Talisce 2011): Wenn es wirklich eine Pluralität fundamentaler Werte gäbe, wäre nicht einsichtig, wie Akteure deren relatives Gewicht vergleichen könnten, ohne auf einen fundamentalen Wert, aus dem sie abgeleitet sind, zu rekurrieren. Der Wertpluralismus schließt einen Vergleichsstandard aus, in Bezug auf den gilt, dass ein Wert in einer Situation vorrangig ist. Dieser Umstand hat, so die Kritik, verheerende Folgen: Wenn zwei fundamentale Werte konfigurierten, wären Akteure nicht in der Lage, zu beurteilen, welche Alternative größeres moralisches Gewicht hat und verfolgt werden sollte. Entscheidungen in Wertkonflikten wären stets von Irrationalität befallen.

Ich argumentiere dafür, dass die für den Einwand zentrale Annahme, dass Werte nur unter Rekurs auf einen grundlegenden, monistischen Wert verglichen werden können und plurale fundamentale Werte daher unvergleichbar sind, unplausibel ist. Plurale fundamentale Werte können – so mein an Ruth Changs (2004) Covering-Value-Ansatz angelehnter Vorschlag – vielmehr mit Bezug auf non-fundamentale Werte verglichen werden, die erste als konstitutive Teile enthalten und deren relatives Gewicht situationsspezifisch bestimmen. Somit ist es möglich, sowohl an der Annahme festzuhalten, dass es eine Vielzahl fundamentaler Werte gibt, als auch an der Annahme, dass das relative Gewicht dieser Werte in Konflikten bestimmt werden kann. Folglich muss auch die Kritik zurückgewiesen werden, der Wertpluralismus impliziere die Irrationalität moralischer Entscheidungen in Wertkonflikten.

4

Boge

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 9.00 Uhr, 15/134
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 9:00 a.m., 15/134

On the Epistemic Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

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The status of state descriptions by wave functions in quantum mechanics (QM) has always been subject to heavy debates. These wave functions (quantum states) have the feature that they do not assign definite values for all physical magnitudes at all times, and at any given time can only assign definite values to a limited subset of such magnitudes. Von Neumann's (1932) analysis of the measurement process made things worse: Couple a cat to some deadly machinery engaged by a quantum mechanical process, and the cat could end up in a state of being ›dead and alive at the same time‹ (cf. Schrödinger 1935).

Some physicists have felt very uncomfortable about these consequences, and have hence urged to regard the

wave function of the system merely as a measure of our *knowledge* about its true state (cf. Einstein 1939). Despite its many difficulties, this view has become fashionable again in recent years. N. Harrigan and R. W. Spekkens (2010) have developed a formal framework for construing the quantum state of a system in terms of knowledge. The framework rests on so called *ontological models*, which aim to reproduce the quantum statistics by introducing probability distributions that reflect uncertainties in the observer's knowledge and in the measurement process.

For ψ -epistemic models it is required that probability distributions $p_\psi(\lambda)$ and $p_\phi(\lambda)$, associated with distinct quantum states ψ and ϕ can have non-trivially overlapping supports (Harrigan and Spekkens, 2010, p. 126). This makes the true states λ hidden variables. Of course we know from Bell's (1964) theorem that such hidden variables must be *nonlocal*.

However, Spekkens (2007) and Bartlett et al. (2012) have developed ψ -epistemic models which—seemingly—reproduce at least part of QM locally, including interference phenomena. Building on a theorem by Hardy (2013) and the Reeh-Schlieder (1961) theorem, I will demonstrate that the ψ -epistemicist ultimately has to appeal to nonlocal elements in his models of interference, which undermines the apparent success.

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5

Bohl

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 15.15 Uhr, 15/131
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 3:15 p.m., 15/131

The Blind Spot in Social Cognition Research: Social Relationships

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Many researchers of social cognition assume that the lynchpin of human social cognition is *mindreading*: the ability to make sense of other people's behavior in terms

of their mental states. Recently the mindreading paradigm has been heavily criticized by *interactionists* who argue that social cognition research is deeply misguided by its excessive focus on mindreading and fails to do justice to the importance of *social interaction* in social cognition. Interactionists argue that most real life social interactions take place in the absence of mindreading and thus that mindreading, far from being the lynchpin of human social cognition, plays only a peripheral role in it.

In my talk, I argue that by claiming that mindreading has no significant role in human social cognition, interactionists throw the baby out with the bath water. On the other hand, I show that the mindreading paradigm as well as interactionist approach ignore an important aspect of the human social life: *social relationships*. I argue that reasoning about social relationships is an important social cognitive ability. I provide a generic working definition for »social relationship« and analyse the differences between reasoning about social relationships and reasoning about the mental states of individuals. I draw on evidence suggesting that the human ability to reason about social relationships is uniquely well developed and argue that social-relational cognition (reasoning about social relationships) may be evolutionarily and developmentally prior to mindreading. Finally, I argue that mindreading is likely to serve social-relational purposes. Thus, instead of shifting from the study of mindreading to the study of social interactions as the interactionists propose, I suggest that the way forward is to study how mindreading interacts with social-relational reasoning.

1

Bouche

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 9:45 Uhr, 15/114
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 9:45 a.m., 15/114

Ein Beweis dafür, dass Sprache singuläre Termini und Prädikate enthalten muss

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In meinem Vortrag werde ich zu zeigen versuchen, dass aus einigen wenigen recht allgemein gehaltenen und meines Erachtens plausiblen Annahmen über die notwendige Struktur von Sprache folgt, dass Sprache singuläre Termini und Prädikate enthalten muss. Wenn es stimmt, dass unsere Vorstellung der Welt notwendigerweise eine sprachlich vermittelte ist, bedeutet dies, dass wir uns die Welt nur als eine Welt Eigenschaften aufweisender Einzelgegenstände vorstellen können.

Ich werde in drei Schritten vorgehen. In einem ersten, vorbereitenden Schritt werde ich die Prämissen meines Beweises offenlegen. Sie enthalten Annahmen einerseits über die notwendige Struktur von Sprache, andererseits über die syntaktischen und semantischen Eigenschaften von singulären Termini und Prädikaten. In einem nächsten Schritt werde ich auf sehr direktem Wege zu zeigen versuchen, wie aus diesen Annahmen folgt, dass Sprache notwendigerweise singuläre Termini und Prädikate aufweist. Schließlich werde ich die weit verschlungeneren Pfade der von Robert Brandom in *Making It Explicit* vorgelegten Deduktion nachzeichnen. Ich werde zeigen, dass diese mehrere Schwachstellen ent-

hält, von denen manche nicht ausgebessert werden können, aber auch einen Hinweis, der sich möglicherweise zu einem gültigen Beweis ausbauen lässt. Abschließend werde ich ein paar Worte zum Verhältnis zwischen dem ersten, sehr direkten und dem zweiten, weniger geradlinigen Beweis sagen.

5

Brandl

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 9:45 Uhr, 15/131
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 9:45 a.m., 15/131

How to Acquire a Self-concept? In Defence of the Linguistic View

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The self-concept is a special concept that we employ whenever we form thoughts about ourselves in the first-person mode. How do we acquire such a concept? It seems highly plausible that we acquire this concept when we become competent in using the first-person pronoun. However, it has been argued that there is a fundamental problem with this proposal. The ability to form a first-personal thought, so the objection goes, is more basic than the ability to comprehend linguistic utterances expressing such thoughts. This means that possessing a self-concept is presupposed by and cannot be explained in terms of a linguistic competence. The cognitive processes that enable us to acquire a self-concept have to be language-independent processes, so the argument goes.

In this paper, I want to counter this objection. In order to do so I will draw attention to two critical premises on which the objection rests (section 1). Challenging either of them provides us with two possible strategies for countering the argument. Ansgar Beckermann, for instance, pursues the first strategy in his social theory of self-consciousness. This strategy is not successful, I will argue, because it targets the wrong premise (section 2). A similar, but more promising approach is Francois Recanati's theory of mental files. I submit that his theory successfully tackles the problem by following the second strategy. It shows that the linguistic theory of acquiring a self-concept is not just initially plausible, but also consistent on reflection.

10

Bratu

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 10:30 Uhr, 11/115
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 10:30 p.m., 11/115

Personale Selbstachtung

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Im ersten Teil meines Vortrags stelle ich drei unterschiedliche Arten von Selbstachtung vor.

- A. *Moralische Selbstachtung*: Eine Person A achtet sich selbst genau dann, wenn A
i. weiß, was ihr zusteht, und

ii. dazu bereit ist, öffentlich einzufordern, was ihr zusteht, sofern dies in Frage gestellt oder nicht beachtet wird.

- B. *Personale Selbstachtung*: Eine Person A achtet sich selbst genau dann, wenn A ihre persönlichen Projekte umsetzt. Ein persönliches Projekt aufzugeben ist nur dann kein Fall mangelnder Selbstachtung, wenn A ihr persönliches Projekt aufgibt, weil A eingesehen hat, dass Gründe gegen dessen Umsetzung sprechen.
- C. *Achtung vor den eigenen Leistungen*: Eine Person A achtet sich selbst genau dann, wenn sie ihre eigenen Leistungen nicht grundlos negativ bewertet.

Im zweiten Teil diskutiere ich, welche Gründe dafür sprechen könnten, personale Selbstachtung an den Tag zu legen. Eine angemessene Begründung sollte darauf achten, akteursrelativ zu sein und keinen Gedanken zu viel zu erfordern. D.h. eine Person A sollte den Erwägungen, die für personale Selbstachtung sprechen, nicht dadurch gerecht werden können, dass A dafür sorgt, dass andere Personen sich selbst achten; vielmehr soll A durch diese Erwägungen dazu verpflichtet sein, sich selbst zu achten. Und A sollte nicht nur deswegen dazu verpflichtet sein, sich selbst personal zu achten, weil Menschen allgemein achtenswert sind und weil A ein Mensch ist.

Meine These ist, dass sich eine Person A personal achten sollte, weil A zu sich selbst in einer intimen Beziehung steht. Im dritten Teil meines Vortrags muss ich daher erläutern, inwiefern unser Verhältnis zu uns selbst als intime Beziehung verstanden werden kann. Ich werde zeigen, dass unser Umgang mit uns selbst Merkmale aufweist, wie sie für unseren Umgang mit Freund*innen und also für intime Beziehungen kennzeichnend sind. So können wir uns auch um uns selbst sorgen, Zu- (oder Ab-)neigung uns selbst gegenüber empfinden, uns mehr oder weniger gut kennen und mit uns selbst Zeit verbringen wollen. Ist gezeigt, dass wir zu uns selbst in einer intimen Beziehung stehen können, kann die Pflicht zu personaler Selbstachtung als Pflicht verstanden werden, die aus dieser besonderen Beziehung resultiert.

11

Bratu / Dittmeyer

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 16.00 Uhr, 15/111
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 4:00 p.m., 15/111

**Weil die Regeln es fordern?
Kritik des Konstitutivismus**

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Der Konstitutivismus hat in der praktischen Philosophie in den letzten Jahren viel Aufmerksamkeit erregt. In der Variante von Korsgaard behauptet er, die Fragen »Warum moralisch sein?« und »Warum rational sein?« auf eine neue Art zu beantworten. In Teil I rekonstruieren wir die Hauptthesen von Korsgaards Konstitutivismus:

- (C1) Das Verhalten einer Person A ist eine Handlung x genau dann, wenn A, indem sie x ausführt, den kategorischen und den hypothetischen Imperativ (KI und HI) befolgt.

(C2) Wenn A handelt, ist A verpflichtet KI und HI zu befolgen, weil das Befolgen von KI und HI konstitutiv ist für Handeln.

(C3) Für menschliche Wesen ist Handeln unvermeidbar.

In Teil II zeigen wir, dass eine Kritik an Korsgaards Konstitutivismus nicht überzeugt. Nach dieser ist C2 nicht zu halten: Damit das konstitutivistische Projekt gelingt, müssten wir die Verpflichtung, von der in C2 die Rede ist, als normative Verpflichtung interpretieren – doch konstitutive Regeln verpflichten lediglich begrifflich. Diese Kritik überzeugt nicht, weil sie lediglich leugnet, was der Konstitutivismus annimmt, ohne Gründe für ihren Zweifel anzuführen. Zudem gibt es Fälle, in denen die Tatsache, dass eine Regel konstitutiv für eine Praxis ist, dafür zu sprechen scheint, sich an diese Regel zu halten. So erscheint es bspw. nicht kontraintuitiv, wenn eine Person sich dagegen entscheidet, eine Freundin zu bestehlen, weil Freundinnen so etwas nicht tun, d.h. weil Diebstahl gegen die Regeln verstößt, die konstitutiv sind für Freundschaftsbeziehungen.

In Teil III wollen wir Korsgaards Konstitutivismus schließlich selbst kritisieren. Der Konstitutivismus versucht C2 zu rechtfertigen unter Rückgriff auf ein allgemeines Prinzip (AP):

AP: Wenn eine Person A an einer Praxis Y teilnimmt, für die das Befolgen der Regel Q konstitutiv ist, ist A verpflichtet Q zu befolgen, weil das Befolgen von Q konstitutiv ist für Y.

AP ist problematisch, weil es bootstrapping erlaubt. Würde AP gelten, könnte man Gründe aus dem normativen Nichts hervorzaubern, indem man eine passende Praxis Y erschafft, für welche die Befolgung von Q konstitutiv ist, und dann sicherstellt, dass andere Personen Teil von Y sind. Da bootstrapping vermieden werden sollte, ist AP nicht zu halten – und damit auch nicht die konstitutivistische Argumentation für C2.

12

Brewer-Davis / Hoffmann

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 14.15 Uhr, 11/211
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 2:15 p.m., 11/211

**Should I Stay or Should I Go Now?
Harm in Relationships and Its Implications
for Relationship Obligations**

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Much of the literature on relationship obligations so far has treated relationships as if their effect on the lives involved is only good. We challenge this optimistic view by paying attention to harm in relationships. Few relationships are completely without harm, hence, more nuance is needed with regard to the many varieties and depths of harm that occur within relationships, and the implications this has for relationship obligations.

At the beginning, we set out an account of intimacy, to show how interacting within intimate relationships is different from interacting with strangers, since intimacy

produces all sorts of additional opportunities for harm. Then, we consider varieties of harm, and how harm is different within relationships compared to similar interactions with strangers. We proceed asking what good reasons people might have for staying in relationships in which significant harm has occurred. We propose that if harm does not damage properties that are necessary for intimacy then one has reason to maintain the relationship. These properties include trust, vulnerability, and shared information or knowledge. Lastly, we consider some ways harm might influence relationship obligations, especially in the case of ambivalent relationships. We ask whether harm weaken or dissolve them or whether they maintain to be the same.

6

Briesen

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 14.15 Uhr, 11/213
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 2:15 p.m., 11/213

Bayesianismus und Evidentielle Eindeutigkeit

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Der Bayesianismus beschreibt den Überzeugungshaushalt ideal rationaler Subjekte unter Rekurs auf Axiome der Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie. Manche Varianten des Bayesianismus gehen mit der Zurückweisung des folgenden Prinzips einher:

Evidentielle Eindeutigkeit (EE). Gegeben die Gesamtheit an Evidenz E und Proposition P , so gilt: Es gibt genau eine doxastische Einstellung (entweder Für-Wahr-Halten, Für-Falsch-Halten oder Enthaltung), die ein Subjekt im Lichte von E hinsichtlich P einnehmen kann, ohne epistemisch irrational zu sein.

Einige Erkenntnistheoretiker/innen halten die Tatsache, dass bestimmte bayesianistische Ansätze auf eine Zurückweisung von (EE) verpflichtet sind, für einen hinreichenden Grund, die entsprechenden Varianten des Bayesianismus abzulehnen. Allerdings ist nicht ganz klar, welche theoretischen Kosten mit einer Zurückweisung von (EE) eigentlich verbunden sind. Auf welchen Annahmen beruht die scheinbare Plausibilität von (EE)? Dieser Frage werde ich im Rahmen des Vortrags nachgehen. In einem ersten Schritt werden sowohl das angeführte Prinzip (EE) als auch die Varianten des Bayesianismus, die eine Zurückweisung des Prinzips nach sich ziehen, genauer spezifiziert. Anschließend werden in der Literatur vorgebrachte Überlegungen untersucht, die (EE) motivieren sollen. Etwas vereinfachend lassen sich hierbei drei Kernmotivationen für (EE) unterscheiden:

- Wer (EE) aufgibt, lässt zu, dass ein Subjekt im Lichte von Evidenz E mehr oder weniger zufällig zwischen doxastischen Einstellungen wechseln kann, ohne irrational zu sein. Das ist unplausibel. Daher darf (EE) nicht aufgegeben werden.
- Wer (EE) aufgibt, kann nicht erklären, inwiefern es unseren epistemischen Zielen zuträglich ist, doxastische Einstellungen an den zur Verfügung stehenden Evidenzen auszurichten. Daher darf (EE) nicht aufgegeben werden.
- Wer (EE) aufgibt, muss letztlich zulassen, dass epistemisch irrelevante Faktoren mitbestimmen, welche Propositionen ideal rationale Subjekte für wahr halten und welche nicht. Das sollte nicht zugelassen werden, daher darf (EE) nicht aufgegeben werden.

Ich werde dafür argumentieren, dass (a) und (b) bei genauerer Betrachtung nicht überzeugen. Obwohl auch (c) zunächst nicht überzeugt, wird im Zuge der Diskussion von (c) dennoch eine vortheoretische Annahme lokalisiert, die (EE) in gewisser Hinsicht motiviert.

4

Brooks

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 15.15 Uhr, 15/133
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 3:15 p.m., 15/133

Avoiding the Supervenience Trap: Causal Exclusion and Interventionist Solutions to Higher-Level Causation

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In recent years, a heated discussion has developed concerning the usefulness of interventionism for providing a means of articulating higher-level causal claims, thereby vindicating non-reductive causation. Though several independent interventionist arguments have been offered for saving nonreductive causal claims, opponents counter that interventionism in general runs into fundamental problems as an adequate framework for vindicating higher-level causation. In particular, critics charge that interventionism is thoroughly incapable of redressing worries of causal exclusion, because there is no possible intervention on a candidate higher-level cause that does not also change a corresponding, and independently sufficient, lower-level cause. This state of affairs is a direct result of the supervenience relation that holds between higher- and lower-level causal variables.

Here it will be argued that discussions of higher-level causation have been prone to falling into what will here be called the *supervenience trap*. Supervenience, arguably, designates the crux of exclusion-type problems, and is a key premise in articulating why lower-level and higher-level properties appear to compete for both explanatory relevance and causal power. The ›trap‹ aspect of supervenience refers to the tendency exhibited in the philosophical literature of rigidly formulating and treating higher-level causation in terms of supervenience, and what the relation entails for evaluating the causal features exhibited by higher- and lower-level variables so related. Consequently, this has structured the space of philosophical solutions to problems of higher-level causation in way that is both well-defined as well as stultifying. However, upon inspection, there are compelling reasons to view the role of supervenience in structuring this area of philosophical analysis as uninformative and ill-suited to real-world instances of causation in science. Most importantly, as a result of this implicit commitment to supervenience, otherwise legitimate criteria of merit for evaluating the coherence and viability of higher-level causation (and specifically those offered by interventionism) are not, and apparently *cannot*, be entertained. Though supervenience cannot simply be lightly cast aside from issues pertaining to higher-level causation, acknowledging this underlying premise and its effects on philosophical discussion motivates a new perspective for treating the dispute between metaphysically-based causal exclusion worries and ›evidence-based‹ approaches to defending higher-level causation.

5

Brössel

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 15.15 Uhr, 15/115
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 3:15 p.m., 15/115

**On the Rationale of Reverse Inference
in Neuroscience**

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Reverse Inference is a popular inference schema in neuroscience, typically used to link evidence about brain activation with hypotheses about the elicitation of cognitive processes. However, there are many reasons to consider this inference schema fallacious. First, I argue that Machery's (2014) attempt to defend it by analyzing it in likelihoodist terms is unsuccessful. Second, I demonstrate that the rationale behind it is the same as behind the schema *Inference to the Best Explanation* and that both inference schemas can be framed in Bayesian terms. Finally, I provide a vindication for both inference schemas by showing that they are truth-conducive.

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6

Baumberger / Brun

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 15.15 Uhr, 11/214
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 3:15 p.m., 11/214

Objectual Understanding and Equilibrium

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In science and philosophy, a relatively demanding notion of understanding is of central interest: an epistemic subject understands a subject matter by means of a theory. This notion can be explicated in a way which resembles JTB analyses of knowledge. The explication requires that the theory answers to the facts, that the subject grasps the theory, is committed to the theory and justified in the theory. In our presentation, we focus on the justification condition and argue that it can be analysed with reference to the idea of a reflective equilibrium. This approach acknowledges that the epistemic evaluation of theories is related to a plurality of epistemic goals which can be subject to trade-offs. Three conditions are suggested: the subject's commitments, the theory and relevant background assumptions must agree with one another; the theory must do justice to epistemic goals, which ensures its credibility and systematicity; and the resulting account must respect the subject's antecedent commitments about the subject matter at hand, which ensures that the theory is in fact

a theory about this subject matter. This basic structure of justification can be supplemented with internalist requirements.

4

Büter

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 9.45 Uhr, 15/133
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 9:45 a.m., 15/133

**Psychiatric Classification between Science and
Practice**

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Current psychiatric classification (as exemplified by the DSM) is based on observable symptoms of mental disorders—a fact that many critics hold accountable for its problems, such as heterogeneity, comorbidity, and lack of predictive success of the diagnostic categories. Therefore, it is often argued that it is time to move on to an etiology-based system, in which diagnostic categories are not limited to reflecting surface symptoms, but are informed by theories about their underlying causes. In my talk, I will discuss the question whether it is time for such an etiological reorganization in psychiatric classification.

Proponents of such an »etiological revolution« often present it as a move forward towards a more scientific, evidence-based nosology. What I want to show is, first, that the question of the classificatory basis is not one that can be answered by empirical evidence alone. Instead, it requires judgments on what level of evidence is needed to justify changes, as well as judgments on what kind of evidence is most important. Second, in making these judgments we need to weigh the needs of clinical practice and scientific research.

At present, these stand in conflict with each other. For one, the importance of various validators is judged differently from the perspective of science than from that of health care. Moreover, while clinical practice calls for a conservative approach and high standards of evidence before every radical change, the DSM does exhibit severe problems concerning its function to serve as a basis of scientific research. Its dominance presents a heuristic obstacle on the way to causal explanations of mental disorders—a situation that calls for more pluralism in research and for the exploration of possible alternatives.

The central difficulty in psychiatric classification is, accordingly, not just a lack of validity or evidence; rather, it lies in integrating the different demands of research and practice. Therefore, I will argue, it is not time for an overall etiological revolution of psychiatric classification (yet)—instead, it is time to distinguish between taxonomy and theory, which call for different strategies: conservatism versus pluralism.

11

Čeč / Malatesti

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 10.30 Uhr, 15/113
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 10:30 a.m., 15/113

**Self-knowledge and Moral Responsibility:
The Case of Psychopathy**

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Recently the issues of the moral responsibility of persons classified as having psychopathy has attracted increasing and considerable philosophical attention (Malatesti and McMillan 2010). This raise of interest is motivated by the remarkable scientific advancement in the study of psychopathy (Patrick 2006; Glenn and Raine 2014) combined with the mounting pressure of the practical problem of the social response to psychopathic offenders and those with antisocial personality disorder.

Some maintain that psychopaths might be defective in their capacity for »mental time travel« (McIlwain 2010). In relation to the past, mental time travel is the capacity of an agent to have memories of past episodes in which she was personally involved. In relation to the future, mental time travel involves *prospection*: the capacity of an agent to imagine future situations where she might be involved. Some philosophers have investigated how this impairment might affect the moral responsibility of psychopathic offenders (Kennett and Matthews 2009; Levy 2014). Their focus is mainly on the relevance of this capacity for moral understanding and motivation.

In this paper, instead, we investigate whether or not psychopathic offenders satisfy some minimal epistemic requirements for the capacity of mental time travel. We will also offer some evidence to conclude that, if we focus on these prerequisite epistemic capacities, psychopathy might involve an impairment of self-identity that might be relevant in ascribing diminished moral responsibility to them.

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13

Claas

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 8.15 Uhr, 11/211
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 8:15 a.m., 11/211

**Bolzano und die Unerklärbarkeit der Beziehung
zwischen Begriffen und ihren Gegenständen**

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Als Bernard Bolzano im frühen neunzehnten Jahrhundert die *Wissenschaftslehre* verfasste, war eine These über eine bestimmte strukturelle Ähnlichkeit zwischen Begriffen und ihren Gegenständen verbreitet. Dieser *Isomorphie-these* zufolge sind die Bestandteile eines Begriffs genau diejenigen Begriffe, welche Eigenschaften repräsentieren, die etwas notwendigerweise haben muss, um unter jenen Begriff zu fallen. Mit §64 der *Wissenschaftslehre* ist Bolzano einer der ersten, der gegen diese These ausführlich argumentiert. Seine Argumente sind von besonderer philosophiehistorischer Bedeutung, da er nicht nur die Isomorphie-these, sondern auch einige der traditionsreichen Hintergrundannahmen, durch welche sie motiviert wird, zurückweist. Da diesem Artikel bisher in der Literatur nur wenig Aufmerksamkeit zugekommen ist, scheint es angeraten, anhand eines der Bolzano'schen Argumente und der damit einhergehenden konsequenten Zurückweisung bestimmter metaphysischer Hintergrundannahmen auf die historische Relevanz aufmerksam zu machen.

Besonders geeignet dazu ist Bolzanos Argument in §64.2.e der *Wissenschaftslehre*. Der Kerngedanke dieses Arguments ist, dass es nach einem adäquaten Verständnis davon, was ein Begriffsbestandteil überhaupt ist, nicht zutrifft, dass Begriffe, welche mereologisch einfache Begriffe repräsentieren, diejenigen Bestandteile haben, die sie der Isomorphie-these zufolge haben müssten. Die Isomorphie-these wird somit durch logisch-sprachliche Überlegungen zur Begriffsbildung höherstufiger Begriffe zurückgewiesen.

Am Beispiel von Leibniz lässt sich zeigen, dass ein Grund für die Annahme der Isomorphie-these, und generell einer Ähnlichkeit zwischen Begriffen und ihren Gegenständen, eine Verpflichtung auf den Satz vom zureichenden Grund ist, demzufolge jeder Sachverhalt erklärbar ist. Die Isomorphie-these stellt dabei den besten Kandidaten für die Erklärung der Beziehung zwischen Begriffen und ihren Gegenständen dar. Bolzano argumentiert nun nicht nur gegen die Isomorphie-these, sondern ist auch bereit zu bestreiten, was durch diese erklärt werden soll. So bestreitet er, dass zwischen Begriffen und ihren Gegenständen eine nicht-triviale Ähnlichkeit bestehe, und er bezweifelt, dass die Beziehung zwischen Begriffen und ihren Gegenständen erklärbar sei. Dieses Vorgehen scheint dabei symptomatisch für den Übergang von der frühneuzeitlichen Philosophie zur frühen analytischen, welcher auch dadurch gekennzeichnet ist, dass gewichtige metaphysische Prinzipien, insbesondere der Satz vom zureichenden Grund, angesichts logisch-sprachlicher Plausibilitätsüberlegungen aufgegeben und unerklärbare Relationen postuliert werden.

6

Croce

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 9:45 Uhr, 11/214
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 9:45 a.m., 11/214

**Expert-oriented Abilities vs Novice-oriented
Abilities: An Alternative Account
of Epistemic Authority**

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This paper faces a recent debate over the notion of epistemic authority. Zagzebski (2012) defines epistemic authorities (EAs) as those subjects whom I as the layperson judge, through a personal relationship with them, that they are more likely than I am to form true beliefs in a given domain. Jaeger (forthcoming) refuses her notion of EA and offers an account of Socratic authority (SA), according to which authorities are those experts who aim at fostering the subjects' understanding of the problems, more than their acquiring true beliefs.

I argue that both accounts give a reductive picture of what epistemic authority is. Zagzebski's account excludes other fundamental kinds of authority (i.e. SA). In contrast, Jaeger's account of SA unjustifiably irons out the differences between experts and EA, and hence reduces the possibility of encountering epistemic authorities in the ordinary life. Therefore, I propose an alternative account, according to which we need to distinguish three kinds of authority: experts, EA, and SA. Two notions support my argument: »expert-oriented abilities« are those that allow a subject to exploit her fund of knowledge to face new problems in the field of expertise; »novice-oriented abilities« those that allow a subject to aptly address the novice's epistemic dependence. I argue that (1) experts represent the lowest degree of epistemic authority, for they only need to possess »expert-oriented abilities«. (2) EAs combine »expert-oriented abilities« with some »novice-oriented abilities«—namely, the awareness that the layman's epistemic dependence constitutes a mutual opportunity to achieve epistemic goods. Finally, I argue that (3) EAs become SAs only insofar as they care about fostering our understanding. Indeed, SAs possess the highest degree of »novice-oriented abilities«—namely, cultivating others' insights and intellectual abilities, challenging her own reasons for beliefs, etc.

6

Dahlback

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 10:30 Uhr, 11/213
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 10:30 a.m., 11/213

**Epistemic Decision Theory and
Higher-Order Evidence**

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Epistemic consequentialists hold that an agent's doxastic states should maximize expected accuracy: their beliefs and credences should be such that agents expect them to be as close to the truth as they can be. Accord-

ing to calibrationism, on the other hand, an agent who is uncertain which credence assignment to some proposition p is rational should update her credence in p to a mixture of all candidate rational credence assignments to p , where the weight assigned to a particular credence function is equal to the agent's expectation that that particular credence function is rational.

This paper discusses an apparent paradox for a more specific form of calibrationism—calibrationism about higher-order evidence—from the perspective of epistemic consequentialism. An agent possesses higher-order evidence when (i) on her first-order evidence, it is likely that p , yet (ii) she has evidence that her assessment of the first-order evidence manifests some kind of epistemic defect.

I discuss a puzzle case where calibrationism does not permit any stable credence assignment, thereby engendering a troubling form of »credal instability«. This instability also causes apparent trouble for epistemic consequentialism, since it implies the following: (i) the credence function attained by complying with calibrationism maximizes expected accuracy from the point of view of the agent's current credence function, (ii) once the agent has moved to the credence function that appeared to maximize expected accuracy from the point of view of his previous credence function, a different credence function will appear optimal. Hence, calibrationism appears to conflict with epistemic consequentialism: calibrating cannot maximize expected accuracy.

However, calibrationists and epistemic consequentialists can avoid this kind of instability by combining the calibrationist compromise strategy with a deliberational epistemic decision theory. The deliberational theory is shown to be immune to the instability engendered in the puzzle case. Furthermore, it is shown that combining the deliberational theory with calibrationism yields a new principle that enables calibrationists to escape unharmed from the puzzle.

2

De

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 14:15 Uhr, 15/E28
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 2:15 p.m., 15/E28

Haecceitism and Actuality in Counterpart Theory

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It has been argued that there is no reasonable way of extending Lewisian counterpart theory (CT) with an »actually« operator, and that such an operator is an essential piece of modal vocabulary. One such objection goes as far as arguing that (a version of) CT is *inconsistent* in the presence of an »actually« operator. In this paper I argue against these claims and defend what I maintain is a serviceable notion of actuality definable in Lewis's canonical presentation of the theory. Along the way I discuss a related issue concerning counterpart theory's commitment to haecceitism and whether Lewis's »cheap substitute« is viable.

5

Dellantonio / Pastore

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 9.00 Uhr, 15/115
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 9:00 a.m., 15/115

**Abstractness Reconsidered. The Internal
Grounding of the Human Conceptual System**

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The classical cognitive view on concepts suggests that the human conceptual system is composed of two different kinds of concepts: concrete concepts that are developed on the basis of observable properties of external objects and abstract concepts which are essentially linguistic constructs. In this study, we challenge this picture and support a new view of the nature and composition of abstract concepts suggesting that they also rely to a greater or lesser degree on body-related information. Specifically, we support a version of this view which we call »x-ceptive theory« maintaining that at least some the concepts that are usually considered as abstract are developed on the basis of internal information of a proprioceptive, interoceptive and affective (i.e. emotional) kind. Secondly, we focus on the consequences this view has with respect to the previous idea of conceptual organization. We show that, by virtue of this »grounding«, these particular abstract concepts might be in some respects more similar to concrete concepts than to truly abstract ones as for the way they are developed and mastered. On the other hand, we point out that the »x-ceptive theory« allows us to give a more precise idea of what kind of abstract concepts might be based more heavily on internal information and what kind of abstract concepts might, on the contrary, rely mainly on linguistic information.

1

Del Pinal / Reuter

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 16.00 Uhr, 15/114
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 4:00 p.m., 15/114

**Jack is a True Scientist:
A Philosophical and Empirical Study on the
Content of Dual Character Concepts**

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In a recent paper, Knobe, Prasada, and Newman (2013) present a series of original experiments designed to

show that the concepts (so-called »dual character concepts«) expressed by terms such as *artist* and *scientist* are unique in that they seem to have two independent criteria for categorization, one of which is inherently normative. Modifiers such as *true* in colloquial expressions such as »John is a true artist«, seem to operate on this normative dimension. Leslie (2014) proposes that the normative dimension involves the »idealized primary functions« associated with certain (usually social) categories. The basic idea is that although the category of artists is associated with many secondary functions—e.g., to make sculptures—it is also associated with a primary idealized function, which is something like creating works of deep aesthetic value. Based on two experiments, we will argue that the content of the normative dimension rather consists of *commitments* to carry out the relevant idealized functions. On this view, someone would could as a true artist not because s/he is actually a really good or famous artist, but rather because s/he is *committed* to creating works of deep aesthetic value.

In Experiment 1, 134 subjects were presented with a high-function context that read: »Jack is an artist/doorman. He is very good at his job«. Participants were then asked to rate how natural/weird this sentence sounded on a 7-point Likert scale. The results suggest that high-function contexts—i.e., being very good at one's job—do not positively increase the acceptability of true-modifications. In Experiment 2, we tested the hypothesis that what matters for the normative dimension is not whether one is a good x, but rather whether one is committed to be an x. We presented 312 participants with a context that changes the devotion that Jack has towards his respective profession. Our results show that devotion contexts have a massive impact on the acceptability of true-modifications. Crucially, when a high-devotion context is provided, no significant difference emerges between the acceptability ratings of true-modifications involving dual character concepts and those involving controls.

2

Diehl

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 9.00 Uhr, 15/E27
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 9:00 a.m., 15/E27

**Fineness of Grain and Grounding:
A Lewisian Account?**

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Theories of grounding and ontological dependence raise a new challenge to the sufficiency of David Lewis's account of propositions to provide adequate fineness of grain. In *On the Plurality of Worlds* (1986), Lewis argues that modal realism yields a satisfying theory of propositions: propositions are sets of worlds, or, equivalently, functions from worlds to truth values.

But grounding claims are intended to capture worldly, non-causal, explanatory dependence relationships between the grounding and the grounded facts. Thus, propositions will have to possess a finer-than-modal structure. The fineness of grain is essential to the theoretical advantages grounding offers in capturing the particular nature of many philosophical claims.

I argue that the Lewisian theory can be modified to meet the challenge posed by grounding. Any account must satisfy two desiderata: first, it must supply sufficient fineness of grain to make distinctions that are not

captured by differences in possible worlds. Second, it must offer some sort of story about how these differences could be *in the world*. A Lewisian-inspired approach is capable of satisfying the first desideratum. To show this, I propose a modification of John Bigelow's framework for belief contexts to account for the grounding operator. This demonstrates that a Lewisian-inspired approach can satisfy the technical requirements of grounding.

To evaluate whether a Lewisian approach can fulfill the second desideratum, we have to distinguish two senses of worldliness. I call a view *weakly worldly* iff mental or representational items don't affect the truth-value of its claims; it is *strongly worldly* iff no components of its content are representational or mental. My approach satisfies weak but not strong worldliness, but I argue that's the only sense that matters. I claim that a Lewisian theory offers an attractive, theoretically tractable way of handling the fineness of grain of grounding that fares well when compared to rival theories of structured propositions.

6

Dinges

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 9:00 Uhr, 11/213
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 9:00 a.m., 11/213

**Skeptical Pragmatic Invariantism:
Good, but Not Good Enough**

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In this talk, I will discuss what I will call skeptical pragmatic invariantism (SPI) as a potential response to the intuitions we have about scenarios such as the so-called bank cases. The bank cases trigger intuitions to the effect that the truth-value of knowledge claims depends on the epistemic standard of the context of utterance. In particular, they trigger intuitions to the effect that a speaker, call her *A*, can truly say, »I know the bank will be open,« when not much is at stake and no error-possibilities are mentioned (that is, in a low standards context) even though *A* could also truly say, »I don't know the bank will be open,« if much were at stake and an error-possibility had been mentioned (that is, in a high standards context). How do we explain these intuitions? Proponents of SPI argue that *A* doesn't know the bank will be open in the low and the high standards context. We say that her knowledge ascription in the low standards context is true nevertheless because it has a true implicature, in particular, because it truly implicates that *A* is *close enough* to knowing that the bank will be open. The goal of this talk is to refute SPI. In particular, I will show that SPI is incompatible with reasonable assumptions about how we are aware of the presence of implicatures. Such objections are not new, but extant formulations are wanting for reasons I will point out in the course of my presentation. One may worry that refuting SPI is not a worthwhile project given that this view is an implausible minority position anyway. To respond, I will argue that, contrary to common opinion, other familiar objections to SPI fail and, thus, that SPI is a promising position to begin with.

1

Doerge

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 11:15 Uhr, 15/114
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 11:15 a.m., 15/114

Much Ado about Performatives

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The use of scholarly terms with inconsistent meanings (or definitions) leads to serious problems, able to spoil a scholarly debate entirely.

The talk illustrates the issue with reference to the argument between Bach/Harnish on the one hand and Searle on the other, about »how performatives (really) work«. This debate starts with Bach/Harnish's explanation of how »performative utterances«—i.e., explicit performances of (what they call) »communicative illocutionary acts«—achieve communicative success. Their suggestion is that the explicit performance of a communicative act is a »standardized« way of performing it, and that standardization facilitates the audience's understanding.

Searle rejects Bach/Harnish's account and presents an alternative. »Performatives« are declarations, he suggests, and they succeed by satisfying a convention. Searle's argument, however, shows several puzzling features. Thus, he requires, as a »condition of adequacy«, that performatives be »self-guaranteeing«; however, it really does not seem to be the case—let alone an appropriate condition of adequacy—that »communicative illocutionary acts« (those acts Bach/Harnish are dealing with) actually have this feature: if, for example, the surrounding of an utterance is very noisy, then even an explicit performance cannot *guarantee* communicative success.

This leads to a re-examination of the term »performative utterance«, as applied in the present debate. It turns out that in fact the two parties are talking at cross purposes, due to the inconsistent use of the term »illocutionary act«. The two parties do agree that a »performative utterance« is the »explicit performance of an illocutionary act«; however, they apply different meanings (and extensions) to the term »illocutionary act«. While Searle aims at certain institutional acts, Bach/Harnish aim at mere acts of communication. Accordingly, with the term »performative utterance«, Searle aims at the *mere performance of institutional acts*, whereas Bach/Harnish are concerned with the *communicative success of acts of communication*.

After the analysis of the argument between Bach/Harnish and Searle, the talk turns to other debates which might be infected by covert definition problems, including the notions »meaning theory« and »semantical incompleteness«, as used by Davidson (1967) and Capelen/Lepore (2004).

6

Dorsch

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 9.00 Uhr, 11/213
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 9:00 a.m., 11/213

The Phenomenal Presence of Reasons

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Doxasticism about our awareness of normative (i.e. justifying) reasons—the view that we can recognise reasons for forming attitudes or performing actions only by means of normative judgements or beliefs—is incompatible with the following triad of claims:

- (1) Being motivated (i.e. forming attitudes or performing actions for a motive) requires responding to and, hence, recognising a relevant reason.
- (2) Infants are capable of being motivated.
- (3) Infants are incapable of normative judgement or belief.

It should be clear that (3) is true, given that infants lack the required reflective and conceptual capacities. So doxasticists have to reject either (1) or (2) (or both). But this forced choice may be understood as a dilemma for doxasticism. On the one hand, doxasticists may adopt a Kantian approach and reject (2), precisely because they think that motivation presupposes the doxastic recognition of reasons, and because infants lack the capacity to doxastically recognise reasons. But this choice seems to wrongly reduce the responses of infants to mere reflexes or instinctive reactions. On the other hand, doxasticists may choose a Humean route and deny (1) by espousing a purely causal or teleological account of motivation. But this would mean detrimentally ignoring the normative nature of (some instances of) motivation.

One elegant way of avoiding this dilemma is to give up doxasticism and instead endorse *experientialism*—the view that we enjoy some experiential access to reasons, which is independent of, and perhaps more fundamental than, our capacity to form normative judgements and beliefs. In this talk, I would like to provide an argument for the existence of such a non-doxastic form of access to reasons. More specifically, I aim to defend the claim that our basic awareness of reasons is *phenomenal* in nature. What this means is that it forms part of our *access from the inside* to those of our mental episodes that provide us with access to reasons. In other words, when we introspectively attend to reason-giving mental episodes and what they are about, we have the impression of the presence of a reason for us. My defence of this experientialist alternative to doxasticism will primarily focus on perceptual reasons for first-order beliefs about the external world.

5

Drozdewska / Sartenaer

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 9.45 Uhr, 15/115
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 9:45 a.m., 15/115

**Does Synchronic Causation Save
the Mental from Exclusion?**

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Mental causation is probably one of the most broadly discussed and vexing topics in contemporary philosophy of mind. During the last decades, its main focus has been on the notorious »Causal Exclusion Argument«, articulated and popularized by Jaegwon Kim. In a nutshell, this argument leads to the following dilemma: for you can't have both physicalism and (an interesting form of) antireductionism in the same package, it turns out that, when it comes to the mind/body relationship, you unavoidably have to embrace either epiphenomenalism or an outright dualistic stance.

For many, this dilemma is deemed unacceptable. Accordingly, numerous attempts to overcome it have recently flourished, from the ones that frontally reject (at least) one of the argument's explicit premises—the causal closure of the physical world or the implausibility of systematic causal overdetermination—to the others that put into question some aspects of Kim's implicit metaphysical framework—like his account of properties, realization or causation.

In this paper, we would like to investigate a promising way out of the exclusion argument by following what seems to be an unprecedented thread, namely the possibility that causation could be consistently construed in a synchronic way. In contrast with the usual picture shared by proponents of any productive or counterfactual accounts of causation where it is always assumed that causes temporally precede their effects, considering that mental events can have an *immediate* causal impact on their own, *simultaneous* physical basis, could be an interesting and consistent way of holding together, *contra* Kim, the causal closure of the physical world and the dismissal of causal overdetermination.

With this idea in mind, we will show that (i) there exist consistent accounts of synchronic causation that are resistant to the common critics raised against them since Hume; (ii) that these accounts can be implemented into the specific context of the mind-body relationship; and finally (iii) that this implementation allows us to shed some light on a new, plausible way to reply to Kim's exclusion argument.

10

Dufner

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 13.30 Uhr, 11/115
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 1:30 p.m., 11/115

**Der Prioritarismus: eine distributionssensitive
Form des Konsequentialismus?**

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This paper argues that Derek Parfit's most recent 2012 defence of prioritarianism, as a consequentialist theory of just distribution, is still vulnerable to certain fairness objections by critics. Prioritarianism gives non-absolute priority to worse-off individuals in cases in which benefits can be distributed. The view will usually recommend helping the worse off, but if the possible benefits for the better off would be very significant, it will sometimes recommend helping the better off. After a surprisingly long absence of truly powerful objections against the view, Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve have objected that prioritarianism generates a problem in trade-off cases—cases in which one can help only some, but not all individuals affected. They have argued that in such cases, prioritarianism will sometimes disregard the conflicting claims of those who will then end up worse off and will not have received any help. This can happen whenever prioritarianism recommends helping the better off. In 2012 Parfit has published a further defense of the view in light of such fairness objections. This presentation shows that this latest version of Parfit's prioritarianism is still vulnerable to fairness objections—albeit in a narrower range of cases than alternative consequentialist theories.

4

Durán

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 9.00 Uhr, 15/133
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 9:00 a.m., 15/133

**Varying the Explanatory Span: Scientific
Explanation in Computer Simulations**

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Much of today's scientific practice is being carried out by computer simulations. It is easy to find good reasons for this, as they are grounded on accessibility to the phenomenon under study, the ability to control several variables, and even economic motives such as the availability of human resources, among others. Moreover, scientists and engineers have come a long way in terms of computer architecture, mathematical machinery, programming languages, and our general understanding of the world, all of which facilitates the use and implementation of computer simulations in scientific and engineering domains.

Despite the well-grounded scientific and engineering understanding of computer simulations, their philosophical implications and novelty are less clear. One of such implications is the question about scientific explanation in the context of computer simulations. In this vein, this paper discusses some central issues surrounding scientific explanation of results of computer simulations. More specifically, in this paper I sketch an account of explanation via computer simulations; discuss some of the shortcomings of my view; and suggest some solutions to those shortcomings.

To this end, I must first identify the *explanans* and the *explanandum* in an explanation carried out by a computer simulation; this is an important step since it is not entirely clear what is being explained (i.e., data broadly construed or the real-world phenomenon being simulated) nor in virtue of what we explain. Secondly, and more extensively, I show that the unificationist theory of scientific explanation is the most suitable theoretical framework for computer simulations; despite its suitability, however, I argue that the unificationist framework needs to be slightly modified in order to give room to computer simulations. This is, arguably, the most difficult and speculative part of the paper. Finally, I present what is still missing for a full-fledged account of scientific explanation in computer simulations as well as some promising solutions for accomplishing such account.

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Dutilh-Novaes

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 9.00 Uhr, 11/116
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 9:00 a.m., 11/116

A Dialogical Analysis of Structural Rules

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Recently, a number of substructural approaches to the semantic paradoxes have been proposed, which identify one or another structural rule as the 'culprit' giving rise to paradox. This is often taken to be sufficient motivation to restrict or altogether ban the rule in question. However, it seems that independent, i.e. not paradox-related, motivations would be required for such restrictions to be truly convincing. In other words, we need independent arguments on what is wrong with this or that structural rule, and to this end, we need to discuss the (putative) reasons why the rule was thought to be plausible in the firstplace. In this talk, I adopt a dialogical conception of deductive proofs in order to discuss the rationale behind weakening, contraction, and reflexivity. I argue that, while they may seem *prima facie* plausible dialogical principles, there are also purely dialogical reasons to restrict all three—especially reflexivity.

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Dworschak

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 13.30 Uhr, 15/105
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 1:30 p.m., 15/105

Realism and its Opponents in Contemporary Aesthetics

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Realism versus anti-realism concerning aesthetic objects and properties is a long-running debate in analytic aesthetics. However, it does not always reveal what is at stake in it and which argumentative background it presupposes. This issue is all the more pressing since recent contributions to the ontology of art (by Andrew Kania, David Davies, Derek Matravers, and others) have pushed the debate towards the subject matter of *cultural practices* without making explicit that following their line of thought is likely to call the implicit foundations of the previous debate into question, thus forcing us to reassess the notion of »reality« (and, conversely, of »irreality«) in aesthetics.

In order to establish this conclusion, I make three claims:

(1) Anti-realist positions depend on their realist counterparts, sharing most of their ontological presuppositions. Thus, they fail to set up an independent position concerning the concept of what is mostly discussed as aesthetic properties; they are, in the long run, themselves versions of realism.

(2) If our attention is called to the fact that many aesthetic entities are embedded in cultural practices, we are led to an alternative view according to which aesthetic discourse does not represent (aesthetic or more basic) properties. Then, what are they about? The recent contributions to analytic aesthetics mentioned above do not give a positive answer, but tend to remain agnostic while implicitly relying on the customary picture of »reality«, saying that it is fine to have practices concerned with »inexistents« (A. Kania).

(3) It is unsatisfactory to class much-discussed »properties« such as expression or meaning under the heading of »inexistents«. The question what they are calls for a positive answer, which is possible only if we analyse the *concept of the subject(s)* concerned with them. In the end, it is the concept of a subject—neglected in analytic aesthetics despite recent talk about cultural practices—which is at stake in debates on aesthetic objects and properties. A crucial point in this analysis must be the distinction between *cognition* and *understanding*, since each of them offers a peculiar perspective on »reality«.

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Dziurosz-Serafinowicz

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 10.30 Uhr, 15/111
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 10:30 a.m., 15/111

A Resiliency-Based Approach to Chance

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We show how a particular resiliency-centered approach to chance provides a justification for two conditions that are claimed in the literature to be constitutive of chance. The first condition tells us that the present chance of some proposition *A* conditional on the proposition about some later chance of *A* should be set equal to that later chance of *A*. The second condition requires the present chance of some proposition *A* to be equal to the weighted average of possible later chances of *A*, where the weights are chances assigned by the present chance function to propositions about *A*'s possible later chances. In this paper we first introduce, motivate and make precise a resiliency-centered approach to chance whose basic idea is that any chance distribution should be maximally invariant under variation of experimental factors. Second, we provide resiliency-based arguments for the two conditions: we show that any chance distribution that violates the two conditions can be replaced by another chance distribution which is more resilient under variation of experimental factors.

6

Eder

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 15.15 Uhr, 11/213
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 3:15 p.m., 11/213

Getting Rid of Ideal Agents

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Williamson argues that an evidential probability (i.e., the probability of a proposition on an agent's total evidence) can neither be (adequately) interpreted as the actual credence of a human agent nor as that of an (epistemic-)ideal agent (2002: 209–11). He concludes that no interpretation in terms of credence is adequate.

If Williamson is right in his criticism of credence interpretations, this has far-reaching consequences for epistemology and philosophy of science. It is common among epistemologists and philosophers of science to interpret (evidential-)probabilities in terms of credences. Remarkable advances in these areas must be withdrawn if such an interpretation is inadequate.

Williamson's criticism of credence interpretations is widely ignored in epistemology and philosophy of science. I make up for this. In the first part of my presentation, I argue that Williamson's criticism is flawed. In the second part, I propose a credence interpretation of evidential probabilities that he does not consider and that neither refers to actual credences of human agents nor to credences of ideal agents. However, it is still in terms of credences.

References

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[Paperback]

6

Ernst

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 16.00 Uhr, 11/213
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 4:00 p.m., 11/213

Das Wahre und das Gute

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Einer naheliegenden Vorstellung zufolge spielt das Wahre für den theoretischen Bereich eine ähnliche Rolle wie das Gute für den praktischen: Wahrheit, so scheint es, ist das intrinsische Ziel von Überzeugungen – etwas zu glauben, heißt, es für wahr zu halten – so wie das Gute das intrinsische Ziel von Handlungen ist – etwas (absichtlich) zu tun, heißt, ein, zumindest scheinbares, Gut zu verwirklichen.

In meinem Vortrag werde ich zum einen diese Vorstellung angreifen, indem ich eine Reihe von grundlegenden Unterschieden zwischen dem Wahren und dem Guten aufzeige: »gut« ist gradierbar, »wahr« nicht; andererseits gibt es Überzeugungsgrade, aber keine Handlungsgrade; konfligierende Handlungen können gleich gut, konfligierende Überzeugungen aber nicht gleich wahr sein; gleich gute Gründe für Handlungen lassen rationale Wahlfreiheit, gleich gute Gründe für Überzeugungen führen rationalerweise zu Urteilsenthaltung; Gutheit ist maximierbar, Wahrheit nicht; sowohl Überzeugungen als auch Handlungen sind auf das Gute hin orientiert, aber nicht beide auf Wahrheit.

Zum anderen werde ich eine alternative Vorstellung verteidigen. Demnach ist das Wahre auf der theoretischen Ebene nicht mit dem Guten, sondern mit dem Erfolgreichen auf der praktischen Ebene auf eine Stufe zu stellen. Überzeugungen zielen so auf Wahrheit, wie Absichten auf Erfolg zielen! Diese Kernthese des Vortrags wird dadurch gestützt, dass sich auf ihrer Grundlage die richtigen Vergleiche zwischen Theorie und Praxis ergeben: Weder »wahr« noch »erfolgreich« ist gradierbar; es gibt sowohl Überzeugungs- wie Absichtsgrade; konfligierende Absichten können nicht zugleich erfolgreich sein, so wie konfligierende Überzeugungen nicht zugleich wahr sein können; es gibt eine wichtige Parallele zwischen (einer Form von) theoretischer und praktischer Rationalität: es geht dann nämlich jeweils darum Überzeugungs- beziehungsweise Absichtsgrade aufeinander abzustimmen; Erfolg ist ebenso wenig maximierbar wie Wahrheit; sowohl wahre Überzeugungen als auch realisierte Absichten (Handlungen) sind auf das Gute hin orientiert.

Meine These ist allerdings nicht, dass keine Disanalogien übrig bleiben. Insbesondere zwischen theoretischen und praktischen Gründen gibt es m.E. wichtige Unterschiede. Dennoch trägt die beschriebene Analogie zum Verständnis unseres erkennenden und handelnden Umgangs mit der Welt bei.

4

Eronen

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 16.00 Uhr, 15/133
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 4:00 p.m., 15/133

Defending the Interventionist Solution to the Exclusion Problem

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The causal exclusion argument suggests that mental causes are excluded in favor of the underlying physical causes that do all the causal work. Recently a debate has emerged concerning the possibility of avoiding this conclusion by adopting Woodward's interventionist theory of causation. While several philosophers have proposed that mental causation can be saved if we adopt interventionism, others have suggested that interventionism gives rise to an exclusion problem that very much resembles the original problem. In this paper, I defend the interventionist approach to mental causation against this recent criticism. First of all, I argue that (in contrast to how it is presented) the interventionist exclusion problem is not an isolated problem in philosophy of mind, but a challenge to the plausibility of interventionism in general. I then argue that the interventionist exclusion problem can be circumvented, and that interventionism is compatible with higher-level or mental causation with only minor amendments. I also illustrate this approach by drawing a parallel with biology, showing that in analogous cases in biology it would be absurd to not accept the causal relevance of higher-level variables.

4

Fahrbach

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 9.45 Uhr, 15/111
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 9:45 a.m., 15/111

IBE and Bayesianism: A Couple in Harmony

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There is no epistemic concept that is common to the frameworks of IBE (inference to the best explanation) and Bayesianism. To compare the frameworks one must first establish suitable correspondences between the relevant concepts. I propose that the notion of explanatory quality of IBE corresponds to the product $\Pr(H) \cdot \Pr(E|H)$. I show that this simple identification is inherently plausible, and that it implies a straightforward correspondence between the criterion for successful inference within IBE and a criterion within the Bayesian framework: a hypothesis has the highest explanatory quality, iff it fulfils a certain probabilistic inequality. I discuss the pros and cons of this approach to linking IBE and Bayesianism, and compare it with other approaches in the literature.

6

Feldbacher

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 14.15 Uhr, 11/214
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 2:15 p.m., 11/214

Epistemic Normativity of Social Reliabilism

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Epistemological investigations of belief in philosophy differ from such investigations in psychology. While psychologists focus on the question how real agents actually form beliefs and gather knowledge, philosophers investigate normative questions about more or less idealized agents. The problem of how to interpret this epistemic normativity led many authors to an instrumentalist point of view, claiming, as e.g. Quine (1986) did, that »normative epistemology is a branch of engineering. It is the technology of truth-seeking [...] it is a matter of efficacy for an ulterior end, truth [...]. The normative here, as elsewhere in engineering, becomes descriptive when the terminal parameter is expressed«. Several forms of epistemic consequentialism assume analogue to a deontic means-end-principle, which is often used to express normative instrumentalism in ethics, an epistemic means-end-principle also for norms of knowledge and belief of the following form: If M is an optimal means in order to achieve epistemic goal G, then, since G is on its very basis epistemically ought or rationally accepted, M is also rationally acceptable. This principle has at least two components that require further clarification: (i) the concept of an epistemic goal and (ii) the concept of an optimal means to achieve such a goal. In this paper we focus on a clarification of the second concept and show how optimality results of the theory of strategy selection allow for spelling out the normative part of rationality in social reliabilism, a generalization of Hume's approach to testimony.

1

Felka

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 15.15 Uhr, 15/114
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 3:15 p.m., 15/114

On Easy Arguments for the Existence of Numbers

Katharina Felka

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In my talk I am concerned with easy arguments for the existence of numbers. A paradigmatic easy argument starts with the commonly accepted premise that the sentence »Mars has two moons« is true and proceeds as follows: If »Mars has two moons« is true, then »The number of moons of Mars is two« is true as well. The truth of the latter sentence requires the existence of numbers and, thus, numbers exist. The existence of such arguments is surprising, since they suggest that the existence of numbers follows immediately from the commonly accepted premise that the sentence »Mars has two moons« is true. If this is correct, then something must be wrong with disputes about the existence of numbers, since they are based on the assumption that the question of whether numbers exist is a hard one that does not have a trivial answer. However, in my talk I argue with the aid of results from current linguistic theory

that easy arguments for the existence of numbers are not convincing. Accordingly, they do not show that ontological disputes about the question of whether numbers exist are mistaken.

8

Fischer, Christoph

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 14.15 Uhr, 15/105
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 2:15 p.m., 15/105

**Absicht und Kreation:
Gibt es nicht-intendierte Artefakte?**

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Artefakte sind absichtlich gemachte Dinge – darüber besteht in der analytischen Artefaktphilosophie weitgehende Einigkeit. Weniger Einigkeit besteht jedoch hinsichtlich der Auslegung dieser These. Das ist insofern nicht verwunderlich, als sich Absichten auf verschiedene Aspekte eines zu kreierenden Gegenstandes richten können: auf den kommunikativen Erfolg (Dipert 1993), auf die Funktion (Baker 2008) oder auf gewisse (etwa geschmackliche) Merkmale (Thomasson 2014). Die in allen diesen Varianten vorausgesetzte Absicht ist die, einen Gegenstand bestimmter Art zu produzieren (Hilpinen 1992). Wie aber verhält es sich mit dem folgenden Fall: Jemand kreiert etwas, ohne zu wissen, was daraus werden wird (und damit auch: wozu es taugen mag) und *ohne* etwaige Merkmale absichtlich zu fixieren. Existiert die Möglichkeit eines solchen Kreierens? Und falls ja: Ist das so Erschaffene kein Artefakt? Ich möchte in meinem Vortrag zeigen, dass diese Möglichkeit durchaus besteht und dass es sich bei dem auf absichtslose Weise entstandenen Gegenstand natürlich um ein Artefakt handelt. Mit anderen Worten: Artefakte müssen zwar kreiert, aber nicht intendiert sein. Ich verfare in drei Schritten. Zunächst werde ich den Begriff der *Intention* definieren, und dann jenen der *produktiven Intention* (Schritt 1). Dass dies nötig ist, zeigt die Verwechslung des Intendierens mit anderen intentionalen Prozessen (wie dem des Entscheidens) ebenso wie die kuriose Annahme, dass jemand mitunter auch dann intendiert, wenn er davon nichts weiß. In einem zweiten Schritt werde ich Bedingungen nennen, die zusammen hinreichend sind für den Akt des Kreierens (Schritt 2). Schließlich werde ich an einem Beispiel veranschaulichen, was es konkret heißen kann, absichtslos zu kreieren (Schritt 3).

S

Fischer, Enno

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 15.15 Uhr, 15/E28
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 3:15 p.m., 15/E28

**Welche Rolle spielt der Begriff
der Kausalität in der Physik?**

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Bertrand Russell beschrieb 1912 das Kausalitätsprinzip (KP) als ein Relikt eines vergangenen Zeitalters, das wie die Monarchie nur überlebt, weil jeder irrtümlicherweise denkt, es richte keinen Schaden an. Er sah im Begriff der

Kausalität Probleme, die dessen Verwendung in sogenannten entwickelten Wissenschaften im Weg stehen und forderte dessen vollständige Elimination aus dem philosophischen Vokabular (Russell 1912). Heute weist eine lebhaft philosophische Debatte bezüglich Kausalität darauf hin, dass Russells Forderung sich nicht durchsetzen konnte. Eine besondere Beziehung zum Begriff der Kausalität wird dabei aber der Physik zugeschrieben. Russells Position ist hier exemplarisch. Demnach konkurrieren kausale Aussagen in der Physik mit Naturgesetzen, die als mathematische Funktionen präziser formuliert werden können. In entwickelten Theorien wie Newtons Gravitationstheorie spielt der Begriff der Kausalität deshalb keine Rolle.

In meinem Vortrag werde ich zunächst aufzeigen, mit welchen Annahmen Russell zu seiner auf den ersten Blick radikalen Forderung kommt (1). An diese Untersuchung anknüpfend werde ich meine eigene These darstellen. Diese gliedert sich in zwei Teile. Einerseits spielt das KP auf der Ebene entwickelter Theorien der Physik in der Tat keine fundamentale Rolle (2). Andererseits geht eine Elimination kausaler Begrifflichkeit aus der gesamten Physik zu weit. Im Prozess physikalischer Forschung sind wir auf deren Verwendung angewiesen. Um die Rolle des Begriffs der Kausalität hier zu bestimmen, muss erst geklärt werden, wie Kausalität trotz fehlendem physikalisch fundamentalem KP im Alltag eine Rolle spielen kann (3). Aus der Funktion, die kausale Begrifflichkeit im Alltag hat, ergibt sich deren Relevanz für die Physik. Wenn in einem Experiment die tatsächlichen Ergebnisse von den in Modellen formulierten Erwartungen abweichen, dann ist die Bestimmung der *Ursachen* dafür ein wichtiger Schritt (4).

Literatur

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6

Fischer, Eugen

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 9.00 Uhr, 11/214
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 9:00 a.m., 11/214

Submarine Iceberg Epistemology: Or, Experimental Philosophy 2.0

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Intuitions play key roles in philosophy, as evidence for theories and as a source of paradoxes and problems. Experimental philosophy's ›warrant project‹ deploys surveys and experiments to assess the evidentiary value of philosophically relevant intuitions, and philosophers' warrant for accepting them. A first generation of studies employed surveys and simple experiments to study the sensitivity of intuitions to otiose parameters, with mainly critical intent. A second generation of studies has embarked on the more open-ended project of developing and experimentally testing psychological explanations of philosophically relevant intuitions that facilitate their epistemological assessment—negative or positive. Contributions to this ›sources project‹ focus on developing explanations that invoke automatic cognitive processes and their interplay with consciously accessible processes. This research promises to give empirical substance to the project of an ›iceberg epistemology‹ (Henderson and Horgan) that examines epistemologically

relevant psychological factors both above and below the waterline of conscious accessibility. This talk provides proof of concept for the challenging ›underwater‹ part of ›iceberg epistemology‹.

To show it viable, we need to develop and experimentally test an explanation of specific philosophical intuitions which (i) traces them back to particular automatic cognitive processes and (ii) facilitates their epistemological assessment. When philosophers ›consider a case‹ in thought experiments, etc., they typically read or rehearse verbal case-descriptions. Many intuitions thus elicited are likely to be due to discourse processes that automatically occur in language-comprehension. Whereas extant contributions to the sources project build on findings and methods from cognitive and social psychology, the present paper therefore turns to psycholinguistics. It develops a psycholinguistic explanation of intuitions at the root of a familiar paradox about perception (›argument from illusion‹), reports plausibility-ranking and eye-tracking experiments (with CI Paul Engelhardt) that tested this explanation, and explains how to proceed without naturalistic fallacy from this explanation to epistemological assessments. We thus obtain a debunking explanation of paradoxical intuitions, which resolves the targeted paradox—and establishes the feasibility of a genuinely interdisciplinary approach in epistemology.

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Fischer, Stefan

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 14.15 Uhr, 15/113
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 2:15 p.m., 15/113

What is Promoting a Desire?

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According to Humean accounts of normative reasons, there is reason for an agent to perform an action if and only if, and because, doing so promotes one of her desires' objects. It is unclear, however, what exactly the promotion relation is. I approach the issue in a general way, evaluating various candidates. My discussion covers several options for understanding promotion that aren't mentioned in the recent literature. The account I end up with is, as I show, extensionally equivalent to the one proposed in Schroeder (2007), though there are some structural differences between the two. My main result is of interest for all Humeans: they must rely on some probabilistic understanding of promotion in order to account for the reasons we have in many of the everyday ›probabilistic scenarios‹ we find ourselves in.

I then turn to a recent objection against (purely) probabilistic accounts of promotion raised by Behrens, diPaolo, and Sharadin. I argue that the argument is based on a false premise. Contrary to what the three authors argue, we do not have reasons to f if what we desire happens anyways and independent of our f-ing. I conclude that we should strive to enhance our understanding of probabilistic accounts of promotion, rather than look for non-probabilistic alternatives.

6

Flowerree / Kruse

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 13.30 Uhr, 11/214
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 1:30 p.m., 11/214

How to Be an Epistemic Consequentialist (Or, how We Learned not to Be a Mad Mad Dog Reliabilist)

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In this paper, we show how one can be an epistemic consequentialist about epistemic justification. We argue that epistemic consequentialism (and reliabilism in particular) can avoid Selim Berker's recent challenge. Berker (2013a, 2013b) argues that epistemic consequentialist approaches fail because they allow for illicit trade-offs between propositions. According to Berker, illicit trade-offs commit consequentialist approaches to epistemic justification to counterintuitive evaluations regarding the status of epistemic justification of beliefs in certain cases. We will introduce these cases in our talk and refer to them as Berker-Firth cases in what follows. While we grant that all epistemic consequentialist approaches to epistemic justification allow for trade-offs between propositions of one kind or another, we argue that the most common epistemic consequentialist approaches to epistemic justification avoid counterintuitive results in the Berker-Firth cases. We will focus on reliabilist approaches to epistemic justification and argue that not all reliabilist approaches fall prey to Berker-Firth cases. Reliabilist approaches to epistemic justification are epistemic rule consequentialist approaches. There are various kinds of reliability to be found in the literature on reliabilist approaches to epistemic justification which are compatible with epistemic rule consequentialism and which are not prone to Berker-Firth cases. Moreover, we identify the kind of reliabilism—which we will introduce as Mad Mad Dog Reliabilism—that falls prey to Berker-Firth cases and observe that neither of the common approaches is of that kind. We conclude with a methodological point. Recent responses to Berker [cf. Alstrom-Vij and Dunn (2014), Goldman (forthcoming)] have argued that Berker has misunderstood reliabilism. We agree with these responses, but go beyond them by diagnosing where Berker has gotten the theory wrong. Berker overlooks that reliabilist approaches to epistemic justification have two tasks. The first task is to justify reliability as the criterion for justification conferring processes or process rules in an epistemic rule consequentialist manner (cf. Goldman 1986). The second task is to look at intuitive cases of justified beliefs and unjustified beliefs and to choose the kind of reliability suited to take these intuitions into account (cf. Goldman 1979, 1986).

S

Fox

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 10.30 Uhr, 15/E28
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 10:30 a.m., 15/E28

The Subjective Incoherence Argument Against Parfit's Agony Argument

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In this paper, I defend desire-based subjectivism about practical reasons against Parfit's *Agony Argument*. This subjectivist view holds that *S* has most reason to ϕ iff ϕ -ing is what best fulfils the desires that *S* would have after formally ideal deliberation. The *Agony Argument* against subjectivism involves an example where, even after allegedly ideal deliberation, *S* has no desire to avoid a future period of agony. Subjectivism entails, says Parfit, that in this example *S* would not have any reason to desire to avoid, and try to avoid, the agony. This appears to be an unacceptable result for any theory of practical reasons. In defence of subjectivism, my aim is to show in the *Subjective Incoherence Argument* that subjectivism does not entail this implausible result, given that Parfit underestimates the substantive resources that even a formal account of ideal deliberation offers. More precisely, I argue that in Parfit's example, every formally coherent agent will both (a) desire to avoid present agony, and, on that basis, after ideal deliberation, (b) desire to avoid future agony. In support of these claims, I introduce the *legitimate input account of coherence*. This account draws on epistemic standards of discourse in a given domain, such as normativity, and explains why the mere fact that some agony takes place tomorrow rather than today is no legitimate input to rational deliberation about whether to avoid it. Importantly, this illegitimacy is explained in purely conceptual, i.e. non-normative terms regarding what kind of domain normativity *is*, not what it *requires*. Hence, even a subjectivist about practical reasons can appeal to these non-normative conceptual considerations. Therefore, even under a formal account of practical deliberation, any coherent agent in Parfit's example will desire to avoid, and hence have reason to avoid, future agony and subjectivism does not entail the implausible result that agents sometimes lack these reasons.

1

Fraissler

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 16.00 Uhr, 15/114
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 4:00 p.m., 15/114

Informativity and Schmidtity

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The aim of this talk is to draw a genuinely new conclusion from Saul Kripke's *schmidtity argument* (henceforth »SA«). SA was originally directed against a possible solution of Frege's puzzle, i.e. the question how a sentence like »Hesperus is Phosphorus« can be informative (while »Hesperus is Hesperus« is trivial), although »Hesperus« and »Phosphorus« are coreferential names. This

problem appears to be extremely pressing for a referentialist like Kripke. He endorses *SA* to refute *metalinguistic solutions* of Frege's puzzle according to which identity statements do not deal with the identified objects but with the names used to make the statement. In virtue of Kripke's own assessment of *SA* the metalinguistic account is not able to solve the problem or explain the underlying phenomenon of informativity and therefore represents a superfluous and idle pseudo-solution. Yet the very brevity of Kripke's formulation of *SA* demands thorough reconstruction to evaluate and appreciate the argument's full force. Following Murali Ramachandran, I take *SA* to be effective against not only metalinguistic theories but against *every semantic account* of the informativity problem, including Frege's own solution (distinguishing between sense and reference of a term) and many later attempts. At first glance, this may actually appear like a case against *SA*, because if informativity were a semantic problem (as a widespread albeit silent consent depicts it), something would have to be amiss with an argument set out to *disqualify every semantic solution* of the informativity challenge. I, on the contrary, argue that it is reasonable even on independent grounds *not* to treat informativity as a semantic issue at all. Thus *SA* turns out to be not only sound but also important in helping us see where a theoretical treatment of informativity must be located: namely on a pragmatic level. In conclusion, the outcome of *SA* is a fundamental methodological restriction that has to be taken into account by every attempted explanation of the informativity phenomenon and/or solution of Frege's puzzle. To phrase this result as a slogan: Just don't bother with Frege's puzzle if you want to do (only) semantics!

3

French

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 9:45 Uhr, 11/116
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 9:45 a.m., 11/116

Structural Reflexivity and the Semantic Paradoxes

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That one can deal with the semantic paradoxes by restricting or rejecting structural rules is now relatively well known. In particular, solutions which reject the structural rule of cut and contraction are currently en vogue. What has not been seriously considered are the prospects of dealing with the paradoxes by rejecting the *ur-structural* rule of *reflexivity*—for all formulas A : $A \vdash A$. Here we will show that the non-reflexive approach to the semantic paradoxes bears further investigation. In particular we will show that a fully non-reflexive approach can capture much of what is desirable about classical reasoning.

5

Fricke

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 14:15 Uhr, 15/131
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 2:15 p.m., 15/131

Three Transparency Theories of Self-Knowledge: Moran, Byrne and Fernández

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Transparency theories of self-knowledge are inspired by Gareth Evans's dictum that »in making a self-ascription of belief, one's eyes are, so to speak, or occasionally literally, directed outward—upon the world. [...] I get myself in a position to answer the question whether I believe that p by putting into operation whatever procedure I have for answering the question whether p .« (Evans 1982, 225) In this paper, I shall compare the attempts of Richard Moran, Alex Byrne and Jordi Fernández to develop a theory out of Evans's observation. The central question is whether these theories are able to explain how it is possible for our access to our own mental states to be—in Byrne's terms—both privileged (comparatively error-proof) and peculiar (only available for knowledge of my own states, not for knowledge of others' states).

Moran relates transparency (responding to a question about what I believe by considering »reasons that would justify an answer to the corresponding question about the world«) with epistemic agency (not discovering, but deciding what to believe, making up one's mind). I argue that transparency does not imply epistemic agency and epistemic agency does not explain privileged and peculiar access.

Byrne's rule BEL (»If p , believe that you believe that p «) does explain privilege and peculiarity. Two interesting objections are (1) that the inference embodied in BEL is mad (Boyle 2011) because the fact that p has no tendency to show that I believe that p and (2) that BEL does not *reveal* our occurrent or dispositional beliefs, but rather makes us form *new* beliefs that we then self-ascribe (cf. Gertler 2011).

Fernández proposes that second-order beliefs are not formed on the basis of first-order beliefs, as BEL suggests, but, rather, formed on the basis of the same grounds as the first-order beliefs they are about. This »Bypass« procedure is justified because we regularly form the same first-order beliefs on the same grounds. I shall object that Fernández leaves it open how we identify the regularities in question. On balance, Byrne's approach seems to me to be the most promising transparency theory.

4

Friebe

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 10.30 Uhr, 15/134
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 10:30 a.m., 15/134

**Leibniz-Prinzip, Tropen-Ontologie und die
Quantenmechanik**

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Hauptziel ist, den Zusammenhang des Universalien-Problems mit dem Leibniz-Prinzip zu klären. Dies geschieht vor dem Hintergrund der Diskussion um die Quantenmechanik. Es wird dafür argumentiert, dass die nach Standard-Auffassung zu erzielende Kombination aus Erfüllung von Permutationsinvarianz und Verletzung jeder interessanten Version des Leibniz-Prinzips weder mit Eigenschaften als Universalien noch als Tropen erreicht werden kann. Dies stützt den ontischen Strukturrealismus.

4

Friederich

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 11.15 Uhr, 15/134
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 11:15 a.m., 15/134

Symmetries and the Identity of Physical States

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The importance of symmetries in physics has been a recurring topic in the philosophy of science in recent years. According to a (first and imprecise) characterization, symmetries are (or induce) mappings of a theory's state space onto itself which connect states that are in some sense »physically equivalent«. Philosophical debates about symmetries often start from recognizing that »physical equivalence« has (at least) two different meanings in this context. Distinguishing between these two meanings by deciding which one applies in which case is a core challenge in the philosophical analysis of symmetries.

According to the first meaning of »physical equivalence«, symmetries are descriptive redundancies in that any two states related by symmetry represent one and the same physical state in mathematically distinct ways. According to the second, symmetries operate between physically distinct states of affairs, but in such a way that there is no empirically detectable difference between states connected by symmetries for observers who can only make observations inside the region where the symmetry transformations operate. Classifying symmetries in actual physical theories in terms of this distinction is nontrivial. The debate is often formulated in terms of the question of which symmetries have »direct empirical significance«. Roughly speaking, those symmetries which connect physically identical states do not have any direct empirical significance, whereas those which operate between physically distinct states do.

Clearly specifying which symmetries have direct empirical significance is the same as specifying which mathematical states correspond to the same physical

state. Therefore, the debate about the direct empirical significance of symmetries concerns the very identity of physical states and is closely related to our concept of physical state.

The present contribution builds on a recently proposed framework by Hilary Greaves and David Wallace and derives a result according to which, contrary to Greaves and Wallace, only so-called *global* symmetries have direct empirical significance. Given a small number of plausible assumptions it is shown that mathematical states that are related by local symmetry transformations correspond to the same physical state.

7

Gäb

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 14.15 Uhr, 11/214
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 2:15 p.m., 11/214

Das Paradox der Unsagbarkeit

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Ausgehend von der Kritik William Alstons diskutiere ich die These, dass der Satz »Gott ist unsagbar« selbstwidersprüchlich ist. Alston argumentiert, dass auf einen Gegenstand, der unsagbar ist, keine Prädikate angewandt werden können; zu sagen, Gott sei unsagbar prädiiziert aber etwas von Gott, so dass die Aussage paradox ist. Anschließend diskutiere ich John Hicks Antwortversuch, wonach es eine Unterscheidung zwischen formalen und substantiellen Prädikaten gibt, und nur die substantiellen Prädikate als unsagbar ausgeschlossen werden. Die Unterscheidung ist aber (1) unklar und (2) nicht hinreichend um den Widerspruch aufzulösen, denn auch wenn »unsagbar« ein formales Prädikat ist, liegt immer noch eine Prädikation vor. Ausgehend von der *Mystica Theologia* des Pseudo-Dionysios entwickle ich eine alternative Interpretation der Unsagbarkeitsthese. Erstens zeige ich, dass es sich bei dieser These nicht um eine Prädikation von Gott handelt, sondern um eine metalinguistische Aussage. Zweitens argumentiere ich, dass diese metalinguistische Aussage nicht den Bereich möglicher Prädikate betrifft, die Gott zugeschrieben werden können, sondern den Bereich möglicher Propositionen, die den Term »Gott« enthalten. Drittens konstruiere ich auf dieser Basis die Unsagbarkeitsthese so, dass nach ihr einige dieser Propositionen die Eigenschaft haben, unsagbar zu sein. Abschließend grenze ich den Begriff der Unsagbarkeit von Falschheit und Sinnlosigkeit ab und erkläre, welche Implikationen das für unser Verständnis mystischer Erfahrung hat.

4

Gähde

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 9:00 Uhr, 15/134
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 9:00 a.m., 15/134

Gibt es eine Autodetermination des Anwendungsbereichs einer empirischen Theorie?

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An Hand welcher Kriterien wird entschieden, ob eine empirische Theorie für die Behandlung eines konkreten (physikalischen, ökonomischen etc.) Systems zuständig ist? Eine radikale Antwort gibt das *Prinzip der Autodetermination des Anwendungsbereichs* einer Theorie. Danach entscheidet die Theorie selbst, welche Systeme zu ihrem Anwendungsbereich gehören und welche nicht: Diejenigen Systeme, die mit ihrer Hilfe erfolgreich theoretisch beschrieben werden können, gehören dazu, die anderen nicht. Ein so verstandenes Prinzip der Autodetermination führt offenbar in ein grundlegendes methodisches Problem: Seine Anwendung hätte eine vollständigen Immunisierung der Theorie gegen widerspenstige Beobachtungsdaten zur Folge und ist insofern inakzeptabel.

Das Ziel des Vortrags besteht darin zu erläutern, dass auch abgeschwächte Varianten dieses Prinzips – d. h. Versuche, eine empirische Theorie selbst zur Eingrenzung ihres Anwendungsbereichs heranzuziehen – mit einer grundlegenden Schwierigkeit zu kämpfen haben: Zwar kann mit Hilfe einer Theorie festgestellt werden, dass sie ein konkretes System erfolgreich beschreiben und damit zu ihrem Anwendungsbereich rechnen kann. Dagegen kann mit Hilfe dieser Theorie allein im Allgemeinen nicht bestimmt werden, wo ihr Anwendungsbereich endet, d. h. wo die Grenzen ihrer Leistungsfähigkeit liegen.

Der Grund wird an zwei kurzen Fallstudien erläutert. In beiden Fällen geht es um Theorien, die erfolgreich zur Beschreibung eines bestimmten Systemtyps herangezogen worden sind. In beiden Fällen scheitert die jeweilige Theorie jedoch hartnäckig bei der Anwendung auf ein »neues« System, das weitgehende Ähnlichkeiten zu erfolgreichen Anwendungen aufweist. Im ersten Fall gelingt es – allerdings erst nach mehr als dreißigjährigen Anstrengungen –, das System doch noch mit Hilfe der Theorie zu beschreiben; im zweiten Fall gelingt dies nicht.

Der Vergleich der beiden Fallstudien zeigt, warum das Scheitern einer empirischen Theorie mit den Mitteln dieser Theorie selbst häufig nicht erklärt werden kann: Relevante Unterschiede zu erfolgreichen Anwendungen sind aus der Perspektive dieser Theorie schlicht unerkennbar; sie werden erst aus der Perspektive einer sie verdrängenden Theorie sichtbar, die die Anomalie auflöst.

Die Überlegungen weisen damit auf ein weiteres grundlegendes Problem hin, mit dem sich auch abgeschwächte Versionen des Prinzips der Autodetermination des Anwendungsbereichs konfrontiert sehen: Sie können nicht adäquat erfassen, wo der Anwendungsbereich einer Theorie endet.

5

Gauker

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 13:30 Uhr, 15/115
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 1:30 p.m., 15/115

The Role of Inner Speech in Metacognitive Awareness of Success in Categorization

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This presentation reports an empirical study of the role of inner speech in categorization and in one's assessments of one's success in having categorized. A silent rhyming task was used to select participants, from a population of people with aphasia, whose capacity for inner speech was impaired. A two-stage categorization task was employed, involving three kinds of trials: geometric, thematic and abstract. In the first stage of each trial, participants had to select the four of five pictures of objects that go together. Next, participants had to evaluate their own success in the first stage, as indicated by their decision whether to proceed to a second stage. No significant difference was found between inner speech impaired (ISI) participants and controls with respect to their ability to correctly categorize in the first stage. Further, no significant difference was found between ISI participants and controls in the geometric or thematic trials with respect to the reliability of their self-assessments. However, in the abstract trials the ISI participants were significantly less reliable than controls in correctly assessing their own success. These results are interpreted in terms of the availability of »mental cues«. In the geometric and thematic trials, the ISI participants and the controls alike can decide whether they have categorized correctly on the basis of a mental cue taking the form of a mental image (of a geometric shape or a scenario). In the abstract trials, in contrast, the useful mental cues may take the form of an inner speech label, which the ISI participants cannot so readily produce. The exact sense in which this demonstrates a role for inner speech in metacognition depends on what we take the mental cues to be telling the agent. This presentation reports work carried out in cooperation with Peter Langland-Hassan, Michael Richardson and Aimee Dietz, all of the University of Cincinnati.

11

Gaus

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 11:15 Uhr, 15/111
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 11:15 a.m., 15/111

Was ist mentale Inkonsistenz?

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Wer gleichzeitig glaubt, dass ein Delfin ein Säugetier ist, dass Säugetiere niemals Fische sind, und dass Delfine Fische sind, dessen Überzeugungen stehen offensichtlich in Konflikt miteinander, der widerspricht »sich selbst«, ist inkonsistent und eben deshalb irrational. Auch wer zum selben Zeitpunkt sowohl die Absicht hat, dem Hilfsbedürftigen Beistand zu leisten, als auch die Absicht, den Hilfsbedürftigen sich selbst zu überlassen, scheint sich in

gewisser Weise selbst zu widersprechen und eben deshalb irrational zu sein. Ähnliches scheint für gewisse Kombinationen von Wünschen, von Hoffnungen und von Präferenzen zu gelten. Es scheint mithin ein verschiedene Arten mentaler Einstellungen übergreifendes Phänomen von *Irrationalität qua mentaler Inkonsistenz* (oder: qua Selbstwidersprüchlichkeit) zu geben.

Wiewohl die Rede von Selbstwidersprüchlichkeit, inkonsistenten Absichten und Überzeugungen uns wohlvertraut ist, und wiewohl der Eindruck, die genannten Phänomene seien artgleich oder eng verwandt, nahe liegt, ist zunächst schwer zu sehen, was genau der gemeinsame Kern der verschiedenen Ausformungen mentaler Inkonsistenz ist – was genau es ist, dass Kombinationen verschiedener Einstellungen *inkonsistent* macht. Dieser Frage geht der Vortrag nach.

Der Vortrag argumentiert zunächst, dass weder ein Rückgriff auf den Begriff der Irrationalität, noch auf den der mentalen Kohärenz viel zur Beantwortung dieser Frage beitragen kann; sodann, dass die naheliegende Vorstellung, mentale Inkonsistenz bestehe im gleichzeitigen Vorliegen von mentalen Einstellungen, die aufgrund ihres Gehalts und ihrer intrinsischen Eigenschaften miteinander in Konflikt stehen, aufgegeben werden muss; und schließlich, dass der gemeinsame Kern verschiedener Ausformungen mentaler Inkonsistenz nicht in einer gleichartigen Struktur der vorliegenden mentalen Zustände besteht, sondern einzig darin, das Resultat einer ganz spezifischen Art von Denkfehler zu sein.

13

Geerdink

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 14.15 Uhr, 11/116
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 2:15 p.m., 11/116

**Intuition and Analysis:
A Case Study from Early Analytic Philosophy**

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Analytic philosophy can be characterized as an episode within the history of ideas where the method of analysis is taken to be the primary method of philosophical inquiry (Hacker, 2013). Taken as such, analytic philosophy was born when Moore claimed in *The Nature of Judgment* (1899) that conceptual analysis was the true method of philosophy.

Michael Della Rocca has recently argued that with this emphasis on analysis also came a stronger emphasis on the use of intuitions, or common sense beliefs (Della Rocca, 2013). Since any method of analysis presupposes an analysandum, it is indeed plausible that these two trends developed together. Pre-theoretical intuitions (or common sense beliefs) are a natural place for an analysis to start, although other starting points are of course possible.

In this talk, I show that both Moore and Russell, who can be seen as the founders of analytic philosophy, indeed started philosophical inquiry from a common sense view of the world. However, I also show that they had different attitudes towards this analysandum. Moore had the tendency to conserve the common sense view of the world, while Russell tried to reinterpret this common sense view into the language of science, thereby transforming it. I argue that this difference is due to

a difference in how Moore and Russell conceived of the method of analysis.

Basing myself on a distinction by Michael Beaney, I argue that it is because Moore held a decompositional conception of analysis that he tends to be conservative towards common sense. Russell, who developed a transformative conception of analysis due to his work in formal logic, came to hold a more revisionary attitude towards common sense belief.

Since both conceptions of analysis are still present in contemporary philosophy, understanding how these different conceptions of analysis gave rise to different attitudes towards intuitions in concrete cases might help us gain insight into the contemporary debate on the exact role that intuitions ought to play in philosophy.

11

Gertken / Kieseewetter

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 14.15 Uhr, 15/111
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 2:15 p.m., 15/111

**Is there a Liberal Principle of Instrumental
Transmission?**

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Some of our reasons for action are grounded in the fact that the action in question is a means to something else we have reason to do. This raises the question as to which principles govern the transmissions of reasons from ends to means. In this paper, we discuss the merits and demerits of a liberal transmission principle (LT), which plays a prominent role in the current literature. The principle states: If an agent A has an intrinsic reason to ϕ , and if ψ -ing is a means for A to ϕ , then A has a reason to ψ . Proponents of this principle argue that it provides a natural vindicating explanation of the intuitions that (1) we often seem to have reasons to take non-necessary means to intrinsically favoured actions, and (2) intentionally taking nonnecessary means to what one has reason to do amounts to acting for a reason. Opponents, on the other hand, point to its counter-intuitive normative implications. In this paper, we aim to strengthen the case against (LT) and provide an alternative, significantly less liberal principle that is nonetheless capable of explaining the intuitions (1) and (2).

In the first part of our paper, we substantiate the charge that (LT) has implausible implications by rejecting an important and influential reply that is standardly made against it, which appeals to pragmatic strategies for debunking intuitions about so-called negative reason existentials. In addition, we provide a novel argument against (LT), according to which this principle entails that we sometimes have decisive reasons to take each of a number of different means that are on their own sufficient. In the second part of the paper, we propose an alternative transmission principle, which holds: If A has an intrinsic reason to ϕ , then A has a reason to *take some means to ϕ -ing*. We argue that this alternative principle allows us to accommodate the phenomena that seem to support (LT), while avoiding its problems.

5

Glauer

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 13.30 Uhr, 15/131
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 1:30 p.m., 15/131

An Empirical Structure for a Measurement Theory of Propositional Attitudes

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Matthews (2007) presents the sketch of a full measurement theory for propositional attitudes. A measurement theory shows that an abstract structure, in this case propositions, can be used to represent objects of a target domain. A measurement theory for propositional attitudes would presumably explain how propositional attitude reports can be used to talk about certain mental states, the attitudes. But Matthews' account partly undermines the measurement idea as it presupposes that propositions can already be used to represent certain mental states. In this talk an alternative to Matthews' account is presented that takes propositional attitude reports to be based on observable factors that can be used to predict and explain behavior, not on representations of mental states directly. The proposed target domain is an elaboration of Butterfill & Apperly's (2013) minimal theory of mind.

12

Grahle

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 15.15 Uhr, 11/211
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 3:15 p.m., 11/211

Do Children Have a Right to Be Loved?

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There is an on-going debate whether children have a right to be loved (Liao 2006, 2012; Cowden 2012; Ferracioli 2014). While such a right is proclaimed in a number of bills and declarations, it is a challenge to specify what, if anything, could morally justify it. I provide a brief overview of the core issues raised within this debate, including the issue of a limited enforceability of love, before discussing in detail an argument presented by Ferracioli (2014). Ferracioli's position is based on the view that children are owed the means to a *meaningful* childhood, which requires children to engage in projects of independent value. However, since children lack the epistemic abilities to recognise such value, whether or not they acquire meaning depends on them having adults who take care of them, for instance by making value judgements on their behalf. According to Ferracioli, love, with its disposition to advance the loved one's good, and the tendency of loving parents to conceive of their children and their relationship to them as irreplaceable, is the only *reliable* source of such epistemic care. By contrast, she argues that professional caring relationships are fundamentally unreliable due to their essentially fungible nature. This, she concludes, justifies a right of children to be loved (and it is supposed to be the state's duty to ensure children are raised by parents capable of love). Against Ferracioli, I argue that we should take seriously the possibility of love sometimes

being harmful despite the parents' best intentions. In these cases, irreplaceability makes things worse, as it complicates things for the child having to escape its parents' bad influence. By contrast, the virtue of professional caring relationships arranged by the state directly consists precisely in its fungibility, as carers can be replaced more easily in case of failure. I conclude that if there is a right to be loved, the argument from meaning cannot establish it. Perhaps it can be modified, however, to make a case for a significant extension of the content of a right to education.

5

Greif

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 14.15 Uhr, 15/131
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 2:15 p.m., 15/131

Resurrecting Dretskean Information

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The influence of Fred Dretske's informational theory of meaning on philosophical debates is remarkable in being almost entirely comprised of arguments *against* his view. According to the first major line of criticism, Dretske's terminology of signals, channel conditions, noise and equivocation in his »Knowledge and the Flow of Information« is misleading in terms of bearing no tenable relation to the mathematical theory of communication from which it was borrowed. In abstracting from senders, receivers, and the conditions of transmitting messages between them, and in focusing on kinds of relations between world affairs instead, his theory of information might be of an altogether different kind. According to the second major line of criticism, Dretske's requirement for informational relations to obtain if and only if there is a nomologically rooted probability $p=1$ to the co-occurrence between signalling and signaled world affair is too restrictive to meet real-world conditions. In particular, Dretske's theory will find it difficult to accommodate, firstly, for the possibility of being mistaken about word affairs and, secondly, for variance in information uptake between individuals.

The qualified endorsement of Dretske's theory undertaken here accepts the first line of criticism in order to deflect the second: Dretskean information needs to be clearly distinguished from the mathematical paradigm. Information is, above all, natural information, in terms of being present in the environment independently of any means of signal transmission or processing. It hence approximates the notion of information for perception, as introduced in Gibsonian ecological psychology (which Dretske endorsed): Information is a set of, in a specific sense, invariant relations in the environment that is foundational to the possibility of perceiving and keeping track of objects and events throughout a multitude of conditions. These relations are also foundational to the possibility of the same objects being perceived and treated in variant ways by variably constituted organisms. Information, thus conceived, specifies the environment *for* the organism rather than being specified *by* the organism. If both these relations and the reference classes for the probabilities involved are correctly identified, a Dretskean theory of information will provide valuable groundwork for naturalistically minded cognitive inquiries.

5

Grüne

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 13.30 Uhr, 15/134
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 1:30 p.m., 15/134

A Master-Argument for Representationalism?

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It is often remarked that the claim that perceptual experiences have content is typically taken for granted and rarely argued for by those who make it. One exception is the paper *Perceptual Content Defended* by Susanna Schellenberg, in which she presents such an argument and calls it the »Master-Argument«. This argument is directed against a position which Schellenberg calls »austere relationalism«, according to which perceptual experience is fundamentally a matter of a subject standing in an acquaintance relation to a mind-independent object or a property that this object instantiates. Such a position is defended, for example, by Bill Brewer, John Campbell, Michael Martin, and Charles Travis. In my talk, I will evaluate Schellenberg's argument. My central claim is that even if the argument was valid and its premises were true, it would not be suitable to persuade her opponents of the falsity of their assumption that perceptual experiences do not have content. The reason for this is that by »content« Schellenberg means something else than austere relationalists do. Austere relationalists might agree with Schellenberg that perceptual experiences have content, if one understands »content« in the way she understands it. Still, they can insist on the claim that perceptual experiences do not have content, if one takes their conception of content as a basis. The goal of this paper is a rather modest one. In examining Schellenberg's Master-Argument, I will not take a stand on the question of whether the claim that perceptual experiences have content is true or false. Instead, my task is exclusively clarificatory, namely to point out that this debate is obscured by the fact that its participants use different concepts of content. These are—as I call them—the seems-conception of content, the accuracy-conception of content and the possibility-of-falsity conception of content.

4

Haas

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 9.45 Uhr, 15/133
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 9:45 a.m., 15/133

Fleshing out Quineian Empiricism

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In his seminal paper *Two Dogmas of Empiricism* Quine famously accused logical empiricism of making two untenable assumptions. The first of these so-called dogmas is the analytic/synthetic distinction while the other is the atomistic presupposition that hypotheses can be tested individually. Quine also gave an outline of how empiricism without dogmas may and should look like. Modern theories that evolved much after Quine's writings now enable us to spell out his conception of empiricism.

More than anything else, logical empiricism is characterized by the *principle of verification*, according to which a sentence is insignificant if it is impossible to determine its truth-value. Most formulations of this principle involve both of Quine's dogmas. Presumably this is one reason why most philosophers abandoned verificationism decades ago.

In my talk, I will show how recent developments in formal epistemology and logic can substantially contribute to a solution of the key problems of verificationism. More specifically, I will propose a verificationist principle that neither presupposes confirmation atomism nor refers to a concept of analyticity over and above logical validity. In view of these improvements, I will argue that a weak form of verificationism is still tenable. This proposal is in line with Quine's conception of empiricism.

9

Hahn

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 15.15 Uhr, 11/215
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 3:15 p.m., 11/215

Zur politischen Verantwortung unstrukturierter Gruppen (am Beispiel der Konsumentenverantwortung)

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In der Regel fallen Probleme der globalen Ethik in die Verantwortung kollektiver Akteure. Der Klimawandel fällt in die Verantwortung von Industrieländern, moderne Ausbeutungsformen fallen in die Verantwortung von Konsumenten und Unternehmen, historische Ungerechtigkeiten fallen in die Verantwortung nachkommender Generationen, etc.

Das Problem dabei ist, dass es sich um sogenannte unstrukturierte Gruppen handelt, bei denen wichtige Voraussetzungen für die Zurechnung einer gemeinsamen oder geteilten Verantwortung fehlen. Die Zurechenbarkeit hängt davon ab, ob sich eine Gruppe instantan organisieren und somit als handlungsfähige Gruppe konstituieren kann – und diese Bedingungen scheinen im Fall der Konsumentenverantwortung nicht gegeben zu sein. Ich teile diese Kritik, vertrete aber die These, dass unstrukturierten Gruppen eine residuale Form geteilter Verantwortung zugeschrieben werden kann, die ich als politische Verantwortung bezeichne. Konsumenten, so das Argumentationsziel, haben keine geteilte Verantwortung qua Konsumenten, aber als politische Subjekte.

9

Hallich

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 13.30 Uhr, 11/215
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 1:30 p.m., 11/215

**Verlängerte Autonomie?
Zur Verbindlichkeit von Demenzverfügungen**

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Demenzverfügungen sind Verfügungen, die im Zustand der Kompetenz für einen späteren Zustand eines irrever-

siblen Kompetenzverlustes verfasst werden. Sie sollen sicherstellen, dass die Behandlungswünsche des kompetenten Subjekts auch in Stadien des Kompetenzverlustes beachtet werden. In Fällen, in denen der aktuelle Wille des Dementen in der Behandlungssituation dem in der vorhergehenden Anweisung artikulierten Willen widerspricht, taucht jedoch die Frage auf, ob wir die Demenzverfügung auch gegen den entgegenstehenden aktuellen Willen des Dementen beachten sollen. Meist wird diese Frage bejaht und die Befolgung der Demenzverfügung als Ausdruck des Respekts vor der »verlängerten Autonomie« des Patienten aufgefasst. Dabei wird davon ausgegangen, dass die in der Demenzverfügung zum Ausdruck kommenden reflektierten »kritischen Interessen« der kompetenten Person als vorrangig gegenüber den ihnen entgegenstehenden »Erfahrungsinteressen« des Dementen aufzufassen sind. In diesem Beitrag wird hingegen die These verteidigt, dass die normative Autorität der in einer Demenzverfügung ausgedrückten kritischen Interessen durch gegenläufige Erfahrungsinteressen des Dementen außer Kraft gesetzt werden kann und das Prinzip der Autonomierespektierung uns nicht darauf festlegt, Demenzverfügungen durchweg als bindend anzusehen.

In einem vorbereitenden Argumentationsschritt wird gezeigt, dass, da die normative Autorität kritischer Interessen zweifelsohne durch andere kritische Interessen außer Kraft gesetzt werden kann, derjenige die Beweislast hat, der behauptet, dass Erfahrungsinteressen des Dementen *nicht* die normative Autorität von kritischen Interessen unterminieren könnten (1). Im Folgenden werden drei Argumente zur Begründung dieser These untersucht und kritisiert. Es ist nicht überzeugend, darauf zu verweisen, dass der Demente die vorhergehende Verfügung nicht ausdrücklich zurückgenommen hat, denn die Rücknahme einer Patientenverfügung ist eine zwar hinreichende, aber keine notwendige Bedingung für den Verlust ihrer Gültigkeit (2). Auch der Kompetenzverlust des Dementen schließt nicht aus, dass er die Gültigkeit der Verfügung aufheben kann, da für die Aufhebung der Gültigkeit einer Patientenverfügung weniger anspruchsvolle Kompetenzstandards anzusetzen sind als für die Abfassung einer gültigen Patientenverfügung (3). Auch dass die kompetente Person voraussetzt, dass sie im Zustand der Demenz andere Präferenzen haben wird als gegenwärtig, ändert nichts daran, dass die Erfahrungsinteressen des Dementen die früheren kritischen Interessen unterminieren können, da mit der späteren Präferenz eine veränderte Bewertung der bereits zum früheren Zeitpunkt vorausgesehenen Präferenzänderung ausgedrückt werden kann (4).

4

Harbecke

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 14.15 Uhr, 15/133
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 2:15 p.m., 15/133

Levels: Computational and Mechanistic

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This paper discusses two normative ideals for explanations in cognitive neuroscience and the metaphysical hierarchies of levels associated with them. The first has been presented by David Marr in combination with a distinction of »computational levels«. The second builds on a hierarchy of »mechanistic levels« in the sense of Carl Craver. It is first argued that the two models of explanation are limited in their material applications. It is then

demonstrated that the models are neither conceptually incomparable nor identical, and that they are fusible into a unified framework. The resulting »mechanistic-computational model of explanation« is defended as materially adequate and conceptually plausible, a precursor of the framework is reviewed, and some metaphysical background assumptions are discussed.

4

Haueis

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 13.30 Uhr, 15/133
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 1:30 p.m., 15/133

Are Mechanisms the Laws of Neuroscience? A Comparison of Mechanistic and Pragmatic- Nomological Accounts of Explanation

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In this paper, I argue that neuroscientific generalizations about mechanisms as described by Carl Craver fulfill the roles that Marc Lange attributes to laws in scientific practice. By focusing on the roles of generalizations for counterfactual reasoning, mechanistic discovery and disciplinary autonomy, I intend to show that Craver's and Lange's accounts do not oppose, but mutually reinforce each other.

The starting point for my comparison is that common objections against laws in biology—evolutionary contingency, fragility, scope restrictions—do not apply to Lange's account because he does not view laws as unrestricted universally quantified material conditionals. Instead, he defines laws as sets of truths that are preserved under every counterfactual that is logically consistent with that set. I transpose this definition to Craver's mechanistic account by showing how neuroscientific generalizations remain counterfactually stable through normative *ceteris paribus* clauses, allowing researchers to decide which events *count* as disturbing factors of a mechanism, as causally co-occurring with it, or as falling outside their explanatory interest.

I furthermore show that Craver's *mechanism sketches*—incomplete models which guide the experimental search for mechanistic parts—fulfill the same role as Lange's *conceptual outlooks*. Such outlooks allow researchers to predict new patterns with a law that makes otherwise empirically equivalent predictions with another law of the same domain. Sketching levels of mechanisms with different conceptual outlooks could therefore lead to the prediction of divergent data patterns in the course of mechanistic discovery.

I finally argue that the combination of counterfactual stability with different disciplinary outlooks on a mechanism sharpens Craver's thesis of the autonomy of neuroscientific subdisciplines. I therefore discuss how from a neurophysiological outlook, Hebb's law (»neurons that fire together, wire together«) is a counterfactually stable generalization about connection patterns produced by the mechanism of long-term-potential, even if those patterns do not fulfil the functional roles predicted from a psychophysical outlook.

My comparison suggests that with regard to their practical roles, mechanistic generalizations *are* the laws

of neuroscience, even if no metaphysical identity between these two notions is presupposed.

6

Haverkamp

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 9:45 Uhr, 11/213
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 9:45 a.m., 11/213

Williamson on Mathematical Knowability

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One of the most central questions in the philosophy of mathematics concerns the extent of our possible mathematical knowledge. In a forthcoming paper, Timothy Williamson presents a simple argument for the conclusion that every mathematical truth can be known. The aim of this talk is to undermine this argument, thereby contributing to a defense of the view that the limits of mathematical knowability are still unknown.

Assuming that interpreted mathematical sentences are the contents of mathematical knowledge, Williamson puts forward the following thesis:

Williamson's Thesis (WT): For every true mathematical sentence A there could be (finite) mathematicians who (i) interpret A as we actually interpret A and (ii) have immediate (axiomatic) knowledge of A. Williamson justifies WT by presenting a thought experiment about what he takes to be a possible group of mathematicians. He holds that they find A »primitively compelling« on its actual interpretation and »could not easily have been wrong in a relevantly similar case«, thus satisfying the condition of *safety* characteristic of knowledge. He claims that *our own* cognitive relation towards *standard logical and mathematical axioms* is no better than *their* cognitive relation towards A. Consequently, given that we know standard logical and mathematical axioms, he infers that they know A.

Focussing on the continuum hypothesis (CH) as a famous set-theoretic sentence whose truth value seems to lie beyond our cognitive reach, I will undermine Williamson's argument by developing a dilemma. (a) The claim that some possible mathematicians interpret set-theoretic vocabulary in a certain way requires substantial assumptions about their mathematical attitudes and activities. This is illustrated by the example of a possible group of set theorists who accept a strengthening of the standard axiomatic system ZFC by Gödel's axiom of constructibility. Members of this group are most plausibly taken to speak only about what we would call »constructible sets«. (b) But once Williamson's thought experiment is spelled out in such a way that it is indeed plausible to assume that the described mathematicians attach the actual interpretations to set-theoretic vocabulary, it is no longer plausible to suppose that they can have immediate (axiomatic) knowledge of CH.

11

Heidl

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 13:30 Uhr, 15/113
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 1:30 p.m., 15/113

Behavioral Economics and the Pragmatic Justification of Rational Choice Theory

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Behavioral economists propose alternative theories to rational choice theory based on psychological research. Most of them think that these alternative theories should only replace rational choice theory in its role as a descriptive theory of choice, but that standard rational choice theory is the correct normative theory of choice.

In this paper, I take a look at an argument by the behavioral economist Thomas Schelling who argues that alternative theories of choice should under certain circumstance also be accepted as the correct normative theories of choice. His argument is interpreted as offering a pragmatic account of the justification of rational choice theory in the sense that an agent is justified in employing a theory to guide her actions, if the theory is working in practice which is shown by the fact that the agent is successful in achieving her ends.

I agree that Schelling offers a pragmatic account of the justification of rational choice theory, but think that in such a pragmatic justification actual success of the agent does not matter. Schelling's pragmatic account should rather be understood in analogy to Reichenbach's pragmatic justification of induction. Rational agents have certain goals and if employing an alternative theory of choice rather than the standard theory of choice is the only possible way of achieving these goals they are pragmatically justified in employing this alternative theory to guide their actions, even if success is not guaranteed.

11

Heinzelmann

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 9:00 Uhr, 15/113
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 9:00 a.m., 15/113

Moral Conflicts as Conflicts of Judgement

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This paper argues for the existence of moral conflicts as conflicts of judgements about what one morally ought to do, all things considered. That is, some agent sometimes judges that she ought to F, all things considered, and judges that she ought to G, all things considered, although it is not possible to do both. It might be false that the agent in fact ought to F, all things considered, and ought to G, all things considered. Maybe this is so because moral oughts cannot or do not conflict. In this case, the agent is mistaken. She might even be irrational, maybe when she is aware that she cannot both F and G. Yet all this is entirely compatible with the existence of moral conflicts as conflicts of judgements. That such cases obtain could have wide-ranging implications for moral psychology and action theory. For one thing, they

cast serious doubts on contemporary accounts of akrasia.

4

Held

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 10.30 Uhr, 15/134
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 10:30 a.m., 15/134

What Is a Ceteris Paribus Law?

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According to the classic deductive-nomological account of scientific explanation, an ideal explanation is a sound argument for the explanandum using a law of nature. This characterization, by means of counterexamples, is easily shown to be insufficient for an explanation but can it at least be shown to be necessary for an ideal explanation? This depends on whether we can show the law statement involved to be true. We realize that the law is a process law that is not true in full generality, i.e. is a Ceteris Paribus (CP-) law. This is good news since CP-laws are problematic, anyway, and understanding them may aid understanding the general role of laws in ideal explanations. Here, I propose to interpret CP-laws simply as generic cases of certain natural language conditionals. Some such conditionals do not support (the logically valid) Antecedent Strengthening. These conditionals, it turns out, must be understood as tacitly quantified over situations, where situations making the consequent false without making the antecedent true are explicitly excluded. It is only by this construction that a conditional like »if you come to dinner, I'll be happy« is both falsifiable and immune to far-fetched possible situations. But such immunization is exactly what we need to understand CP-laws and their role in explanations.

10

Henning

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 15.15 Uhr, 11/115
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 3:15 p.m., 11/115

Kant's Ethics and the Problem of Maxim Fiddling

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Kant's ethics is commonly thought to face grave problems when it comes to the formulation of an agent's maxim. The test procedure that is prescribed by the Categorical Imperative seems to be extremely sensitive to details of the formulation of maxims. Consequently, we seem to face a plethora of implausible moral prohibitions and permissions. If we put too much or too little content into maxims, we run a serious risk of generating the wrong verdicts—e.g., that it is permissible to act on the maxim to steal from John in particular, or that it is impermissible to act on the maxim to become a baker. This talk develops new solutions to these problems. Unlike other proposals in the literature, I do not formulate independent constraints that govern the formulation of maxims. Proposals of this kind have rightly been accused of being arbitrary, inviting charges of »maxim

fiddling«. Instead, I argue that, properly understood and applied, Kant's procedure leads to the correct formulations and the correct verdicts all by itself.

4

Henschen

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 9.45 Uhr, 15/134
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 9:45 a.m., 15/134

Ceteris Paribus Conditions and the Interventionist Account of Causality

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James Woodward claims that the scientific legitimacy of causal statements doesn't require that (i) causal statements (claims of direct type-level causation) be laws, or that (ii) causal statements be qualified by a *ceteris paribus* (cp) clause. He supports claim (i) by pointing out that causal statements cannot express strict laws (in the sense of exceptionless regularities) because causes aren't nomically sufficient for their effects, and because causal statements may be true for only a few values of the variables that figure in these statements. He supports claim (ii) by arguing that there is »no motivation« to qualify a causal statement by a cp clause if this statement is scientifically legitimate and not a regularity.

The paper aims to defend the thesis that Woodward's interventionist account of direct type-level causation represents an excellent account of causal cp laws. This thesis is somewhat surprising but doesn't necessarily contradict Woodward's claims (i) and (ii). It states more precisely that (1) causal statements may be regarded as cp statements because Woodward's interventionist account of direct type-level causation implies a statement of truth conditions that makes reference to three conditions that, in the context of the applicability of causal statements, can be referred to as cp conditions, and (2) that causal statements may qualify as laws in a sense different from that of exceptionless regularities.

The paper will argue for claim (1) by (a) developing a de-relativized (or objectified) variant of Woodward's account of direct type-level causation, by (b) suggesting that the relation between X and Y needs to satisfy three conditions in order to qualify as one of direct typelevel causation, that satisfaction of these conditions guarantees the applicability of claims of direct type-level causation, and that the context of applicability motivates referring to these conditions as cp conditions, and by (c) noting that the de-relativized variant of Woodward's definition of direct type-level causation can be reformulated as a statement of truth conditions for causal cp statements. The paper will argue for claim (2) by (d) defining the notion of a causal cp law in terms of Woodward's notion of explanatory depth.

2

Himmelreich

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 15.15 Uhr, 15/E28
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 3:15 p.m., 15/E28

**A New Solution to the Problem
of Profligate Omissions**

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In this paper I put forward a new solution to the problem of profligate omissions. The problem is that some definitions of causation identify any omission that could have prevented an effect as a cause, which leads to counterintuitive results. The solution is to strengthen the counterfactual dependence condition of causation and to weaken the centering condition of the semantics. In contrast to existing solutions, this new solution does not appeal to normative, epistemic, pragmatic, or metaphysical considerations.

8

Hoffmann

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 14.15 Uhr, 15/105
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 2:15 p.m., 15/105

Die neue Debatte um *Thick Aesthetic Concepts*

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Warum noch ein Artikel zu *thick aesthetic concepts*? Die Debatte schien eigentlich längst erledigt seit Zangwill, Levinson und natürlich allen voran Sibley die Möglichkeit der Existenz von solchen Begriffen kritisch eingeschätzt, teilweise negiert und das Problem mehr oder weniger ad acta gelegt haben. 2013 fährt Nick Zangwill seinen skeptischen Ansatz in *Moral Metaphor and Thick Concepts* zurück. Das ist Grund genug, sich der Problematik erneut anzunehmen. Dabei sollen (1) die Motive der Entstehung der moralphilosophischen Debatten um *thick concepts* ausgemacht werden. (2) Soll aufgezeigt werden, dass die Debatten in der Ethik relevant sind für jene in der Ästhetik, jedoch eine neue Perspektivierung verlangen. Dies deshalb, weil *thick aesthetic concepts* nicht in erster Linie dazu dienen, die Debatten um Realismus und Anti-Realismus in der Kunst zu entscheiden, sondern ihre Funktion wesentlich darin besteht, *thin concepts* und *thin judgments* vorzubereiten. (3) Ist nachzuweisen, dass die frühen Debatten um *thick aesthetic concepts* insofern problematisch sind, als sie in einen starken Skeptizismus in Bezug auf diese Begriffsklasse führen. (4) Ist unter Beweis zu stellen, dass die skeptische Perspektive zurückzuweisen ist, weil diese Begriffsklasse notwendiger Bestandteil von ästhetischen und vor allem von kunstkritischen Diskursen sind, die (5) ein hohes Niveau ästhetischer Bildung voraussetzen.

2

Hoffmann-Kolss

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 9.45 Uhr, 15/E27
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 9:45 a.m., 15/E27

On a Sufficient Condition for Hyperintensionality

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Let an X/Y distinction be a distinction between kinds of properties, such as the distinctions between intrinsic and extrinsic, qualitative and non-qualitative, dispositional and categorical or between perfectly natural and less-than-perfectly natural properties. An X/Y distinction is hyperintensional iff there are cointensional properties P and Q, such that P is an X-property, whereas Q is a Y-property. For instance, the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is hyperintensional iff there are cointensional properties P and Q, such that P is an intrinsic property, whereas Q is an extrinsic property. Many accounts of metaphysical distinctions among properties presuppose that such distinctions are nonhyperintensional. In this paper, I call this presupposition into question. I develop a sufficient condition for the hyperintensionality of X/Y distinctions and argue that this condition is indeed satisfied by a number of standard classifications of properties. It follows that non-hyperintensional analyses of distinctions among properties are much harder to defend than is often assumed.

5

Hofmann

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 9.00 Uhr, 15/114
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 9:00 a.m., 15/114

**Intentionalism and Disjunctivism about
Perceptual Experience**

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Two main contenders in the contemporary debate about the nature of perceptual experience are intentionalism (representationalism) and disjunctivism.

I would like to investigate whether intentionalism should be disjunctivist or not. I will argue against the marriage: intentionalism should be construed as a common factor theory, not as a disjunctivist account—*contra* A.D. Smith (2010). The key thesis in the argument concerns *singular content*: Having a singular content is not a matter of object-dependence or object-involvingness, as A.D. Smith wants to have it, but of having a referential *teleo-function* (proper function; R. Millikan 1984). The singular content common to all three cases (perception, illusion, hallucination), understood teleo-functionally, can serve as the significant common factor, thereby averting disjunctivism. The particularity of perceptual experience can be captured adequately by this form of anti-disjunctivist intentionalism. An important argument for this view comes from the current debate about singular thought. A unified account of singular content, in thought and in experience, can be provided and yields the anti-disjunctivist conclusion.

2

Horden

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 16.00 Uhr, 15/E27
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 4:00 p.m., 15/E27

Metaphysical Triviality and Trivialist Platonism

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Philosophers often label certain interpreted sentences as »trivial« or »insubstantial«. These labels are equivocal, however. *Epistemically trivial* sentences are those whose truth is obvious and dull. *Metaphysically trivial* sentences are those whose truth requires nothing of the world. My focus here is on the latter notion. I further explicate metaphysical triviality in a way designed to vindicate its intelligibility, and I distinguish it from analyticity and metaphysical necessity. I also explain how this notion allows us to make optimal sense of neoFregean philosophy of mathematics. In short, assuming that Hume's Principle (»The number of Fs = the number of Gs iff there are just as many Fs as Gs«) can be legitimately stipulated as an implicit definition of »number«, the existence of numbers requires nothing of the world. In recent work, Agustín Rayo advocates a similar »trivialist« view of numbers. However, unlike neoFregeans, he refrains from appealing to any notion of analyticity or conceptual truth. Instead, appealing to pragmatic considerations, he endorses the following schema: »For the number of the Fs to be *n* just is for there to be exactly *n* Fs«. He contends that if each instance of this schema is true, the existence of numbers is metaphysically trivial. In response, I provide counterexamples to Rayo's assumption that every true »just is«-statement is metaphysically trivial. In addition, I outline an interpretation of number talk that accords with Rayo's schema while treating »There are numbers« as a metaphysically substantial and contingent truth. I conclude that Rayo fails to provide a viable »trivialist« alternative to neoFregeanism.

ertheless for all those theories one problem remained: in how far are agents rational that prefer to believe propositions that are demonstrably less probable to serve the goal of believing true propositions.

In my talk I want to suggest a completely new approach that takes its starting point in recent theories of cognitive science and the philosophy of mind. According to the predictive coding framework, the brain (and the mind) is a prediction machine that constantly tries to predict its sensory inputs. Thus, agents do not have the epistemic goal of believing the truth; they have the goal of accepting beliefs that let them accurately predict (future and past) evidence. In accordance with this, I suggest a theory of belief that satisfies both desiderata: it is a good predictor of the conjunction fallacy and one can demonstrate that in these cases believing the conjunction is more probable to serve the goal of predicting evidence than believing only one of the conjuncts. Formally the suggested theory is a Bayesian variation of the inference schema inference to the best explanation.

Finally, I will argue that the presented theory is an equally good predictor of the conjunction fallacy as the incremental confirmation account of Crupi, Russo and Tentori (2012).

References

- Crupi, V., Russo, S., & Tentori, K. (2012). On the determinants of the conjunction fallacy: Probability versus inductive confirmation. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 142, 235-255.
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional vs. intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. *Psychological Review*, 90, 293-315.

13

Horvath

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 13.30 Uhr, 11/116
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 1:30 p.m., 11/116

**Philosophical Analysis:
The Concept Grounding View**

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What is claimed by philosophical analyses of, e.g., *knowledge*, *free will*, *action*, *causation*, or *truth*? According to the standard view, such analyses should be interpreted as necessary biconditionals that state individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for membership in the relevant category. In this talk, I will present a number of pressing objections to the standard biconditional view of philosophical analyses. For example, the biconditional view faces the problems of circularity and triviality, the problem of asymmetry, the problems of irrelevant guises and irrelevant necessary coextensionality, and the clutter problem. To deal with these and a number of further issues, I will suggest the concept grounding view as a promising alternative. Roughly, the idea is that philosophical analyses should be understood as necessary biconditionals that are constrained by suitable grounding relations among the concepts involved.

S

Horrig

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 11.15 Uhr, 15/E28
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 11:15 a.m., 15/E28

**The Conjunction Fallacy, Belief and Inference to
the Best Explanation**

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The conjunction fallacy is often considered to be the most paradigmatic example for human irrationality: the fallacy consists in judging a conjunction to be more probable than one of the individual conjuncts. This is taken to be irrational because rational agents are assumed to believe propositions that serve the goal of believing true propositions, and believing conjunctions is less probable to serve that goal than believing the individual conjuncts.

Ever since Tversky's and Kahneman's (1983) exposition of the conjunction fallacy, accounts have been proposed to save human rationality, at least partially. Nev-

2

Hörzer

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 16.00 Uhr, 15/105
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 4:00 p.m., 15/105

**Zombies Threaten the Contingency
of Physicalism and Dualism**

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Physicalism, the view that everything, including mentality, is broadly physical, as opposed to dualism, the view that mentality is fundamental, usually takes the form of supervenience physicalism. This idea is prominently expressed in terms of minimal physical duplicates: Any minimal physical duplicate of our world is a duplicate simpliciter. Such definition entails that the mental metaphysically supervenes on the microphysical. Despite this, most philosophers take physicalism to be a contingent thesis because it only seems to restrict the composition of our world. Some have challenged this view recently, and I extend one of the arguments against the contingency of physicalism to show that neither physicalists nor dualists can take their position as contingent in the sense of allowing the opponent view to be a metaphysical possibility. Much of the recent debate between dualists and physicalists has been centered on the notion of zombies—physical duplicates of humans that lack conscious experience. Based upon two seemingly innocent premises, specifically the widely held thesis among both dualists and physicalists that physicalism is necessarily incompatible with the possibility of zombies, and the similarly reasonable claim that dualism is necessarily compatible with the possibility of zombies, I show that the mere metaphysical possibility of a world in which physicalism is true renders impossible a world in which dualism is true. Similarly, if dualism is metaphysically possible such that there is a possible world in which mental properties are fundamental, a world in which physicalism is true is rendered impossible. Moreover, while the physicalist might still be able to take her view as contingent in the sense of being compatible with possible worlds in which mental properties are non-physically realized by, say, ectoplasm, such that neither physicalism nor dualism, but rather something we might call ectoplasmism is true of that world, the dualist is unable to take her position contingent in that sense. The possibility of the truth of dualism is similarly incompatible with the possibility of such worlds as it is with the possibility of the truth of physicalism. Hence, while physicalism remains contingent in some sense, dualism has to be understood as non-contingent.

5

Hufendiek

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 16.00 Uhr, 15/131
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 4:00 p.m., 15/131

**Why a Theory of Emotions Needs
a Concept of Representation**

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Current philosophical theories tend to criticize not only cognitivist approaches to emotions but also theories that take emotions to be representations. Mainly among embodied and enactive approaches, there is a growing anti-representationalist consensus (e.g., Hutto 2012, Colombetti 2014). Authors describe emotions as »embodied attitudes« (Teroni, Deonna 2012) or as »enacting meaning« (Colombetti 2014). Such embodied accounts are highly promising when it comes to explaining how emotions feel, how they motivate for action, and how they have evolved. Yet, in my talk I will argue that embodied accounts fail to acknowledge the many arguments that speak in favor of emotions being representations. Conceptualizing emotions as representations a) allows us to explain our talk of emotions as being adequate or inadequate, b) it helps us to explain how emotions relate to other mental states and c) it also facilitates an explanation of how emotions can be about complex states of affairs, such as the violation of social rules and norms. I will argue that no current embodied or enactive account that denies the representational status of emotions can account for these features. On the other hand, assuming that emotions are representations does not necessarily imply an over-intellectualization of the emotions. I propose instead to conceive of emotions as embodied action-oriented representations. Such representations are simple non-conceptual representations, they are constituted by patterns of bodily reactions and directly guide our behavior.

5

Hundertmark

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 15.15 Uhr, 15/131
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 3:15 p.m., 15/131

Produktivität als Problem für die Teleosemantik

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Intentionale mentale Zustände repräsentieren die Welt als auf eine bestimmte Art und Weise seiend. Die Teleosemantik ist der meistdiskutierte und aussichtsreichste Ansatz zur Naturalisierung der Intentionalität. Die meisten teleosemantischen Theorien nehmen Bezug auf einen historisch fundierten ätiologischen Funktionsbegriff, dem zufolge ein System die Funktion hat, zu ϕ -en, wenn seine Existenz durch das ϕ -en seiner Vorgänger erklärt werden kann.

Im kritischen Teil meines Vortrags werde ich dafür argumentieren, dass teleosemantische Theorien nicht auf den ätiologischen Funktionsbegriff zurückgreifen können, wenn es darum geht, Produktivität zu erklären. Unter »Produktivität« versteht man die Eigenschaft re-

präsentationaler Systeme, potentiell unendlich viele verschiedene Sachverhalte repräsentieren zu können. Der Grund dafür, dass eine Teleosemantik, die auf einen ätiologischen Funktionsbegriff Bezug nimmt, Produktivität nicht erklären kann, ist, dass ein ätiologischer Funktionsbegriff keine produktiven Funktionen erlaubt, die für eine solche Erklärung nötig sind. Produktive Funktionen zeichnen sich dadurch aus, dass sie unter unendlich vielen verschiedenen Umweltbedingungen auf jeweils unterschiedliche Weise erfüllt werden. Der ätiologischen Theorie zufolge hat ein System jedoch *prima facie* nur dann eine produktive Funktion, wenn es eine legitime Erklärung für seine Existenz gibt, die auf eine unendlich komplexe Tatsache Bezug nimmt, die das vergangene Verhalten seiner Vorgänger betrifft. Da aber die Selektionsgeschichte eines jeden Systems endlich ist, existiert für kein System eine solche Tatsache und somit auch keine Erklärung, die auf eine solche Tatsache zurückgreifen kann. Folglich erlaubt der ätiologische Funktionsbegriff *prima facie* keine produktiven Funktionen.

Im positiven Teil meines Vortrags werde ich dafür argumentieren, dass dieses Problem nur entsteht, wenn man voraussetzt, dass Erklärungen immer die tatsächliche Kausalgeschichte nachzeichnen müssen. Sterelny und Griffiths (1999) haben jedoch gezeigt, dass so genannte robuste Erklärungen Bezug auf kontrafaktische Abhängigkeiten nehmen. Somit reicht in manchen Fällen für die vom ätiologischen Funktionsbegriff geforderte legitime Erklärung aus, dass Vorgänger unter gewissen Umständen ϕ -t und somit einen kausalen Beitrag zur Existenz des fraglichen Systems geleistet hätten, damit dieses System die Funktion zu ϕ -en hat. Produktive Funktionen setzen folglich keine unendlich komplexe Tatsache in Bezug auf das Verhalten von Vorgängern voraus, sondern lediglich die Wahrheit unendlich vieler verschiedener kontrafaktischer Konditionale. Ein entsprechend modifizierter ätiologischer Funktionsbegriff ermöglicht es der Teleosemantik, Produktivität zu erklären.

11

Huppert

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 15.15 Uhr, 15/111
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 3:15 p.m., 15/111

Inconsistency in Relevance-Based Evolutionary Debunking Arguments

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Research findings regarding the determinants of moral judgment are often used to distinguish reliable from unreliable processes of judgment formation. Prominent arguments of this kind claim that moral judgments shaped by evolutionary processes are not to be trusted. Such 'evolutionary debunking arguments' (EDAs) are problematic in several respects: For instance, they could have far more pervasive impact than their proponents intend them to have. I take a closer look at how EDAs are in fact presented, and sketch how evolutionary moral psychology could impinge on their plausibility. If evolutionary processes have far-reaching influence, EDAs could appear much less attractive because of their potentially global skeptical consequences. Moreover, debunking based on *impressions of the moral irrelevance* of evolutionary processes might even be inconsistent, if these impressions are themselves owed to evolution. I argue that moral psychological research does indeed in-

dicate that evolved emotional sensibilities shape impressions of moral relevance, that the range of EDAs therefore extends problematically, and that relevance-based debunking appears to be inconsistent. This result also affects non-evolutionary variants of relevance-based debunking: Debunkers need to show that the relevance-assessments on which they rely are immune to the criticism they level at moral judgments.

2

Jaskolla / Gierstel

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 15.15 Uhr, 15/105
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 3:15 p.m., 15/105

Within the Internal World: Why Panpsychism Trumps Neutral Monism

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In our present paper, we discuss the question whether Russellian neutral monism—the position that the physical and the mental are grounded in something neither physical nor mental—overtrumps panpsychism—the position that the mental is a fundamental feature of the world pervading the whole universe. Some philosophers—for example Emmett Holman—have argued that this is the case.

We argue that the contrary is true. We present a three-step argument for this assertion based on the conviction that introspection allows for a special kind of *a priori*-knowledge, which favors panpsychism over Russellian neutral monism:

First, we will give stipulated definitions of both panpsychism and Russellian neutral monism. We argue that those definitions capture the central characteristic features of both accounts and therefore allow for a systematic exploration of the relation between panpsychism and Russellian neutral monism.

Second, we are going to provide a brief critique of Russellian neutral monism, which is based on certain similarities of Russellian neutral monism with the Kantian concept of the »Ding an sich«. We call this the Hegelian Critique of Russellian neutral monism.

Third, we will explicate the above mentioned argument from first person phenomenal experience. We argue that the privileged access we have to certain parts of this experience—which is based on certain allegations introduced by Franz Brentano and has been further developed by philosophers like Dan Zahavi—in combination with our Kantian critique of Russellian neutral monism establishes an argument for the assertion that indeed panpsychism overtrumps Russellian neutral monism.

2

Jaster

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 16.00 Uhr, 15/E28
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 4:00 p.m., 15/E28

Agents' Abilities

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In the paper, I propose a novel view of agents' abilities. More specifically, I provide an answer to the question what it is for some agent to have the ability to perform some action. The talk has three parts. In part one, I present a few adequacy conditions that any comprehensive view of abilities has to meet. The most crucial of those adequacy conditions are that any comprehensive view of abilities will have to (i) make sense of the relation between general and specific abilities and (ii) account for the fact that abilities come in degrees. In part two, I argue (briefly) against a view that is very often adopted as the default view of abilities: the conditional analysis. As I argue, the conditional analysis fails for a variety of reasons: besides failing to meet the adequacy conditions, it also runs into a well-taken inherent problem. Against the background of this criticism I present, in part three, my own view of agents' abilities, which I dub *the success view of ability*. Like the conditional analysis, the success view analyzes abilities in terms of a modal tie between the agent's intention to ϕ and her effectively PHIing. But it does so in ways that circumvent the problems of the conditional analysis and allow for an account of degrees on the one hand and a unified conception of general and specific abilities.

4

Kaiser

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 16.00 Uhr, 15/134
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 4:00 p.m., 15/134

**On the Limits of Causal Modeling:
Spatially-Structurally Complex Phenomena**

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This paper examines the adequacy of causal graph theory as a tool for modeling biological phenomena and formalizing biological explanations. I point out that the causal graph approach reaches its limits when it comes to modeling biological phenomena that involve complex spatial and structural relations. Using a case study from molecular biology, DNA-binding and -recognition of proteins, I argue that causal graph models fail to adequately represent and explain causal phenomena in this field. The inadequacy of these models is due to their failure to include relevant spatial and structural information in a way that does not render the model non-explanatory, unmanageable, or inconsistent with basic assumptions of causal graph theory.

11

Kasmann

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 14.15 Uhr, 15/114
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 2:15 p.m., 15/114

**Können Kollektivakteure Subjekte einer
kantianischen Ethik sein?**

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Eine kantianische Ethik zeichnet aus, dass sie das Subjekt der Moral als ein solches bestimmt, welches zugleich als Adressat und Autor der für es geltenden Rechte und Pflichten vorgestellt werden kann. Dies ist der Kernbestand der kantischen Idee der Autonomie als Selbstgesetzgebung, der die einflussreichen kantianischen Moraltheorien der Gegenwart wie etwa den Kontraktualismus von Rawls und Scanlon oder die Diskursethik von Habermas und Apel fundiert. Ich möchte in meinem Beitrag prüfen, ob Kollektivakteure, genauer Unternehmen, Subjekte solcher Moraltheorien sein können, ich will also untersuchen, ob man ihnen das Vermögen der moralischen Selbstgesetzgebung zuschreiben kann. Ich werde dabei geltend machen, dass Unternehmen selbstverständlich in Vertragsverhandlungen eintreten können. Unternehmen müssen als handlungsfähig in Bezug auf Vertragsschlüsse betrachtet werden. Daraus folgt aber nicht, dass man sie sich als Vertragspartner in Diskursen über moralische Normen vorstellen kann. Dies muss deswegen ausgeschlossen sein, so mein Hauptargument, da sie keine Selbstzwecke sind. Die Gründe, die ein Unternehmen gegen eine Norm vorbringen kann, können ihre normative Quelle letztlich nie in den berechtigten Wünschen und Bedürfnissen des Unternehmens haben, denn diese können keine unbedingte Geltung beanspruchen. Unternehmen sind schließlich nur Mittel zur effizienten Befriedigung unsere Bedürfnisse. Deswegen können Unternehmen keine Subjekte einer kantianischen Ethik sein. Wie dieses Ergebnis mit dem Phänomen der moralischen Empörung über Handlungen von Unternehmen und dem Konstitutivismus von Korsgaard zu vereinen sein könnte, soll abschließend kurz angedacht werden.

4

Kästner

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 15.15 Uhr, 15/133
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 3:15 p.m., 15/133

**Building Powerful Explanations:
Mechanisms vs. Difference Making**

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Two accounts of scientific explanations are currently on everyone's lips: interventionism and the mechanistic view. Interventionist explanation require knowledge about which factors can potentially make a difference to a given outcome (the explanandum phenomenon). Often we can have this knowledge without knowing how or why a given relevance relation obtains. By contrast, a mechanistic explanation requires mechanistic knowledge about the precise entities and activities at

work. For instance, to explain recovery from tonsillitis, we can rely on statistical data telling us that tonsillitis is usually a streptococcal infection and that ingesting certain types of antibiotic drugs will reliably exterminate the relevant bacteria in a patient's body. To explain it mechanistically, we would further have to know about bacterial metabolism and how antibiotics interfere with it to produce their bactericidal effect. Thus, mechanistic explanations are often considered somewhat more convincing. But are they actually more powerful? And how could this be if, as proponents of the mechanistic view suggest, mechanistic explanations are constructed through interventionist research? I will discuss the contrast between interventionist and mechanistic explanations finding that there is actually no mystery about the interplay between them as long as we keep certain rules in mind. Once we realize this, we also see how we can often translate between difference-making and mechanistic knowledge and that neither is in principal superior to the other.

11

Kietzmann

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 13.30 Uhr, 15/114
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 1:30 p.m., 15/114

Zwei Konzeptionen des geteilten Handelns

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In seiner einflussreichen Theorie des gemeinsamen Handelns knüpft Michael Bratman an zwei weit verbreitete Vorstellungen innerhalb der analytischen Philosophie der Psychologie an. Zum einen ist das die Vorstellung, dass Handlungen als Bewegungen zu verstehen sind, die durch bestimmte Einstellungen des Handelnden verursacht werden – das ist die Grundannahme der kausalen Handlungstheorie. Zum anderen ist es die Idee, dass sich scheinbar komplexe geistige Phänomene dadurch verstehen lassen, dass man sie auf eine Konstellation einfacher Bestandteile zurückführt – das ist die Idee einer reduktiven Analyse.

Gemeinsames Handeln ist Bratman zufolge ein Agglomerat von individuellen Bewegungen mehrerer Akteure, das durch eine gemeinsame Absicht verursacht wird. Diese analysiert er als einen Komplex von in ihren Gehalten aufeinander bezogenen individuellen Absichten und Überzeugungen. Seine Theorie ist insofern eine Variante der kausalen Handlungstheorie, die zudem reduktiv und individualistisch vorgeht. In meinem Beitrag möchte ich erstens zeigen, dass diese Strategie Bratmans Vorschlag in systematische Schwierigkeiten verstrickt, die sich m.E. nur durch die Aufgabe des Ziels einer kausalen Theorie gemeinsamen Handelns und einer reduktiven und individualistischen Analyse geteilter Absichten vermeiden lassen. Zweitens werde ich kurz eine alternative Konzeption gemeinsamen Handelns und geteilter Absichten skizzieren, die weder reduktiv noch individualistisch angelegt ist und dennoch Erhellendes zu geteiltem Handeln zu sagen hat.

In meinem Gegenvorschlag knüpfe ich an die Arbeit von G.E.M. Anscombe zum individuellen Handeln an. Anscombe lehnt wie ich die beiden methodischen Vorurteile von Bratman ab. Sie versteht absichtliches Handeln stattdessen als eine Bewegung, die ihrer Form nach von anderen Bewegungen unterschieden ist. Der formale Unterschied liegt in dem Bewusstsein des Handelnden von der Bewegung, die sein absichtliches

Handeln ist. Es ist Anscombe zufolge dieses praktische Wissen, das einer absichtlichen Handlung ihren intentionalen Charakter, ihre interne teleologische Gliederung, ihren Bezug auf Gründe und ihre Wirklichkeit gibt. Gemeinsame Absichten möchte ich deshalb als das geteilte praktische Wissen mehrerer Akteure begreifen, welches ihre gemeinsames Tun anleitet, ihm seine teleologische und arbeitsteilige Struktur verleiht, seinen Bezug auf Gründe umfasst und seine Wirklichkeit erklärt.

1

Kindermann

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 9.00 Uhr, 11/215
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 9:00 a.m., 11/215

Structured vs Unstructured Content

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In this paper I argue for two theses: (1) The division between structured propositions views and unstructured propositions views (e.g., in possible worlds semantics) is unhelpful and has led to an unjustified rejection of possible worlds semantics by many philosophers. (2) Everything that structured propositions can do can be done with possible worlds content, suitably understood; in fact, more can be done with possible worlds content, suitably understood. I argue for these claims by distinguishing between *functions-in-extension* and *functions-in-intension* and by showing that functions-in-intension naturally fall out of possible worlds semantics to deliver all the fineness of grain that structured propositions provide. I argue that functions-in-intension can deliver more fineness of grain than the structure of structured propositions, thus providing us with distinctions at the level of lexical simples that help solve Frege's puzzle for singular terms. The upshot of the paper is that lovers of possibility-based conceptions of propositions and of possible-worlds semantics need not embrace any of the so-called ›structured‹ views of propositions.

S

Kirfel

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 10.30 Uhr, 15/E28
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 10:30 a.m., 15/E28

Fallible Minds

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Can all human thinking be explained solely in virtue of syntax? In this talk, I want to turn psychological findings in deductive reasoning into a challenge to the Representational Theory of Mind (RTM). According to the Language of thought hypothesis (LOTH), mental processes are conceived as causal transformations of mental representations (MRs) that are driven by the syntactical structure of MRs, in ways that are faithful to their semantic properties. Crucially, the causal processing of MRs is insensitive to the meaning of the symbols, and dependent on syntax only: For example, if I believe that

it rains tomorrow, and that if it rains tomorrow, the flowers get wet, I will come to believe that the flowers get wet because the syntax-based computational relations among my MR's respect the semantic relations of their contents. Drawing upon psychological studies on the »belief bias« in deductive reasoning, I will show that the believability of a representation can significantly influence people's thinking. These studies suggest that people are more likely to ignore the logical structure of a syllogism when parts of it have believable content. I argue that this presents a challenge to LOTH: There is no purely syntactical relation S that relates a certain set of propositions P to a representation R such that we can infer from P the believability of R without making reference to meaning. The believability of R depends on the meaning of R together with the meaning of a large collection of relevant background beliefs. To conclude, I will argue that RTM has to allow for meaning to inform causal transitions between mental representations.

2

Kitamura

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 10.30 Uhr, 15/E27
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 10:30 a.m., 15/E27

**Defending Priority Views from
the Gunk/Junk Argument**

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Recently, Jonathan Tallant has argued that we should reject *priority views* (PVs), which hold that some objects are fundamental and others are dependent. Tallant's argument relies on two proposed mereological possibilities: a *gunky* world, where everything has a proper part, and a *junky* world, where everything is a proper part. In this paper, I criticise Tallant's argument and argue that neither of these possibilities threaten PVs *per se*. I first defend pluralism against the gunk argument: the genuine conceivability of gunk can be plausibly doubted on the basis of the principle of illusions—the principle that if scenario ω is conceivable, then either it is possible, or there is some genuinely possible world ω' that is generating the *illusion* that ω is possible—and even if this principle is false, the possibility of a gunky world poses no devastating problem for pluralism *per se* because it can be considered consistent with nonatomism. Rebutting the gunk argument establishes the tenability of some type of PV, but I proceed to show that the range of tenable forms of PV is even wider by defending monism against the junk argument: the possibility of a junky world poses no devastating problem for monism *per se* because it can be considered consistent with nonholism in a twofold sense. Furthermore, even monism as defined as genuinely holistic can be plausibly defended against the junk argument once the claim of the possible nonexistence of the maximal whole is reinterpreted based on the priority-based conception of existence. This paper thus shows that the modal facts about mereology in question threaten, at most, only particular forms of PV that contain the assumption of atomism.

2

Kitsik

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 10.30 Uhr, 15/105
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 10:30 a.m., 15/105

**Can Philosophical Ontology Be
Practically Significant?**

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Some ontological controversies in philosophy are claimed to have practical significance in the sense that public laws and other social norms should be affected by the proper resolution of such controversies. For example, disputes on the existence of races are in part motivated by the need to devise policies on positive discrimination and on racial categorization in medicine. For another example, disputes on the existence of collective agents are partly motivated by the need to establish whether companies or other collectives can be attributed criminal liability, malice with foresight, etc., on a par with individuals. The idea seems to be that philosophers' insights and arguments concerning the ontological questions should be considered by public representatives in devising appropriate norms. If so, this would seem to assign a distinct kind of importance to philosophical ontology, a discipline struggling to prove that its problems are substantive and relevant. However, I will argue that the case for the practical significance of philosophical ontology does not fit well with some dominant ideas among metaphysicians about the nature of philosophical existence questions and the methodology for answering them. Hence, only if we adopt a revisionary conception of philosophical ontology can the latter be practically relevant in the described sense.

In particular, the following elements of metaphysicians' understanding of their questions and methods are in conflict with the practical relevance of philosophical ontology: (1) strategies that distance the justification of ordinary beliefs, talk and practices from metaphysical truths (for example, the idea of »useful fiction«); and (2) the idea that metaphysicians have special expertise with the sorts of ontological questions they address. In my talk, I will give examples of these two elements in metaphysicians' self-understanding, and explain how they are in conflict with the thesis that metaphysicians' input is relevant for public policy negotiations. The aim is to sharpen the distinction between the sort of (mainstream analytic) metaphysics that incorporates the described distancing strategies and assumptions about metaphysicians' expertise, and the sort of metaphysics that can be practically relevant.

5

Klincewicz

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 14.15 Uhr, 15/115
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 2:15 p.m., 15/115

Limits of Temporal Phenomenology

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Is subjective time something over and above the subjective experience of other, non-temporal features, such as colors and sounds? In this paper I argue that, on the one hand, subjective time depends on experience of colors, sounds, and so on, but it also depends on something more than just their succession. On the view I offer here, there is no distinct ›time sense‹ or organ of time, but there are distinct and modality-specific temporal features that are the basis of subjective time. What motivates this view is that some (but not all) of the celebrated phenomenological features of subjective time, such as seamless continuity, temporal extension (interval durations), punctuality (the specious present moment), and directionality (arrow of time) can be straightforwardly accounted for by the perception of non-temporal features. This paper offers an analysis of these features in terms of a function (a two place relation) that takes as its variable an ordered pair of mental qualities from the same family, e.g., two colors, two sounds. This and recent empirical evidence strongly suggests that we perceive time because we perceive non-temporal features, such as colors or sounds. But the relation that features in the content of our subjective experience of temporal features is something over and above the mere succession of colors and sounds. This means that subjective time is constructed by a set of distinct modality-specific processes. Nonetheless, the phenomenology of dynamic passage of time that is relevant to the debate about the metaphysics of time remains problematic for the view presented here. This is because the experience of passage is, at least on the face of it, independent of any non-temporal features, such as colors or sounds, and therefore modality-neutral. After outlining the problem I offer some ways in which it could be addressed in the future.

9

Klonschinski

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 10.30 Uhr, 11/215
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 10:30 a.m., 11/215

Das disability adjusted life year im Rahmen des Global Burden of Disease Projekts – Eine Kritik seiner Aussagekraft und normativen Relevanz

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Das von der WHO initiierte *Global Burden of Disease* Projekt (GBD) zielt darauf ab, die globale durch Krankheiten und Behinderungen induzierte »Krankheitslast« zu erheben. Dies soll nicht nur dem Monitoring dienen, sondern auch Informationen für eine effiziente Allokation von Ressourcen liefern. Als generische Messgröße für die

»Krankheitslast« wurde in den 1990er Jahren das sogenannte *disability adjusted life year* (DALY) konzipiert. Das DALY vereint Informationen über Mortalität und Morbidität, indem Lebensjahre, die in einem Zustand suboptimaler Gesundheit verbracht werden, mit einem auf empirischen Befragungen basierenden *disability-weight* diskontiert werden. Entsprechend der genannten Ziele des GBD Projekts kann das DALY nicht nur als deskriptives Maß der Krankheitslast fungieren, sondern auch als normativ relevante Größe in eine Entscheidungsregel zur Ressourcenallokation integriert werden. Die Entwicklung des DALYs im Rahmen des GBD Projekts wurde seit Beginn an von einer kritischen Debatte um zentrale konzeptionelle und methodische Aspekte begleitet. Insbesondere stehen dabei die Fragen, was genau das DALY eigentlich abbilden soll und an welcher Stelle Verteilungsgesichtspunkte zu integrieren seien, im Vordergrund.

Der vorliegende Beitrag gibt einen Überblick über die für den breiteren gesundheitsökonomischen Diskurs exemplarische Debatte und zeigt auf, dass die genannten Schwierigkeiten auch in der neuesten GBD 2010 nicht vollständig ausgeräumt werden konnten. Dabei wird die These vertreten, dass dies letztlich in der mangelnden Reflektion der impliziten Prämissen des konsequentialistischen Grundgerüsts gesundheitsökonomischer Evaluationen begründet ist. Die Analyse dieser angewandten Problematik weist damit auf Schwierigkeiten konsequentialistischer Theorien als solcher hin. Insgesamt stellt das DALY keine valide Messgröße für »Krankheitslast« dar und weist allenfalls eine begrenzte normative Relevanz für die Ressourcenverteilung auf.

11

Koch

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 15.15 Uhr, 15/113
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 3:15 p.m., 15/113

Voluntarism and Practical Deliberation

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A number of recent philosophers (Frankfurt, Korsgaard, Chang, Bratman, and others) have defended some version of voluntarism either about reasons for action or about subjective reasons for action. The aim of my talk is to offer an assessment of the motives and prospects of such voluntarist views by distinguishing between two versions of voluntarism that are often insufficiently demarcated from each other. On the first construal, voluntarism is a normative thesis. On the second, it is a metaphysical thesis about the nature of (some) reasons for action. I argue that the normative construal of voluntarism is more likely than the metaphysical one to emerge as plausible in the face of objections, and that it is able to save the phenomena that animate the voluntarist project in the first place. It does so at the price of restricting the extent to which exercises of the will can make a difference to what reasons we have.

Voluntarism, considered as a normative doctrine, abandons the idea that the relevant choices and volitional attitudes (adoption of a policy, endorsement of a principle, and the like) can make it the case, in a non-trivial way, that a given kind of consideration is a normative reason for an act. Rather, insofar as voluntarism is true, the relevant volitional facts give us reasons to deliberate in certain ways: namely in ways that take certain considerations to speak in favor of (or against) cer-

tain actions, or to have some specific weight or priority. Not to deliberate in those ways, once we have made the relevant choices or adopted the relevant attitudes, would be to act against reason (insofar as deliberation is an activity). On the resulting account, the truth and scope of voluntarism are substantive normative issues concerning the extent to which our practical deliberation is properly guided by, or responsive to, relevant exercises and dispositions of our will.

11

Köhler

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 13.30 Uhr, 15/111
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 1:30 p.m., 15/111

Expressivism, Belief, and All That

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In recent years, meta-normative quasi-realist expressivists have used minimalist accounts of belief to argue that expressivism is fully compatible with the claim that normative judgements are beliefs. However, the accounts that have been given have so far neglected one important question in this context, namely, what an expressivist can say about the *contents* of those beliefs. But, given that beliefs are propositional attitudes expressivists have not earned the right to claim that normative judgements are beliefs at all, as long as we have no answer to that question. In this paper, I set out to address this question. I will argue that an expressivist who accepts conceptual role semantics and uses a particular account of *that*-clauses in their use in belief-attributions—an account based on the work of Wilfrid Sellars—can give an account of the contents of beliefs that is compatible with an expressivist claiming that normative judgements are beliefs.

13

Königs

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 16.00 Uhr, 11/116
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 4:00 p.m., 11/116

**Two Types of Debunking Argument,
Two Ways of Philosophizing**

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Genealogical debunking arguments follow the logic of »you just believe that because...«. They aim at defeating the justification of a belief by showing this belief to have a dubious etiology. Debunking arguments are particularly popular in moral philosophy, where the evolutionary or psychological processes underlying moral judgment are often assumed to have such an undermining effect.

What is often overlooked, though, is that debunking arguments falls in two crucially different categories. One type of debunking argument proceeds by showing that the evidence is not what it appears to be, e.g. by undermining the evaluative intuitions that drive our evaluative judgments. Another type of debunking argument, however, proceeds by impugning the proper

functioning of the cognitive apparatus of the person whose belief is being debunked. The to-be-debunked doctrine is, for instance, dismissed as a product of post hoc rationalization.

Debunking arguments of the second type deserve special attention as they violate an important ethical principle governing philosophical debate, which I call the principle of rational respect: In a philosophical debate, it is not allowed to assess the merits of a philosophical position by drawing on higher-order evidence related to the cognitive prowess of the proponents of this position. That is, the principle of rational respect rules out *ad hominem* arguments even when they are sound.

The fact that academic philosophy is governed by such a principle is related to the type of activity that academic philosophers engage in. *At least to some extent*, academic philosophy resembles competitive debating more than the cooperative quest for enlightenment. Sometimes, the constitutive aim of academic philosophy seems to be the production of successful arguments rather than personal philosophical enlightenment.

Although this way of institutionalizing philosophical inquiry has major advantages, it has also significant drawbacks. In particular, it discourages a more reflexive way of philosophizing. Reflexive philosophical inquiry pays more attention to higher-order evidence related to our cognitive (mal)functioning and is thus more sensitive to the psychological, political or institutional circumstances of philosophical research.

2

Korbmacher

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 13.30 Uhr, 15/E28
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 1:30 p.m., 15/E28

**How to Distinguish Necessarily Coextensive
but Distinct Properties**

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In this paper, I propose a theory of properties that can distinguish between necessarily coextensive but intuitively distinct properties. I begin by arguing that the most common hyperintensional theories in the literature have problems dealing with necessarily coextensive but distinct properties: The *impossible worlds theory* appears to distinguish between *all* properties, not only the intuitively distinct ones and the *structured properties theory* cannot distinguish between necessarily coextensive but distinct *simple* properties. I propose that instead we view properties as functions that assign to every object at every possible world a set of *conditions*, i.e. sets of states of affairs. We then say that an object instantiates a property at some world iff at least one condition that the property assigns to the object at that world *holds*, i.e. iff all its members obtain at the world.

4

Kornmesser

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 10:30 Uhr, 15/133
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 10:30 a.m., 15/133

**Frame-basierte Repräsentation
operationalisierter Begriffe**

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Frames sind Attribut-Wert-Matrizen, die in der Wissenschaftsphilosophie u.a. als Instrument zur Rekonstruktion von wissenschaftlichen Begriffen und begrifflichem Wandel verwendet werden. Der semantische Gehalt der rekonstruierten Begriffe wird mittels einer Menge attribut-spezifischer Werte bestimmt. Zusätzlich zum semantischen Gehalt können Frames empirisches Wissen als *constraints* zwischen den Werten des Frames ausdrücken.

In den bisher entwickelten frame-basierten Repräsentationen wurden wissenschaftliche Begriffe mit einer Definitions- oder Prototypenstruktur rekonstruiert. Neben definierten Begriffen bzw. Prototypenbegriffen spielen in den Wissenschaften (mehrfach) operationalisierte Begriffe eine wichtige Rolle, zu deren Repräsentation bisher noch keine frame-basierte Methode entwickelt wurde. In meinem Vortrag werde ich eine solche Methode vorstellen und zeigen, dass Frames, die operationalisierte Begriffe repräsentieren, eine andere Struktur besitzen als Frames, die definierte Begriffe oder Prototypenbegriffe repräsentieren. Um die Strukturen in den frame-basierten Repräsentationen der verschiedenen Begriffstypen unterscheiden zu können, werde ich diese mittels der mathematischen Graphentheorie explizieren. Es wird sich zeigen, dass bei Frames, die operationalisierte Begriffe repräsentieren, die *constraints* aus der logischen Struktur des Frames folgen – im Gegensatz zu Frames, die definierte Begriffe oder Prototypenbegriffe repräsentieren. Frames ermöglichen somit eine integrierte Darstellung der Mehrfachoperationalisierung eines wissenschaftlichen Begriffs und der sich daraus ergebenden empirischen Folgerungen.

6

Koscholke

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 16:00 Uhr, 11/214
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 4:00 p.m., 11/214

**Carnap's Relevance Measure as
Probabilistic Measure of Coherence**

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It is generally assumed that Tomoji Shogenji was the first author to present a probabilistic measure of coherence suggesting to calculate the coherence of a set of propositions in terms of the deviation from their joint probabilistic independence. This paper, however, points out that Rudolf Carnap already had a function based on the very same idea, namely his well-known relevance measure. This function is often overlooked in the coherence debate because it has been proposed as a measure of evidential support and still is conceived as such. The

goal of this paper is therefore to show that it is plausible and fruitful to interpret Carnap's measures as a probabilistic measure of coherence. For this purpose the measure is generalized and shown to be closely related to Shogenji's coherence measure: both measures are based on the idea of measuring the extent to which propositions deviate from their joint probabilistic independence, they both satisfy and violate a similar collection of adequacy constraints and they perform similarly in a series of test cases for probabilistic coherence measures. Moreover, by conducting a Monte Carlo simulation Carnap's and Shogenji's measure can be shown to be highly correlated with each other and with several prominent probabilistic coherence measures such as e.g. Douven and Meijs', Fitelson's, Glass' and Olsson's and Roche's.

2

Krämer

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 13:30 Uhr, 15/E27
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 1:30 p.m., 15/E27

On the Granularity of Ground

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This talk contributes to the current vivid debate concerning the logical features of *metaphysical ground*. I discuss a tension, highlighted by Fabrice Correia ([1]), between two otherwise plausible-seeming claims, and propose a solution. The first, *metaphysical claim* is that ground is a relation that structures *reality* rather than our *representations* of reality. The second, *logical claim* concerns the interaction of ground with logical concepts. It is that ground ($<$) satisfies inference rules like: from A , infer $A < A \vee B$, as well as $A < \neg A$.

The tension concerns the *granularity* of ground. Call the relation of ground *facts*, leaving open their precise nature. Then the logical claim requires facts to be individuated very finely; for example, the fact that A must differ from the fact that $\neg A$. However, the metaphysical claim seems to require a more coarse-grained conception of facts, on pain of rendering them representational in nature. Thus, Correia maintains, one of the claims has to be given up.

Against this contention, I present a conception of facts that, I argue, fits both claims. The key notion of my account is that of a *state verifying* a fact *in a certain way*, either directly or *by* verifying some other fact(s). States and verification are here conceived as in Kit Fine ([2]). My central innovation is to also take into account in the individuation of facts *how* their verification occurs. The resulting theory validates all the desired inference rules. At the same time, it also respects the non-representational character of facts. For many pairs of sentences with very different representational structures still turn out to correspond to the same fact. Examples include the pairs of $A \wedge A$ and $A \vee A$, $\neg(A \wedge B)$ and $\neg A \vee \neg B$, as well as $A \vee B$ and $B \vee B$ whenever $A < B$. I conclude that the proposed conception of facts resolves the tension between the logical and the metaphysical claim, and is therefore well suited to the demands of the theory of ground.

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4

Krickel

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 16.00 Uhr, 15/133
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 4:00 p.m., 15/133

Against the Flat View of Constitutive Mechanisms

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In the new mechanistic literature, authors usually distinguish between two different types of mechanisms: *etiological mechanisms*, which consist of the preceding causes of a phenomenon-to-be-explained, and *constitutive mechanisms*, which underlie or constitute a phenomenon (Salmon 1984; Craver 2007a). While the notion of causation is extensively discussed in philosophy of science as well as metaphysics, the way in which mechanisms »underlie« phenomena remains unclear (for analyses of this notion see Craver 2007a, 2007b; Harbecke 2010; Kistler 2010; Couch 2011; Fagan 2012; Kaiser and Krickel forthcoming). In this paper, I will present two different general views on constitutive mechanisms, the *flat* and the *dimensioned* view of constitutive mechanisms. I will argue that the flat view is problematic in ways in which the dimensioned view is not.

More specifically, this paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2, I will present the general idea behind the notion of a constitutive mechanism. In doing so I will explicate the central characteristics of the relation involved (»mechanistic constitution«) and of the relation of this relation (the mechanism and the phenomenon). I will argue that there are two different ways of interpreting the general idea of a constitutive mechanism. In Section 3, I will introduce the first way of interpreting the general idea, which I will call the *flat view*. Most authors, for example Craver (2007a), seem to endorse this view. In Section 3, I will present four problems for the flat view. In Section 4, I will introduce an alternative view of constitutive mechanisms, which I will call the *dimensioned view*. I will argue that this view avoids the problems that arise for the flat view.

4

Krödel

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 13.30 Uhr, 15/133
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 1:30 p.m., 15/133

Causal Modelling and Mental Causation

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The paper argues that causal modelling theories of token causation can explain the causation of physical events by supervenient mental events. There has been a debate about whether Woodward's (2003) interventionist theory, a member of the causal modelling family, can accommodate mental causation, but it has not yet been studied in detail whether the problems with this theory generalize. The present paper uses a causal modelling framework in the spirit of Hitchcock's (2001, 2007) causal modelling theory of token causation and shows that it can accommodate mental causation. Accommodating mental causation requires some unorthodoxy, however, in the way the relevant causal model is constructed. Starting from certain uncontroversial counterfactuals

about a given mental event, its actual and possible realisers, and a later physical event, one can construct a causal model in which all the required counterfactuals are true. In this model, the variable for the later physical event can be shown to counterfactually depend on the variable for the mental event, which licences the conclusion that the mental event causes the later physical event. The main unorthodoxy of the model for mental causation is that its equations, and hence its causal graph, are cyclic. In particular, the variable for the physical realiser of the mental event appears in the equation for the variable for the mental event and vice versa. This cyclicity is not harmful, however, for it does not prevent the evaluation of the relevant causal counterfactuals in the model.

12

Kühler

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 16.00 Uhr, 11/211
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 4:00 p.m., 11/211

Narrative Identität, Autorschaft und soziale Einbettung

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Narrative Identitätstheorien erfreuen sich seit geraumer Zeit großer Beliebtheit. Sie betreffen unser grundlegendes Selbstverständnis als je besondere Personen mit einer je eigenen (sozialwissenschaftlich verstandenen) Identität. Ihnen zufolge konstituiert sich die Identität einer Person *narrativ*, d.h. dass die Frage nach der Identität einer Person nur durch eine *Erzählung* adäquat beantwortet werden kann. Werde ich also gefragt, *wer* ich bin, so muss meine Antwort darin bestehen, dass ich *meine Geschichte* erzähle.

Der Umstand, dass damit *ich selbst* der Autor *meiner Geschichte* bin oder zumindest sein kann, wirft allerdings erstens die Frage auf, ob dies nicht impliziert, dass *ich als Autor* bereits eine bestimmte Identität haben muss, von der ausgehend ich allererst *meine* Geschichte entwerfen und erzählen kann. Zweitens stellt sich die Frage, ob nicht nur diese gegebenenfalls bereits vorauszusetzende Autor-Identität, sondern auch die Rahmenbedingungen des Erzählens wiederum einer *sozialen Einbettung* unterliegen, die ihrerseits entscheidenden Anteil an der Konstitution der Identität (sowohl meines Autorseins als auch meiner Person im Ganzen) hat.

In meinem Vortrag möchte ich den beiden genannten Fragen nachgehen, wobei ich exemplarisch auf Paul Ricoeurs Konzeption narrativer Identität zurückgreife. Meine These lautet, dass Ricoeurs Konzeption – und jede hinreichend ähnliche Konzeption narrativer Identität – die Frage der Konstitution der Identität des Autors und damit auch der Person im Ganzen angesichts der kritischen Implikationen der beiden Fragen in der Tat nicht hinreichend klären kann. Entweder es droht ein infinites Regress, wenn die Identität des Autors ihrerseits *narrativ* konstituiert sein soll, oder narrative Identitätstheorien sind in der Tat auf vorgängige nicht-narrative, insbesondere sozial-relationale Theorien des *Autorseins* und *Erzählens* zurückgeworfen, um die Auswahl und Ausgestaltung der Spezifika der jeweiligen Geschichte einschichtig machen zu können. Die »Geschichte« der narrativen Identitätstheorie bedarf insofern – ganz im Sinne einer jüngeren Hollywood-Mode – eines konstitutionstheoretisch vorgängigen »Prequels«.

9

Laimann

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 14.15 Uhr, 11/215
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 2:15 p.m., 11/215

**Should Breast Implants Be Prohibited?
Undermining Harmful and Unequal Social Norms**

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Some individuals decide to inflict harm on themselves. Examples range from smoking or fasting, up to self-mutilation or suicide. In liberal moral theory, paternalistic interventions, that is, interventions with an individual's choices for the individual's own good, are considered *prima facie* morally wrong. Clare Chambers argues that some self-harming choices do permit interference if the self-inflicted harm is a response to an unequal and significantly harmful social norm that regulates access to certain benefits, such as in the case of breast implants. She claims that breast implants ought to be prohibited and justifies this proposal along three value dimensions: autonomy, gender equality and prevention of harm, and respect. I argue that Chambers' proposal provides the wrong solution to an accurately diagnosed problem. Compared to measures which aim at changing the underlying social incentive structure without directly interfering with women's choices, prohibition performs worse with respect to all three values. I argue that a combination of education campaigns and legal regulations avoid all of these problems, yet involves problematic transition costs. In the transition period, women continue to undertake unnecessary, painful, and risky surgery, and therefore continue to pay a price for a socially regulated benefit that they should not be required to pay. I suggest that this problem, which seems to motivate Chambers' more radical claim for prohibition, is in fact better addressed with a subsidy and compensation system.

S

Lang

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 9.00 Uhr, 15/E28
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 9:00 a.m., 15/E28

The Incredible Gunk

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The possibility of atomless gunk, a thing whose parts all have proper parts, threatens theories about composition and fundamentality. Among them are Mereological Nihilism (nothing is ever composed), van Inwagen's Organicism (only living things are composed), and Priority Pluralism (mereological simples, things without any proper part, are fundamental and all other things depend upon them). More often than not the possibility of gunk is backed by its alleged conceivability (most recently Tallant (2013)). While there have been defences against this argument, they all come with a cost, whether it is accepting the possibility of co-located mereological simples (Williams 2007) or giving up on the necessity of composition (Cameron 2006). I propose a novel defence

that lacks any such cost, because I claim that the argument was never valid in the first place. This is the case, because the sense in which gunk is conceivable differs from the sense in which conceivability entails possibility. Common accounts that defend the entailment from conceivability to possibility all share a restricting feature that is put upon what counts as conceivable. This restricting feature, what Chalmers (2002) calls modal coherence, rules out that gunk is conceivable (in the possibility entailing sense). Since modal coherence is the weakest point in my reasoning, and because it is not really argued for by proponents of such views, I offer an argument due to David Lewis (1986) why we can't do without it. I conclude that, while the possibility of gunk remains a threat, arguing for it on grounds of its conceivability fails.

8

Langkau

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 15.15 Uhr, 15/105
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 3:15 p.m., 15/105

Learning from Fiction

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The main purpose of fiction is to offer entertainment or some kind of aesthetic experience. It is, however, common sense that we can gain interesting and relevant knowledge about the world from it. I argue that fiction can be used to gain knowledge in much the same way knowledge is thought to be gained in thought experiments. While existing views that have drawn a similarity between fiction and thought experiments focus on one particular account of thought experiments, I take a closer look at different ways to reconstruct thought experiments and in particular the content of our knowledge from thought experiments and apply them to fiction. The view according to which we gain counterfactual knowledge meets the requirement of this knowledge being interesting and relevant best. In order to establish that we can gain evaluative knowledge such as that somebody in Anna Karenina's situation would be pitiful, I discuss the imaginative process involved in making evaluative judgments. Empirical evidence suggests that this process is reliable as long as we do not try to simulate when we generate empathic concern for fictional characters, and it also suggests that this is usually not the case.

6

Lawler

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 9.00 Uhr, 11/214
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 9:00 a.m., 11/214

Knowledge-Why Revisited

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To understand why something happened is an important epistemic gain. One thesis is that such understanding-why can be defined in terms of knowledge (e.g., Lipton 2004, Grimm 2006 & 2014, Kelp 2014):

UNDERSTANDING-WHY-IS-KNOWLEDGE-WHY S understands why p iff S knows why p . Knowledge-why is usually defined as knowledge of causes, which is defined as follows (e.g., Kvanvig 2003, Pritchard 2008 & 2014, Grimm 2014, Kelp 2014):

KNOWLEDGE OF CAUSES S has knowledge of some cause(s) of p iff there is some q such that S knows that p because q .

UNDERSTANDING-WHY-IS-KNOWLEDGE-WHY has been under attack recently. Both the sufficiency and the necessity of knowledge-why for understanding-why have been cast into doubt. Against the sufficiency claim, Duncan Pritchard (2008, 2009, 2014) and Alison Hills (2009, 2015) provide cases in which a subject has knowledge of the cause of a phenomenon but still lacks understanding-why of the phenomenon. Against the necessity claim, Jonathan Kvanvig (2003), Pritchard (2008, 2009, 2014), and Kevin Morris (2012) provide cases in which a subject gains a true justified belief about the cause of the phenomenon but no knowledge, nonetheless achieving understanding-why.

My agenda comprises four steps: First, I argue that the presupposed definition of knowledge-why is not apt. To know why a phenomenon took place goes beyond merely knowing what causes the phenomenon. One has to have at least some information about how cause and effect are related. Secondly, I reject Grimm's suggestion (2014) how to revise the notion »knowledge-why«. Thirdly, I provide a more appropriate definition of knowledge-why based on work by Michael Strevens (2013) and by Kaarem Khalifa and Michael Gadowski (2013):

KNOWLEDGE-WHY REVISED S knows why p iff S justifiably believes a correct explanation for why p .

Fourthly, I argue that KNOWLEDGE-WHY REVISED is immune to luck. If so, the current attacks against the necessity of knowledge-why for understanding-why lose their force. One might still argue that KNOWLEDGE-WHY REVISED is not sufficient for understanding-why, but it seems at least necessary.

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4

Leuschner

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 16.00 Uhr, 15/134
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 4:00 p.m., 15/134

Social Exclusion despite Methodological Criteria: On Biases in Scientific Quality Evaluation

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Empirical studies show that academia is socially exclusive. I'll argue that this social exclusion works partly through scientific exclusion within the process of scientific quality evaluation, i.e. through systematic methodological disqualification of contributions from members of underrepresented social groups. Drawing on Kuhn I'll point out that methodological quality criteria are underdetermined, i.e. they must be interpreted and weighed in the context of their application. However, this interpreting and weighing can be biased. If there are prejudices that are related to gender, race, social background, etc., and that are shared by an entire community (or at least by the majority of members of the community) the biases can cause a systematic exclusion of the contributions from members of the respective social groups. In light of recent empirical studies, I'll demonstrate that such prejudices in fact bias the methodological judgments in scientific quality evaluation. I'll point this out with regard to Longino's social pluralism which, however, does not provide a convincing solution of the problem as I'll explain. I'll finally argue that scientific quality evaluation can be biased on a local and a global level, and illuminate this by the current situation of women in philosophy. In contrast to Longino, I'll conclude that only mechanical solutions can effectively change the situation.

3

Liefke / Werning

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 10.30 Uhr, 11/116
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 10:30 a.m., 11/116

Evidence for Single-Type Semantics: An Alternative to e/t-Based Dual-Type Semantics

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Partee (2006) conjectures a formal semantics for natural language (hereafter, single-type semantics) which interprets referential DPs and declarative sentences in the same semantic type: properties of situations. Partee's semantics contrasts with Montague semantics and its recent contenders (dubbed dual- or multi-type semantics), which assume distinct basic types for the semantic values of referential DPs (i.e. individuals) and sentences (i.e. propositions, truth-values, or sets of assignment functions). Partee's conjecture is motivated by results in event semantics and discourse representation theory. However, none of these results gives single-type seman-

tics an explicit modeling advantage over dual-type semantics. Our talk compensates for this shortcoming. In particular, it identifies a number of new arguments for the adoption of a single-type semantics which display this semantics' greater explanatory and predictive power. To further support single-type semantics, we defend it against a number of standard objections.

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4

Loew

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 13.30 Uhr, 15/134
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 1:30 p.m., 15/134

Why we Cannot Control the Past

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We have some control over the future, but we have absolutely no control over the past. This time-asymmetry is puzzling, especially in light of the supposed time-symmetry of the fundamental dynamical laws of physics. In this paper I give a reductive explanation of why we cannot control the past in terms restrictions on our agency imposed by physics. We are unable to control the past because any known correlations between our decisions and past outcomes break down if we try to exploit these correlations for the sake of manipulating the past. This fragility in how our decisions are correlated with the past is due to a time-asymmetry in our decisionmaking: the mental states motivating our decisions temporally precede these decision and, hence, interfere with their correlations toward the past. I will argue that this time-asymmetry in our decision-making is physically explicable and has the same physical basis as the time-asymmetry of records, thus providing a reductive account of why we cannot control the past.

11

Löschke

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 16.00 Uhr, 15/111
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 4:00 p.m., 15/111

Persönliche Beziehungen als indirekte Gründeverstärker

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Seit geraumer Zeit gibt es eine intensive moralphilosophische Debatte über den moralischen Status von speziellen Pflichten – Pflichten, die innerhalb von persönlichen Beziehungen wie Freundschaften oder Familienbeziehungen auftreten. Die Beteiligten in solchen Beziehungen schulden einander mehr, als sie Ausenstehenden schulden, und es stellt sich die Frage nach der Begründung dieser Pflichten und nach ihrer Vereinbarkeit mit dem moralischen Egalitarismus und dem Standpunkt der Unparteilichkeit. Hier haben sich in der

jüngsten Debatte zwei Argumentationsstrategien herauskristallisiert: Reduktionistische Ansätze reduzieren spezielle Pflichten auf Anwendungsfälle von allgemeinen moralischen Prinzipien; non-reduktionistische Ansätze verstehen persönliche Beziehungen selbst als Quelle moralischer Handlungsgründe, die ihrerseits spezielle Pflichten begründen. Beide Arten von Ansätzen sind problematisch: Während reduktionistische Ansätze persönlichen Beziehungen zu wenig moralische Relevanz zusprechen, sprechen non-reduktionistische Ansätze persönlichen Beziehungen zu viel moralische Relevanz zu. Der Vortrag skizziert eine dritte, neue Möglichkeit, spezielle Pflichten zu begründen und mit dem moralischen Egalitarismus zu versöhnen: Moralische Handlungsgründe werden durch den moralischen Wert von Personen erzeugt, und dies bedeutet, dass wir jeder Person gegenüber dieselben Handlungsgründe haben. Um den deontischen Status einer Handlung zu bestimmen, reicht es aber nicht aus, nur die Handlungsgründe zu beachten, die für eine bestimmte Handlung sprechen. Vielmehr müssen auch die Gründe, die gegen eine Handlung sprechen, beachtet werden, insbesondere die Kosten für den Akteur. Persönliche Beziehungen sind ein konstitutiver Teil des guten Lebens von Personen; dies bedeutet, dass ein Handeln zugunsten von Beteiligten in persönlichen Beziehungen weniger Kosten impliziert als das Handeln zugunsten von Fremden, mit denen der Akteur keine persönliche Beziehung unterhält. Indem Beziehungen die Gründe, die gegen eine Handlung sprechen, abschwächen, verstärken sie das relative Gewicht der Gründe, die für die entsprechende Handlung sprechen – dies ist die indirekte Verstärkerfunktion moralischer Gründe von Beziehungen, die spezielle Pflichten unter der Annahme des moralischen Egalitarismus begründen. Der Vortrag schliesst mit einer kurzen Verteidigung des Ansatzes gegen potenzielle Einwände.

13

Lötscher

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 9.45 Uhr, 11/211
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 9:45 a.m., 11/211

Hilbert's Rescue of Mathematics

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In this paper, I will argue for the thesis that Hilbert's approach to axioms rescued mathematics from the single-minded focus on truth as correspondence to reality. Historically, mathematical axioms were considered to express self-evident truths—truths about an abstract reality of such a basic kind that they seemed true beyond any doubt. This implied that the investigation of mathematical axioms was restricted to describing an abstract reality—a rather uncreative process. Hilbert, however, proclaimed a version of coherentism. According to him, mathematical axioms should be regarded as true if they form a consistent system, i.e. a system that entails no contradictions. This approach to mathematical axioms is faced with the many problems a coherence theory of truth brings with it. Even though Hilbert was not able to solve these problems, he could still rid mathematics from the burden of looking for axioms that correspond to an abstract reality. The crux of Hilbert's rescue of mathematics lay in his conception of axioms. He regarded axioms as partially uninterpreted sentences—sentences whose non-logical primitive concepts are

empty placeholders open for interpretation. This enabled Hilbert to avoid reference to an abstract reality and nevertheless provided a criterion for identifying potentially fruitful axiom systems. Thus, my claim is that Hilbert's approach to axioms frees mathematics from the single-minded focus on truth as correspondence to reality. By claiming that we need only demand that axiom systems be consistent, Hilbert shifted the focus in mathematics from questions of truth to questions of deductive relationships. He thus removed the stigma of investigating axioms that do not describe a known ›reality‹ and cleared the way to mathematical creativity: new mathematical theories could be created by simply laying down new axioms. So, even if Hilbert did not succeed in solving the philosophical problems entailed by his coherentism, his approach can be regarded as a kind of rhetorical device that allowed mathematicians to set aside the question of truth and to focus on axiom systems that are interesting on some standard other than truth.

6

Löwenstein

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 10.30 Uhr, 11/214
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 10:30 a.m., 11/214

Analyzing ›to know how to‹ and Explaining Intelligent Practice

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The philosophical problem of know-how—of knowledge how to do something—concerns the metaphysics of this particular kind of knowledge state and the way in which a person's know-how explains her intelligence in what she does. Still, an influential methodology in the debate about this problem seeks to explain the metaphysics of know-how in terms of the syntax and semantics of the English expression ›to know how to‹. In particular, it uses linguistic theories of embedded questions to establish intellectualism, the view that know-how is a species of propositional knowledge. This talk will offer a new kind of objection against this argument and a new kind of alternative view about know-how compatible with the linguistic data.

The first part of this talk will show that the linguistic theories cited here merely establish what one may call a *semantic correlation* between the truth of ›S knows how to A‹ and the truth of ›S knows that p(A)‹, where p(A) is a relevant proposition about the activity of A-ing. This result is equally compatible with an alternative view according to which S' knowledge how to A and S' knowledge that p(A) are two distinct knowledge states—even two distinct *kinds* of knowledge—while the former grounds the latter. The second part of this talk will sketch such an alternative account. Developing the view of the grandfather of the current debate, Gilbert Ryle, know-how can be understood as a skill—an ability to do well at some activity in virtue of the fact that one possesses an understanding of this activity which guides one's conduct of engaging in it. It will be shown how such a Rylean conception of know-how nevertheless involves precisely the kind of propositional knowledge which the linguistic argument claims to be correlated with know-how.

11

Lumer

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 9.45 Uhr, 15/113
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 9:45 a.m., 15/113

Unconscious Motives and Actions: Responsibility and Agency

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According to many criteria, responsibility, intentionality and agency require conscious decisions. Already Freud assumed that a big part of our decisions is influenced by unconscious motives or that we perform unconscious actions based on completely unconscious thoughts; such actions are possibly not intentional, perhaps not even actions in the narrow sense, and we would not be responsible for them. Recent psychological and neurophysiological research has revealed a number of further phenomena where behaviour is executed completely unconsciously or where the decision is influenced by unconscious factors: priming, automatic behaviour, habitualised behaviour, actions based on unconscious deliberations, etc. Since this behaviour makes up the largest part of our behaviour commonly taken to be actions, intentionality, agency and our responsibility for most of our behaviour appear to be at risk here. Such considerations have led to a fierce debate that revolves around the fundamental issues just mentioned, and discusses a whole range of other phenomena as well. Unfortunately, this debate suffers considerable from incautious generalisations. A more appropriate and cautious approach in the theory of action, instead, would have to analyse and explore the single (especially the *prima facie* problematic) very heterogeneous phenomena ascertained by the empirical sciences, with respect to how far they fulfil the conditions of intentionality, of agency and responsibility or just do not fulfil them.

In this context, the present contribution has the following objectives: 1. A list of different types of unconscious actions / behaviours or actions significantly influenced by unconscious or misunderstood factors will be established; and their mechanisms will be analyzed. Because of the great length of this list, automatic actions / behaviours are not considered here; I have discussed them elsewhere. 2. The most important of these types will be examined with respect to how far they meet the criteria of intentionality, agency and accountability, but also of rationality and, if they do not (fully) meet them, how problematic this is for traditional theories of action.

4

Lutz

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 9.00 Uhr, 15/111
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 9:00 a.m., 15/111

**Empirically Adequate but
Observably False Theories**

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I show that a theory may be empirically adequate according to van Fraassen's definition even though it can be observationally determined that the theory is false. I suggest a modification of empirical adequacy that avoids this result.

9

Lyreskog / Nagel

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 11.15 Uhr, 11/215
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 11:15 a.m., 11/215

**The Possibilities and Limitations
of Motivation Enhancing Drugs**

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What happens when you take a prescription medication and you suddenly feel more motivated to go to work? In the multifaceted debate about enhancement interventions there has been investigation of the neurological effects of the drugs, of the effects as perceived by the users, and of the ethical and social dimensions. Awareness has also recently been raised about the ethical issues involved in usage of prescription drugs for motivation enhancement purposes, such as alienation and the value of effort. However, a conceptual basis for a thorough ethical analysis of motivation enhancing drugs is still lacking. We offer a framework that arranges human willpower in a hierarchical structure of higher and lower orders, and thereby helps to disentangle some of the ethical issues.

Building on this framework, we discuss the complexities involved in targeting specific mental content. When using motivational enhancement, there is an epistemological uncertainty regarding what desires or volitions we enhance: how do I know if it is a lower order desire or third order volition that will be enhanced? We argue that this problem calls for a more sophisticated approach in addressing the ethics of motivational enhancement—one that takes into consideration that motivation is not one single mechanism that can be enhanced by manipulating one single chemical process. We propose a motivation type-sensitive framework that tackles parts of the epistemic problem, and that helps to map out the internal borders as well as the limits of motivation enhancing interventions.

1

Mai

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 8.15 Uhr, 11/215
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 8:15 a.m., 11/215

Resistant Rigidity

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Saul Kripke's claim that proper names are rigid designators seems to be the best explanation of their scopeless behaviour in modal contexts. Since famous deeds descriptions, such as »the author of *Gravity's Rainbow*«, are not scopeless with respect to modal expressions, Kripke concludes that no name has the same intension as any famous deeds description.

However, Glüer and Pagin have recently argued that the scopal difference between names and famous deeds descriptions can be explained alternatively by appeal to the semantics of modal expressions. On this approach, dubbed »relational modality«, a name's contribution to modal contexts is simply the name's extension in the actual world. The semantics is fully compatible with famous deeds descriptivism, the claim that every name is synonymous with some famous deeds description. So, relational modality apparently offers descriptivism a way to defend itself against Kripke's attack without having to deny the semantic significance of those normal descriptions speakers associate with names.

However, I will argue that famous deeds descriptivism combined with relational modality is committed to false predictions concerning the validity of certain arguments, where modal expressions occur. Consequently, famous deeds descriptivists should not accept relational modality.

6

Mantel

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 16.00 Uhr, 11/214
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 4:00 p.m., 11/214

**Dispositionen: Segen oder Fluch für die kausale
Theorie der epistemischen Stützungsbeziehung?**

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Wir stützen viele unserer Überzeugungen auf andere mentale Zustände. Doch worin besteht eine Stützungsbeziehung (engl. *basing relation*)?

Oft werden *kausale Theorien* der Stützungsbeziehung vertreten, da sie angeblich die beste Erklärung für die Intuition liefern, dass zwei Zustände nicht nur zufällig gemeinsam auftreten, wenn der eine den anderen stützt. Kausale Theorien nennen folgende *notwendige* Bedingung dafür, dass die Überzeugung Ü auf den mentalen Zustand M gestützt ist:

(KB) M hat Ü verursacht oder M verursacht, dass Ü aufrechterhalten wird.

Das altbekannte Problem abweichender Kausalketten zeigt jedoch, dass KB allein nicht *hinreichend* für die Stützungsbeziehung ist. In letzter Zeit wurde mehrfach vorgeschlagen, dass das Problem abweichender Kausalketten durch eine dispositionale Zusatzbedingung gelöst werden könne, die zusammen mit KB hinreichende Be-

dingungen für die Stützungsbeziehung angibt. Sie lautet grob folgendermaßen:

(DB) Ü ist die Manifestation einer mentalen Disposition des Subjekts, auf M-artige Zustände hin Ü-artige Zustände auszubilden oder aufrechtzuerhalten.

Ich werde die Frage untersuchen, ob die kausale Theorie durch DB gerettet werden kann, oder ob sie von ihr vielmehr geschwächt wird. Ich argumentiere, dass DB abweichende Kausalketten erfolgreich ausschließt: *Wenn* eine kausale Theorie überhaupt angemessen ist, dann muss sie daher DB an Bord nehmen.

Jedoch lässt sich unter Bezugnahme auf DB letztlich KB in Zweifel ziehen und für eine *rein* dispositionale Theorie argumentieren, die auf KB verzichtet. Wie gesagt wird für KB angeführt, es liefere die beste Erklärung unsere Intuition über die Stützungsbeziehung. Es zeigt sich jedoch, dass DB diese Intuition ebenso gut erklärt, so dass KB überflüssig wird. Außerdem wird KB durch DB *nicht impliziert*. Beide Thesen untermauere ich durch einen Vergleich mit der Rolle von Dispositionen in der Tugendkenntnistheorie und mithilfe eines Beispiels, in dem die epistemische Stützungsbeziehung vorliegt, obgleich nur DB, jedoch nicht KB, zutrifft. KB erweist sich damit nicht nur als überflüssig, sondern auch als extensional unzutreffend.

Ich komme daher zu dem Schluss, dass der Versuch, die kausale Theorie durch eine dispositionale Zusatzbedingung zu retten, unbeabsichtigter Weise den kausalen Ansatz als solchen in Frage stellt. Daraus folgt, dass eine *rein* dispositionale Theorie vorzuziehen ist.

4

Mantzavinos

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 11.15 Uhr, 15/133
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 11:15 a.m., 15/133

Explanatory Progress

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The traditional philosophical theory of explanation has focussed on answering the »what is an explanation« question and on developing normative models of an ideal successful explanation; explanatory progress was implicitly deemed possible insofar as the real-world explanations approached the ideal model. In the recent literature an alternative view of explanatory pluralism has been suggested and conceptualized further in terms of explanatory games (Mantzavinos, »Explanatory Games«, *The Journal of Philosophy*, 2013). The main idea there is that explanatory activities take place in a social context of a game and unfold according to explanatory rules that are of four types: 1) constitutive rules, 2) rules of representation, 3) rules of inference and 4) rules of scope. Following this useful framework the focus of this paper is on the *evaluation* of the rules of explanatory games and on a suggestion of a *procedural, multidimensional view* as the appropriate normative stance. The rules of the explanatory game are quite literally created in some participatory process of discussion, criticism, and persuasion. Good explanations are those that have emerged because good rules have been followed, and working out the criteria of their goodness is not a once-for-all matter, but rather a continuous enterprise taking place with the participation of different participants in the explanatory games and philosophers alike.

The plurality of rules and the plurality of values allow for a *multi-dimensional evaluation*, where different sets of rules can be evaluated with respect to different values. Two kinds of explanatory progress are distinguished and discussed: *local explanatory progress* takes place within the premises of one explanatory game and *global explanatory progress* takes place across different explanatory games. The claims are substantiated with the help of two case studies, one from Economics focusing on economic explanations of the value of commodities and one from Medicine focusing on the functioning of the heart and the circulation of the blood, i.e., the way the cardiovascular system works. These case studies illustrate from very different angles the main message of the paper: *how explanatory progress is possible, even within the premises of a pluralistic account*.

5

Marchi

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 9.45 Uhr, 15/131
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 9:45 a.m., 15/131

Cognitive Penetration and Emotion Recognition

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Do our background beliefs, desires, and mental images influence our perceptual experience of other's emotions? In this paper, I will address the possibility of cognitive penetration of perceptual experience in the domain of social cognition. In particular, I focus on emotion recognition on the basis of visual experience of facial expressions. First I review examples, of perceptual adaptation for facial expressions of emotion. This evidence supports the idea that facial expressions are perceptually processed as wholes. That is, the perceptual system integrates lower-level facial features, such as eyebrow orientation, mouth angle etc., into facial compounds. Afterwards I present additional experimental evidence showing that, in some cases, emotion recognition on the basis of facial expression is sensitive to background knowledge of the subject. I argue that such sensitivity is constrained in a principled way that is best explained as a difference in the visual experience of the facial expression and not as a modification of the judgment based on this experience. The difference in experience is characterized as the result of the interference of background knowledge with the perceptual integration process for faces. Thus, according to the best explanation, we have to accept cognitive penetration in some cases of emotion recognition.

5

Matthiesen

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 16.00 Uhr, 15/115
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 4:00 p.m., 15/115

**Perspektivische Wahrnehmung,
Repräsentationalismus und die *Geometry of Visibles***

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Unsere Wahrnehmung, insbesondere das Sehen, enthält ein perspektivisches Element: Das *Aussehen* der Dinge ändert sich, wenn wir sie von verschiedenen Orten aus betrachten. Runde Oberflächen können elliptisch erscheinen, eine rechteckige Tischplatte bald als Trapez, bald als Parallelogramm.

Gleichzeitig verfügt unsere Wahrnehmung klarer Weise auch über ein nicht-perspektivisches Element: Eine rechteckige Tischplatte scheint, wenn wir um den Tisch herumgehen von gleichbleibender Größe, Gestalt und Position zu sein. Wir weisen dem Tisch nicht die Eigenschaft zu bald größer, bald kleiner, bald ein Parallelogramm und bald ein Trapez zu sein.

Sind wir an einer umfassenden Beschreibung des Charakters visueller Wahrnehmung interessiert, müssen wir beide Elemente – Perspektivität und Konstanz – erklären, die, zumindest oberflächlich betrachtet, in einem Spannungsverhältnis stehen:

1. (PERSPEKTIVITÄT) Aus unterschiedlichen Perspektiven betrachtet, erscheinen die Dinge unterschiedlich.
2. (KONSTANZ): Auch aus unterschiedlichen Perspektiven betrachtet, erscheinen die Dinge unverändert.

In meinem Vortrag diskutiere ich verschiedene Wege, mit dem augenscheinlich bestehenden Widerspruch umzugehen und plädiere dafür, dass wir ihn am besten auflösen können, indem wir zwei Sinne von *Erscheinen* einführen, einen perspektivischen (»die Tischplatte erscheint trapezförmig«) und einen nicht-perspektivischen, kognitiven (»die Tischplatte scheint rechteckig zu sein«).

Visuelle Wahrnehmung hat damit einen Doppelcharakter. Will man diesen im Rahmen einer repräsentationalistischen Theorie des Wahrnehmungsgehalts – derzufolge Wahrnehmungen dadurch fundamental bestimmt sind, dass sie die Welt als so-oder-so-seiend repräsentieren – beschreiben, so hat man einerseits die Möglichkeit, den perspektivischen Aspekt als bloß qualitativ und nicht-repräsentational zu konzeptualisieren. Ich plädiere hingegen dafür, sowohl den nicht-perspektivischen als auch den perspektivischen Wahrnehmungsgehalt als Repräsentation geistunabhängiger Eigenschaften der gesehenen Dinge zu begreifen. Die trapezförmige Erscheinung einer rechteckigen Tischplatte wird somit als Repräsentation einer nicht-mental aber beobachtungspunktrelativen Eigenschaft des Tisches beschrieben.

Ich schlage schließlich vor, zur Entwicklung einer Theorie dieser perspektivischen Eigenschaften auf Thomas Reids *Geometry of Visibles* zurückzugreifen, der zufolge die geometrischen Eigenschaften von Visible Figures – auch bei Reid werden diese als geistunabhängige relationale Eigenschaften aufgefasst – denen von Projektionen der Körperrumisse auf die Innenseite einer Kugel mit dem Beobachtungspunkt im Zentrum entsprechen.

S

Mattner

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 9.00 Uhr, 15/E28
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 9:00 a.m., 15/E28

Selbst

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Wie ist die Entität beschaffen, auf die Menschen sich mit »ich« beziehen – wenn sie überhaupt *ist*? Diese Frage wird unter dem Thema *Selbst* gegenwärtig kontrovers diskutiert. Der Begriff *Selbst* wird dabei vielerorts als Variable verwendet, die Konzepte wie *Subjekt* und *Person* umfasst. Neben erfahrungsbezogenen und sozialen Aspekten ist insbesondere der ontologische Status des Selbst umstritten. Das Spektrum reicht hier von solchen Theorien, die das Selbst zu einer Fiktion erklären, bis zu narrativen Theorien wie der P. Ricoeurs, die das Selbst als eine narrative Struktur fassen, die durch die Herstellung von Kontinuität und Kohärenz personale Identität ermöglicht. Während letztere Theorierichtung die Existenz des Selbst ontologisch oft nicht durchsichtig zu begründen vermag, neigen Theorien, die das Selbst als Illusion verstehen, dazu, die vermeintliche Selbstverständlichkeit des Phänomens zu übergehen.

In diesem Vortrag soll beleuchtet werden, wie der ontologische Status des *Selbst* bestimmt werden kann. Dazu ziehe ich in einem ersten Schritt die Theorie des *minimalen Subjekts* von G. Strawson heran und vollziehe nach, wie er von der Existenz von Erfahrung auf die Existenz von Erfahrungssubjekten schließt. Ich untersuche dann Theorien, die einen breiteren Subjektbegriff zugrunde legen und erwäge, ob und wie sich die Ontologie Strawsons auf diese übertragen ließe. Die Einheit von Subjekten wird hier unter der Frage nach personaler Identität verhandelt und es wird diskutiert, inwiefern Kausalitätsprofile und die Verwendung des deiktischen Ausdrucks *Ich* als Identitätskriterien fungieren können. Mit der sozialen Relevanz, die das Konzept *Selbst* hinsichtlich der Motivierung von Handlungen, der Zuschreibung von Verantwortung und der Bewältigung von Kontingenz hat, sollen Argumente gegen die Elimination des Konzepts als Fiktion angeführt werden. Abschließend resümiere ich, wie sich der Existenzstatus eines narrativ verstandenen *Selbst* ontologisch plausibel vertreten lässt.

2

Mayr

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 9.45 Uhr, 15/105
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 9:45 a.m., 15/105

The Individuation of Processes

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In recent years, philosophers have become increasingly interested in the ontology of ongoing processes (which are usually taken to be described by using verbs in the continuous-imperfective form in English), as contrasted to completed events (which are taken to be described by verbs in the perfective form). However, ongoing pro-

cesses seem to raise specific problems with regard to individuation and quantification, and though we have some grounds for thinking we can quantify over them, it remains unclear how particular processes are meant to be individuated.

In this talk, I will first briefly present the *prima facie* case for why we should accept quantification over incomplete processes (which is a reapplication of Davidson's influential argument for the case of events). I will then go on to present one main problem for this view which arises from a currently widely held view of processes, according to which noun-phrases which refer to processes do not function like count-nouns, but like mass-nouns (such as ›gold‹ or ›water‹). On this view, we can individuate particular processes only by delimiting (temporally or spatially) stretches of activity. I argue that this proposal is unsatisfactory for processes described by telic verbs, since it would, in crucial respects, lead to counter-intuitive results. I conclude by proposing a different way of how particular processes described by telic verbs are individuated, which is based on the fact that the directedness of these processes towards a certain end provides them with an internal structure which processes described by using a-telic verbs lack.

8

McGuigan

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 10.30 Uhr, 15/105
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 10:30 a.m., 15/105

A Problem with Abstraction in Understanding the Effect of Morals on Aesthetic Value

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I argue that aestheticians should refrain from using fantastical examples in order to discover whether the morals expressed by artworks can affect their aesthetic value, on the grounds that our intuitions are unreliable when considering such far-fetched cases. This brings into question one common argument for establishing a correlation between the morals expressed by an artwork and that work's aesthetic value.

This argument is made, for instance, by Noël Carroll, who asks us to imagine ›Saviour‹, a painting that depicts the death of Hitler as a tragedy on a par with the crucifixion of Jesus (›Ethics and Aesthetics‹ (BJA 46/1, 2006)). It is clear, Carroll says, that the painting is artistically deficient because of this morally abhorrent suggestion. I argue *contra* Carroll that this is not at all clear. There are real examples of artworks with abhorrent morals, and our reactions to these artworks are not what Carroll predicts. Gauguin's *Te Tamari No Atua* (1896), for instance, is morally repellent for, most notably, its paedophilia. However, although critics discuss this, and criticise Gauguin for it, there is no suggestion that the *painting* is any worse for it.

The fact that our judgement in the real-world case differs from our judgement in the fantastical case suggests that our judgements concerning either real-world or fantastical artworks are not reliable. I argue that our intuitions regarding real-world cases are fairly reliable, because the community of art criticism ›keeps us honest‹ by allowing judgements to mature through discussion and reflection. If this is so, it must be our intuitions in hypothetical cases that are at fault.

We could be more modest in our imagining: instead of imagining a totally new work like ›Saviour‹, we could imagine moral changes to existing works, and inquire into whether our aesthetic judgements change correspondingly. I argue, though, that such a large change to a work as its morals would also substantially change it in non-moral ways such that it would never be possible to tell, when imagining these hypothetical versions of the artwork, whether our aesthetic judgements differed because of the moral or corresponding non-moral changes.

11

Meliopoulos

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 15.15 Uhr, 15/113
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 3:15 p.m., 15/113

Das Maß aller Dinge

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Bestimmte Philosophen, unter ihnen Héctor Wittwer und David Copp, haben argumentiert, dass die weit verbreitete Vorstellung, wonach moralischen Gründen normativer Vorrang gegenüber anderen Arten von Gründen zukommt, zu verwerfen ist. Dies liegt ihnen zufolge daran, dass keiner der Standpunkte, von denen aus man praktische Gründe nach ihrem normativen Gewicht ordnen könnte, neutral ist. Ich werde dafür argumentieren, dass (a) die Kriterien dafür, ob eine Person über genuine moralische Überzeugungen verfügt, es nicht zulassen, dass diese Person gleichzeitig Gründe nichtmoralischer Art als normativ prioritär gegenüber dem ansieht, was sie als ihre moralische Pflicht betrachtet und (b) dementsprechend Verhaltensmaßstäbe, die über ähnliche Charakteristika aufweisen – etwa Vernünftigkeit, Rationalität oder Höflichkeit – nicht gleichzeitig mit der Moral von einer Person adaptiert werden können, wenn sie mit moralischen Pflichten in Konflikt stehen. Die ursprüngliche Frage, welche Gründe alles in allem betrachtet normative Priorität haben, wird damit nicht direkt beantwortet, sondern es wird gezeigt, dass respektive inwiefern die Frage obsolet ist. Ich versuche zu zeigen, dass die oben genannten Kriterien dafür, dass eine Person über genuine moralische Überzeugungen verfügt, auf ein Charakteristikum der Moral zurückzuführen sind, das gelegentlich als ›Praktikalität‹ bezeichnet wird: Die Praktikalität der Moral besteht darin, dass man, wenn man etwas für moralisch geboten hält, weitgehend in Übereinstimmung mit dieser Forderung handelt und andernfalls emotionale oder motivationale Reaktionen (wie Scham und Reue) an den Tag legt, die es legitimieren davon zu sprechen, dass man *willensschwach* respektive entgegen seinem besten Urteil gehandelt hat. Zuletzt versuchen ich drei Einwände zu widerlegen, die gegen die oben skizzierte Position erhoben werden können: (1) den Einwand, dass die Zuschreibung von moralischen Urteilen nicht semantisch impliziert, sondern bestenfalls (im Grice'schen Sinn) ›konversationell impliziert‹, dass die oder der Urteilende über eine motivational-emotionale Disposition der weiter oben beschriebenen Art verfügt, (2) den Einwand, dass Praktikalität in einem Spannungsverhältnis zur angeblichen Nichtsubjektivität moralischer Maßstäbe und der davon abgeleiteten Urteile steht, (3) den Einwand, dass, obwohl der Besitz einer bestimmten emotional-motivationalen Disposition tatsächlich notwendig für den Besitz moralischer Überzeu-

gungen ist, diese Disposition weniger umfasst als ich behaupte (nämlich nur *Bedauern* oder *Unbehagen*, aber kein *Bereuen*).

11

Menges

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 9.00 Uhr, 15/113
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 9:00 a.m., 15/113

How Blameworthiness Requires Wrongness

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It is widely assumed that there are three independently necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of moral blameworthiness: an agent must fulfil a control condition, a knowledge condition and an objectionability condition for its being appropriate to blame her. Typically, theories of blameworthiness focus on the control, the epistemic condition, or both. The objectionability condition is rarely in the focus of philosophical attention. One possible reason for this is that there is a seemingly obvious account of it, namely that it is only appropriate to morally blame an agent if she committed a moral wrongdoing. It has recently been argued, however, that this is false. In my talk, I will defend the thesis that blameworthiness requires wrongness against two prominent objections. The first is that this thesis is incompatible with its being possible that it is appropriate to blame an agent who did the right thing for the wrong reason. The second is that the thesis is incompatible with its being possible that it is appropriate to blame an agent for certain character traits or stances even though it is not wrong to have these character traits or stances.

4

Menke

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 15.15 Uhr, 15/134
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 3:15 p.m., 15/134

Das Innovationsproblem: Kuhn'sche und pragmatistische Lösungsansätze

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Das Problem, zu erklären, was Forscher dazu bringt, eine neue, wenig ausgereifte Theorie gegenüber einer artikulierten den Vorzug zu geben, ist nicht neu; Larry und Rachel Laudan (1989) haben es treffend als »Innovationsproblem« bezeichnet.

Thomas Kuhn hat in dem klassischen Aufsatz *Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice* (1977) aufgrund dieses Problems argumentiert, nur eine Auffassung der Kriterien der Theoriewahl »not as rules, which determine choice, but as values, which influence it«, könne dieses Problem lösen. Ziel des Vortrags ist zu zeigen, daß Kuhns Lösung das Innovationsproblems nicht wirklich befriedigend löst (1); Adäquatheitskriterien zu formulieren, die eine Lösung erfüllen sollte (2); schließlich, das Potential eines »pragmatistischen« Lösungsansatzes einzuschätzen (3).

(1) Kuhns Lösung in *Objectivity* ist nicht die einzig denkbare – er selbst vertritt in *The Structure of Scientific*

Revolutions (1962) eine andere, frühere Lösung. Die Lösung ist also nicht notwendig – sie ist aber auch nicht hinreichend, da ihre Erklärungskraft begrenzt ist (ebenso wie die der frühen Lösung in *Structure*).

(2) Das Innovationsproblem erweist sich bei näherem Hinsehen als ein Spezialfall eines allgemeineren Problems, das die Wahl zwischen Theorien allgemein betrifft, nicht nur die zwischen »artikulierten« und »nicht-artikulierten«: dem der Abwägung zwischen den *erwiesenen Erfolgen* einer Theorie und deren *Potential*. Dieses Problem ist ungelöst – aber eine Lösung des Innovationsproblems sollte sich auf diese allgemeinere Schwierigkeit übertragen lassen. Weder das späte noch das frühe Modell Kuhns leisten dies.

(3) Ein alternativer, pragmatistischer Ansatz knüpft die Beurteilung des Potentials einer Theorie an deren Erfolge in Abhängigkeit von den aufgewandten Forschungsressourcen. Ein Vorzug ist, daß dieser Ansatz dem Raisonement von Forschern gerecht wird; ein weiterer, daß er nicht nur das Innovationsproblem löst, sondern allgemein anwendbar ist. Dem steht die Schwierigkeit gegenüber, daß er – jedenfalls auf den ersten Blick – zu einem Relativismus führt: Die Erfolglosigkeit einer Theorie könnte stets darauf zurückgeführt werden, daß zuwenig Mittel zu ihrer Entwicklung aufgewandt worden seien. Es soll gezeigt werden, daß ein pragmatistischer Ansatz nicht zwingend mit einem Relativismus verbunden ist.

11

Messerli

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 10.30 Uhr, 15/113
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 10:30 a.m., 15/113

Unvergleichbarkeit und Rationalität

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Wir sind grundsätzlich daran interessiert, richtige Entscheidungen zu fällen und damit eine rationale Wahl zu treffen. Das jedoch ist nicht immer ganz einfach. Es lassen sich unterschiedliche Erklärungen dafür anführen, warum derartige Entscheidungen ein Problem darstellen. In meiner Dissertation nehme ich eine relevante Erklärung genauer in den Blick. Es ist die Behauptung, dass rationale Entscheidungen manchmal nicht nur schwierig, sondern unmöglich sind. Dies ist genau dann der Fall, wenn die Optionen, zwischen denen wir wählen müssen, unvergleichbar sind – das heisst, wenn zwischen den Handlungsoptionen keine der drei Vergleichsrelationen »ist besser als«, »ist schlechter als« oder »ist gleich gut wie« besteht. »x ist besser als y«, »y ist besser als x« und »x ist gleich gut wie y« bedeutet im Rahmen moderner Entscheidungstheorien, dass ein Akteur x gegenüber y vorzieht, y gegenüber x vorzieht respektive indifferent zwischen x und y ist. Moderne Entscheidungsmodelle, wie beispielsweise die (rationale) mikroökonomische Präferenztheorie, gehen dabei davon aus, dass in Entscheidungssituationen jeweils genau eine dieser drei Vergleichsrelationen gegeben ist.

Dies jedoch scheint nicht immer der Fall. Wir machen in unserem Alltag die Erfahrung, dass wir Optionen manchmal nicht als besser, schlechter oder gleich gut bewerten können. Dies betrifft unwichtige Entscheidungen wie beispielsweise die Wahl, welches Dessert man im Restaurant bestellt, und es betrifft wichtige Entscheidungen, die ihrerseits eine Vielzahl von Optionen öffnen

oder schliessen, wie etwa die Wahl, welchen Beruf man ausüben möchte. Im geplanten Vortrag würde ich mich auf drei Fragen beschränken: (1) Wie kann Unvergleichbarkeit verstanden werden? (2) Welche Argumente sprechen für Unvergleichbarkeit? (3) Worin besteht genau das Problem für die Rationalität von Entscheidungen? Meine These ist, dass Unvergleichbarkeit primär auf Wert-Konflikte zurückgeführt werden kann und mögliche Kontra-Argumente, wie z.B. der Verweis auf einen so genannten ›revealed preference-Ansatz‹, nicht überzeugen können. Bezüglich der dritten Frage würde es darum gehen, das Problem adäquat zu charakterisieren.

4

Meyer

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 14.15 Uhr, 15/133
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 2:15 p.m., 15/133

Schließt der kausale Interventionismus eine kausale Wirksamkeit des Mentalen aus?

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Der kausale Interventionismus vertritt die Auffassung, dass das Phänomen der Kausalität analysiert werden müsse über das des handelnden Hervorbringens. Demnach würde ein Ereignis *a* Ursache eines anderen Ereignisses *b* sein genau dann, wenn man *b* hervorbringen könnte, indem man *a* handelnd hervorbringt. Neben den Einwänden, die nun generell gegen diese Kausalitätsauffassung vorgebracht werden, lässt sich fragen, ob dieses Verständnis von Kausalität in anderen Bereichen der Philosophie, in denen Kausalität eine Rolle spielt, auf bestimmte Positionen festlegt. Insbesondere die Debatte um mentale Verursachung wirft diese Frage auf, da gerade mentale Verursachung als Erklärungstyp menschlichen Handelns verstanden wird. Demnach lässt sich fragen, ob der interventionistische Begriff der Kausalität mentale Verursachung zulässt oder vielleicht ausschließt. In dem Vortrag soll diese Frage thematisiert und die These vertreten werden, dass eine akteursbasierte Kausalitätstheorie eine kausale Wirksamkeit des Mentalen ausschließt.

Letzteres lässt sich aus folgender Überlegung motivieren: Wenn ein Ereignis *a* dann ein Ereignis *b* verursacht, wenn man *b* durch Hervorbringen von *a* erreichen könnte, dann müsste dies, auf mentale Verursachung angewandt, bedeuten, dass der mentale Zustand *f* die Handlung *d* dann verursacht, wenn man *d* durch das Hervorbringen von *f* erreichen könnte. Da nun aber das Hervorbringen von *f* selbst gemäß der interventionistischen Theorie eine Handlung ist, die der Theorie mentaler Verursachung gemäß wiederum mental verursacht sein muss, würde sich hieraus ein infinites Regress ergeben. Damit scheint eine interventionistische Kausalitätsauffassung mentale Verursachung auszuschließen. Dabei kann offenbleiben, ob man (i) an der These mentaler Verursachung festhält und die Kausalitätsauffassung ändert, (ii) mentale Verursachung aufgibt, oder aber (iii) über einen Pluralismus in der Kausalitätsauffassung eine Kompatibilität beider Positionen erreicht.

5

Michel

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 14.15 Uhr, 15/115
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 2:15 p.m., 15/115

Attitudes and Norms of Rationality

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Two concepts have been at the heart of our behavioral sciences and their understanding of our mind in reasoning, deciding and acting: rationality and attitudes. These fundamental concepts of analysis have always been seen as being closely linked. However, developments of our understanding of human rationality and reasoning during the last decades have yet failed to make a deep impact upon how to model our building bricks for mental explanations: beliefs and preferences. In this talk I shall consider implications of pluralism in the theory of rationality for attitude-theory and for the idea that attitudes are subject to rationality constraints. If, as I am going to argue, context-sensitivity holds as a meta-norm for rationality, this entails a demand for context-sensitivity also on the level of attitudes. This demand creates tensions with the naïve internalist realism in the representationalist, functionalist and dispositionalist orthodoxies that have been dominating in the philosophy of mind. It appears that context-sensitivity creates a pressure to take constructionism more seriously in the metaphysics of propositional attitudes.

5

Michels

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 11.15 Uhr, 15/115
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 11:15 a.m., 15/115

One-Dimensional versus Two-Dimensional Zombies

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One of the most influential arguments against materialism is Chalmers's Zombie argument. (See Chalmers (2009).) The Zombie argument belongs to the family of conceivability arguments, which means that it involves an inference from conceivability to metaphysical possibility. In classical conceivability arguments, the inference from conceivability to metaphysical possibility involves two premises (See e.g. Gendler and Hawthorne (2002)):

1. *p* is conceivable.

2. If *p* is conceivable, *p* is metaphysically possible.

Classical conceivability arguments are nowadays widely rejected, since philosophers take great care to distinguish epistemological categories such as conceivability from metaphysical categories such as (metaphysical) possibility. (See Kripke (1980).) Two-dimensional conceivability arguments like the Zombie argument promise to bridge the gap between the epistemic and the metaphysical by exploiting the framework of two-dimensional semantics and in particular the two notions of 1- and 2-possibility. The crucial inference in these arguments consists of the following three premises:

1'. *p* is conceivable.

2'. If p is conceivable, p is 1-possible.

3'. If p is 1-possible, p is 2-possible.

Criticisms of the Zombie argument are usually based on objections to its premises. In this talk, I pursue a different approach to criticising the argument. Based on an analysis of the metaphysical and semantical assumptions underlying the inference from 1- to 2-possibility and on general considerations about how one argument can improve on another, I will argue that two-dimensional conceivability arguments do not genuinely improve on their classical counterparts. This suggests that ›going two-dimensional‹ is of limited use to opponents of materialism.

References

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12

Mildenberger

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 13.30 Uhr, 11/211
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 1:30 p.m., 11/211

Externalities and Market Exchange

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This essay explores some aspects of the ethics of externalities, and notably the relation of externalities and market exchanges. I examine whether free market exchanges that contribute to externalities should be regulated. Should the state interfere with free market exchanges which further air pollution or global warming? Should we hold that a just exchange not only has to be non-deceptive, non-coercive, non-exploitative, and so on, but also ›nonexternality-creating‹? These questions have received surprisingly little attention given the fact that the question of how we should evaluate ›collective‹ or ›public‹ harms such as global warming is in the focus of attention.

I take it that state interference with market exchanges contributing to externalities would be appropriate if and only if such exchanges are instances of wrongful harming. I find that although causing externalities is a case of wrongful harming, and although market exchanges are linked to the emergence of externalities, the state should not regulate market exchanges in light of externalities. This is because market exchanges might be said to contribute to the emergence of externalities, but they do not cause them. Put differently, I defend the idea that the state should intervene in order to combat externalities, but that this does not mean that it should intervene with free market exchanges.

My argument proceeds in three steps. First, I introduce the economic concept of an externality. Second, I argue that we can conceive of causing externalities as a case of wrongful harming. While causing flow externalities is a straightforward case of causing wrongful harm, stock externalities raise more complex moral issues in this regard. Third, I analyze in what way exactly market exchanges contribute to the emergence of externalities. I highlight that market exchanges do not cause exter-

nalities but only enable their emergence. Because of this, we are able to effectively prevent externalities by regulating free market exchanges, but it seems like we would also be aiming at the wrong target; that we would be ›blaming‹ the wrong suspect, so to speak.

1

Milne-Plückebaum

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 10.30 Uhr, 11/215
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 10:30 a.m., 11/215

Where Does the Actually Existent Golden Mountain Actually Exist?

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Meinongians, who claim that some objects don't exist, but nevertheless in some sense have the properties they're characterised as having, are experts in defending their view against alleged counterexamples. They've dealt with round squares, vaguely identical objects and existent golden mountains. Modal Meinongians welcome these objects within a plurality of (nonexistent) worlds. Specifically, they claim that actually nonexistent objects have the properties they're characterised as having, but only in certain worlds, which needn't include the actual one. The existent golden mountain, for example, just is golden, a mountain and existent, but only in certain worlds, namely those that realise the situation about the object envisaged, among which the actual world isn't to be found. Yet a new allegedly untameable object is ready to cause trouble: the actually existent golden mountain. In which world(s) does it have the properties it's characterised as having? Clearly not in the actual world. But neither in any nonactual world(s), possible or impossible, or so I argue in this paper. Problematically, then, there's no place for this troublemaker within the Modal Meinongian's plurality of worlds. Yet I argue further that the Modal Meinongian must merely expand the logical (and illogical) space into a plurality of pluralities of worlds, which the actually existent golden mountain can happily inhabit. Specifically, I claim that the actually existent golden mountain is actually golden, actually a mountain and actually existent, but only in certain pluralities of worlds, namely those that realise the situation about the object (and world) envisaged, among which the actual plurality isn't to be found. This Extended Modal Meinongianism introduces objects that are hardly tameable beasts—but tameable nonetheless, at least until the Modal Meinongian's imagination fails to handle them.

5

Moore

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 10.30 Uhr, 15/115
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 10:30 a.m., 15/115

Is Gricean Communication a Form of Joint Action?

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A widely accepted view of Gricean communication is that it is intrinsically a species of joint action (Tomasello, 2008; Jankovic, 2013). According to this Cooperative Communication View, intentional communication is possible only because speaker and hearer work collaboratively to realise a state in which H understands S's communicative goal.

For the purposes of this paper, there are two significant implications of the Cooperative Communication View. The first is that prior to the emergence of Gricean communication in human phylogeny, our hominin ancestors would have needed to develop the cooperative motivations that Gricean communication is thought to suppose. The second is that, since Gricean communication presupposes forms of joint action, we could not appeal to Gricean communication to explain the emergence of these forms of joint actions our evolutionary history. This is problematic if we think that human forms of cooperation have their source in our capacity to use language to negotiate and coordinate (Habermas).

The goal of this paper will be to show that the Cooperative Communication View is false. I will argue that human communication is not *necessarily* a form of joint action in the way that Tomasello and Jankovic—and perhaps also Grice—suppose, even though it is *often* a form of joint action. That's because, I will argue, the need for cooperative coordination arises only where there is a significant 'pragmatic gap' between what a speaker says, and what she means to communicate by uttering. While Gricean communication often features such a gap, it does not do so necessarily. As a result there could be forms of Gricean communication that do not require speaker and hearer to work together to recover the speaker's message. These forms could themselves be used to structure collaborative acts, and to facilitate the emergence of joint action in phylogeny.

2

Morato

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 15.15 Uhr, 15/E27
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 3:15 p.m., 15/E27

**Is there any Epistemic Constraint
on Metaphysical Necessities?**

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In case one believes that there are different kinds of necessity, one probably also believes that some kind of necessity is stronger than another. In order to prove that a kind of necessity X is stronger than another kind Y, one has to prove that X-necessities and Y-necessities are not

equivalent in a particular way, namely that every X-necessity is also a Y-necessity and that there are some Y-necessities that are X-contingencies. If one believes that there are metaphysical and epistemic kinds of necessity and that metaphysical necessity is a stronger kind than epistemic necessity, one has thus to prove that every metaphysical necessity is also an epistemic necessity and that there exist some epistemic necessities that are metaphysically contingent. But if one claims that P is epistemically necessary (for an agent A) just in case what A knows (a priori or a posteriori) is sufficient to rule out non-P, then, while proving the apparently plausible claim that what is metaphysically necessary is stronger than what is epistemically necessary for an agent, one has also proved that there is, after all, an 'epistemic constraint' on metaphysical necessities, namely that what is metaphysically necessary is something whose negation an agent is always in condition to rule out. This thesis appears to be problematic, at least for us living in a post-Kripkean age, where the independence of epistemic and metaphysical notions is a dogma. The irony is that two views defended in 'Naming and Necessity', one about the relation between essentialist claims and conceivability claims, the other about the existence of contingent a priori truths, constitute, de facto, an argument for the claim that metaphysical necessities are of a stronger kind than epistemic necessities and, therefore, constitute, de facto, an argument that connects metaphysical necessities with a certain 'epistemic profile'. In my talk, I will try to disentangle this situation by evaluating the consequences of these three moves: (i) changing the definition of 'epistemic necessity' (ii) changing the relations between conceivability claims and epistemic possibilities and (iii) changing the relation between conceivability claims and essentialist theses. Finally, I will also consider the consequences of viewing metaphysical and epistemic necessities as incommensurable kinds of necessity.

9

Muders

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 16.00 Uhr, 11/215
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 4:00 p.m., 11/215

Menschenwürde: intrinsisch, inhärent, absolut?

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Würde wird sowohl in der Rechtsprechung wie auch der philosophischen Diskussion häufig als ein Wert porträtiert, der primär Menschen (und ggf. anderen personenhaften Lebensformen) zukommt. Diesem werden häufig wenigstens drei verschiedene Eigenschaften zugewiesen. In philosophischer Terminologie werden diese Merkmale von Menschenwürde – gleich ob sie innerhalb einer Wert-, Status- oder Rechtskonzeption von Menschenwürde verhandelt werden – häufig unter die Stichworte 'inhärent', 'intrinsisch' und 'absolut' gefasst.

Der vorliegende Beitrag stellt sich *einmal* die Aufgabe, unter Rückgriff auf die allgemeine Werttheorie hinreichend geschärfte Fassungen für die Verwendung dieser drei Begriffe in Verbindung mit dem Menschenwürdebegriff zu geben. Darunter fällt auch die Prüfung, inwieweit sich aus einer Wertqualifizierung eine andere ergeben kann: Sind alle intrinsisch wertvollen Dinge bereits begrifflich auch inhärent wertvoll? Da diese Prüfung negativ ausfällt und sich keine Zusammen-

hänge auf begrifflicher Ebene ergeben – etwas kann also absolut wertvoll sein, ohne gleichzeitig intrinsisch oder inhärent wertvoll sein zu müssen, und so für die übrigen Konstellationen – werde ich in einem *zweiten Schritt* ergründen, welche Beschaffenheit eine Wertkonzeption von Menschenwürde aufweisen muss, um alle drei der genannten Werteigenschaften plausiblerweise in sich vereinigen zu können.

Der erste Schritt macht die Offenlegung des eigenen Verständnis derjenigen Eigenschaften erforderlich, die mit »intrinsisch«, »absolut« und »inhärent« bezeichnet werden. Ich schlage vor, die ersten beiden Merkmale unter die Gruppe der *normativen* Eigenschaften zu fassen, die Würde als Wert auszeichnet. Darunter verstehe ich Eigenschaften, die die Normen betreffen, die aus diesem Wert gewonnen werden können und häufig die Gestalt von Gründen haben. Das letzte Merkmal fällt demgegenüber unter die Gruppe seiner *ontologischen* Eigenschaften.

Im zweiten Teil des Beitrags möchte ich eine Form von Wertkonzeption der Würde vorstellen, mit deren Hilfe Menschenwürde alle drei Merkmale zugeschrieben werden können. Im Ergebnis erscheint es am vielversprechendsten, Menschenwürde als Wert der spezifisch menschlichen Form der Selbstorganisation zu verstehen, die das (objektiv verstandene) Wohlergehen der dadurch konstituierten Lebensform wesentlich prägt.

6

Müller, Andreas

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 10.30 Uhr, 11/213
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 10:30 a.m., 11/213

**Reasons-Factualism and
Rationality without Reasons**

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Factualism about reasons-had, the thesis that the reasons one has must be facts (or true propositions), has recently gained popularity both in debates about practical reasons, as well as in epistemology. Here, I will only be concerned with factualism about epistemic reasons. Williamson (2000) is probably the most widely known defense of this thesis. Williamson also defends a particularly strong version of factualism, he claims that one's evidence, that is one's reason for believing, consists only of propositions one knows. My arguments are not merely meant as a defense of factualism. They should also put pressure on all internalists who hold that one's evidence consists of one's mental states, whether they are factual or not.

Comesaña&McGrath (2014) argue against reasons-factualism by using links between reasons and rationality. Their key assumption is that in order to be rational, one must have reasons. But there are many cases in which one can be rational despite having a false belief. Since reasons-factualism cannot account for the reasons-had in these cases, reasons factualism is false.

In order to deal with this issue, I want to explore a seemingly radical proposal: one can be rational without having reasons. I will argue that this proposal is not as radical as it might appear. The key idea to be exploited is a distinction between reasons and rationalizing considerations. I shall argue that these two need not be identical, they just need to be appropriately related. I shall argue that reasons should be identified with facts,

while rationalizing considerations should be identified with mental input states for mental dispositions.

This proposal allows for some elegant solutions to debates about internalism and externalism in epistemology and thus should not only be of interest to those who endorse reasons-factualism.

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10

Müller, Andreas

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 16.00 Uhr, 11/115
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 4:00 p.m., 11/115

How Does Consent Work?

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By consenting to an agent's action, we can change its moral status and turn an action that is morally wrong into a permissible one. For example, consent can make the difference between visiting someone's home and trespassing, between battery and surgery, and between rape and sex. While it is uncontroversial that consent often plays this crucial role, it also gives rise to a number of questions, e.g. concerning its scope or the conditions for its validity. Perhaps most fundamentally, however, it might seem puzzling or even »magical« that the mere utterance of a few words suffices to morally transform an action in that way. Why, one might ask, is consent relevant at all? How does it change the moral status of an action? How, in other words, does consent work?

In my talk, I will distinguish a number of possible answers to this question and discuss their respective merits. In particular, I will argue that what explains the significance of consent is not that consent is a feature which counts in favour of an action, nor that lack of consent is a feature which counts against it. I also reject a proposal according to which consent grants an »exclusionary permission« to ignore the wrong-making feature(s) of the action. Instead, I suggest that consent serves as what J. Dancy calls a »disabler«: it undermines the moral relevance of certain features that would otherwise count against the action and make it wrong. This provides the best account of how consent affects the moral status of actions and can thus serve as a foundation for a more comprehensive theory of consent.

5

Müller, Jean Moritz

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 11:15 Uhr, 15/131
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 11:15 a.m., 15/131

How to Think of Emotions as Evaluative Modes

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It is currently popular to hold that emotions apprehend value properties. This view—which I call the »epistemic view« of emotion (EV)—is commonly spelled out by likening emotions to perceptions: in much the way that perception provides access to sensory properties of the perceiver's environment, emotions provide access to its axiological properties. In response to several difficulties with this perceptual understanding of emotion, Deonna & Teroni (2012, 2014, 2015) have recently developed an alternative version of EV. According to them, emotions do not apprehend value in virtue of being experiences of value or having value properties as part of their content, but rather in virtue of the evaluative character of their intentional mode or attitude. The central idea is to think of individual emotions as relating to particular values in the same way belief relates to truth: just as the attitude of belief is that of considering-true a proposition, the attitude of anger is that of considering-offensive a certain object. In this paper, I first argue that Deonna & Teroni fail to salvage EV. As I show, there are reasons to suppose that EV is false to begin with, which simultaneously support a different, non-epistemic understanding of the link between emotions and values. On this non-epistemic understanding, emotions are responses to value, which are based on, rather than constitutive of, apprehensions of value. I go on to show that their positive proposal nonetheless contains an important insight and develop a more adequate understanding of the idea that emotions are evaluative modes. I argue that the sense in which the intentional mode of emotions structurally resembles that of belief is to be explicated in terms of their character as specific responses, that is, responses that are due or merited by particular values. In believing a proposition, we consider it true in virtue of responding to its apparent truth in the manner that is due truths; likewise, in being angry at someone we consider her behaviour as offensive in virtue of responding to an apparent offence in the way that is due offences.

4

Müller, Thomas

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 9:45 Uhr, 15/134
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 9:45 a.m., 15/134

**Thermodynamics and Statistical Mechanics:
A Difference of Sorts**

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It may seem plausible that thermodynamics (TD) should reduce to statistical mechanics (SM). After all, SM refers to a system's fundamental molecular microstate, while TD refers to macroscopic variables only, and there is nothing more to a TD system than its microscopic con-

stituents. However, reduction fails. The main problem, well known since the inception of SM at the end of the 19th century, lies with the Second Law of TD. That law states that the entropy of a closed system (e.g., a gas in an insulated container) never decreases over time. There have been numerous attempts at deriving the resulting temporal asymmetry (the »thermodynamic arrow of time«) from the laws of SM, but these laws are temporally symmetric, and all extant derivations of the Second Law import some kind of temporal asymmetry over and above the dynamical laws of the microlevel. TD thus appears to have some content over and above SM. But then again, a gas is a gas; the gas as a TD system doesn't have any extra parts or secret powers that the gas as an SM system is lacking. What is going on?

In this paper we will try to take seriously the idea that a TD system is indeed, at any moment of its existence, nothing over and above an SM system, in the sense that the TD system is identical to the SM system. But we still want to allow for different laws applying to TD systems vs. SM systems. The difficulty in this, we argue, is mostly a logical one, and we will show that there is a formally rigorous way to overcome the difficulty. On the account we are proposing, based on case-intensional logic, sortal predication plays a crucial role. That logical resource allows one to say that the gas as a TD system is a thing of a different sort than the gas as an SM system, and so has different persistence conditions resulting in different laws. The Second Law belongs to the persistence conditions of TD systems but not of SM systems. We thereby gain a new perspective on the famous reversibility objection.

12

Müller-Salo

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 9:00 Uhr, 11/211
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 9:00 a.m., 11/211

Was ist Gewalt? Eine begriffliche Analyse

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Obleich Gewalt noch immer in vielen Regionen der Welt und auch in Teilen unserer Gesellschaft zu den alltäglichen menschlichen Erfahrungen gehört, schenkt die Philosophie der Frage danach, was Gewalt – verstanden als physischer Zwang, nicht als Amtsgewalt – eigentlich ist, nur wenig Aufmerksamkeit. Dies war nicht immer so, insbesondere in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren entwickelte sich in der angloamerikanischen analytischen Philosophie eine Debatte um den Gewaltbegriff, in der wichtige Einsichten für ein vertieftes Verständnis von Gewalt erarbeitet wurden. Diese verlor jedoch gegen Ende der 1980er Jahre an Bedeutung und die Philosophie hat die Reflexion über Begriff und Phänomen der Gewalt seither beinahe ausschließlich den Sozial- und Kulturwissenschaften überlassen.

Ausgehend von der genannten Debatte wird im Vortrag durch Adaption und Abgrenzung von den dort vertretenen Positionen eine Definition des Gewaltbegriffs entwickelt, die die Schwächen bisheriger Definitionen von Gewalt vermeidet und mit problematischen Grenzfällen umzugehen vermag. Gewalt ist demnach als eine Handlung – und nicht, wie in den Sozialwissenschaften immer wieder behauptet wird, als Prozess – zu verstehen, die einen Menschen oder ein Tier direkt physisch und/oder psychisch schädigt, wobei diese Schädigung durch den Akteur beabsichtigt wird.

Eine solche Minimaldefinition verzichtet auf jede normative Bewertung von Gewalt und eignet sich daher als Grundlage sowohl einer Ethik der Gewalt, die der Frage nachgeht, ob überhaupt und unter welchen Umständen Gewalt legitim ist, als auch als Ausgangspunkt einer Kritik an politisch einflussreichen Gewaltkonzeptionen unserer Zeit. Letzteres wird abschließend durch zwei Beispiele erläutert: Ausgehend von der Definition lässt sich zeigen, dass sich sowohl die Rede von »struktureller Gewalt« als auch die legitimistische Behauptung, Gewalt sei lediglich als Bezeichnung für die nicht von Recht und Gesetz gedeckte Anwendung physischen Zwangs zu verstehen, nicht halten lässt, da beide Konzepte auf unzulässige Weise die Frage nach der Bestimmung von Gewalt mit der Frage ihrer normativen Bewertung vermischen.

5

Musholt

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 9:45 Uhr, 15/115
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 9:45 a.m., 15/115

What Is at Stake in the Mindreading Debate?

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It is a widely accepted assumption within the philosophy of mind and cognition that our ability for complex social interaction is based on the mastery of a common folk psychology, that is to say that social cognition consists in reasoning about the mental states of others in order to predict and explain their behavior. This, in turn, requires the possession of mental-state concepts, in particular the concepts belief and desire.

In recent years, this standard conception of social cognition has been called into question by proponents of so-called »direct-perception« approaches to social cognition (e.g., Zahavi 2005, Gallagher & Hutto 2008) and by those who argue that the »received view« implies a degree of computational complexity that is implausible (e.g., Bermúdez 2004, Apperly and Butterfill 2009). In response, it has been argued that these attacks on the classical view of social cognition have no bite at the subpersonal level of explanation, and that it is the latter which is at issue in the debate in question (e.g., Herschbach 2008, Spaulding 2010).

In this paper, I critically examine this response by considering in more detail the distinction between personal and subpersonal level explanations. I will argue that concept possession can only be ascribed at the personal level; hence the dispute between the standard conception and alternative approaches to mindreading is a dispute concerning personal-level explanations. Moreover, the appeal to the subpersonal level cannot adequately address concerns regarding the computational complexity of mental state attributions. Thus, this defense of the received view of social cognition is unconvincing because it misses what is at stake in the debate between proponents of the classical view of social cognition and their critics—namely, how we, as persons, navigate our social world. I will conclude by proposing a pluralistic approach to social cognition.

4

Näger

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 15.15 Uhr, 15/134
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 3:15 p.m., 15/134

Fundamentale Asymmetrien: gegen Russells kausalen Eliminativismus

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Kausale Eliminativisten bezüglich eines bestimmten Bereichs der Welt vertreten die These, dass dieser Bereich in akausaler Weise strukturiert ist. Kausale Aussagen haben in dieser Sicht keinerlei Entsprechung in der Welt; sie sind in diesem Bereich generell falsch. Diese Position steht im Gegensatz zum kausalen Realismus (es gibt genau kausale Relationen oder Entitäten) sowie dem kausalen Reduktionismus (kausale Aussagen werden durch nicht-kausale Tatsachen wahr gemacht). Der Eliminativismus wird heute üblicherweise für die fundamentale physikalische Ebene der Welt vertreten. Es war vor allem Russells Argument aus der Zeitsymmetrie der fundamentalen Physik (1912), das zur Akzeptanz dieser Position geführt hat. Reduktionistische Theorien der Kausalität, so die These, sind erst auf einer makroskopischen Ebene anwendbar, wo wegen statistischer Effekte aus Vielteilchensystemen (Zweiter Hauptsatz der Thermodynamik) Asymmetrien ins Spiel kommen; auf zeitsymmetrischer fundamentaler Ebene hingegen haben kausale Aussagen keine Referenz.

In diesem Vortrag entwickle ich ein dreifaches Argument gegen Russells Position. Erstens zeige ich, dass sich manche von Russells Argumenten auflösen, wenn man statt einer naiven Regularitätstheorie, wie Russell sie voraussetzt, eine aus moderner Sicht angemessene Theorie der Kausalität annimmt: die Theorie kausaler Bayes Netze (Spirtes, Glymour, Scheines 1993; Pearl 2000). Zweitens kritisiere ich Russells Hauptargument aus der Zeitsymmetrie der fundamentalen Physik, indem ich zeige, dass es eine unplausible Prämisse enthält. Positiv argumentiere ich schließlich, drittens, dass es entgegen üblicher Meinungen Asymmetrien auf einer fundamentalen Ebene gibt. Nach den klaren Kriterien der Theorie kausaler Bayes Netze sind diese Asymmetrien von dem gleichen Typ wie man sie in typischen kausalen Systemen antrifft. Dies kann als positive Evidenz für kausale Struktur in der fundamentalen Physik gewertet werden.

5

Newen

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 10.30 Uhr, 15/131
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 10:30 a.m., 15/131

What Is an Emotion?

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In the metaphysical debate we have two extreme positions: emotions are individuated as social constructs (Lutz 1986, Harré 1986), on the one hand, or they are individuated as evolutionary anchored affect programs (Ekman 1972, Griffith 1997), on the other. Both accounts have severe deficits. Let us mention only the two main

deficits: psychoevolutionary accounts state that shared evolutionary history is the only criteria to identify types of emotions. They do not provide any classificatory schemes which do not refer to each category's evolutionary history but for many emotion categories referred to not only in everyday speech but also in psychological theories, it is far from clear whether their members share the same evolutionary history. In principle, psychoevolutionary accounts of emotions can easily account for basic emotions but have problems to account for the role of cognitive contents in so-called cognitive emotions. On the other hand, the social constructionist can easily account for the latter including the cultural variety of emotion phenomena but they underestimate the strong overlap of the emotion repertoire despite the cultural variation. Here Ekman (1972) has shown that basic emotions like joy, fear, anger, sadness etc. are accompanied with the same facial expression. The evolutionary anchor of basic emotions constraints our emotion repertoire and undermines the social constructivist view that emotions are entirely created by cultural factors. What could be an alternative? We need to do justice to both features, the evolutionary anchor of basic emotions and the cultural dependence of some emotions. *I argue that emotions are individuated as pattern of characteristic features* (which mostly not necessary but only characteristic features). The pattern theory of emotion will be unfolded and it will be shown that it is coming with several important advantages which includes the following: pattern can easily involve both, evolutionary anchored as well as culturally shaped features and thus account for both observations.

1

Nimtzt

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 9:45 Uhr, 11/215
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 9:45 a.m., 11/215

A Pragmatic Argument for Neo-Descriptivism

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Textbook Kripkeans (see e.g. Kripke 1980, Soames 2012, ch. 3–6) assume that the semantic content of a statement comprising a natural kind term is exhausted by the singular proposition it expresses. On this view, »Gold is rare« merely expresses the singular proposition <Au, being rare>.

Embracing a rival Fregean perspective, neo-descriptivists (e.g. Jackson 2004, 2010, 1998; Chalmers 2006) argue that the semantic content of statements comprising natural kind terms exceeds the singular proposition expressed. On their view, »Gold is rare« does express <Au, being rare>. But it also and more fundamentally expresses a descriptive content such as *that the goldish stuff of our acquaintance is rare*.

I devise an argument from pragmatics that tells against textbook Kripkeans and supports neo-descriptivism. I argue that on textbook Kripkean premises, we cannot explain the pragmatic import our sentences comprising natural kind terms manifestly have. The richer neo-descriptivist picture, by contrast, allows us to do so.

My argument proceeds in two steps. In a first step, I discuss two general principles—the *Requirement of Pragmatic Suitability* and the *Principle of the Conveyal of Contents*. The first captures a general pragmatic constraint on semantic theories. The second spells out what

it is to convey a content. I argue that both principles are well-motivated on independent grounds.

In a second step, I devise the *Argument from Pragmatic Suitability*. Drawing on the two principles discussed, the argument aims to establish that the semantic properties of »Gold is rare« exceed its expressing <Au, being rare>. I conclude that textbook Kripkeanism fails and that neo-descriptivism might well be right. Some such Fregean semantics arguably is.

I end with a short general moral.

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Omerbasic

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 9:45 Uhr, 11/215
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 9:45 a.m., 11/215

Der Schädigungsbegriff in der ethischen Debatte um die Reproduktionsmedizin

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Den Ausgangspunkt dieses Vortrags bildet die Annahme, dass Individuen hinsichtlich ihrer reproduktiven Entscheidungen ein Freiraum zukommt – dass es folglich so etwas wie »reproduktive Freiheit« gibt. Im Hinblick auf die Verfügbarkeit neuer medizinischer Möglichkeiten, die sich aus dem vergleichsweise rasenden Fortschritt in Medizin und Wissenschaft (insbesondere der Genetik) ergaben, stellt sich jedoch zunehmend die Frage was der Besitz dieser Freiheit impliziert und wo ihre Grenzen liegen. Möchte man etwas über die Grenzen reproduktiver Freiheit sagen und dies mithilfe des Prinzips der Nichtschädigung begründen, dann ist zunächst zu klären, wann genau von einer Schädigung der resultierenden Kinder gesprochen werden kann.

Dies erweist sich jedoch bei sogenannten »genesis cases« als ein ausgesprochen problematisches Vorhaben. Im reproduktiven Rahmen werden »genesis cases« verstanden als Fälle, in denen wenig wünschenswerte Umstände oder Eigenschaften der resultierenden Kinder vor der Konzeption absehbar waren und unweigerlich an die Konzeption und Existenz der betroffenen Kinder gebunden sind. Ganz gleich wie fragwürdig, »unvernünftig« oder gar fahrlässig die Entscheidung der Eltern war, die zu der Geburt des Kindes führte, lässt sich in diesen Fällen keine Schädigung des betroffenen Kindes erkennen, die ein Eingreifen in die reproduktive Freiheit der Eltern rechtfertigen könnte. Dieser Sachverhalt wird durch das durch Derek Parfit berühmt gewordene *Non-Identity Problem* beschrieben. Offenbar stößt man in solchen Fällen weniger an die Grenzen reproduktiver Freiheit, als an die Grenzen unseres gängigen *personengebundenen* Schädigungsbegriffs.

Dan Brock und Derek Parfit zeigten, dass ein attraktiver – wenn auch umstrittener – Lösungsansatz darin

besteht, sich in diesen Fällen von dem personengebundenen Schädigungsbegriff zu verabschieden. Dieser kann das »moral wrong« solcher Fälle nicht erfassen, weil es nicht in der Schlechtstellung eines distinkten Individuums besteht.

Zunächst soll kurz verdeutlicht werden, welche weitreichenden Konsequenzen sich ergeben, wenn das Non-Identity Problem einfach hingenommen wird und warum sich rechtsbasierte Lösungsvorschläge als ungeeignet erweisen. Anschließend wird in Anlehnung an Brock und Parfit für die Verwendung und Notwendigkeit eines *nicht-personengebundenen* Schädigungsprinzips bei »genesis cases« argumentiert.

Abschließend werden – abgeleitet aus der Kritik an einem solchen Vorschlag –, einige Kriterien vorgestellt, die bei der Erarbeitung eines nicht-personengebundenen Schädigungsprinzips berücksichtigt werden beziehungsweise erfüllt sein sollten.

5

Orban

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 15.15 Uhr, 15/115
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 3:15 p.m., 15/115

Internality and Two Kinds of Ownership

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Is the sense of ownership a unified phenomenon? The standard answer is »yes«. I will argue that the correct answer is »no«. Ownership seems to be crucial in understanding the first person and the way the first person perspective has immediate consequences for an agent's action (Campbell 1994, Peacocke 2014).

I will argue that feeling of ownership means something different for body-parts/actions known through internal *as opposed to* external ways of knowing. (Examples of internal W are proprioception, kinaesthesia, nociception and introspection, while external W include vision, touch, audition, olfaction, gustation, and testimony.) Call this *Asymmetry*. If Asymmetry is correct, then one form of ownership could be more fundamental than the other for understanding the first person and the way it has immediate consequences for action. Peacocke (2014, forthcoming) and De Vignemont (2012) deny Asymmetry, because they suppose that the sense of ownership is a unified phenomenon.

11

Padel

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 9.00 Uhr, 15/111
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 9:00 a.m., 15/111

When Two People Quarrel, the Objectivist Rejoices? Why Our Intuitions towards Moral Disagreement Don't Favor Objectivism

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This talk deals with an objection David Enoch (2011) levels against what he calls »response-dependence metaethical views«. Enoch's argument is roughly this: in moral disagreements, it is typically morally permissible

to »stand one's ground« (that is: to *insist* on getting one's way). In disagreements due to conflicting preferences or attitudes, it typically is not. Therefore, moral disagreements are not disagreements due to conflicting preferences or attitudes. But response-dependence metaethical views entail that moral disagreements are disagreements due to conflicting preferences or attitudes. Therefore, response-dependence metaethical views are false.

This argument has recently come under attack. Kate Manne and David Sobel (2014) argue that the alleged asymmetry between moral and preference- or attitude-based disagreements is not as straightforward as Enoch's argument has it. While they acknowledge *some* need for explanation, they deny that the correct explanation is exclusively available to objectivists. It's not the property of being about a *moral* matter, say Manne and Sobel, that makes standing one's ground in a disagreement morally permissible. Instead, standing one's ground is supposed to be morally permissible whenever it is *particularly important* that one party has it her way. And that is an explanation available to *both* objectivists and response-dependence theorists.

This talk argues that, while Manne and Sobel rightly reject Enoch's argument, their explanation is itself problematic, for whether response-dependence theorists should appeal to the relevant notion of importance is highly unclear. But non-objectivists still don't need to worry—so the main argument of the talk—because Enoch's argument draws on a false assumption: the claim that it is typically morally permissible to stand one's ground in *moral* as opposed to preference-based disagreements is false. Instead, the talk concludes, standing one's ground is typically morally permissible if the action one insists on being performed is *morally right*. After all, our intuitive assessments of moral disagreements simply *track* our first order moral judgments with respect to the course of action disagreed upon—regardless of the *type* of disagreement. As the response-dependence *metaethicist* can happily appeal to any first-order ethical theory she likes, she is good to go.

2

Patrone

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 10.30 Uhr, 15/E27
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 10:30 a.m., 15/E27

Against Naturalistic Perdurantism

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According to perdurantism (a.k.a. four-dimensionalism) there is nothing as a numerical same object which exists at different times. Objects are aggregates (or *worms*) of temporal parts as well as spatial parts, each existing at a time. But what is the relation between the temporal parts of a single aggregate? Of course, in the four-dimensional world-view, given the mereological principle of the unrestricted composition, for any temporal parts there is a mereological aggregate of those temporal parts. Take the following aggregates:

(F) A temporal part of my cup, two temporal parts of Woody Allen's nose;

(F*) all and only Elizabeth II's temporal parts.

Perdurantists consider (F) and (F*) on the same meta-physical level. Despite this *worm equality*, someone could be tempted to say that there is a difference be-

tween (F) and (F*). Someone could state that there are kinds of worm that are, in a way, *natural*, and other that are not. Call this attitude »naturalistic perdurantism«. In this paper I argue that a perdurantist cannot settle any difference between what we can call *natural* and *freaky aggregates*. I do that by showing that this problem is analogous at the so-called *special composition question* (SCQ), i.e. the question about under what circumstances some things compose a single object. If in the SCQ the issue is to distinguish between which aggregates exist and which aggregates do not, in what I call *special nature question* (SNQ) the issue is to distinguish between which aggregates are natural (or, in other words, acceptable) and which aggregates do not. Given this analogy, I suggest that the argument against the restricted composition can be applied, *mutatis mutandis*, to the idea that some aggregates are acceptable while others are not.

1

Pavić

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 14.15 Uhr, 15/114
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 2:15 p.m., 15/114

**Semantic Minimalism and the Content
of Bare Demonstratives**

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Prima facie, bare demonstratives like »this« and »that« pose a problem for a minimalist account like the one proposed by Emma Borg (2004, 2012) which subscribes to the following two central tenets:

- (i) Anti-Intentionalism
- (ii) Propositionalism

Confronted with the challenge that we cannot grasp the semantic content of sentences like

(S) This is red

without appealing to speaker intentions, Borg introduces the notion of a *syntactically triggered singular concept* supposed to enable the hearer to grasp the Russellian proposition expressed by an utterance of (S) via linguistic understanding alone.

The aim of my talk is to show that Borg's effort to reconcile the aforementioned central tenets of her version of semantic minimalism does not work and hence she is forced to give up either (i) or (ii). For this purpose, I will offer the following three arguments to the effect that we cannot grasp a Russellian proposition via a syntactically triggered singular concept:

(1) The proposed mental entities cannot ensure that there is a referent (which is a necessary condition for there being a Russellian proposition available to grasp).

(2) Conceiving of these concepts in a more substantial way amounts to a violation of (i).

(3) The epistemic basis for action constituted by understanding (S) in a purely linguistic way is very different from the one constituted by a more substantial understanding of (S) which involves a non-linguistic identification of the referent of the token of »this«.

After briefly mentioning the disadvantages of rejecting (i), in the second part of my talk I will advocate to give up (ii) on the basis of meta-semantic considerations which favor a conceptual separation of the notion of a truth-condition from the notion of a proposition. I will end up by addressing a potential worry concerning the proposed new version of semantic minimalism.

S

Piwonka

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 9.45 Uhr, 15/E28
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 9:45 a.m., 15/E28

**Konstitutivistische Begründung
moralischer Verpflichtung**

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In der Diskussion um eine rationale Begründung moralischer Verpflichtung hat in den letzten Jahren zunehmend eine als »konstitutivism« bezeichnete Strategie Zuspruch erfahren, deren Grundidee darin besteht, dass es moralische Standards gibt, die konstitutiv für menschliche Akteurschaft sind, was bedeutet, dass wir, sofern wir handeln, bereits auf diese Standards verpflichtet sind (v.a. Korsgaard 2009). Zugleich hat dieser Ansatz massives Unbehagen nach sich gezogen, wobei jedoch die exakte Bestimmung der mit ihm assoziierten Probleme bis heute schwer fällt. Vor diesem Hintergrund möchte ich einen erneuten Versuch unternehmen, die grundsätzlichen Erfolgsaussichten des Ansatzes *methodisch* zu untersuchen.

Im ersten Teil versuche ich, die Struktur und Problemsituation konstitutiver Argumente durch einen heuristischen Rückgriff auf die Literatur über *transzendente* Argumente aufzuklären, wodurch zugleich die Basis für eine vielversprechende Neukonturierung der diffusen konstitutivistischen Debatte gelegt wird.

Im zweiten Teil untersuche ich dann, ob es Korsgaard (2009) gelingt, den Begriff der *Notwendigkeit* bei beiden Prämissen konstitutiver Argumente methodisch plausibel zu spezifizieren. Die moraltheoretischen Schwierigkeiten werden dabei v.a. durch den »Shmagency-Einwand« (Enoch 2006) konkretisiert.

Im dritten Teil möchte ich – über Korsgaards Scheitern hinausgehend – zwei alternative Konzeptionen skizzieren. Während der erste Versuch des Nachweises eines performativen Widerspruchs die skeptische Herausforderung missversteht, erscheint der Versuch, den Einwand durch das Aufzeigen seiner *Unverständlichkeit* zurückzuweisen, aussichtsreicher.

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2

Pleitz

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 11.15 Uhr, 15/E27
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 11:15 a.m., 15/E27

**Metaphysical Foundationalism
and the Paradoxes of Non-Well-Foundedness**

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Metaphysical foundationalism about some entities is the view that metaphysical grounding (cf. Correia / Schnieder 2012 and in particular Fine 2012) is transitive and well-founded among these entities, discussed re-

cently with respect to concrete objects (Cameron 2008, Paseau 2010, Schaffer 2010, and Priest 2014). I will argue that we should adopt metaphysical foundationalism about such representational entities as meaningful sentences, sets, and facts, and that this will solve the semantic and set theoretic paradoxes as well as Kit Fine's puzzles of ground (Fine 2010). On the way to this uniform solution to these *paradoxes of non-well-foundedness*, I will first show that the semantic and set theoretic paradoxes do indeed involve relations of metaphysical grounding, e.g., because the truth of a sentence is grounded in its truthmaker and because object *a* being an element of the set of all φ ers is grounded in object *a* being φ . I will then show that they have the same grounding structure as Fine's puzzles of ground, because each involves a self-grounding entity. To argue for the restricted variant of metaphysical foundationalism that thus solves all these problems in a uniform way, I will make the negative point that it is compatible with all kinds of positions about metaphysical grounding among concrete objects, as well as a positive point about the representational nature of the entities it applies to, namely meaningful sentences, sets, facts, and their ilk.

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S

Poth

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 13.30 Uhr, 15/E28
 Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 1:30 p.m., 15/E28

A Solution to the Complex First Paradox

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The *complex-first paradox* consists in the fact that children acquire complex concepts (concrete nouns like *dog*) earlier than simple concepts (abstract attributes like *green*), even though in the light of our best neuroscientific theories of word learning one would expect learning the former is harder than learning the latter and, thus, takes more time (Werning 2010). In particular, we know that concrete nouns »are semantically more complex and their neural realizations more widely distributed in cortex than those expressed by the other word classes in question« (Werning 2010, 1097). We also know that the more widely distributed neural realizations are, the more costly it is for the organism to implement these neural realizations and the more time it takes to implement them. Together these claims present a puzzle for cognitive scientists and philosophers of language: how is it possible that children learn complex concepts earlier than simple concepts?

In my paper I want to present a novel philosophical solution to the *complex-first paradox*. Instead of focusing on neuroscientific theories about the development of neural realizations of mental representations, I suggest

employing theories of rational learning. In particular, I introduce a Bayesian theory of word learning that not only demonstrates how agents can infer a hypothesis about the meaning of a word from just a few instances but also why agents learn the meaning of concrete nouns faster than the meaning of abstract attributes. The theory I want to suggest is a generalization of Xu & Tenenbaum's (2007) theory of word learning (which is restricted to learning nouns). Thus, even though it might be more costly for an organism to implement neural realizations of complex concepts children are nevertheless faster in learning them, because it is easier to infer their meaning from just a few instances than it is to learn the meaning of simple concepts.

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1

Prien

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 9.00 Uhr, 15/114
 Thursday, September 17, 2015, 9:00 a.m., 15/114

Robert Brandom on Rational Rectification and the Objective Validity of Inferences

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In *Making It Explicit* (MIE), Brandom claims that inferential norms are objective. This means that the way the world is determines what follows from what. It is therefore possible that an inference is valid even though nobody in the linguistic community would accept it as valid. Brandom claims that our practices institute norms that are in this sense ratification-transcendent, and it is one of his central aims in MIE to explain how our practices do this.

In support of this claim, two independent lines of thought can be identified in MIE. The by far better known line of thought is developed in Ch. 8.VI of MIE and invokes the ability of speakers to navigate between their different perspectives. In my presentation, however, I want to discuss the other line of thought which has received far less attention and which builds on a practice Brandom later (in *Between Saying and Doing*) calls Rational Rectification.

Before this practice can be discussed, Brandom's distinction between one-sided and two-sided inferentialism has to be introduced. In this regard it is important, the concepts can turn out to be empirically inadequate in the two-sided case. More specifically, the inferences a speaker accepts with regard to a concept together with the way the world is can in some cases force her to acknowledge incompatible commitments. The practice of rational rectification says that speakers are in these cases committed to modify the inferences they accept with regard to the concept.

I argue that by following this practice, speakers cede authority about which inferences are objectively valid, in contradistinction to inferences taken to be valid by any- or everybody, to the world. As it were, we let the world decide what follows from what.

S

Privitera

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 9.45 Uhr, 15/E28
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 9:45 a.m., 15/E28

How to Account for our Duties in Rescue Cases

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Let rescue cases be cases in which an agent can spare different persons from different harms but cannot help all of them. An ongoing debate in ethics concerns the question of how to account for our intuitions regarding moral duties in these cases. In particular, it is difficult to find a rationale that accommodates both the intuition that we ought to save the larger number of persons in cases in which the harms at stake are similarly bad and the intuition that we ought to save those suffering the individually worst harms if the harms at stake are very different.

My talk is divided into two parts. In the first part, I will discuss a recent proposal by Alex Voorhoeve (*How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims*, Ethics 125:1, 2014), which interprets the similarity of harms in relational terms and builds on both aggregative and nonaggregative reasoning to account for our intuitions in rescue cases. I will show that by interpreting the similarity of harms in relational terms Voorhoeve's theory violates two axioms of Rational Choice and, as a result, faces a dilemma: Either it proves to be demanding in situations in which demandingness is not warranted or it cannot account for the obvious wrongness of certain actions.

In the second part of the talk, I will then argue for an alternative account that interprets the similarity of harms in absolute terms—by dividing them into different, lexically ordered classes and taking them to be similar iff they belong to the same class—and that relies on aggregative considerations only in order to account for our duties in rescue cases. First, I will present my account, defend the lexical theory of value, and show how this lexical theory helps avoiding the dilemma Voorhoeve faces. Then, I will explore whether nonaggregative considerations are really unnecessary to establish our duties in rescue cases.

11

Rechenauer / Roy

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 10.30 Uhr, 15/111
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 10:30 a.m., 15/111

**A Formal Approach to Consensus
in Discourse Ethics**

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Consensus plays a large role in current contractualist theories of justice and morality, broadly conceived. We take Discourse Ethics in the style of Habermas as a version of this broad type of contractualism, being quite similar to the theory proposed by Scanlon. In both approaches consensus takes on a pivotal role. This holds in particular for discourse ethics, where it is the basis of all normative claims. Scanlonian contractualism is also closely tied to a notion of consensus on the principles being justified. In this talk we primarily focus on discourse ethics.

In a first step we give a reconstruction of discourse ethics with the help of recent results from epistemic game theory. Following well-known results from Aumann and others, under certain conditions rational agents will in interactions inevitably reach a consensus—there is no possibility of agreeing to disagree. We will show that basic assumptions made by Habermas and others in the course of developing discourse ethics are indeed compatible with principles going into the proofs of the agreement theorems from interactive epistemology. This may sound surprising given the usual hostility of Frankfurt school adherents towards an exclusive reliance on strategic rationality. But the models within epistemic game theory we are following can safely interpreted in a non-strategic way.

Among the assumptions of the agreement theorem, however, there is always the claim that the agents have common priors. This is a contested assumption. In our second step we make use of results from the theory of probability aggregation. In the context of expected utility theory it has been shown (e.g. by Philippe Mongin) that aggregation of individual expected utility representation constrained by the imposition of a Pareto principle is possible only if all individuals agree in their probability measures. This neatly gives us the common prior assumption. We argue that discourse ethicists should have no problem with accepting the formal principles of decision theory or Pareto principles. An open question, however, is whether they should also accept the method of aggregation. We end with discussing this point and with remarks on aggregation of orderings outside a probabilistic context.

13 Reichold

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 10.30 Uhr, 11/211
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 10:30 a.m., 11/211

**Peter Strawsons Analyse reaktiver Haltungen
im Kontext der *Oxford Philosophy***

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Peter Strawsons Konzeption der reaktiven Haltungen in *Freedom and Resentment* (Strawson 1974) soll im Vortrag mit Blick auf die Bedeutung sozialer Regeln in *Social Morality and Individual Ideal* (Strawson 1961) normativ interpretiert und in den Kontext zuvor erschienener Texte Harts, Ryles und Austins zu Handlungs- und Verantwortungszuschreibung und deren Modifikation eingebettet werden. Durch eine Interpretation von *Freedom and Resentment* im Kontext *Oxford Philosophy* werden methodische und inhaltliche Elemente einer Gebrauchstheorie sozialer Normativität in der *Oxford Philosophy* gehoben.

In einem ersten Teil wird ein von Strawson selbst gegebener, in der Sekundärliteratur aber kaum berücksichtigter expliziter Hinweis auf die Verbindung von »general demands« mit sozialen Regeln für eine Hebung der normativen Struktur reaktiver Haltungen genutzt (Strawson 1961: 7; vgl. auch Reichold 2013).

Die normative Analyse der reaktiven Haltungen wird in einem zweiten Teil eingebettet in die seit den späten 40er Jahren in der *Oxford Philosophy* geführten Diskussionen um Verantwortungszuschreibungen und Entschuldigungen (Hart 1948/49; Ryle 1949 und Austin 1956/57). Begriffliche, thematische und methodische Bezüge zwischen diesen Texten und *Freedom and Resentment* sollen aufgezeigt und für die Interpretation der normativen Struktur reaktiver Haltungen genutzt werden.

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7 Reining

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 13.30 Uhr, 11/214
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 1:30 p.m., 11/214

**On the Difficulty of Applying the Notion of
Peerhood to Cases Involving Religious Experience**

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In recent years, a thriving debate has taken place around the question what rationality requires in situations of so-called peer disagreement. The kind of situa-

tion in question is one in which someone who has the same or equally good evidence regarding a certain issue, and whom one regards as equally competent in making judgments on the basis of the kind of evidence in question, turns out to have a different opinion on the relevant issue. In the course of this debate, different positions have been proposed as to the required degree of conciliation. The problem I will be concerned with in this talk is the fact that the debate in question has stayed silent regarding situations of disagreement in which the two parties do not have the same or equally good evidence, and do thereby not count as peers regarding the issue in question, but in which one of them bases her opinion on an alleged religious experience the other party has not made. Accordingly, my aim in this talk will be to widen the perspective of the debate on peer disagreement, by showing a way to apply the notion of peerhood even to those cases in which the bodies of evidence differ in the way just mentioned.

First, I will give a more detailed description of the relevant kind of religious disagreement, thereby distinguishing it from those kinds of religious disagreement to which arguments presented in the debate on peer disagreement are already straightforwardly applicable. Second, I will introduce the notion of meta-peerhood. In contrast to a peer, a meta-peer does not necessarily have the same or equally good evidence regarding the respective issue. Rather, meta-peerhood consists in being equally competent in recognizing whether a given piece of evidence one has is *good* evidence regarding the respective issue. I will then go on to argue that the notion of meta-peerhood is a useful tool for applying the debate on peer disagreement to the relevant kind of religious disagreement.

3

Reinmuth

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 16.00 Uhr, 11/116
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 4:00 a.m., 11/116

Assumptions and Reasons

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Both in everyday reasoning as well as in scientific arguments, not least in mathematical proofs, we regularly adduce premises that have already been established and are not merely assumed. As SCHROEDER-HEISTER, CONTU 2005 point out, such adduced premises, or reasons for short, can be seen as stating the (already) available subject-specific propositions in certain areas, which are to be distinguished from merely assumed premises. FREGE used adduction (»Anziehung«) in his axiomatic calculus and the adduction of axioms is a core feature of all axiomatic calculi, but my aim will be to examine different natural deduction approaches to the adduction of reasons. I will first try to formulate and argue for some requirements for an adequate formal treatment of adduction, e.g. that adductions may not be discharged. Starting with JAŚKOWSKI 1934 and GENTZEN 1936, I will then discuss advantages and shortcomings of different approaches found in the literature with respect to these requirements. I will argue that a strategy of distinguishing syntactically between reasons, assumptions and inferred propositions, as put forward by HINST 1982 and MEGGLE, SIEGWART 1996, seems quite promising: It can be used to formulate rules for linear calculi of natural deduction that differentiate between different

premises, blocking, for instance, the negation of adduced reasons by negation introduction—as in GENTZEN 1936. Furthermore, one can use this format to formulate rules for complex argumentative structures which allow one to decide whether or not an adduction is correct with respect to a certain framework or not—as in JAŚKOWSKI 1934. I will argue that such an approach comes close(r) to our practice of adduction while probably also offering fruitful theoretical possibilities, for example with respect to the development of fine-grained consequence relations that respect the role of lemmata in proofs, as envisaged by SCHROEDER-HEISTER, CONTU 2005. Moreover, in contrast to usual argumentation frameworks, the frameworks will be built on the notion of proof, thus providing a procedural model of complex argumentation which contrasts with approaches such as those following DUNG 1995.

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8

Réz / Bárány

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 9.45 Uhr, 15/105
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 9:45 a.m., 15/105

You Shouldn't Like This: A Novel Account of Personal Taste

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Classical views on taste typically incorporate two different mental activities which take place when being confronted with a work of art: (i) discriminating subtle qualities in the object; i.e., picking out the relevant aesthetic features and apprehending them in the appropriate way and (ii) taking pleasure in aesthetically appreciated works of art (affective component). In this paper we argue for a different conception of taste, which incorporates our contemporary ideas on personal taste and its relation to practical and evaluative identity. Instead of using the concept of a Humean ideal critic (which is inspired and founded in a virtue ethical framework) we spell out aesthetic normativity in terms of obligations. According to our account personal taste is constituted by those cases when we fail to comply with our obligation to appreciate aesthetically valuable works of arts or to disappreciate aesthetically worthless pieces. These discrepancies can sometimes be explained by mere gut reactions, but more often they seem to be adequate reflections of one's moral and aesthetic commitments and thus they express something important about one's normative identity.

10

Roadevin

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 16.00 Uhr, 11/115
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 4:00 p.m., 11/115

In Defence of Elective Forgiveness

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Philosophers have proposed accounts of forgiveness where the victim is warranted in forgiving only if the wrongdoer makes amends for the wrong done. According to such an account, forgiveness is made rational by the wrongdoer apologizing. But this account creates a puzzle because it seems to make cases of elective forgiveness (where there is no apology or repentance) unjustified. Charles Griswold, for example, takes this position and argues that forgiveness is always conditional on the wrongdoer taking some necessary steps to earn forgiveness. In the absence of these steps, forgiveness is either unintelligible or unjustified. My aim in this paper is to argue that elective forgiveness can be intelligible and justified. I shall first examine why philosophers

have argued that unconditional forgiveness is problematic. I shall then consider accounts in the literature (Garard and McNaughton; Pettigrove) which claim that forgiveness is not the sort of thing that requires apology. Finally I propose an alternative account which I believe is well placed to explain why elective forgiveness is both intelligible and justified. I suggest that there are *justificatory* features of a situation, such as generosity and strong community support, which can make unconditional forgiveness intelligible and justified. Such reasons are not the type of reasons that automatically generate moral obligations. As a result, my account can make sense of the fact that forgiveness is essentially an elective phenomenon.

13

Rohr

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 9.00 Uhr, 11/211
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 9:00 a.m., 11/211

Frege über das Verhältnis von Arithmetik und Geometrie

Tabea Rohr

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Während Frege sein Lebenswerk dem Versuch gewidmet hat, die Arithmetik aus der Logik herzuleiten und somit das Kantische *dictum*, die Arithmetik sei synthetisch, zu widerlegen, stimmt er Kant in Hinblick auf die Geometrie zu. In den *Grundlagen der Arithmetik* heißt es: »In dem er [Kant, TR] die geometrischen Wahrheiten synthetisch und apriori nannte, hat er ihr wahres Wesen enthüllt.« Arithmetik und Geometrie besitzen demnach für Frege einen unterschiedlichen erkenntnistheoretischen Status. Im Vortrag soll die systematische Relevanz dieser Eigenheit von Freges Philosophie der Mathematik herausgearbeitet werden. Es soll gezeigt werden, wie Frege in seiner Auseinandersetzung mit dem Verhältnis von Arithmetik und Geometrie, insbesondere in §10 und §13 der Grundlagen der Arithmetik, erste Argumente für die logische Natur der Arithmetik liefert.

2

Roski

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 13.30 Uhr, 15/E27
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 1:30 p.m., 15/E27

Grounding and the Explanatory Role of Generalizations

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In recent years the notion of grounding has received increasing attention in metaphysics. Grounding is usually conceived to be an objective, non-causal kind of priority. In the debate, it is moreover a virtually uncontested assumption that grounding is an *explanatory* notion: grounds explain what they ground. Unfortunately, however, this assumption is hardly ever substantiated. In particular, little work has been done to investigate how the rich literature on explanation in the philosophy of science relates to the debate on grounding. The aim of

the present talk is to contribute to such an investigation.

The talk focuses on a case in which views that are widely held in the debate on scientific explanation seem to contradict commonly endorsed claims about grounding. The case concerns the explanatory role of (universal) generalizations. While many philosophers of science have argued that generalizations explain their instances, adherents of theories of grounding seem to be committed to the contrary view. I will resolve this conflict by employing a theory of explanation developed by Kim (1994) and Ruben (1990) that promises a unified account of scientific explanations and grounding-explanations. I will argue that against the background of this framework, it seems most plausible to reject the view that facts expressed by generalizations stand in explanation-backing relations to their instances.

The structure of the talk is as follows. *First*, I will provide a brief overview of the debate on grounding and the reasons to view generalizations as grounded in, and explained by, their instances. *Second*, I will discuss a recent attempt to reconcile this view with the view that at least some generalizations explain their instances by rejecting transitivity principles for explanations, based on the Kim-Ruben account of explanation (Hicks and van Elswyk 2014). I will argue that this attempt is ultimately unsatisfactory and that the Kim-Ruben account should rather lead us to reject the view that universal generalizations stand in explanation-backing relations to their instances. Beyond the reconciliation afforded by this move, I will, in a *third* step, indicate how the resulting view can account for various roles that generalizations play in scientific explanations.

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S

Rueger

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 14.15 Uhr, 15/E28
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 2:15 p.m., 15/E28

The Close Enough View in Distributive Ethics and its Alleged Violation of Two Dominance Principles

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How ought we to distribute harms and benefits across different individuals when they have competing claims to be helped? Starting from a Nagelian point of view that engages in pairwise comparisons of individual claims, I defend an essentially non-aggregative approach to this problem. However, I hold that this approach ought to make room for aggregating competing claims that are sufficiently close to another in strength. Following Derek Parfit I call this the *close enough view*.

I then go on to defend the close enough view against two dominance objections. The first of these objections holds that it could lead one to act in a way that makes every anonymized position involved worse off, i.e. is in violation of an *anonymous Pareto principle*. I argue that whilst it is true that in some cases the close enough view does violate the anonymous Pareto principle,

ple, this is not necessarily a problem if one denies the consequentialist presupposition that we always ought to do what leads to the best overall (anonymized) outcome.

The second dominance objection holds that when faced with a choice not between single acts but between *sequences* of acts, the close enough view could even lead one to act in a way that makes every »identified« individual involved worse off, violating what I call the *person-affecting Pareto principle*. I argue that if an adherent of the close-enough view knew that a sequence of acts would lead to making every identified individual worse off, she would not choose this sequence. If, on the other hand, she did not know that a certain sequence of acts would make every identified individual worse off, then she does not do anything wrong by performing single isolated acts that are prescribed by the close enough view, even if they are part of such a sequence. I therefore argue that the close enough view does not violate the person-affecting Pareto principle.

5

Samoilova

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 16.00 Uhr, 15/131
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 4:00 p.m., 15/131

Is Cognitive Penetration Ever Good?

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Cognitive penetration, the influence on perception by non-perceptual mental states, has recently been argued to lead to both bad and good epistemic results. In this paper I examine whether cognitive penetration can indeed be epistemically good. I argue that the existing examples of good cognitive penetration either come with hefty assumptions about the content of perceptual experience, or trivialize the notion of cognitive penetration.

5

Sattig

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 10.30 Uhr, 15/131
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 10:30 a.m., 15/131

**Memory, Reflexivity, and Personal Identity:
Does the Lockean Tradition Rest on a Mistake?**

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Lockeanism about personal identity is the view that the persistence of persons is grounded in psychological continuity over time. Reflexivism about episodic memory is the view that the content of episodic memories is reflexive: a memory of a past experience represents the subject of this experience as being identical with the subject of the memory. In the first part of the talk, I shall argue that the textbook argument for Lockeanism rests on reflexivism. In the second part, I shall argue against reflexivism. I shall conclude that the textbook argument for Lockeanism rests on a mistake.

10

Sauer

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 13.30 Uhr, 11/115
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 1:30 p.m., 11/115

**Far-Fetched—What Can we Learn from Moral
Judgment about Unrealistic Scenarios?**

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A significant part of research in experimental philosophy and empirically informed metaethics draws on people's judgments about unrealistic scenarios (e. g. sacrificial dilemmas such as the Trolley Problem). For this very reason (lack of realism), the evidential value of this entire approach is frequently called into question. We are, the argument goes, interested in people's actual moral judgments; but their judgments about extremely unfamiliar situations seem to have very little to do with those. There are various versions of this challenge which I shall consider: ecological validity, unfamiliarity, imaginative resistance, excessive specificity, and stipulated outcome certainty. One popular reply to this general objection is based on what might be referred to as the difference argument. The idea behind this argument is that the level of realism of any particular scenario (such as the Trolley dilemma) is irrelevant to their evidential value, because what we are actually interested in are subjects' differential responses to two distinct scenarios (e. g. the Trolley and the Footbridge dilemma). I argue that this response fails: all or most of the aforementioned problems with unrealistic scenarios apply equally to differential responses.

12

Schickhardt

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 13.30 Uhr, 11/211
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 1:30 p.m., 11/211

**Durchleuchtung der Privatsphäre.
Begriffliche und normative Klärungsversuche**

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Thema des Vortrags ist die Privatsphäre und ihre mögliche Verortung und Stellung in der Sozialethik. In der politischen Diskussion der letzten Jahre spielen Datenschutz und Privatsphäre eine prominente Rolle. Der Wert, den man dem Datenschutz im Verhältnis zu anderen Werten und Rechten zuschreibt, kann direkte rechtspolitische und praktische Konsequenzen haben. Der großen gesellschaftlichen Relevanz ungeachtet stellt aber bereits die ethische Klärung des Begriffs der Privatsphäre eine beachtliche Herausforderung dar. Ähnliches gilt für den Gegenstands- bzw. Schutzbereich der verwandten Begriffe des Datenschutzes und der informationellen Selbstbestimmung. Von der Klärung des Begriffs der Privatsphäre ergeben sich auch Folgen für die sozialethische Verortung der Privatsphäre, so unter anderem für die folgenden Fragen: Handelt es sich bei der Privatsphäre um ein reines Individualrecht oder auch um ein Allgemeingut? Ist für es für die Verletzung der Privatsphäre notwendig, dass eine dritte Person etwas über uns

weiß bzw. bewusst wahrnimmt, oder reicht schon das Speichern persönlicher Daten durch Computer? In meinem Vortrag möchte ich eine Klärung des Begriffs der Privatsphäre vorschlagen und aufzeigen, welche Konsequenzen sich daraus für die weitere normative Konkretisierung, Verortung und Einbindung der Privatsphäre in sozialetische Theorien und Fragestellungen ergeben. Ich werde dafür argumentieren, dass Privatsphäre nicht isoliert als Individualrecht verstanden werden sollte, sondern erstens als wichtiger Bestandteil anderer Rechte einer Einzelperson und zweitens aus der allgemeingesellschaftlichen Perspektive eines freiheitlichen Rechtsstaates auch im Sinne eines Allgemeinguts.

1

Schieder

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 10.30 Uhr, 15/114
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 10:30 a.m., 15/114

Necessity in Virtue of Meaning

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It is widely held that the notion of truth in virtue of meaning is not philosophically helpful. One standard objection is this: Truth is not a property that attaches to a sentence only because of its meaning, rather a meaningful sentence is true, because it represents the world truly. Meaning merely fixes what is represented, while the world fixes the truth of what is represented.

While almost a truism, this observation speaks only against views of analyticity that are committed to meaning, as opposed to the world, making analytic sentences true. Conventionalist views of analyticity arguably claimed that this is so, and the objection may be conceded to work against them. However, this is not the only feasible view of how a sentence can be, in a sense, true in virtue of meaning. The sense in which a sentence can be true in virtue of meaning is not that it is made true by its meaning, it remains to be made true by the world, rather it is guaranteed to be true in virtue of its meaning. One classic account of analyticity that yields this result is the Kantian containment account of analyticity. Containment of concept M in B guarantees the reference of the concepts to be fixed in such a way that the judgment »all Bs are Ms« is guaranteed to come out true. Crucially, it is not required that it is also made true in this way. The Kantian picture has a limited application, for concept-containment is most likely not an ubiquitous phenomenon. Concept containment, however, is not essential to the general form of the account. That some sentence is guaranteed to be true is merely a consequence of how the reference of its constituents is determined in relation to its truth conditions. If appropriately related, the truth of the sentence is guaranteed, while it also remains true that it is true because it represents truly. A general framework for understanding this relationship will be presented.

5

Schlicht

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 9.00 Uhr, 15/115
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 9:00 a.m., 15/115

Subjective Character

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Kenneth Williford (2015) has put forward a new philosophical account of the subjective character of phenomenal consciousness. He maintains that such a theory has to respect (1) the relational structure of consciousness, and (2) the Humean intuition that one of the relata, the subject, remains somewhat invisible and is at least not constituted by a special (additional) entity. His solution is to peacefully combine these two intuitions by *identifying* the subject with (an episode of or) the stream of consciousness which is itself reflexively self-aware. This identity claim leads to the situation that the subject-pole of the consciousness-relation *appearing* (or being manifest) in the conscious episode *is* the episode itself. The subject-pole is thereby manifest, i.e. consciously experienced, but not separable as an entity from the conscious episode in question, and thus—in a sense—invisible.

This paper points out problems of his identification of the subject with the stream (or episodes) of consciousness. In a second and third section, an alternative way of conceptualizing the subject will be presented. On this alternative view, a mental representation is conscious (i.e. exhibits subjective character) if it is integrated in the right way into the overall conscious state of the organism. By way of integration, all *conscious* representations are something *for* the organism, which is itself identified as the subject of experience.

Williford faces a dilemma with respect to the individuation of episodes: *If a single sensation of red is too simple to count as an episode*, then Williford's theory can only explain why the complex episode as an emergent whole (having single experiences as its parts or elements) is conscious. It *cannot* explain what makes an individual element of this whole episode (or stream), a sensation of red say, conscious. *But if a single sensation of red may count as an episode*, then this gives rise to a multiplicity of (streams and consequently) conscious subjects.

The basic idea of a positive alternative to this is that some of the multiple competing representations, like a sensation of red say, are phenomenally conscious because of being *integrated* into the one global conscious state of the organism that also contains the structures responsible for creature-consciousness (Van Gulick 2004). An argument is presented to the effect that we should identify the subject of experience with the organism itself.

8

Schmalzried

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 9.00 Uhr, 15/105
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 9:00 a.m., 15/105

Beauty and the Sensory-Dependence-Thesis

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According to the sensory-dependence-thesis, beauty depends not completely, but still partly on sensory properties. Consequently, judgements of beauty about non-perceptual features or objects—like, e.g., character traits, proofs, or ideas—can only be understood metaphorically. Throughout the history of aesthetics, influential thinkers have asserted as well as denied the sensory-dependence-thesis. Despite this disagreement, barely any meta-theoretical debate about the sensory-dependence-thesis exists. This paper aims to fill this gap. It accepts Gaut's challenge that the burden of proof lies with the defenders of the thesis because in everyday life we attribute beauty to non-perceptual features and objects and this way of speaking is neither obviously false nor senseless. It considers three arguments supporting the sensory-dependence-thesis. The argument of immediacy highlights that judgements of beauty are made immediately. Hence beauty has to depend on immediately accessible features, such as sensory properties. But this argument conflates the logical (»non-inferential«) and the temporal (»at once«) meaning of »immediate«. The second argument builds on the intuitive appealing and often-defended acquaintance principle: One can only judge and especially appreciate the beauty of an object if one has actually experienced it. The sensory-dependence-thesis (partly) explains this principle. The sensory quality of an object is only fully accessible if one actually sees or hears the object. So accepting the acquaintance principle leads to accepting the sensory-dependence-thesis. But not only has the acquaintance principle been raised to question in recent years, one can also defend the acquaintance principle without defending the sensory-dependence-thesis, and vice versa. According to the argument of conceptual clarity, attributing beauty to perceptual as well as to non-perceptual objects leads to conceptual confusion. So for the sake of conceptual clarity, one should defend the sensory-dependence-thesis. Thereby, one is not committed, however, to defend this thesis with respect to all other aesthetic properties. This results in giving up the equation between judgements of beauty and judgements of aesthetic value per se. And this leads to further conceptual clarity. So whereas the first two arguments fail, the third provides a good reason to defend the sensory-dependence-thesis.

6

Schmechtig

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 9.45 Uhr, 11/214
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 9:45 a.m., 11/214

**Wissen-wie, kognitive Leistungen
und epistemische Werte**

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Adam J. Carter und Duncan Pritchard (*forthcoming*) haben jüngst dafür argumentiert, dass sich anhand des speziellen Werts Wissen-wie ein neues *wertgeleitetes* Argument (*value-driven argument*) gegen reduktive Intellektualisten bezüglich der Natur von Wissen-wie entwickeln lässt. Ihre argumentative Strategie lässt sich in Form des folgenden *modus tollens*-Arguments wiedergeben:

- (1) Wenn Wissen-wie eine Spezies von Wissen-dass ist, dann sind alle Eigenschaften von Wissen-dass (inklusive axiologische) Eigenschaften von Wissen-wie.
 - (2) Es ist keine wesentliche Eigenschaft von Wissen-dass, in unverwechselbarer Weise epistemisch wertvoll zu sein.
 - (3) Es ist jedoch eine wesentliche Eigenschaft von Wissen-wie in unverwechselbarer Weise epistemisch wertvoll zu sein.
-
- (C) Wissen-wie ist keine Spezies von Wissen-dass.

Im Verlauf des Vortrags werde ich zwei Dinge diskutieren. Erstens scheint es verschiedene Möglichkeiten zu geben, Prämisse (2) zurückzuweisen. Zweitens möchte ich etwas genauer den Fall betrachten, wonach ein reduktiver Intellektualist – aus welchen Gründen auch immer – Prämisse (2) akzeptiert. Nach Carter & Pritchard gilt in diesem Fall, dass Prämisse (3) gerechtfertigt ist, da das Vollziehen einer kognitiven Leistung für Wissen-wie eine notwendige und hinreichende Bedingung ist, wobei diese Tatsache erklärt, dass Wissen-wie einen unverwechselbaren (d.h. finalen) epistemischen Wert besitzt.

Demgegenüber versuche ich zwei Probleme aufzuzeigen. Die Autoren definieren Leistungen als eine Form des kognitiven Erfolgs aufgrund von Fähigkeiten. Gegen diese Konzeption sprechen Fälle des *leichten kognitiven Erfolgs*. Nicht jede Instanz von Wissen-wie scheint eine echte Leistung zu sein. Das zweite Problem betrifft hingegen den Wert kognitiver Leistungen. Carter & Pritchard gehen davon aus, dass Wissen-wie – als eine Form des kognitiven Erfolgs aufgrund von Fähigkeit – unter allen Umständen einen finalen Wert hat. Es ist jedoch zweifelhaft, ob diese Konzeption das Phänomen der *radikal bösen Leistungen* (*evil achievements*) – bei denen das erfolgreiche Ausüben kognitiver Fähigkeiten einen inhärenten negativen Wert besitzt – erklären kann. Als Alternative schlage ich vor, kognitive Leistungen als ein komplexes Wertganzes zu analysieren, das sich aus verschiedenen Konstituenten (kognitive Kompetenz, Art des epistemischen Ziels und Grad der zu überwindenden Schwierigkeit) zusammensetzt. In diesem Zusammenhang wird sich zeigen, dass die Rede von einem finalen Wert kognitiver Leistungen generell bedenklich ist.

11

Schmidt, Eva

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 13.30 Uhr, 15/111
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 1:30 p.m., 15/111

Evidence Ain't no Reason (to Act)

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In my presentation, I argue against Kearns and Star's attempt to equate reasons to act a certain way with evidence that one ought to act this way. In particular, I criticize the right-to-left direction of their central claim:

RA^{RL}: Necessarily, if a fact F is evidence that A ought to ϕ then F is a reason for A to ϕ .

I provide a new counterexample to this direction of (RA) that involves an inference to the best explanation.

I proceed as follows: First, I elucidate Kearns and Star's view that reasons are evidence. Second, I present my counterexample, which involves an inference to the best explanation: the student case. In this example, high school student Henry uses the fact that he ought to study for his biology exam as evidence for the truth of the proposition that he ought to perform well in the exam. Contrary to what Kearns and Star's are committed to, however, the fact that he ought to study for his exam is not a normative reason for him to perform well in the exam. Third, I provide a diagnosis of the counterexample. I argue that, while an »ought« fact that arises from another ought fact may be evidence of the latter, it is never a reason to perform the corresponding action.

9

Schmidt-Petri

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 13.30 Uhr, 11/215
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 1:30 p.m., 11/215

Persistenz, Tod und die Dead Donour Rule

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In diesem Beitrag möchte ich erstens eine Theorie für transtemporale Persistenzbedingungen von Menschen vorstellen, zweitens skizzieren, welche Bedeutung diese Sicht auf menschliche Persistenz für die Frage hat, wann ein Mensch tot ist, und drittens die Konsequenzen für die Transplantationsmedizin skizzieren. Die Theorie stellt einen Kompromiss zwischen den zwei wichtigsten Ansichten zu personaler Identität dar – der Theorie der biologischen Kontinuität und der Theorie der psychologischen Kontinuität. Der »Disjunktivismus« sieht sowohl biologische wie auch psychologische Kontinuität als individuell hinreichend, nicht jedoch als individuell notwendig für transtemporale Persistenz an. Wir beginnen unser Leben also als (bewusstseinslose) Embryonen. Unser Leben endet aber erst, wenn die biologische und auch die psychologische Kontinuität abgebrochen ist. Hirntote Menschen leben daher noch, obwohl sie ihr Bewusstsein unwiderruflich verloren haben. Eine Organentnahme ist nicht deswegen zwangsläufig illegitim, würde aber auf jeden Fall an hirntoten aber lebenden Spendern durchgeführt. Die Dead Donour Rule müsste also aufgegeben werden.

10

Schmidt, Thomas

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 15.15 Uhr, 11/115
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 3:15 p.m., 11/115

Ethical Theorizing with Moral Equivalences

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Subscribing to an ethical view or theory commits one to holding that there are no morally relevant differences between certain acts and between certain situations—or, to use terminology that I will give a more precise meaning in the talk, that certain acts, and certain situations, are *morally equivalent*. I argue that thinking about ethical theories in terms of the moral equivalences that they imply is philosophically fruitful in a number of ways: it allows for complete and illuminating representations of the moral content of ethical theories; it provides a device for transparent reconstructions of moral reasoning following the methodology of reflective equilibrium; and it shows that, in such reasoning, an appeal to moral principles is a detour that can be avoided without substantial loss.

6

Schmitz

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 9.45 Uhr, 11/213
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 9:45 a.m., 11/213

Does Experience Provide Reasons for Belief?

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Some philosophers have suggested that only factive mental state types can provide good reasons for belief. For example, it has been claimed that only knowledge can be evidence (e.g. Williamson, Littlejohn), or that only experience or perception (construed as factive relations) can provide good reasons for beliefs about the external world, particularly so that skepticism can be refuted, preempted or otherwise blocked (e.g. McDowell). Furthermore, some (e.g. Campbell, Martin, Logue) have even thought that achieving this goal is worth the cost of metaphysical disjunctivism with its apparently implausible commitment of denying that there is a common factor—in the form of an internal, contentful intentional state—between the good cases of successful representation in perception and the bad cases of representational failures. Considered in one way, what these philosophers are trying to establish is a certain primacy of the good cases over the bad ones. However, I will argue with regard to perception that the right way to accomplish this is not by claiming that only experience (conceived relationistically) can provide reasons for belief. Rather the best way to think about this is that in

the normal case experience absolves us from having to provide reasons. For example, when it seems to me perceptually that there is a monitor in front of me, I don't need a reason to believe this, I would rather need a reason to deny or even doubt this. In my talk I will develop several arguments for preferring my account. For example, I will argue that (1) reasons should be understood in terms of the role they play in processes of reasoning and deliberation, and that (2) reasoning essentially involves propositional attitudes and conceptual content, while (3) perceptual experience is non-propositional and non-conceptual, and therefore (4) cannot figure in reasoning processes. On the basis of these arguments, I will show how one can account for the primacy of the good over the bad cases while rejecting the idea that experience provides reasons, dissolving the skeptical problem and avoiding the counterintuitive posits of disjunctivism.

9

Schnüriger

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 9.00 Uhr, 11/215
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 9:00 a.m., 11/215

Die gegenwärtigen Rechte in der Zukunft lebender Personen

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In der Debatte über Klimagerechtigkeit herrscht eine Verunsicherung über die Frage, in welcher Begrifflichkeit das normative Verhältnis zwischen moralischen Akteuren gefasst werden kann, deren Lebensspannen sich nicht überschneiden. Konkret ist umstritten, ob Personen, die erst in der Zukunft leben werden, Rechte gegenüber in der Gegenwart lebenden Akteuren haben können. Sie werden zwar in der Zukunft Rechte gegenüber ihren Zeitgenossen haben, aber können sie Rechte haben, welche das Handeln in der Gegenwart lebender Akteure anleiten? Dieses ›Nicht-Existenz-Problem‹ ist bereits verhältnismässig früh in die Debatte eingebracht worden. Es ist allerdings erstaunlich selten sorgfältig diskutiert worden.

Der Vortrag arbeitet in einem ersten Schritt heraus, wie genau begründet werden soll, dass zukünftig lebende Personen keine Rechte gegenüber in der Gegenwart lebenden Akteuren haben können. In einem zweiten Schritt werden zwei in der Literatur vertretene Verteidigungen der Sinnhaftigkeit der Rede von Rechten zukünftig Lebender, welche das Handeln gegenwärtige lebende Akteure anleiten sollen, dargestellt und kritisiert. Der Schwerpunkt liegt dabei auf einem Argument von Lukas Meyer, der zwar zugesteht, dass in der Zukunft lebende Menschen in der Gegenwart keine Rechte haben können, aber gleichwohl betont, dass die zukünftigen Rechte zukünftig Lebender das Handeln gegenwärtig Lebender anleiten können sollen. Das Problem dieses Ansatzes besteht darin, dass er Rechte und Interessen vermengt. In einem dritten und vierten Schritt wird ein eigenständiger Vorschlag zur Verteidigung der Sinnhaftigkeit der Rede von gegenwärtigen Rechten in der Zukunft Lebender unterbreitet. Er baut auf der Vorstellung auf, dass Rechte und ihre korrelativen Pflichten auf eine bestimmte Begründungsstruktur verweisen. Diesem Vorschlag gemäss unterliegen Rechte denselben Existenzbedingungen wie Gründe. Wenn Eigenschaften wie Interessen von noch nicht existierenden Personen

Handlungsgründe für gegenwärtig lebende Akteure darstellen können, was auf breiter Basis akzeptiert wird, erscheint es entsprechend unproblematisch anzunehmen, dass zukünftig Lebende Akteure in der Gegenwart Rechte haben können. Der vorzuschlagende Rechtsbegriff erlaubt nicht nur eine elegante Lösung für das Nicht-Existenz-Problem, sondern hat auch den Vorteil, auf einer unabhängig von diesem Vorschlag entwickelten Theorie subjektiver Rechte und ihrer Rolle im praktischen Denken aufzubauen.

5

Schulte

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 10.30 Uhr, 15/114
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 10:30 a.m., 15/114

Perceiving the World Outside: A New Causal- Teleological Account of Perceptual Content

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Perceptual states represent the external world as being a certain way—they have *intentional content*. This, at least, is the dominant view in contemporary philosophy of mind. Proponents of naturalistic theories of intentionality must therefore not only account for the content of beliefs and desires, but also for the content of perception. Moreover, explaining perceptual content may be a good starting point for a general theory of intentionality, given that perceptual states are (arguably) the most basic intentional states.

One attractive naturalistic approach to perceptual content is the causal-teleological approach, which identifies the content of a perceptual state with its ›normal cause‹, i.e. with the external state of affairs (type) causally responsible for its occurrence in biologically normal cases. In my talk, I focus on a notorious problem for the causal-teleological approach: how can we explain that perceptual states have distal instead of proximate content, i.e. that we perceptually represent external material objects and their properties, rather than patterns of retinal stimulations or patterns of light? This problem—the *distality problem*—is often thought to be fatal for causal-teleological accounts. However, I argue that this problem can be overcome by (i) paying attention to certain empirical facts about perceptual systems and by (ii) switching from a straightforward causal formulation of the theory to a formulation that employs the notion of causal explanation instead. The second move, I maintain, is not incompatible with the aim of providing an objective, naturalistic account of perceptual content, and it might provide the resources for solving other problems of the causal-teleological approach as well.

11

Schulz

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 13.30 Uhr, 15/113
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 1:30 p.m., 15/113

Fundamental Desire and Belief

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The paper is concerned with the desire-as-belief debate after Lewis's (1988, 1996) attack. It considers a restriction of this hypothesis to *fundamental desires* concerned with outcomes the salient agent takes to be ends in themselves, a restriction Lewis (1988) explicitly excluded from his counterarguments. However, a thesis of this kind has been argued against by Broome (1990) claiming that all desires (or preferences) are shot through with belief by pointing to the fact that a prominent decision theory, the Bolker-Jeffrey formulation of evidential decision theory, is formulated in terms of an *atomless* algebra in which there is no room for non-instrumental desires. The paper will defend a possible correspondence between fundamental desires and what the agent believes to be good for her against Broome's arguments.

11

Schwind

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 14.15 Uhr, 15/111
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 2:15 p.m., 15/111

Ethical Intuitionism and the Linguistic Analogy

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Self-evidence is a central concept for classical ethical intuitionism: it not only determines the *content* of moral principles, but also provides their *justification*. Given the persistent difficulties in spelling out a widely accepted account of self-evidence, the case for ethical intuitionism could however be strengthened by a moral epistemology which does not rely on this concept, even at the price of having to develop separate accounts of content-determination and justification. In my talk, I develop the first part of such a project. I argue that an analogy with Chomskian linguistics—especially the theory of generative grammar and the distinction between operative and express principles—helps to see that the actual well-considered judgments of mature moral agents are guided by moral principles that bear close resemblance to W.D. Ross' list of *prima facie* duties. This would vindicate his claim that intuitionism captures common sense morality without making use of contested claims about self-evidence.

Arguing towards that conclusion, I first derive a list of empirical predictions from Ross' version of intuitionism. Then, I compare those predictions with the results of a large empirical study conducted by John Mikhail in which he presented participants with a set of trolley cases. Even though the participants were unable to explain their responses to the subtle variations in the test scenarios, further analysis reveals abstract principles that underlie those intuitions; these operative principles

are the basis of a moral grammar that is similar in structure and content to Ross' normative theory. I differ in an important respect from Mikhail's interpretation of the deontic rules that underlie people's responses to trolley cases: other than him, I argue that they should be understood as *prima facie* principles, not as a ranked system of rules.

Finally, I consider the methodological implications that result from the application of empirical data to intuitionist moral psychology, especially the shift from the first- to the third-person perspective as well the distinction between operative versus express principles that play different roles in linguistics and in moral deliberations. I conclude by discussing how this account of content-determination relates to theories of justification in intuitionist moral epistemology.

8

Seibert

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 16.00 Uhr, 15/105
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 4:00 p.m., 15/105

**Ästhetische Erfahrung von Musik
in Experimentalsituationen**

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Dem Versuch der empirischen Untersuchung von Aspekten ästhetischer Erfahrung im Experiment muss eine eingehende Analyse der Experimentalsituation vorausgehen. Damit ist nicht die Notwendigkeit angesprochen, alle Variablen und Störvariablen zu identifizieren und zu kontrollieren – dies ist die Voraussetzung empirischer Praxis. Vielmehr geht es um die Frage, inwieweit im Rahmen von Experimentalsituationen und unter Berücksichtigung empirisch-methodischer Voraussetzungen überhaupt von ästhetischer Erfahrung gesprochen werden kann. Dem ästhetischen Objekt wird darin die Rolle eines Stimulus zugewiesen, dessen Eigenschaften zu kontrollieren sind. Die ästhetische Erfahrung, beziehungsweise jene Indikatoren, die ein Konstrukt der ästhetischen Erfahrung zugänglich werden lassen, sind die zu ermittelnden Messgrößen. Die Charakterisierung des Stimulus und die Operationalisierung eines Konstrukts ästhetischer Erfahrung erfolgt dabei in der Sprache der empirischen Forschungspraxis. Damit ist ein notwendiger Übergang angesprochen, vom Ästhetischen zum dem, was im Rahmen einer empirischen Methodik zugänglich ist. Werden Ergebnisse empirischer Forschung auf das Ästhetische bezogen, wird dieser Übergang erneut, diesmal jedoch in entgegengesetzter Richtung, vollzogen. Dieser Übergang ist jeweils kritisch zu untersuchen.

Die Analyse der Experimentalsituation bietet jedoch auch – unabhängig von der konkreten Durchführung eines Experiments – ein Erkenntnispotential für das Verständnis der Situation der ästhetischen Erfahrung. Als hochgradig kontrollierte Situation stellt die ästhetische Erfahrung in Experimentalsituationen einen Spezialfall dar, anhand dessen sich Aspekte ästhetischer Erfahrung durchspielen lassen und der somit die Möglichkeit bietet, den Begriff der ästhetischen Erfahrung zu konturieren. Die Analyse der empirischen Perspektive könnte somit auch die philosophische Diskussion um den Begriff der ästhetischen Erfahrung bereichern.

Diesen beiden Aspekten möchte sich die Analyse einer Experimentalsituation annähern, in der Musik als Stimulus und musikalische Erfahrung als operationalisiertes Konstrukt gegeben sind. Mithilfe der Differenzierung von Verfahren zur Charakterisierung musikalischer Stimuli und der Bestimmung musikalischer Stimuli in Experimentalsituationen soll der spezifischen ästhetischen Erfahrung von Musik in Experimentalsituationen auf den Grund gegangen werden.

10

Seidel

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 9:45 Uhr, 11/115
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 9:45 a.m., 11/115

Risking Compliance and Discounting Risks of Harm: Re-Assessing the Idea of a »Chain of Obligations«

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In response to challenges to the very possibility of intergenerational obligations (like the non-existence problem, the non-identity problem or the non-reciprocity problem), some authors (e.g. Rawls, Howarth, Gosseries) have resorted to the idea of a »chain of obligation«: this is an attempt to derive »weak« intergenerational obligations from (1) obligations between contemporaries, (2) the fact that generations overlap and (3) the key normative principle that it is (sometimes) impermissible to negatively affect other people's compliance with their obligations.

In this paper I argue that this attempt ultimately fails to vindicate intergenerational duties because it cannot deal with uncertainty and risks. My argument will develop in four steps. I will (1) reconstruct (different versions of) the idea of a chain of obligation; (2) argue that the content of moral obligations and moral principles changes considerably in indeterminate, risky contexts; (3) show (a) that this alters (among others) the content of the key normative principle (from claiming that negatively affecting other people's compliance is sometimes impermissible to claiming that risking compliance sometimes is) and (b) how this invalidates the attempt to derive intergenerational obligations; (4) point out that the only way out of this problem is to believe in discounting risks of harms, which is shown to be an untenable position.

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Shnayderman

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 16:00 Uhr, 11/211
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 4:00 p.m., 11/211

Overall Freedom-Measurement and Evaluation

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Freedom is one of the most important moral and political ideals. Questions concerning degrees of overall freedom—e.g., how free are we? How free would we be under different political, social and economic arrangements? How free should we be?—are therefore of

the utmost moral and political concern. To answer these questions we need to know, among other things, how to measure freedom; we need, that is, a theory of overall freedom-measurement. Yet, until very recently the vast literature on freedom lacked sustained attempts to develop such a theory. This gap has started to be filled now by two opposing theories developed by Ian Carter, in his book *A Measure of Freedom* (1999), and Matthew Kramer, in his book *The Quality of Freedom* (2003). Carter argues for a strictly empirical, non-evaluative theory on which the degree of overall freedom we possess is purely a function of the physical extension of the freedoms (and unfreedoms) we possess. Kramer, on the other hand, argues for a partly evaluative theory on which the degree of overall freedom we possess is partly a function of the physical extension of the freedoms (and unfreedoms) we possess and partly a function of the various values they have by virtue of the values of the specific things that they allow (and disallow) us to do. The main point on which Carter and Kramer disagree pertains, thus, to the question of whether such a theory should be value-neutral or value-laden. In this paper I join this debate and seek to substantiate Kramer's position in a novel way.

3

Shramko

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 13:30 Uhr, 11/116
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 1:30 p.m., 11/116

A Modal Translation for Dual-Intuitionistic Logic

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I construct four binary consequence systems axiomatizing entailment relations between formulas of classical, intuitionistic, dual-intuitionistic and modal (S4) logics. It is shown that intuitionistic consequence system is embeddable into the modal (S4) one by the usual modal translation prefixing $\Box$ to every subformula of the translated formula. An analogous modal translation for dual-intuitionistic formulas consists then in prefixing $\Diamond$ to every subformula of the translated formula.

5

Smortchkova

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 14:15 Uhr, 15/134
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 2:15 p.m., 15/134

Extending the Reach of Perceptual Content

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What kinds of properties enter into the experiential contents of perception? Do only low-level properties (such as being blue, square, etc.) contribute to perceptual experiences (poor content view) or do high level properties (such as being an agent, being a banana, being sad, etc.) enter into experiential content as well (rich content view)? I focus on the ways in which we could establish the truth of the rich content view. I first underline a limitation of an argument proposed to argue for the rich

content view: the phenomenal contrast method (Kriegel, 2007; Siegel, 2010). The limitation stems from its failure to clearly distinguish cases of visual, perceptual, phenomenology from cases of non-perceptual, cognitive, phenomenology.

I suggest one way to improve the method is by checking its predictions against the experimental data provided by psychological research on perceptual adaptation. High level properties that are susceptible to perceptual adaptation are the best candidates for being part of perceptual content (following Block, 2014). In order to argue for this claim I respond to two potential objections. First, I rule out the possibility of post-perceptual adaptation; second, I examine the relation between the level of perceptual mechanisms underlying perceptual adaptation and the level of perceptual experience.

My aim in so doing is not simply to imply that the methods used by psychology are the right ones: taken on their own they do not cut finely enough between competing possible interpretations of certain data. Instead, I outline how a combination of approaches might positively impact future research on the reach of perceptual content.

13 Spiegel

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 15.15 Uhr, 11/116
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 3:15 p.m., 11/116

Quietism as an Alternative to Naturalism

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In this talk I demonstrate how the recent metaphilosophical view of quietism is an alternative to widespread scientific naturalism (»naturalism«, henceforth). Naturalism is most notably characterized by an ontological view: all that exists are basic entities posited by the theories of natural sciences. All other phenomena must be suitably related to scientifically respectable entities. Consequently, naturalism's metaphilosophical outlook is that own philosophy should explain phenomena in a way acceptable by scientific theorizing. However, this produces so-called »placement problems« (Huw Price) since it dismisses entities which are not objects of sciences as unnatural, e.g. norms, values, mind, numbers. Objects of this sort are difficult to assign a spot in the natural world. I call them *hard-to-place phenomena*.

I propose the term »metaphysical explanations« to describe naturalism's main tool for dealing with placement problems. Metaphysical explanations are supposed to assign hard-to-place phenomena a spot in the natural world by *linking* entities respectable by scientific standards with hard-to-place phenomena. The target phenomenon is thereby found to be ontologically somehow dependent on the base phenomenon. The most relevant species of metaphysical explanations are reduction, supervenience, elimination, and emergence

Recently, philosophical quietism has been viewed as a contender against naturalism. Quietism is the view that such philosophical attempts at theoretical explanations about certain concepts and phenomena are misguided or inappropriate. So quietism is a metaphilosophical view because it tells us what *not* to do in philosophy. Quietism rejects two assumptions of naturalism: First, Quietism rejects scientific naturalism's view of nature, the idea that only that which is investi-

gated by sciences is part of nature. Second, quietism rejects the metaphilosophical task of integrating hard-to-place phenomena into a naturalistic world-view by way of metaphysical explanation. I close the talk by sketching a positive metaphilosophical view implicit in the quietist's rejection of naturalism.

4 Starzak

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 10.30 Uhr, 15/133
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 10:30 a.m., 15/133

Morgan's Canon—Interpretation and Justification

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When philosophers, cognitive ethologists and comparative psychologists investigate the animal mind they typically face the problem that animal behavior is ambiguous concerning the underlying psychological abilities. As a consequence, they have to choose between various rival explanations for every observed behavior. In those cases many researcher's rely on *Morgan's Canon* as a tie-breaking principle to guide their decision which explanations they should prefer. Roughly Morgan's Canon states that we should always prefer explanations of behavior in terms of *lower psychological processes* over explanations in terms of *higher psychological processes*. In this talk I critically discuss both the meaning and the justification of Morgan's Canon. In section (1) I argue that the idea of a psychological scale according to which we can rank different psychological abilities as higher or lower relative to each other is much less straightforward than is usually assumed. I then consider recently proposed alternatives to Morgan's original idea, one from Hans-Johann Glock and one from Elliott Sober, and argue that their attempts to save Morgan's idea are deeply problematic. In section (2) I focus on the question whether a systematic preference of lower psychological abilities in explanations (under any of the interpretations discussed in Section (1)) is justified. Here, I'll consider explanatory power and likeliness of being true in general and, more specifically, parsimony, simplicity and the idea that we need to counter a human tendency to anthropomorphize animals, but I conclude that none of these criteria can justify Morgan's Canon. Finally in Section (3) I offer the outline of a positive account of how we should deal with rival explanations solely on the basis of available evidence instead.

5 Staudacher

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 9.45 Uhr, 15/114
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 9:45 a.m., 15/114

A Problem with the Epistemic Conception of Hallucination

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How should the philosophy of perception deal with hallucinations? Defenders of a relational and non-

intentional view of perception like M.G.F. Martin have argued with respect to a certain class of hallucinations (»causally matching« hallucinations) that they can be characterized in mental respects only negatively, namely as introspectively indistinguishable from the respective veridical perception. This claim is criticized with a new argument focussing on the possible relations between these causally matching hallucinations and other types of hallucinations. According to this argument the negative conception cannot do justice to the fact that causally matching hallucinations may vary only gradually from these other types of hallucinations.

3 Stei

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 10.30 Uhr, 11/116
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 10:30 a.m., 11/116

Logical Pluralism and the Argument from Incoherence

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Logical Pluralism is the view that there are at least two correct systems of logic. JC Beall and Greg Restall (2006) defend a variant of this view in terms of pluralism about logical consequence (PLC). I focus on an argument against PLC discussed by Graham Priest (2006) and Stephen Read (2006).

Beall and Restall make room for different instances of »validity« resulting from different specifications of »cases« in their *Generalized Tarski Thesis*: »An argument is valid_i if and only if, in every case_x in which the premises are true, so is the conclusion.« (Beall and Restall 2006, 29) Given different classes of cases, an argument that is valid₁ in one class of cases K_1 may fail to be valid₂ in a different class of cases K_2 . Combined with a number of additional restrictions, this results in different but equally acceptable notions of validity.

The idea of Priest's argument is that there might be a case or situation s about which we are reasoning and that is both in K_1 and K_2 . The question that arises is whether one should reason according to the notion of validity appropriate for K_1 or K_2 . Apparently, we cannot use both as there will be some inference $\alpha \vdash \beta$, valid in K_1 but not K_2 . Now, Priest asks, »suppose that we know (or assume) α holds in s ; are we, or are we not entitled to accept that β does?« (Priest 2006, 203) Read's (2006) challenge takes the argument further by supposing that there is a third account of validity, K_3 , such that »while β follows K_1 -ly from α , ' $\sim\beta$ ' follows K_2 -ly from α , while α is consistent—that is, there is some world, indeed this one, in which α is true. Should we infer that β is true, or that ' $\sim\beta$ ' is true?« (Read 2006, 197)

Read's verdict is that PLC is an incoherent position (Read 2006, 209). Central elements of his analysis rest on the *meaning-variance thesis*—the claim that a change in logic leads to a change in meaning of the logical connectives. I argue that, given assumptions explicitly made Beall and Restall themselves, the arguments can be made more general. Even without relying on meaning-variance, epistemological considerations suggest that one cannot coherently advocate pluralism about logical consequence.

References

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Read, S. (2006). Monism: The one true logic. In DeVidi, D. and Kenyon, T., editors, *A Logical Approach to Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Graham Solomon*, pages 193–209. Springer, Dordrecht.

2

Steinberg

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 9.00 Uhr, 15/E27
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 9:00 a.m., 15/E27

Syntactic Arguments Against »that«-Clause Reference

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The Reference Thesis claims that »that«-clauses in propositional attitude ascriptions are singular terms that refer to propositions. Recently, some philosophers and linguists have argued that the Reference Thesis is in conflict with certain substitution failures in propositional attitude ascriptions: substituting a »that«-clause, »that p «, with the corresponding proposition description »the proposition that p « does not always result in sentences with the same truth-value. There are two relevantly different kinds of substitution failure: (i) failure to preserve grammaticality, and, thus, trivially truth value as, e.g., in the pair »Anne hopes that there is life on Mars«/»Anne hopes the proposition that there is life on Mars«; (ii) failure to preserve truth value while preserving grammaticality as, e.g., in the pair »Anne fears that there is life on Mars«/»Anne fears the proposition that there is life on Mars«. In a recent paper Tobias Rosefeldt has argued that, though type (ii) cases may be explained away, type (i) cases prove fatal to the Reference Thesis. In the talk I argue against Rosefeldt's diagnosis, in particular against the bridge principle between syntax and semantics he employs in his argument. And I propose and defend an explication of the failure to preserve grammaticality that is compatible with co-reference of »that«-clause and proposition description.

3

Stern

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 15.15 Uhr, 11/116
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 3:15 p.m., 11/116

A New Norm for Truth

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The most central but naive norm for theories of truth asserts that for all sentences ϕ the so-called T-sentence $T\phi \leftrightarrow \phi$ should be derivable within the theory. However, this norm cannot be satisfied if classical logic is assumed because of Tarski's famous undefinability theorem. The question then arises what an alternative but satisfiable norm should look like. One way is to require the T-sentences to be derivable for some sentences only. This option has proven more problematic than one might think—especially for axiomatic theories of truth. The problem is that it proved notoriously difficult to

come up with a »big«, recursively enumerable and well-motivated set of sentences for which one can consistently maintain all T-sentences. As a consequence we propose a change of perspective and to abstract away from the question of whether a theory proves the T-sentence for a particular sentence ϕ . The idea is to view the initial norm as characterizing a logic of truth. That is, we view the norm as ascribing a particular modal property to the notion of truth. This can be easily expressed in the setting of modal operator logic: the logic of truth is the normal modal operator logic axiomatized by the modal principle $\Box\phi \leftrightarrow \phi$. Of course, Tarski's undefinability theorem shows that we cannot adopt the full naive logic of truth in the presence of liar-like or other self-referential sentences. But we can try to find a sublogic of the logic of truth that is consistent in the presence of self-reference and, for which, no logic properly extending it is consistent. In other words we can require the modal logic of a theory of truth to be a maximal modal logic in this sense—a logic that gets as close to truth as it is possible. In this talk we shall explain and discuss this alternative norm for truth and using a recent result by Czarnecki and Zdanowski, we show that the modal logic of symmetric theories of truth is maximal in this very sense.

11 Sticker

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 9:45 Uhr, 15/111
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 9:45 a.m., 15/111

**Taking an Agent's Global Outlook Seriously:
A Conciliationist Response to Peer Disagreement
Does not Lead to Skepticism in Ethics**

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I defend Conciliationism as a response to peer disagreement in ethics. A standard objection against Conciliationism is that if, in cases of peer-disagreement, we have to move our credence towards the beliefs of our peers, then we have to adopt scepticism in fields where disagreement between peers abounds. The case of ethics is particularly worrisome because here we touch upon issues which potentially guide our actions. I will argue that this objection is based on a highly idealised notion of epistemic peerhood. In cases of disagreement about *ethical* issues, it is often unknown to us what another person counts as her evidence, since a person's notion of evidence is constituted by her *global outlook*. The global outlook is a set of background beliefs pertaining mainly to normative matters. Knowing what an agent considers as evidence requires familiarity with that agent's global outlook. This introduces two constraints on epistemic peerhood in those cases of disagreement that touch upon the global outlook: an epistemic constraint (I might not know what someone counts as evidence, and hence not consider that person a peer), and a factual constraint (we might disregard each other's evidence, and hence not consider each other peers). I will close with a brief discussion of whether my strategy to defend conciliationism in ethics generalizes to other fields. I argue that if it does not, this shows something interesting about ethics and the role of the global outlook.

5 Störzinger

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 13:30 Uhr, 15/131
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 1:30 p.m., 15/131

**Was ist »analytische Metakognition?« – Gegen das
Modell des »evaluativen Abgleichs« und für ein
Modell des »inneren Begründens«**

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Joëlle Proust trennt in ihrem 2013 erschienenen Werk *The Philosophy of Metacognition* zwischen einer *prozeduralen* und einer *analytischen* Form von Metakognition. »Prozedural« ist Metakognition genau dann zu nennen, wenn damit das Phänomen bezeichnet werden soll, dass ein kognitives Subjekt aufgrund von epistemischen Gefühlen in die Lage versetzt wird einen kognitiven Prozess zu *evaluieren*. Da diese Fähigkeit gerade nicht auf der Kompetenz sich anhand eines repräsentationalen Vokabulars mentale Zustände selbst zu zuschreiben basiert, ist dieser Ansatz in der Lage empirische Experimente mit Affen und Delphinen zu erklären, welche gezeigt haben sollen, dass diese Tiere in der Lage sind bis zu einem gewissen Maße eine Einschätzung ihrer kognitiven Kompetenzen vorzunehmen (natürlich nur so lange man – wie gemeinhin üblich – davon ausgeht, dass Tiere nicht dazu in der Lage sind sich selbst in Form von Metarepräsentationen eigenen mentale Zustände zuzuschreiben). *Analytische Metakognition* wird von einem kognitiven Subjekt dann betrieben, wenn dieses, auf der Basis begrifflicher Kompetenzen (beispielsweise einer Theorie-Theorie des Geistes) Selbstzuschreibungen mentaler Zustände vornimmt, um deren Gehalt schließlich evaluieren zu können. Da Proust analytische Evaluation jedoch wesentlich als ein Prozess des Abgleichs zwischen einem mentalen Zustand und der »realen Welt« versteht, macht sie gegen die Möglichkeit analytischer Metakognition geltend, dass vollkommen unklar ist, woher das kognitive Subjekt eigentlich beim Vergleich mit der realen Welt irgendwelche anderen Evidenzen zur Kenntnis nehmen sollte, als die welche es bei der Formung der fraglichen Überzeugen selbst benutzt hat. Folglich kann die analytische Metakognition nicht in der Lage sein mehr zu leisten als die eigentlich zu evaluierende Überzeugen erneut und immer wieder zu bestätigen. (vgl. Proust 2013: 47) Ich möchte hingegen dafür argumentieren, dass analytische Metakognition nicht auf einem Weltabgleich, sondern auf der *Internalisierung* des sozialen Sprachspiels des Geben und Nehmen von Gründen in das eigene kognitive System basiert.

3 Strößner

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 11:15 Uhr, 11/116
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 11:15 a.m., 11/116

**The Normativity of Probability and Logic; Or:
The Difference Between Lotteries and Books**

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Formal representations of belief usually follow the probabilistic or the logical paradigm. The tension between

the two approaches is famously illustrated in the lottery paradox and the preface paradox: An agent believes for every ticket in a large lottery that it will lose but also that at least one ticket will win. The author of a book admits in the preface that his work contains flaws even though he believes for every single claim in the book that it is correct. I will show how the probabilistic and logical principles regard different parts of human rationality by introducing rules for reliable expansion and consistent correction. Expansion adds any belief that logically follows and is at least as probable as the prior beliefs. Correction removes inconsistencies. By taking the logical aim of consistency as serious as the probabilistic reservations against conjunctions, I will shed some new light on the two paradoxes and point out the different ways they need to be solved.

9

Tarkian

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 15.15 Uhr, 11/215
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 3:15 p.m., 11/215

Der Begriff des Todes als Clusterbegriff

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Die Diskussion um die Hirntodkonzeption des Todes hat sich in den letzten Jahren erneut intensiviert. Sind hirntote Patienten tot, oder sind sie irreversibel bewusstore Patienten, die durch intensivmedizinische Maßnahmen am Leben erhalten werden? Und ist der Tod des Menschen in moralischer Hinsicht eine Voraussetzung für die Entnahme lebenswichtiger Organe mit dem Ziel der Transplantation? Unterschiedliche Antworten auf diese Fragen markieren die Kontroverse, die in der Stellungnahme des Deutschen Ethikrats *Hirntod und Entscheidung zur Organspende* (2/2015) zum Ausdruck kam.

Im Vortrag soll es um Methodenfragen der Hirntoddebatte gehen, die in der Stellungnahme vernachlässigt werden. Ich werde zwei grundagentheoretische Ansätze einander gegenüberstellen. Nach einer seit Anfang der achtziger Jahre zunächst besonders von James Bernat, Charles Culver und Bernard Gert propagierten Sicht ist Fragen nach der Natur und Feststellung des Todes am besten mit der Unterscheidung dreier Problemebenen mit verschiedenen Teilaufgaben zu begegnen. Zunächst gelte es, eine überzeugende *Definition* des Todes vorzulegen. Weiter müsste das physiologische *Kriterium* bestimmt werden, welches beim Menschen die notwendige und hinreichende Bedingung für das Vorliegen des in der Definition bestimmten Merkmals ist. Zuletzt müssten zuverlässige *Tests* entwickelt werden, mit denen die Erfüllung des Todeskriteriums im konkreten Einzelfall zweifelsfrei nachgewiesen werden kann. Die Beantwortung der Teilfragen erfordert unterschiedliche Kompetenzen. Die den anderen Aufgaben vorgeordnete Arbeit sei begrifflicher und somit philosophischer Art. Die Identifikation des Todeskriteriums sei eine interdisziplinäre Aufgabe; sie bedürfe medizinischer und philosophischer Expertise. Die Auswahl klinischer oder apparativer Tests zuletzt ist die Sache von Medizinern.

Das »D-K-T-Modell« hat die Debatte insgesamt maßgeblich geprägt; es stellte auch die Grundlage für die von Bernat, Culver und Gert verteidigte organismische Standardbegründung des Hirntodkriteriums dar. Aus meiner Sicht ist es gewichtigen Einwänden ausgesetzt. Ich stelle ihm den Vorschlag gegenüber, Leben und Tod als Clusterbegriffe im Rahmen einer HPC-Theorie natürli-

cher Arten zu verstehen. Die HPC-Theorie natürlicher Arten (für: »homöostatisches Eigenschafts-Cluster«) wurde – ohne Bezüge zur Hirntoddebatte herzustellen – besonders von Richard Boyd in einer Reihe von Beiträgen in den neunziger Jahren verteidigt. Ich werde diese Sicht motivieren, ihre Vorzüge erläutern und zuletzt zu ihren Konsequenzen für eine Positionierung in der Hirntoddebatte kommen.

2

Thompson

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 14.15 Uhr, 15/E27
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 2:15 p.m., 15/E27

Grounding, Metaontology and Metametaontology

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This paper defends an approach to metaontology that appeals to grounding against a *prima facie* troubling objection. Sophisticated variants of antirealist positions about a given domain of discourse win the antirealist the right to all the trappings of realist discourse. Familiar Quinean approaches to ontological commitment are blind to the ontological disputes that realists and sophisticated antirealists take themselves to be engaging in, because both realist and antirealist assert sentences with the same canonical form. Fine (2001) appeals to the notion of *grounding* to mark the distinction between realism and sophisticated antirealism, and a corresponding difference in ontological commitment can be shown to follow.

Here is the challenge: for any given metaontological theory, we can examine how that theory fares by its own lights. If there is a plausible version of antirealism about grounding (as I claim in this paper that there is), a question arises as to how to distinguish realism from sophisticated antirealism *about grounding itself*. I argue that this challenge can be met without undermining the practice of appealing to grounding in order to settle ontological disputes, and that the stance one adopts with respect to the reality of grounding is properly independent of one's first order ontological commitments, and vice versa.

3

Tranchini

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 9.00 Uhr, 11/116
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 9:00 a.m., 11/116

Harmony, Rule Equivalence and an Inferential Criterion of Synonymy

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Harmony, the central notion of logical inferentialism, is a condition that the rules for a connective should satisfy in order to endow it with a proper meaning. In the natural deduction setting, the standard way to explain the notion of harmony is by appeal to the inversion principle, a recipe for generating a specific collection of elimination rules in harmony with a given collection of introduction rules.

As recently observed by Peter Schroeder-Heister, harmony cannot be explained by the inversion principle alone: Any advocate of the inversion principle is willing to concede that the collection of elimination rules generated by inversion is not the only one in harmony with a given collection of introduction rules. To avoid this problem, Schroeder-Heister proposed a more general criterion for harmony which entails that any collections of elimination rules interderivable with the one generated by inversion will also be in harmony with the given collection of introduction rules.

We first observe that there are connectives governed by harmonious rules (in Schroeder-Heister's sense) which, although equivalent, have a very different inferential ›behaviour‹. Following Kosta Došen, we argue that an inferential criterion of synonymy should be stricter than equivalence and that it should be defined using the notion of formula isomorphism developed in the theory of lambda calculus and category theory.

By discussing some examples, we show that Schroeder-Heister's criterion of harmony turns out to be too loose a condition for the rules of a connective to count as harmonious, at least if the inferentialism account is to qualify as ›intensional‹. The addition to the language of a connective whose rules are in harmony in Schroeder-Heister's sense may be enough to trivialize the notion of isomorphism.

12

Urban

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 15.15 Uhr, 11/211
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 3:15 p.m., 11/211

Global and Local Exclusivity in *Intellectual Property*

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This paper attempts to show that pro-IP arguments in the tradition of labour theory of appropriation (Locke) critically fail. Their failure lies in that they are only sufficient for holding secrets (local exclusivity), but not for the true monopolies (global exclusivity) that are instituted by the most important forms of IP, i.e. patents, trademarks and copyright.

Copyright, patents and trademarks are subcategories of IP that grant monopolies on certain types of intellectual works or the use thereof. Those monopolies are globally exclusive in their use. This means no other party can use them, independent of their method of creation (e.g. reverse engineering, copying, independent invention or creation, industrial espionage etc.). At the same time, trade secrets are akin to normal secrets in that they are locally exclusive. That is, they do not prevent third parties from using the intellectual works if the third party gains access to them. In that sense, trade secrets are not property.

Private property is characterised by the (i) right to use, (ii) the right to exclude all others from its use and (iii) the power to transfer these rights to others. IP is private and so it satisfies the three conditions. Yet, most arguments attempting to institute IP are only sufficient for a local type of exclusivity of usage (second condition) and thus fail to account for the global kind which is always present in other types of private property. It is argued that local exclusivity in intellectual works is equivalent to trade secrets. If indeed, all arguments attempting to institute global exclusivity fail, then the on-

ly justified type of intellectual property are trade secrets.

The thought experiment of the Garden of Eden is introduced to advance the idea that non-rivalry lies at the core of the IP problem. It is argued that the exclusivity of the use of intellectual works should not be enforced based on its non-rivalry. A basic account of alternative methods of control over intellectual works, e.g. contractual and trade secrets, is given.

2

van Riel

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 15.15 Uhr, 15/E27
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 3:15 p.m., 15/E27

Relation Tracking Accounts of Explanation and the Semantics of ›Because‹

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In the talk, I develop a particular version of a relation tracking account of explanation, based on observations concerning the semantics of ›because‹, and I show that this theory can be fruitfully applied in a number of contexts.

On the view presented here, ›because‹ signifies a 4-place relation (or, if you like, a function that takes 4 arguments), such that if a sentence of the form ›p because q‹ expresses a truth then there is a complex consisting of two states of affairs, x, y, two propositions, that p and that q, such that x, when presented under the proposition that p, is explained by y, when presented under the proposition that q, and such that x is relevantly related to y. Based on this interpretation of the semantics of ›because‹, we can give a detailed account of what it is for an explanation to track a dependence relation: It is for it to determine that some dependence relation obtains between the relevant states or objects (such as events in the case of event causation, or objects in the case of mereological dependence). Sometimes, an explanation semantically determines that a unique kind of dependence relation, such as a causal relation, a relation of mereological dependence, or a relation of metaphysical dependence obtains between the relevant states of affairs or objects. If so, we can speak of a causal, a mereological, a metaphysical, or some other type of explanation. The semantic determination of a unique kind of dependence relation is shown to stem from semantic features of the explanans and the explanandum, rather than an ambiguity in ›because‹. This has several significant consequences, some of which will be hinted at.

3

Verdée

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 9:45 Uhr, 11/116
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 9:45 a.m., 11/116

**Understanding Scientific Dialectics by
Means of Adaptive Logics**

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In this talk I will present a method for analysing scientific reasoning. More specifically I will show how adaptive logics can be used to explain how scientific progress can be obtained through a self-organisational dialectical process of defeasible reasoning steps.

Based on the adaptive logic analysis, I will argue for the hypothesis that rational debates about local disagreements, even when locally destructive, may lead to global scientific progress. Moreover I will claim that this process of local debating governed by relatively simple rules, can (spontaneously) converge or stabilise into complex scientific knowledge at the global level. In this sense scientific practice can be seen as a self-organisational system with an outcome much more complex than the agents of the system (individual scientists or scientific schools) could have obtained independently.

The adaptive logic analysis also allows me to argue that one can develop an intrinsically dialectical view on scientific progress without a dialetheistic metaphysics behind it. One can coherently recognise the power of contradictions as fuel of scientific evolution without believing that they can ever be true.

6

Vetter

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 13:30 Uhr, 11/213
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 1:30 p.m., 11/213

Virtue Epistemology and the Value of Knowledge

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Virtue epistemology is the view that knowledge is to be understood as true belief that is owed to the exercise of epistemic virtues, where epistemic virtues may be character traits analogous to moral virtues (in virtue responsibilism) or well-functioning faculties such as the ability to see (in virtue reliabilism). Virtue epistemology is often advertised as one of the best extant answers to the question what explains the characteristic intrinsic value of knowledge. I argue that it fails at that task, and sketch an alternative that promises to do better while preserving some insights of virtue epistemology.

Virtue epistemology accounts for the value of knowledge either by seeing it as a kind of *achievement* for which we deserve special credit (in virtue reliabilism), or as a virtuous act that shares normative features with morally virtuous acts (in virtue responsibilism). I argue that knowledge can be considered valuable in two distinct ways: from the third-person perspective, as *admirable*; and from the first-person perspective, as *desirable*. Virtue epistemology does account for the value of

knowledge in the sense of the admirable, but not in the sense of the desirable. But that second sense, I argue, is at least as much a part of the original problem as the first.

I end by sketching an alternative that preserves the virtue epistemologist's focus on the subject's epistemic constitution, as well as its strategy of aligning the value of knowledge with values in the practical realm. The value of knowledge, I suggest (following and expanding on some well-known threads in epistemology), is to be understood in analogy to the value of action. Merely true beliefs are inferior to knowledge in the same way in which merely satisfied desires are inferior to actions: by lacking a kind of active engagement with the world.

1

Viebahn

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 15:15 Uhr, 15/114
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 3:15 p.m., 15/114

Ambiguity and Zeugma

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In arguing against a supposed ambiguity, theorists often rely on the zeugma test. In an application of the zeugma test, a supposedly ambiguous expression is placed in a sentence in which several of its supposed meanings are forced together. If the resulting sentence sounds zeugmatic (i.e. funny or infelicitous), that is taken as evidence for ambiguity; if it does not sound zeugmatic, that is taken as evidence against ambiguity. The aim of this paper is to show that the second direction of the zeugma test is defective: the test cannot be used to argue against ambiguity. Ambiguous expressions, and in particular philosophically interesting ones, do not reliably lead to zeugmaticity, so an absence of zeugmaticity does not indicate an absence of ambiguity. The paper first presents two recent applications of the zeugma test (one from epistemology, the other from metaphysics) and then shows why these and similar applications of the test are mistaken.

10

Višak

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 14:15 Uhr, 11/115
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 2:15 p.m., 11/115

Happiness: A Mere *Instrumental* Prudential Good?

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Hedonism about welfare holds that pleasure is the sole intrinsic prudential good and suffering is the sole intrinsic prudential evil. While hedonism about welfare is all about *pleasure*, hedonists and hedonistic utilitarians (such as Bentham, Mill and Sidgwick and many contemporaries) often speak about the sole intrinsic prudential good in terms of »*happiness*«. This suggests that these hedonists do not only accept hedonism about *welfare*. They also seem to accept hedonism about *happiness*. This latter view defines happiness in terms of pleasure and holds that the nature of happiness consists in hav-

ing predominantly pleasant experiences. Daniel Haybron (2008), however, argued that hedonism about happiness is wrong. If happiness and pleasure are indeed two different things and the former cannot be reduced to the latter, then hedonists about welfare that used to assume hedonism about happiness need to revise their view.

In this paper, I explore two possible revisions of prudential hedonism. One option is admitting that happiness and pleasure are different things, while maintaining that pleasure, rather than happiness, is the sole ultimate prudential good. Along those lines, Peter Singer recently argued that happiness is only extrinsically valuable, because happy individuals are more likely to experience pleasure (Lazari-Radek and Singer 2014). Following this strategy would require revisions in these hedonists' vocabulary. They would need to speak consistently only about »pleasure« rather than also about »happiness« as the sole ultimate prudential good. A drawback of this strategy is that much of the appeal of prudential hedonism seems to be due to its vindication of *happiness* as a very plausible intrinsic value. The second option is admitting that pleasure and happiness are different things, while holding on to a substantive account of welfare in terms of happiness. This option is more revisionary in the sense that one would no longer be a hedonist. On the other hand, the intuitive attraction of happiness as an intrinsic prudential value could be maintained. This paper points out the strengths and weaknesses of both strategies.

2 Vogt

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 11.15 Uhr, 15/105
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 11:15 a.m., 15/105

A Problem for Bird's Dispositional Essentialism

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In *Nature's Metaphysics* (2007), Alexander Bird presents a defense of dispositional essentialism, the view that fundamental properties have dispositional essences. On this picture, dispositional essences provide the identity conditions for fundamental properties, ground the laws of nature and allow for explanations of matters of particular fact. The aim of my talk is to show that central parts of his account are based on an overly simple and unduly uniform characterization of dispositions and to argue against the following principle:

- (C) For every fundamental disposition, *D*, there is a specific fundamental property *S*, *D*'s stimulus property, and a specific fundamental property *M*, *D*'s manifestation property, such that:
A manifestation process of *D* consists in the possessor of *D* acquiring *M* in response to acquiring *S*; *D*'s modal role is best captured by the biconditional $\forall x(Dx \leftrightarrow (Sx \square \rightarrow Mx))$.

Although Bird does not explicitly endorse (C), it is entailed by two main parts of his theory: first, by his theory of natural laws, and second, by his account of the identity conditions of fundamental properties.

I will argue that (C) minimizes the explanatory force of Bird's theory: it prevents Bird both from explaining how fundamental objects lose fundamental properties and from explaining how fundamental objects interact. To fix this problem, Bird would have to rely on additional connections among fundamental properties and fundamental objects. But none of the obvious ways to ac-

count for these connections is open to Bird. Therefore, he would have to postulate additional primitive relations among fundamental properties and objects. This move, however, would be entirely ad hoc, and it is hard to see how to formulate these relations precisely.

Endorsing (C) thus results in a dilemma for Bird: either his theory does not allow for dispositions to fulfill the explanatory role he sets out, or he is saddled with a commitment to additional primitive relations among fundamental properties.

5

von Maur

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 9.00 Uhr, 15/131
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 9:00 a.m., 15/131

The Epistemic Goal and Value of Emotions

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Perceptual theorists of emotions claim that emotions provide access to the evaluative world in a manner similar or identical to that in which perception provides access to the empirical world (cf. Döring 2007 among others). This core assumption regarding the epistemic dimension of emotions has been recently challenged by Michael Brady (2013). Building upon his rejection of the perceptualist model and a reconceptualization of the epistemic goal of emotions in terms of *understanding* rather than *knowledge*, I argue that we should rethink the normative standard for evaluating the epistemic value presupposed by perceptualist theories, namely the correctness criterion. According to this criterion, an emotion is epistemically valuable—i.e., »correct« (Döring 2007), »fitting« (D'Arms & Jacobson 2000) or »true« (Salmela 2006)—if its representational content correctly represents the evaluative properties of its intentional object. I argue that there are (at least) three reasons why this correctness criterion fails as an adequate measure for the epistemic value of emotions. It does not and is not able to adequately capture (i) the epistemic goal of emotions (the *wherefore*), (ii) the variety of »objects« which are evaluated and made accessible to us via experiencing emotions (the *what*), and (iii) the situatedness and context-dependence of emotional insight (the *where*). To argue for (i), I draw on Brady's shift from knowledge to understanding and argue that a set of criteria concerning the *consequences* of experiencing an emotion provide a better measure of epistemic value than correctness. Drawing on the notion of the *focus* of an emotion (Helm 2001), I argue for (ii) by showing that the correctness criterion cannot be used to evaluate the epistemic dimension of emotional insights with regards to the subject's concerns. Finally, (iii) is illustrated by showing that emotions are interwoven in complex *frames of mind* (Elgin 1996) and that these are, in turn, embedded within a subject who is situated in a specific context (Griffiths & Scarantino 2009). I use concrete examples to show that by ignoring these considerations we risk not only misconstruing the epistemic contribution of a token emotion in a concrete situation, but also misconceiving the epistemic value of emotions as a whole.

10

von Wedelstaedt

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 9.00 Uhr, 11/115
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 9:00 p.m., 11/115

**Keine Geschichte(n) für Theorien
narrativer Identität**

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Philosophische Theorien narrativer Identität wollen etwas über die Identität von Menschen oder Personen sagen, indem sie Geschichten zur Hilfe nehmen. Das an Geschichten Besondere muss dazu auf die Identität von Menschen oder Personen übertragen werden. Anderenfalls handelte es sich nicht um eine *narrative* Identität. Unter »Identität« ist hierbei eine Antwort auf die Frage, was jemanden zu dem macht, der er ist, zu verstehen. An Geschichten besonders ist ihre Form. Diese zeichnet sich insbesondere dadurch aus, dass in einer Geschichte ein Sinnzusammenhang herrscht. Das heißt, dass die einzelnen Teile einer Geschichte so zusammenhängen, dass ein Sinn der Geschichte erkennbar ist. Nicht alles, was alltäglich »Geschichte« genannt wird, ist demnach eine Geschichte. Nur wenn man einen solchen engen Geschichtsbegriff verwendet, kann man aber erläutern, was das Spezifische an Theorien narrativer Identität ist. Wenn man nun dies an Geschichten Besondere auf jemandes Identität überträgt, heißt das, dass jemandes narrative Identität eine Geschichte von jemandes Leben ist, in der die einzelnen Teile einen Sinnzusammenhang ergeben. Da die Frage, was jemanden zu dem macht, der er ist, eine alltägliche Frage ist, ist eine naheliegende Frage, welche Geschichten im Leben von Menschen der narrativen Identität entsprechen. Man kann grundsätzlich drei Antworten auf diese Frage unterscheiden: 1. Es handelt sich bei jemandes narrativer Identität um eine tatsächlich erzählte Geschichte wie eine Autobiographie. 2. Es handelt sich um eine unbewusste Geschichte, die jemand vielleicht nur partiell artikuliert. 3. Es handelt sich um die vielen kleinen Geschichten, die Menschen tatsächlich von ihrem Leben erzählen. Gibt man die erste oder zweite Antwort, wird eine narrative Identität zu etwas Exklusivem, das nur wenige Menschen haben. Oder man müsste den Geschichtsbegriff aufweichen, was allerdings zu Folge hätte, dass nicht mehr ersichtlich wäre, wieso es sich bei jemandes so verfasster Identität um eine narrative Identität handelte. Gibt man die dritte Antwort, stellt man fest, dass die vielen kleinen Geschichten nicht annähernd die Einheit liefern können, die wir alltäglich erwarten, wenn wir von jemandes Wesen oder Persönlichkeit sprechen. Es gibt deshalb keine narrative Identität, weil Menschen tatsächlich nicht so von sich erzählen, wie es in Theorien narrativer Identität gefordert wird.

11

Wagner, Johanna

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 16.00 Uhr, 15/113
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 4:00 p.m., 15/113

**Die Homunculi in unserem Kopf: Praktisches
Überlegen zwischen Philosophie und Psychologie**

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Gemäß dem Tagungstitel schlägt mein Beitrag eine Brücke zwischen dem Lehnstuhl der philosophischen Handlungstheorie und dem Labor der kognitiven Psychologie. Es wird diskutiert, welche Funktion praktische Überlegungen beim Zustandekommen einer Handlung haben, um dann in einem zweiten Schritt zu untersuchen, inwiefern die kognitive Psychologie zu einer Klärung dieser Frage beitragen kann. Dabei werden drei Thesen vertreten. (1) Nicht jeder Handlung geht zwingend eine praktische Überlegung voraus, sondern dies ist nur bei manchen Handlungen der Fall. (2) Die Forschung der kognitiven Psychologie unterstützt die These, dass viele unserer Handlungen ohne das Zutun praktischer Überlegungen ausgeführt werden. (3) In der Diskussion um praktische Überlegungen wird gelegentlich auf Metaphern zurück gegriffen, die den Vorwurf eines Homunculus-Fehlschlusses provozieren. Die kognitive Psychologie bietet eine Möglichkeit die Rede von Homunculi in unseren Köpfen naturalistisch zu fundieren.

11

Wagner, Verena

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 11.15 Uhr, 15/113
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 11:15 a.m., 15/113

On why Indeterminism Matters for Compatibilism

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In the free will debate, compatibilism is the thesis that free agency is possible in a deterministic world. In order to spell out a theory of free agency, the compatibilist, so it seems, only has to take into account the possible truth of determinism. The question as to whether and how indeterminism may be reconciled with free agency seems to be none of the compatibilist's business. But this view is mistaken. Being a convinced compatibilist myself, I aim at showing that compatibilists have to care more about reconciling indeterminism with free agency if they do not want to commit themselves to the determinist position, but rather stay neutral with regard to this question. In this talk, I will show that proponents of the most prevalent compatibilist line of thought, the so-called »neutral compatibilists,« are committed to affirming the compatibility of freedom and indeterminism when they claim that there are actually free agents in our world. I will point out that these compatibilists not only have to allow for some random occurrences that are irrelevant for our agency, but have to side with the libertarian in her aim to refute the luck objection. This does not mean, of course, that neutral compatibilists have to agree with the libertarian in her incompatibilist position or the view that indeterminism

enhances an agent's freedom in any way. The affirmation of the compatibility of free agency and indeterminism does neither commit to the indeterminist position nor to the incompatibilist one. I will explain how the neutral compatibilist can defend both compatibility claims (free agency is compatible with determinism and indeterminism) by the same arguments. This parallel will turn out as a major problem for the libertarian.

12

Wallimann-Helmer

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 10.30 Uhr, 11/211
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 10.30 a.m., 11/211

The Ultimate Purpose of Social Equality

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Social equality concerns the conditions ensuring equal standing between all members of society. According to its proponents, social equality is the ideal of a society in which each and every member of society sees eye to eye with everybody else. In this talk I argue that social equality as the vision of a society of equals always has two sides. On the one side, we find demands regarding the just distribution of wealth, power and opportunities and on the other side, there are concerns about how the members of an egalitarian society should relate to each other. In this sense, advancing a certain conception of social equality necessarily goes hand in hand with demands regarding how goods are distributed and ideas of how members of society should relate to each other. The reason for this is that any account of what it means to be equals needs to specify both what kind of social relationships are compatible with this ideal and what kind of distributions are necessary for achieving and safeguarding every person's status as an equal. My aim in this talk is to further specify why social equality should be understood as being intricately linked with social and distributive justice. I want to claim that the idea of social equality promotes a particular understanding of which kind of distributions can be deemed just. In advancing this claim, I argue that the ultimate purpose of social equality are those conditions of justice deemed to be necessary for collective democratic decision-making among equals. It is these conditions which secure that each and every member of society can see eye to eye with everybody else.

3

Wansing

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 14.15 Uhr, 11/116
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 2:15 p.m., 11/116

On Split Negation, Falsification, and Verification

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This paper deals with some criticism that has been put forward against strong, constructive negation in comparison to a certain example of Galois connected negations. A pair of negations $\sim$ and $\neg$ is said to be a pair of

Galois or split negations iff for all formulas A and B of the language under consideration it holds that $A \vdash \sim B$ iff $B \vdash \neg A$. In substructural logics with left and right-searching implications, the idea of negation as »implies falsity« gives rise to a pair of split negations. However, this kind of split negation cannot be used to express direct falsification, as has been emphasized by, among others, Gurevich [1] and Wansing [3].

Sequoia-Grayson [2] suggested what he calls »a procedural interpretation of negative information in terms of split negation as procedural prohibition.« He claims that Gurevich and Wansing are wrong in their symmetrical analysis of verification and falsification and that »a strong asymmetry between positive and negative information is in fact the case.« In this talk I will first supplement the information frame semantics presented by Sequoia-Grayson with a formal definition of entailment and an axiomatization. Moreover, I will scrutinize Sequoia-Grayson's critique and explain why and where it goes astray. This discussion will also give me an opportunity to make some remarks on symmetry between verification and falsification in the setting of both constructive logic and the logic of generalized truth values.

References

- [1] Gurevich, Y., »Intuitionistic logic with strong negation«, *Studia Logica* 36 (1977), 49–59.
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- [3] Wansing, H., *The Logic of Information Structures*, Lecture Notes in AI 681, Berlin, Springer, 1993.

6

Weber

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 10.30 Uhr, 11/214
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 10:30 a.m., 11/214

Peer Disagreement with Seemingly Irrational Peers

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What should we reasonably believe about some political, philosophical or ideological issue, for example whether the EU should relax sanctions against Russia, if we come to know that someone who is as competent and well-informed as we are concerning the matter under dispute tends to think differently? In such a *peer disagreement* case, we seem to have to admit that our peer is as likely to be right as we are. Consequently, and contrary to what pre-theoretically appears correct to us, we should revise our original belief in favour of agnosticism about whether our peer's opinion is correct or our own.

This line of reasoning establishes the so-called *Equal Weight View*. This view gets under attack by scenarios in which our peer comes up with a seemingly irrational opinion, for example, that the EU should rather impose sanctions on Switzerland. In such a case, we find it even harder than normally to revise our beliefs according to the Equal Weight View.

In my talk, I examine the answers of Tomas Bogardus, David Christensen and Adam Elga to this challenge and explain why I find them lacking. I then present my own account, according to which the best explanation for irrational answers in real-world cases such as the sanctions-against-Russia scenario is precluded by definition in those artificial examples that are usually taken to motivate the attack. Since in real world

cases, it is more likely that our alleged peers are, for instance, not sincere, or misunderstand relevant concepts, or are indeed partially insane, than that they are right, we are allowed to disregard them as peers. We are even allowed to withdraw an already conferred peer status after we learn about the irrationality an alleged peer displays afterwards. To be sure, the extent of irrationality required for this withdrawal is considerable; as a consequence, the scope of the Equal Weight View remains impressive.

12

Wendt

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 9.45 Uhr, 11/211
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 9:45 a.m., 11/211

Zum Verhältnis von Frieden und Gerechtigkeit

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Anders als Gerechtigkeit ist Frieden ein in der politischen Philosophie überraschend vernachlässigter Wert. Ein Grund dafür könnte sein, dass viele davon ausgehen, dass Frieden nicht als eigenständiger Wert, sondern als in der einen oder anderen Weise eng mit Gerechtigkeit verknüpft anzusehen ist. Man kann Frieden und Gerechtigkeit auf mindestens drei Weisen zu verknüpfen versuchen. Erstens, indem man die begriffliche These vertritt, dass wohlverstandener Frieden Gerechtigkeit umfasst. Zweitens, indem man die empirische These vertritt, dass die Realisierung von Gerechtigkeit eine notwendige empirische Vorbedingung für die Realisierung von hinreichend stabilem Frieden ist. Drittens, indem man die axiologische These vertritt, dass Frieden nur eine Vorbedingung für die Realisierung von Gerechtigkeit ist, die keinen eigenständigen Wert hat. Ich möchte zu zeigen versuchen, dass alle drei Versuche wenig plausibel sind. Frieden und Gerechtigkeit sind stattdessen als distinkte Werte anzusehen. Sie sind in dreierlei Hinsicht distinkt: Erstens haben Frieden und Gerechtigkeit eine je eigene Wertbasis; sie sind nicht ein bloßes Instrument oder eine bloße Vorbedingung zur Realisierung des jeweils anderen. Zweitens ist stabiler Frieden realisierbar ohne die Realisierung von Gerechtigkeit. (Das Umgekehrte gilt wohl nicht). Drittens können Frieden und Gerechtigkeit als Werte manchmal konfliktieren – und es ist manchmal moralisch gerechtfertigt, im Namen des Friedens Abstriche bezüglich Gerechtigkeit zu machen.

2

Werner

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 14.15 Uhr, 15/E27
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 2:15 p.m., 15/E27

Bootstrapping and Contingent Grounding

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In the recent literature about grounding the thesis that grounding is *contingent* gains popularity. It is argued that some facts may ground another fact even if the former facts obtain in a possible world in which the latter fact fails to obtain. In my talk I will argue that this

claim conflicts with the thesis that all *grounding-facts* are grounded in the *grounds* they invoke. It has been proposed that if a collection of facts grounds another fact, then it also grounds the fact that it does so. This principle affords an elegant and uniform solution to the problem that all grounding-facts invoke non-fundamental facts and therefore should themselves be grounded.

My argument is based on principles concerning the *explanatoriness* of grounding. If grounding-fact is contingent in the described sense, then it is possible to wonder what makes our world a world in which the grounding-connection holds. The question »How do the grounds manage to bring about the grounded *in our world*?« then calls for an informative explanation. However, if grounding-facts are grounded in the grounds they invoke, then citing the grounds of the grounding-fact falls short of being informative for anyone who is seeking such an explanation. I'll argue that this is an untenable result given the explanatory ambitions that motivate the very concept of grounding. The main part of my talk will be concerned with establishing this line of argument.

Furthermore, I will show that my argument is based on weaker and more plausible principles than related arguments that have been put forward to reject contingentism. Especially, it doesn't require the grounds to provide an exhaustive answer to the aforementioned question, which would rule out too many plausible grounding claims. The principles I defend are compatible with the arguments of contingentists that we should allow individual relations of grounding to work against a certain background the world provides. However, they require that this background becomes explicit at some point in the grounding chain.

4

Werning / Cheng

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 9.00 Uhr, 15/133
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 9:00 a.m., 15/133

Is Episodic Memory a Natural Kind?

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Colloquially, episodic memory is described as »the memory of personally experienced events«. Even though episodic memory has been studied in psychology and neuroscience for about six decades, there is still great uncertainty as to what episodic memory is. Here we ask how episodic memory should be characterized in order to be validated as a natural kind. We propose to conceive of episodic memory as a knowledge-like state that is identified with an experientially based mnemonic representation of an episode that allows for a mnemonic simulation thereof. We call our analysis the Sequence Analysis of Episodic Memory since episodes will be analyzed in terms of sequences of events (Cheng & Werning, 2013, 2015). Our philosophical analysis of episodic memory is driven and supported by experimental results from psychology and neuroscience. We discuss selected experimental results that provide exemplary evidence for uniform causal mechanisms underlying the properties of episodic memory and argue that episodic

memory is a natural kind. The argumentation proceeds along three cornerstones: First, psychological evidence suggests that a violation of any of the proposed conditions for episodic memory amounts to a deficiency of episodic memory and no form of memory or cognitive process but episodic memory fulfills them. Second, empirical results support a claim that the principal anatomical substrate of episodic memory is the hippocampus. Finally, we can pin down causal mechanisms onto neural activities in the hippocampus to explain the psychological states and processes constituting episodic memory.

References

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6

Wieben

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 11.15 Uhr, 11/214
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 11:15 a.m., 11/214

Practical Knowledge: Between Thought and Practice

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Is knowledge-how a species of knowledge-that? The debate around this question is still ongoing and there is no comfortable position to take. On the one hand, the anti-intellectualist thesis that knowledge-how is best analysed as an ability has serious trouble with counterexamples. These show that having an ability to ϕ is not necessary for knowing how to ϕ , ruling out direct reduction. On the other hand, the intellectualist analysis of knowledge-how as a subspecies of propositional knowledge is threatened by its own set of counterexamples. They convincingly establish that knowledge-how lacks many of the typical characteristics of »thick« knowledge: it is not susceptible to Gettier-cases, it is not susceptible to defeaters and it does not even require belief. It can be concluded that such attempts of fully reducing knowledge-how to either knowledge-that or abilities have failed. Intellectualists and anti-intellectualists may then retreat to weaker positions, according to which knowledge-how is essentially propositional or dispositional, respectively. At this point, the important task is to provide the details of an alternative account and to show that it captures relevant intuitions. I develop an account of knowledge-how that avoids the counterexamples against ability-based analyses, without sacrificing cohesion. It can be shown to preserve both the status of knowledge-how as a cognitive achievement and its apparently close conceptual relation to abilities. I start from counterexamples against the ability-hypothesis and make use of the logic of dispositions to bridge the gap that they open. It will be argued that, instead of the ability to ϕ , it is the disposition to have the ability to ϕ that makes ascriptions of knowledge-how to ϕ true. The account will thus be derived from further development of the ability hypothesis, on which knowledge-how is fundamentally dispositional. At the same time it will turn out that, depending on the nature of the categorical base of the disposition and of the relation between the two, the essential motivations for an intellectualist position are preserved. However, the ac-

count does not come down to an unsatisfactory compromise, but rather highlights the extent of the common ground between the most plausible versions of intellectualism and anti-intellectualism.

2

Wildman

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 9.45 Uhr, 15/E27
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 9:45 a.m., 15/E27

For Contingent Necessity-Makers

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The notion of a *truth-maker*—a fact that fully grounds another fact's truth—is well known and (relatively) widely accepted. However, the related notion of a *necessity-maker*—a fact that fully grounds another fact's *necessity*—is radically under-explored. One particular lacuna here concerns the potential modal status of necessity-makers; specifically, if Q is a necessity-maker for some necessity P, could Q be a contingency? Speaking more generally, we might ask, are there any contingent necessity-makers?

Here, I argue that there are. To do so, I first examine a trio of recent arguments (from Hanks, Lange, and Hale) against the possibility of contingent necessity-makers; all three are shown to be unsuccessful, either due to faulty, irreparable premises, or because they only entail the impossibility of certain, limited kinds of contingent necessity-makers. Building on these results, in the second, positive part of the paper, I offer an argument demonstrating that there are as many contingent necessity-makers as there are contingent *partial* grounds for (absolute) necessities' necessity. Thus, after dismissing some potential objections, I conclude that, *contra* Hanks, Lange, and Hale, not only are contingent necessity-makers possible, but a multiplicity of them are actual, serving to fully ground the necessity of numerous absolute necessities.

6

Wirrwitz / Kraft

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 14.15 Uhr, 11/213
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 2:15 p.m., 11/213

Optimism and the Value of Truth

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Optimism raises a lot of interesting philosophical issues, among them conceptual, ethical and epistemological ones. In this paper we focus on the epistemological issue that arises from the (apparent?) clash between being optimistic and valuing true beliefs. The following assumptions all appear to be reasonable and to contradict each other:

- (1) It is good (at least for a significant number of persons) to be optimistic.
- (2) It is good to have true beliefs and only true beliefs.
- (3) Being optimistic often consists in having beliefs that go beyond one's evidence.

The paper consists of three parts. First, we clarify the concept of optimism we rely on. Second, we defend the three assumptions and explain why they appear to be irreconcilable. Third, we discuss and propose several strategies for solving the puzzle by explaining away the apparent clash between being optimistic and valuing true beliefs. Optimistic beliefs are often too vague and indeterminate to be falsified. Optimistic beliefs are often self-fulfilling. Optimistic beliefs go beyond the evidence only in a way that is epistemically permissible.

9

Witt

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 14.15 Uhr, 11/215
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 2:15 p.m., 11/215

Praktisch tot

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Seit einigen Jahren erleben wir, wie die Diskussion um das richtige Verständnis unseres Todes erneut aufflammt. Die Hirntodkonzeption, die über mehrere Jahrzehnte hinweg breite Unterstützung innerhalb und außerhalb der Wissenschaft genoss, steht neuerdings wieder zur Disposition. Insbesondere die bereits überwunden geglaubten organismischen Todeskonzeptionen erfreuen sich regen Zulaufs: Eine wachsende Zahl von Philosophen glaubt, dass hirntote Menschen nicht tot sind.

Sollte sich diese Auffassung als überzeugend herausstellen, hätte dies, so scheint es, ernsthafte ethische Konsequenzen. Eines der zentralen Prinzipien der Transplantationsmedizin ist die so genannte *Dead Donor Rule*, der zufolge nur toten Menschen ansonsten lebenswichtige Organe entnommen werden dürfen. Wenn nur Tote als Organspender in Frage kommen, Hirntote aber, anders als lange Zeit angenommen, nicht tot sind, kommen Hirntote als Organspender nicht in Frage. Dieses Argument ist in der Bioethik in der jüngeren Vergangenheit intensiv diskutiert worden, vermutlich weil seine Konsequenz, der Ausfall von Hirntoten als derzeit wichtigster Spendergruppe, den Mangel an funktionsfähigen Spenderorganen in einer ohnehin von eklatantem Mangel gekennzeichneten Situation deutlich verschärfen würde. Nennen wir das Argument daher das »unangenehme Argument«.

In meinem Vortrag möchte den Vorschlag David DeGrazias (2005) untersuchen, den er in seinem einflussreichen Buch »*Human identity and bioethics*« entwickelt. DeGrazias Ansatz kann als spezifischer Einwand gegen die zweite Prämisse des unangenehmen Arguments, der zufolge Hirntote in einem relevanten, praktischen Sinne nicht tot seien, aufgefasst werden.

Zentral für DeGrazias Ansatz ist ein Pluralismus bezüglich Todeskonzeptionen, den er als »*Pro-choice view about standards of death*« bezeichnet. Er plädiert dafür, autonome Entscheider aus einer Reihe vernünftiger Alternativen auswählen zu lassen, wann sie als tot angesehen werden möchten. Sie dürfen also selbst entscheiden, welches Todeskriterium in ihrem individuellen Fall gelten soll. Sobald die Personen gemäß des von ihnen be-

vorzugten Kriteriums als tot gelten, ist es, ihr generelles Einverständnis vorausgesetzt, ethisch erlaubt, ihre Organe zu entnehmen.

Ich werde DeGrazia zunächst anhand dreier Überlegungen direkt kritisieren, bevor ich seinen Ansatz abschließend kurz mit dem Ralf Stoeckers (2012) vergleiche und begründe, warum ich letzteren für erfolgversprechender halte.

12

Wollner

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 14.15 Uhr, 11/211
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 2:15 p.m., 11/211

Morally Bankrupt: International Financial Governance and the Ethics of Sovereign Default

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The current practice of dealing with sovereign default and high public indebtedness is chaotic, costly and skewed. On the level of institutional design, the international financial system lacks clear and systematic procedures for restructuring public debt and handling sovereign default. On the level of principle, it is governed by two orthodoxies. Sovereign debt must be repaid in line with *pacta sunt servanda* and in cases where debt cannot be repaid the costs of default are to be borne by the debtor. This paper challenges both institutional status quo and orthodox principles. I argue in defence of a different policy regime which allows debt contracts to be altered and voided such that at least sometimes creditors share the costs of high indebtedness. There are three arguments in support of my position. According to the first argument (section III) debt contracts may permissibly be overridden. There are circumstances under which the values that underpin the practice of lending and borrowing justify voiding debt contracts. According to the second argument (section IV), some debt contracts are non-binding to begin with. In the context of sovereign debt, the standard conditions that render contracts binding are often not met. The third argument (section V) outlines the reasoning in support of my preferred alternatives on the levels of both principle and institutional design. They are supported by the application of a suitably adapted version of the complaint model to the institutions and policies of international financial governance. Before I embark on my substantive argument, I explain the practical and theoretical significance of an ethics of sovereign default by briefly offering some empirical context (section I) and identifying what I believe are the most important philosophical puzzles associated with debt in general and sovereign debt in particular (section II). I consider objections to my position (section VI) before I conclude (section VII).

5

Wong

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 16.00 Uhr, 15/115
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 4:00 p.m., 15/115

Owning My Body

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Our bodies and our sense of embodiment are critical to our sense of ourselves as material beings (Cassam 1997, Longuenesse 2006). One prominent strand of research on embodiment concerns the sense of ownership that we have over our bodies. The key questions are how to understand this sense of ownership, and what its function is. I begin by characterising the sense of body ownership and its relation to basic forms of bodily awareness, such as proprioception (Martin 1995, de Vignemont 2007, Peacocke 2014). A major issue is the shape of a constitutive account and its status with respect to pathologies where it is compromised, such as somatoparaphrenia and alien limb syndrome (Vallar and Ronchi 2009, de Vignemont 2007 and 2011). A second question is the function of the sense of body ownership. I will focus on how the sense of body ownership affects agency and the sense of agency—in health and in pathologies such as anosognosia for hemiplegia (Berti et al. 2005, Baier and Karnath 2008, Tsakiris and Fotopoulou 2013). In this talk, I will sketch an account of body ownership that diverges from the three major accounts and discuss its significance for action and sense of agency.

2

Wörner

Donnerstag 17.09.2015, 9.00 Uhr, 15/105
Thursday, September 17, 2015, 9:00 a.m., 15/105

Relative Identity and the Semantics of Proper Names

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The aim of the paper is to defend weak relativism about identity against an influential objection by David Wiggins. Weak relativism is the view that occurrences of English predicates of the form »*x* is the same *F* as *y*,« where »*F*« is a placeholder for a sortal term, express relative identity relations. Additionally, weak relativism maintains that some, but not all occurrences of the predicate »*x* is *y*« are elliptical for predicates of the former variety.

Relative identity relations are equivalence relations which, contrary to absolute identity, allow for the following schema to be true:

RI: *x* and *y* are the same *F* but not the same *G*

The objection I will discuss is based on the fact that, as Wiggins has shown, relative identity relations do not satisfy Leibniz's Law. That is, it is not true that objects standing in a relative identity relation to each other share all their properties.

Because of this, relativism about identity seems to be unable to account for the validity of a wide variety of everyday inferences. For example, if »*a*« does not express a relation governed by Leibniz's Law inferences of the form

Fa
b=a
Therefore, *Fb*

seem invalid.

To avoid this result, I propose an unorthodox semantics for the proper names that typically figure in the relevant everyday inferences. The core of this proposal is the claim that those names do not directly designate an object. Rather, they have as their semantic values the members of an equivalence class, defined by a relative identity relation. As I show in the paper, this semantics makes it possible for the relativist to account for the validity of everyday inferences usually taken to be based on Leibniz's Law, and thus to answer Wiggins's objection to weak relativism about identity.

10

Wündisch

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 10.30 Uhr, 11/115
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 10:30 a.m., 11/115

Territorial Rights and Climate Change

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Anthropogenic climate change will cause a significant increase in sea levels for decades to come. This process endangers many low lying coastal areas but also entire states. Some states that will likely be lost in their entirety are Kiribati, Tuvalu, the Marshall Islands, and the Maldives. Other states such as Bangladesh and the Netherlands will lose very significant parts of their territory to the sea. This brings into focus the question of whether the loss of statehood or the large scale loss of territory give rise to claims to compensation and, if so, how they can be satisfied.

In this talk I will address the challenges for theories of compensation that arise from territorial destruction due to anthropogenic climate change. In particular I will argue that in-kind compensation is called for. I focus on the pervasive case of partial loss of territory and develop a positive proposal to address it.

5

Wüstholtz

Mittwoch 16.09.2015, 9.00 Uhr, 15/131
Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 9:00 a.m., 15/131

De Se Beliefs: Troubles with Self-Ascription

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Some of our beliefs are about ourselves in a seemingly irreducible *de se* way. However, there is a problem of *de se* beliefs which has been systematically illustrated by

Perry (1979): How can we draw the distinction between Alpha believing *I am making a mess* and her believing *Alpha is making a mess* within the Frege–Russell framework of propositional attitudes? It seems that *de se* beliefs are notoriously underspecified if their objects are determined truth-conditionally. Lewis (1979) argues for a solution which unifies the objects of all beliefs. All beliefs are *de se* beliefs with properties, and not propositions as their object. When a subject entertains a *de se* belief, she *self-ascribes* a specific property. This in turn ensures that the subject takes herself to have the property in question. In this paper I will argue for a positive and a negative claim. The positive claim is that Lewis' solution of the problem gives us a fruitful tool to accommodate important epistemic features of *de se* beliefs, such as their purported immunity to error through misidentification, or their aptitude to account for self-knowledge. The negative claim is that Lewis' solution is question-begging, insufficient, and epistemically problematic. First, Lewis' generalisation of *de se* beliefs presupposes what needs explaining: What is it for Alpha to have a belief about herself? Secondly, the explanatory work rests solely on the shoulders of the notoriously unexplored and largely ignored notion of self-ascription. Thirdly, the solution is incompatible with the widespread idea that *de se* beliefs are generally identification-free. If *de se* beliefs are understood as ascription of properties under the acquaintance relation of identity (Lewis 1979: 543; Chisholm 1981:28), then they involve an unwanted identification element.

4

Wüthrich

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 14.15 Uhr, 15/134
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 2:15 p.m., 15/134

**Conceptualizing Uncertainty:
An Assessment of the Latest Uncertainty
Framework of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change**

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There is considerable disagreement about what the best responses to the global climate change are. A key reason for this is that we are facing severe uncertainties regarding the phenomenon of climate change itself. To address these uncertainties, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has introduced a new version of its framework for communicating uncertainty which involves a confidence and a likelihood metric to qualify findings. In this paper, I critically assess this framework. First, I look at the meta-documents which explain the uncertainty framework and argue that there are substantial conceptual issues which need attention. Secondly, I explore how the uncertainty framework is put into practice and show that the conceptual problems of the framework manifest themselves in concrete practical problems for the authors of the assessment report. Based on these observations, I suggest, thirdly, improvements for the framework. I argue that the confidence metric needs to be constructed in a different way which involves the clarification of the two sub-metrics agreement and evidence.

1

Zakkou

Dienstag 15.09.2015, 13.30 Uhr, 15/114
Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 1:30 p.m., 15/114

Jesus loves you!

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According to semantic orthodoxy, a given sentence as used in a given situation expresses only one content. In the last decade, this view has been attacked from different directions. One objection that still stands undefeated stems from sentences that are used to address several people individually, like »Jesus loves you!« as uttered by a priest at a sermon. Cappelen (2008), Egan (2009), López de Sa (2014), and MacFarlane (2014: ch. 4) claim that, to account for such cases, we have to adopt a pluralist view, according to which these sentences as used in certain situations do not (at least not by themselves) express exactly one content. Cappelen and Egan express sympathies for a content-relativistic version of this view, according to which the sentences express different contents relative to different audience contexts; López de Sa and MacFarlane seem to commit themselves to a non-content-relativistic version of it, according to which the sentences express more than one content just by themselves, without the help of audience contexts. But whilst they offer different accounts of how exactly semantic orthodoxy should be modified, all these critics seem to agree that we have to give up the semantic orthodoxy and adopt the pluralist view as stated above.

In this paper, I shall argue that the semantic orthodoxy can very well account for the cases in question. For there is nothing to prevent us from thinking that, in the cases in question, »you« functions as a bound variable rather than an indexical. Sentences like »Jesus loves you!« as uttered by a priest at a sermon hence do not provide a good reason to complicate the simple and approved orthodoxy.

Poster (Übersicht) / posters (overview)

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	P 1.2	Garcia-Odon, Amaia <i>Counteractuals</i>
	P 1.3	Kremling, Alexander <i>DenkWelt Descartes</i>
	P 1.4	Landig, Anders <i>Starrheit verstehen</i>
Sektion 2 Metaphysik und Ontologie / metaphysics and ontology	P 2.1	Göhner, Julia <i>What Is the Proper Subject Matter of a Scientific Metaphysics?</i>
	P 2.2	Mahoozi, Nasim <i>Bitter and Sweet: A Defense of Vague Existence</i>
	P 2.3	Mulamustafić, Adem <i>Sind der naive Realismus und der wissenschaftliche Realismus kompatibel?</i>
	P 2.4	Petersen, Thorben <i>The Grounding Problem for Four-Dimensionalism</i>
	P 2.5	Salis, Pietro <i>On the Nature of Coincidental Events</i>
	P 2.6	Schmoranzner, Sebastian <i>De Facto Dependence Revisited</i>
	P 2.7	Storm-Henningsen, Peter <i>Mereological Decomposition – a Novel Approach to Complex Systems</i>
Sektion 3 Logik / logic	P 3.1	Bussmann, Raoul <i>Ein verstärkter Lügner als Racheproblem für den Dialethismus?</i>
Sektion 4 Wissenschaftstheorie / philosophy of science	P 4.1	Masterton, George / Zenker, Frank / Gärdenfors, Peter <i>From Classical Mechanics, to Special Relativity Theory, and Quantum Mechanics – Or: Why Structural Realists Would Profit from Studying Structural Continuity by Means of Conceptual Spaces</i>
Sektion 5 Philosophie des Geistes und der Kognition / philosophy of mind and cognition	P 5.1	Behl, Teresa <i>Eureka! A Novel View on Insight in Non-Human Animals</i>
	P 5.2	Dembić, Sanja <i>Out of Order: Problems of Biological Conceptions of Mental Disorder</i>
	P 5.3	Esken, Frank <i>How to Take a Normative Stance?</i>
	P 5.4	Fink, Sascha Benjamin <i>Introspection and Disagreement</i>
	P 5.5	Fink, Sascha Benjamin / Zang, Christin <i>Ein Organ, vier Modalitäten? Oder: Wie man mit Fischen für die Elimination von Sinnesmodalitäten argumentieren kann</i>
	P 5.6	Gouvea, Rodrigo <i>The Problem of Social Entities for Physicalism</i>

Poster (Übersicht) / posters (overview)

	P 5.7	Lindner, Nicolas <i>Shared Intention and Small Children's Joint Activities</i>
	P 5.8	Mölder, Bruno <i>Folk Psychology and the Second-Person Perspective</i>
	P 5.9	Paskaleva-Yankova, Asena <i>An Examination of Influences and Reliability of Autobiographical Accounts of Depression</i>
	P 5.10	Reuter, Kevin / Sytsma, Justin <i>Unfelt Pains: An Experimental-Philosophical Investigation into the Concept of Pain</i>
	P 5.11	Schomäcker, Astrid <i>Can our Phenomenal Concepts Change?</i>
	P 5.12	Seitz, Fabian <i>Hunting Made us Rational: the Evolution of a Logical Mind in the Hominin Lineage</i>
	P 5.13	Strasser, Anna <i>Do Social Interactions Generate a Special Kind of Knowledge? What Kind of Knowledge we Cannot Gain without Interacting with Others</i>
	P 5.14	Stühling, Jan <i>Can Nominalism Save Anomalous Monism from Epiphenomenalism?</i>
	P 5.15	Tillas, Alexandros <i>Intuitions & Philosophical Inquiry</i>
	P 5.16	Welpinghus, Anna <i>Implizite Einstellungen und die Herausforderung für Theorien personaler Autonomie</i>
Sektion 6 Erkenntnistheorie / epistemology	P 6.1	Friederich, Simon <i>Self-Locating Belief and Apparent Anomalous Causal Powers</i>
	P 6.2	Poljanšek, Tom <i>Sinn und Referenz – Die erlebniskonstitutive Dimension von Antizipationen</i>
	P 6.3	Strößner, Corina <i>The Rationality of Conceptual Change</i>
Sektion 7 Religionsphilosophie / philosophy of religion	P 7.1	Damschen, Gregor <i>Das erkenntnistheoretische Prinzip der vollständigen Zugänglichkeit</i>
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Sektion 9 Angewandte Ethik / applied ethics	P 9.1	Lyreskog, David M. / Nagel, Saskia K. <i>Understanding Pre-Frailty</i>
Sektion 10 Normative Ethik / normative ethics	P 10.1	Baum, Kevin <i>Kagans ›Lösung‹ des Problems gemeinschaftlichen Handelns — ein Mangel an Informationen als notwendige Bedingung?</i>

Sektion 11 Metaethik, Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie / metaethics, action theory and decision theory	P 11.1	Barkhausen, Max <i>Moral Objectivity in the Face of Contingency</i>
	P 11.2	Gersbach, Rebekka <i>Praktisches Schließen: Vergleichen von Optionen oder Vereinbarkeit von Zwecken?</i>
	P 11.3	Guinebert, Svantje <i>Where the Buck Stops: Obedience and Final Authority</i>
	P 11.4	Pfister, Jonas <i>Verantwortung für Handlungen und Einstellungen</i>
	P 11.5	Reinmuth, Karl Christoph <i>Zur moralischen Beurteilung von Regeln als gegenständlichen Mitteln</i>
Sektion 12 Politische Philosophie, Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie / political philosophy, philosophy of law and social philosophy	P 12.1	Grahle, André / von Maur, Imke <i>Social Critique, Suffering, and Emotional Involvement</i>
Sektion 13 Geschichte und Methode der Analytischen Philosophie / history and methods of analytic philosophy	P 13.1	Bluhm, Roland <i>Using Linguistic Corpora in the Study of Causal Reasoning</i>
	P 13.2	Tatievskaya, Elena <i>Moore (1944) on Analysis</i>
Zweiter Studierendenkongress für Philosophie	P S.1	Bunkenborg, Francesca <i>How to Understand Process Requirements of Rationality</i>
	P S.2	Faust, Michele <i>Wie ein Dispositionalismus bezüglich Handlungserklärungen und Gründen den Streit zwischen Kausalisten und Antikausalisten in der neueren Handlungstheorie schlichten könnte</i>
	P S.3	Heil, Roman <i>Meaning the Same: Churchland on Meaning Similarity</i>
	P S.4	Salimkhani, Kian <i>On the Fundamentality of Space-Time</i>
	P S.5	Schmidt, Sebastian <i>Warum es keinen Schleier der Wahrnehmung gibt</i>

Die Postersessions finden statt am Dienstag, 15.09.2015, 18.30 bis 19.30 Uhr, sowie am Mittwoch, 16.09.2015, 11.15 bis 12.15 Uhr, in Gebäude 15, Foyer.

The poster sessions will take place on Tuesday, September 15, 2015, 6:30 p.m.–7:30 p.m., and Wednesday, September 16, 2015, 11:15 a.m.–12:15 p.m., building 15, Foyer.

**Intentionen und ihre Rolle im
sprachphilosophischen Minimalismus**

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Der »Semantische Minimalismus« (kurz: »Minimalismus«), zurzeit am prominentesten vertreten von Emma Borg (v.a. *Minimal Semantics* (2004) und *Pursuing Meaning* (2012)), ist eine philosophische Theorie der Bedeutung, deren primäres Ziel es ist, (i) die Bedeutung sprachlicher Zeichen, insbesondere von Wörtern, in einer formalen, kontextunabhängigen Art und Weise zu kennzeichnen, (ii) philosophische Theoriebildung im Bereich der Semantik an die Modularitätsthese der Philosophie des Geistes, hier insbesondere: Fodor, anschlussfähig zu machen sowie (iii) hiermit zu beweisen, dass das »Davidsonsche Programm« – die »Umdeutung« einer Tarskischen Wahrheitstheorie in eine Theorie der Bedeutung – der nach wie vor erfolgreichste Ansatz zur Erklärung sprachlicher Phänomene darstellt.

In meinem Beitrag werde ich der Frage nachgehen, inwieweit Borgs Fokus auf synchrone Fragestellungen die Glaubwürdigkeit ihrer These im Hinblick auf diachrone Phänomene unterminiert. Die Grundidee ist folgende: insoweit gerade eine philosophische Bedeutungstheorie darauf angelegt ist, allumfassend den für sie relevanten Phänomenbereich – natürliche Sprachen – abschließend zu beschreiben, muss ihre Gültigkeit daran gemessen werden, inwieweit diese Theorien auch diachrone Sprachphänomene zu erfassen in der Lage sind. Die These, für die ich im Vortrag argumentieren werde, ist: bezogen auf die Bereiche Spracherwerb und Sprachwandel kann gezeigt werden, dass der Minimalismus hier gegenüber rivalisierenden Theorien ins Hintertreffen gerät. Ausgehend von diesem Befund werde ich aufzeigen, welche Theorien in diesen beiden Bereichen besser greifen – und welche Schlüsse daraus für die philosophische Theoriebildung in der Semantik zu ziehen sind.

Mein Vortrag wird im Kern zwei Argumente näher beleuchten. Das erste geht der Frage auf den Grund, wie plausibel es ist, einerseits anzunehmen, dass Spracherwerb nur gebrauchsbasiert beschrieben werden kann, die Resultate des Erwerbsprozesses aber losgelöst vom Gebrauch sind. Das zweite Argument wird zeigen, dass Sprachwandel sich nicht in einzelnen »Schritten« vollzieht und damit eine wesentliche (notwendige) Hintergrundannahme des Minimalismus zur Beschreibung von Wandelprozessen wegfällt.

Moral Objectivity in the Face of Contingency

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According to a well-known debunking argument, the stumbling block of moral realism is that our evolutionary history invariably led us to hold certain moral convictions independently of the truth of these convictions. The central thought of this argument is that, if evolution determines our moral convictions to a high degree, they are insensitive to the moral truth. In other words, we would have come to hold our moral convictions whether or not they are true. My paper argues that there is a much more powerful debunking argument that proceeds from the contingency of our moral convictions, as opposed to the deterministic tale of their genealogy from which the traditional argument proceeds. Unlike proponents of the traditional argument, I believe that our moral evolution, understood both in biological and cultural terms, gives us strong reasons to believe that many of our core moral convictions are highly contingent, rather than predetermined – hence they support the premise of the argument developed here and call in to question the premise of the traditional argument. The new argument, in a nutshell, is this: Given the contingency of our moral beliefs, objectivist meta-ethical theories are forced to accept that, if our moral beliefs are by and large true, their truth is just a coincidence. In consequence, they are unable to explain, in principle, why our moral convictions are by and large true or, in other words, why they are reliable. This argument is superior to the traditional debunking argument for several reasons. First, it relies on a more compelling view of how our biological and cultural evolution shaped our fundamental moral convictions. Second, it is more sweeping because its target area includes both naturalist and non-naturalist realism as well as quasi-realism. Third, it can answer a well-known Lewisian objection to the reliability challenge.

**Kagans ›Lösung‹ des Problems gemeinschaftlichen
Handelns – ein Mangel an Informationen als
notwendige Bedingung?**

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Gemeinschaftliches Handeln liegt genau dann vor, wenn mehrere Einzelhandlungen zusammen zu Ergebnissen führen, die (a) bei Unterlassung hinreichend vieler der Einzelhandlungen ausgeblieben wären (sie sind also als *vermeidbar* anzusehen), (b) die keine dieser Handlungen alleine hervorbrächte, und (c) die durch das alleinige Unterlassen bloß einer der Handlungen nicht ausblieben. Unter Umständen kann es dabei durchaus sein, dass den Akteuren all dies bekannt ist. Insofern sind die Ergebnisse des gemeinsamen Handelns zumindest in einigen Fäl-

len *absehbar*, wenngleich ihr Hervorbringen *nicht* koordiniert oder geplant vorstattengeht.

Da im Lichte des (maximierenden) (Handlungs-)Konsequentialismus (nachfolgend kurz »Konsequentialismus«) genau jene Handlungen moralisch richtig sind, die zu den besten Ergebnissen führen, droht Theorien dieser Familie durch Fälle gemeinschaftlichen Handelns ein Problem, da die gemeinschaftlich hervorgebrachten Ergebnisse hinsichtlich ihrer moralischen Qualität die Ergebnisse der Einzelhandlungen überwiegen können, ohne dass der Konsequentialismus dem Rechnung tragen kann: Die gemeinschaftlich hervorgebrachten Ergebnisse, obwohl durch Handlungen hervorgebracht, sind eben schlicht nicht das Ergebnis irgendeiner der Einzelhandlungen und können daher nicht in die moralische Bewertung all dieser Einzelhandlungen eingehen. So kann es, *prima facie*, dazu kommen, dass *suboptimale, vermeidbare und absehbare* Ergebnisse durch Handeln herbeigeführt werden, ohne dass *auch nur einer* der Handelnden (gemessen am Konsequentialismus) etwas moralisch Falsches getan hat. Der Konsequentialismus scheitert also, so sieht es aus, auf seinem eigenen Terrain.

Shelly Kagan beansprucht für sich, das Problem gemeinschaftlichen Handelns für den Konsequentialisten in seinem Aufsatz »Do I Make a Difference« von 2011 gelöst zu haben. Dafür versucht er zunächst zu etablieren, dass es genau zwei Unterarten von gemeinschaftlichem Handeln zu geben scheint – Auslöser-Fälle (»Trigger Cases«, *TCs*) und Fälle, in denen sich unwahrnehmbare Unterschiede zu einem Gesamteffekt kumulieren (»Imperceptible Difference Cases«, *IDCs*); Dann argumentiert er dafür, dass der Expected Utility Utilitarianism (*EUU*), wonach eine Handlung genau dann moralisch richtig ist, wenn sie den zu erwartenden Nutzen maximiert, mit *TCs* umzugehen vermag; Abschließend legt er dar, dass es *IDCs* überhaupt nicht geben kann, weil die Annahme ihrer Existenz in einen Widerspruch führt.

Anhand einer kurzen allgemeinen Darstellung von Kagens Ansatz sowie durch Angabe eines Gegenbeispiels wird gezeigt, dass sein Ansatz zur Lösung von *TCs* nicht verallgemeinerbar ist, da er auf einer kritischen Annahme beruht – eine Annahme, die vor allem nicht für Fälle gemeinschaftlichen Handelns des alltäglichen Lebens gegeben scheint.

P 5.1

Behl

Eureka! A Novel View on Insight in Non-Human Animals

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The influential work from Köhler on insight opened up a lively ongoing debate in animal cognition. The insight paradigms are supposed to test real cognition in non-human animals and exclude associative processes. Therefore, these studies are of significant relevance for philosophical questions about the mind as for example the anthropological difference.

In insight studies with humans the focus lies on the phenomenological experience (the Aha!) defining the moment of insight. In order to observe insight in animals, Köhler (1976) presupposed that the *Aha!*-moment co-occurs reliably with both the suddenness of the solution and the preceding impasse and defined insight as the *sudden* solution after an *impasse*. Köhler's widely

used definition is problematic for several reasons regarding the impasse, the suddenness of the solution, and the lacking discrimination possibilities for different levels of insight.

Thus, I propose here a new definition of insight in non-human animals that overcomes the problems listed above and allows for a gradual theory of insight:

Insight = Acquisition of the knowing-how of a new relevant affordance in a situation

An affordance is an option for action anchored in the properties of the environment. The focus on affordances—the options for actions—implies a focus on experimentally observable behavior, which is epistemically desirable. A promising candidate for a systematic elaboration of affordances in this context is the family of affordances explicated by Seuchter and Vosgerau (2011), which provide an increase in abstraction. This set of affordances allows to define an increase in insight via an increase in the level of abstraction of the acquainted affordance. The knowledge format in which the affordance is stored is the second important discrimination criterion. Jung and Newen (2009) propose an image-like knowledge format, which is especially relevant to insight in non-human animals as it includes mid-level abstractions that do not rely on language.

Finally, the here proposed view on insight is in principle expandable to insight characterization in humans opening up new ways in comparative psychology.

P 13.1

Bluhm

Using Linguistic Corpora in the Study of Causal Reasoning

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»[R]esearchers studying causal reasoning skills in adults have typically based their conclusions on studies of a narrow segment of the adult population in a specific context« (Kuhn 2007, 44, 47). The preference for lab experiments is hardly surprising, given that they allow a maximum of control and can be efficiently used to assess behaviour in response to minimally varied conditions. But lab experiments have certain limitations, even when Kuhn's critique is heeded and a more diverse choice of subjects made. Most importantly, being in the lab creates a situation whose artificiality can influence the subjects' responses by priming their attention to aspects of the situation that are relevant to the issue under inquiry. I would like to argue that corpus linguistics—a methodology rarely used in Argumentation Theory—may therefore prove to be a valuable addition to the more common experimental paradigms. While in corpus analysis neither a manipulation of variables nor anything resembling control over the environment is possible, the independently recorded data that corpora provide may be assumed to provide a fairly unbiased empirical basis for the specific research questions probed. This data can be profitably employed in the study of causal reasoning.

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P 5.1

Bunkenborg

How to Understand Process Requirements of Rationality

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The recent debate on the normativity of rationality tries to answer the question if there are reasons to be rational in terms of whether there are reasons to comply with requirements of rationality. Examples of such requirements are: the requirement of means-end-coherence, the requirement of enkrasia, the requirement to believe what follows from our beliefs and the requirement not to have contradicting beliefs. A substantial part of the debate is about what form, precisely, these rational requirements take. It has recently been argued, most prominently by Kolodny (2005), that they are process rather than state requirements. Here, I take issue with Kolodny's formulation of process requirements. I argue that it must in principle be possible to correctly determine whether you are rational in any given situation by determining whether you comply with rational requirements in that situation. I go on to argue that on the formulation of process requirements put forth by Kolodny, this is not possible. Therefore, I develop a different formulation of process requirements that correctly tells us for any point in time t whether you are rational at t . I close by defending my formulation against several objections.

P 3.1

Bussmann

Ein verstärkter Lügner als Racheproblem für den Dialethismus?

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Die dialethistische Lösung der Lügnerparadoxie (und verwandter semantischer Paradoxien) besteht darin, eine naive (aber nicht triviale) Theorie der Wahrheit (und anderer semantischer Begriffe) aufrechtzuerhalten und die daraus resultierenden Widersprüche als (zumindest auch) wahre Sätze zu akzeptieren. Dialethisten werfen daher üblicherweise das klassisch gültige Schlussprinzip *ex falso quodlibet* ($A, \neg A \vdash B$) und schließen ihre semantischen Theorien nur unter schwächeren, parakonsistenten Logiken ab. Wegen Currys Paradoxie lehnen einige Dialethisten darüberhinaus Kontraktion ab.¹

Eine Art von Erwiderung auf diesen dialethistischen Ansatz ist der Versuch zu zeigen, dass auch die dialethistische Theorie trivial ist, selbst wenn man sie mit Hilfe einer solchen, sehr schwachen, parakonsistenten und kontraktionsfreien Logik formuliert. Bromand [1] z. B. geht von einer einzigen Prämisse aus, nämlich, dass jeder Satz der Sprache der fraglichen dialethistischen Logik entweder nur wahr, nur falsch, oder nur sowohl wahr, als auch falsch ist. Er zeigt dann mit Hilfe eines konditionalen Beweises, dass es einen Satz gibt (einen »verstärkten Lügner«), der in jedem der drei Fälle $1 = 0$ impliziert. Da

$1 \neq 0$, zeige dies, dass der Dialethismus, wenn er nicht trivial sein soll, die Semantik seiner eigenen Sprache nicht ausdrücken kann. Dass der Dialethismus aber seine eigene Semantik ausdrücken kann, wird von seinen Freunden als einer der größten Vorteile dieses Ansatzes betrachtet.

Die einzige bisherige Erwiderung eines Dialethisten [3] basiert auf der Zurückweisung der Prämisse des Arguments. Ich zeige, dass das Argument schon deshalb nicht »funktioniert«, da es sich implizit auf die Kontraktions-Regel stützt, die die Dialethistin verwirft. Sie kann das Argument demnach als auf (in ihren Augen) unzulässigen Regeln basierend ablehnen. Allerdings hat diese Erwiderung nur »Biss«, wenn die Dialethistin darüber hinaus zeigen kann, dass das Argument in der von ihr favorisierten Logik *ungültig* ist. Nicht jede von Dialethisten vorgeschlagenen Logik ist jedoch so schwach, dass sie Gegenbeispiele zu Bromands Argumentform zulässt.

¹ Andere plädieren dafür, Modus Ponens aufzugeben. Vgl. [2]. Diese andere Spielart des Dialethismus ist durch das Folgende nicht betroffen.

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P 7.1

Damschen

Das erkenntnistheoretische Prinzip der vollständigen Zugänglichkeit

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In diesem Beitrag wird erstens das erkenntnistheoretische Prinzip der vollständigen Zugänglichkeit eingeführt und bewiesen; es werden zweitens Konsequenzen dieses erkenntnistheoretischen Prinzips für die Religionsphilosophie und die Metaphysik gezogen.

1. Das Prinzip der vollständigen Zugänglichkeit (PVZ) besagt: <Es gibt keine Proposition, zu der niemand einen kognitiven Zugang hat.> Dieses Prinzip kann bewiesen werden, wenn man die zu ihm konträdiktorische realistische Position R untersucht: (R) <Jemand urteilt: Es gibt mindestens eine Entität, die eine Proposition ist, zu der niemand einen kognitiven Zugang hat.> Die realistische Position führt in einen Selbstwiderspruch, denn der Urteilende selbst muss einen kognitiven Zugang zu der Entität haben, um qualifiziert sagen zu können, dass die Entität eine Proposition ist. Damit widerspricht sich der Urteilende selbst, denn mit ihm gibt es jemanden, der diesen rationalen Zugang hat; zugleich behauptet er aber, dass es niemanden gibt, der diesen Zugang hat. Es ergibt sich also ein performativer Widerspruch zwischen dem Akt und dem Inhalt des Urteils.

2. Das Prinzip der vollständigen Zugänglichkeit hat eine Reihe von weitreichenden Konsequenzen für die Grundlagendisziplinen der Philosophie. Es werden zwei Konsequenzen aufgezeigt: Die Unmöglichkeit einer propositionalen Offenbarung in der Religionsphilosophie und die Unmöglichkeit des objektiven Idealismus in der Metaphysik bzw. Ontologie.

P 5.2

Dembić

Out of Order: Problems of Biological Conceptions of Mental Disorder

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Is the concept of mental disorder explicable in terms of the concept of biological function? In the philosophy of psychiatry, two different conceptions of biological function are discussed: Christopher Boorse's systemic account and Jerome Wakefield's etiological account.¹ I argue that neither of those conceptions provides an explication of the concept of mental disorder in biological terms. Each of those conceptions fails to account for one adequacy condition for a biological conception of mental disorder.

Every conception of mental disorder must meet the following two adequacy conditions:

- 1) The conception should pick out the right phenomena, that is, the clear cases of those phenomena we are interested in when we talk about »mental disorders« in a medical context.
- 2) The conception should account for the normativity of disorder. Ascriptions of mental disorder entail the claim that something with the person's mental condition »is not as it should be«. A conception should provide a criterion that justifies such an ascription.

For a biological conception, there is a further condition:

- 3) The conception should account for (1) and (2) solely in biological terms.

My thesis is that Boorse's systemic conception of biological function cannot account for the normativity of the concept of disorder in biological terms. Wakefield's etiological conception might account for the normativity of disorder in biological terms, but it does not pick out those phenomena we are interested in when we talk about »mental disorder« in a medical context. In order to account for the normativity of disorder, a teleological concept of function is needed: the function of an entity is what the entity is *supposed* to do. However, in the case of mental disorder, the sense of »supposed to do« cannot be explicated in purely naturalistic terms.

¹ See Boorse, Christopher (1977): »Health as a Theoretical Concept« *Philosophy of Science* 44: 542–573 and Wakefield, Jerome C. (1992) »The Concept of Mental Disorder: On the Boundary Between Biological Facts and Social Values« *American Psychologist* 47, 3: 373–88

P 5.3

Esken

How to Take a Normative Stance?

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Questions of normativity relate to what *ought* to be. Already at this starting point the consensus about »normativity« reaches its limits. Some would argue that norms and normative understanding arise exclusively in a social or moral context, while others think that norma-

tivity has a much broader meaning including all kinds of practical reason. Consider an individual action like taking the umbrella before leaving the house; if we consider this to be an action which includes a normative dimension (i.e., I should/ought take the umbrella otherwise I will get wet), then every action which is done for a reason, i.e. every intentional action, would be done for a normative reason. Similarly every judgement possesses a normative dimension, if normativity is no more than the possibility of being right or wrong. In this very wide sense of practical and theoretical rationality, understanding normative constraints requires no social or moral context. It basically comes down to the recognition that a certain course of action will contribute—or not—to reach a certain goal and that one's judgement can be correct or incorrect.

Norms in this narrower sense are rules and regularities to which one ought to conform because other people demand it. In other words: in contrast to the term »normative«—as used in the context of practical rationality (e.g., in instrumental reasoning)—the »ought« as it is used in the context of moral norms and conventions is a social matter and not simply an individual matter of believing that one ought to do X in order to achieve goal Y (e.g., to take the umbrella not to get wet). The question for the agent is not what he *needs* to do in order to reach a goal; the question is what he *should* do to fulfill what others expect from him. A fully fledged understanding of social norms as well as of conventions presupposes means-end-reasoning of the form: »I could do x to reach z, but I should do a to reach z«. In my talk I will outline the cognitive prerequisites for understanding social norms in the narrower sense in contrast to an understanding of norms in the wider sense in the context of practical rationality.

P S.2

Faust

Wie ein Dispositionalismus bezüglich Handlungserklärungen und Gründen den Streit zwischen Kausalisten und Antikausalisten in der neueren Handlungstheorie schlichten könnte

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Welche Art von Erklärung liegt vor, wenn es zutrifft, dass A ins Café geht, weil sie B treffen möchte und warum erklärt dieser Wunsch oder Grund As Gang ins Café? Eine gängige Auffassung besagt, dass Handlungen durch Gründe erklärt werden, weil diese als Handlungsursachen fungieren.

Allerdings gibt es eine Reihe von antikausalistischen Einwänden gegen das Standardmodell,

1.) Gründe oder deren Analysanda sind keine mentalen Zustände bzw. keine Ereignisse, sondern sprachliche Entitäten und also kann zwischen Grund und Handlung keine Kausalbeziehung bestehen. 2.) Die (etwaige) Verursachungsbeziehung zwischen Grund und Handlung ist nicht hinreichend für deren rationalisierende Beziehung, da Fälle denkbar sind, wo die kausalistischen Kriterien einer Handlung erfüllt sind (Grund oder Absicht verursacht eine Handlung) und keine intentionale Handlung vorliegt (sog. deviant causal chains). Teleologen machen daran anschließend geltend, dass 3.) Handlungserklärungen und Kausalerklärungen unterschiedliches erklären. Ursachen und Zwecke einer Handlung sind nicht

koextensional und erklären also verschiedenes. Teleologen sehen sich allerdings mit Kims Exklusionsprinzip konfrontiert.

Ein Lösungsansatz soll (mit Arbeiten von John Hyman und Ralf Stoecker) durch eine dispositionale Analyse von Gründen und Handlungserklärungen aufgezeigt werden. Handlungserklärungen sind dispositionale Erklärungen, die Kausalfaktoren, aber keine Ursachen nennen. Wünsche oder Gründe sind keine Ursachen, sondern Dispositionen, die sich in (intentionalen) Handlungen manifestieren. Dispositionen sind keine Ereignisse oder mentale Episoden, sie sind aktueursspezifische praktische Fähigkeiten und Eigenschaften. Neben der ontologischen Sparsamkeit bezüglich mentaler Zustände und dem Erklärungsmonismus, scheint ein weiterer Vorteil des Ansatzes zu sein, das Problem der abweichenden Kausalketten zu vermeiden, indem nur Manifestationen von menschlichen Dispositionen als Handlungen zugelassen werden.

P 5.4

Fink

Introspection and Disagreement

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Based on first-person reports, there seems to be widespread disagreements about phenomenal experiences, e.g. whether dreams are colored or not, whether cognition, intentions, or sensory motor contingencies have phenomenal character or not, and so on. Some (Dennett 1991, Metzinger 2004, Schwitzgebel 2011) see such »introspective disputes« as evidence against the epistemic merits of introspection. However, I believe that such skeptical arguments based on introspective disputes are toothless. My main argument rests on a deflationary account of »introspective disputes«: There cannot be any such disputes. The deflationary argument is based on two commonly held views of phenomenality and introspection: That every experience is someone's and that introspection is an internal process. First-person reports are then essentially ascriptions, which alters their oppositional relations and how they can be justified. Then, either the opinions in the »dispute« (in scare quotes) are introspectively justified but do not constitute a proper dispute; or the opinions in the »dispute« are in the proper oppositional relations but cannot be justified by introspection. Thus, there are no proper introspective disputes, only Scheindisputes. This then blocks these skeptical arguments against introspection: If there are no introspective disputes, they cannot be indicative of a failure of introspection. What we currently take to be introspective disputes might, however, be scientifically relevant: These divergences in opinions hint at variances in experience. These could in turn be investigated empirically, which may reveal facts about the structure of neural correlates of consciousness. I present the study by Schwarzkopf et al (2010) as an example of this type of research.

P 5.5

Fink / Zang

Ein Organ, vier Modalitäten? Oder: Wie man mit Fischen für die Elimination von Sinnesmodalitäten argumentieren kann

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Sinnesmodalitäten werden eindeutig als Phänomene der Psychologie, Psychophysik, sowie der Neuro- und Kognitionswissenschaften angesehen, und eine Reihe von Arbeiten versucht die Anzahl der menschlichen Sinnesmodalitäten zu eruieren. Aber zur Existenz und Abzählbarkeit gehören Individuationskriterien (cf. Quine, 1969: 23). Wir zeigen, dass bisher wissenschaftlich akzeptable Individuationskriterien für Sinnesmodalitäten fehlen. Darauf aufbauend kann man einen Eliminativismus bezüglich Sinnesmodalitäten innerhalb der Wissenschaften motivieren.

Grice (1962) und Leon (1988) schlagen introspezierbaren phänomenalen Charakter als Individuationskriterien vor. Dieser ist jedoch nicht intersubjektiv und dadurch kaum adäquat in wissenschaftlichen Kontexten. Keeley (2002) nennt vier objektive Individuationskriterien, die den Raum der plausiblen objektiven Kriterien erschöpfen.

Wenn es objektive Individuationskriterien sind, dann sollten wir diese auch auf nicht-menschliche Tiere anwenden können, um zu fragen, welche Sinnesmodalität ein Sinnesorgan bedient. Wie sieht es beispielsweise aus mit dem Seitenlinienorgan der Fische? Bisher gibt es vier wissenschaftliche Hypothesen, jedoch verhelfen Keeleys Kriterien hier zu keiner eindeutigen Entscheidung. Dies legt nahe, dass Keeleys Kriterien entweder nicht erschöpfen oder keine Individuationskriterien sind.

Wir wollen aufgrund dieser wohl prinzipiellen Unbestimmtheit einen Eliminativismus bezüglich Sinnesmodalitäten anregen: Weder introspektiv noch objektiv lassen sich Kriterien finden, anhand derer ein Wahrnehmungserlebnis eindeutig einer Sinnesmodalität zugeordnet werden kann. Wir diskutieren einige Phänomene, die einen solchen Skeptizismus stützen könnten: den McGurk-Effekt, die visuelle Einflußnahme auf Geruchswahrnehmung, und Synästhesie. Eine unimodale Sicht auf Wahrnehmung könnte die Unterteilung in Sinnesmodalitäten ersetzen, ohne große Auswirkungen auf die wissenschaftliche Praxis zu haben. Wir halten Sinnesmodalitäten-Eliminativismus deswegen für eine haltbare Position in wissenschaftlichen Kontexten.

P 6.1

Friederich

Self-Locating Belief and Apparent Anomalous Causal Powers

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Reasoning that takes into account self-locating evidence in apparently plausible ways often yields startling, sometimes spectacular, conclusions. One of the weirdest is that in some cases agents appear to be rationally entitled to reason as if they had »anomalous causal powers« (Bostrom 2001). Bostrom proposes some scenarios where this happens—the three »Adam and Eve« experiments and the »UN++Gedanken« experiment. Incidentally, this appearance of »anomalous causal powers« has not been systematically investigated in the literature and the scenarios by Bostrom just mentioned are not among the most-discussed problems of self-locating belief.

In response to this finding, the present contribution has three aims: the first is to derive recommendations analogous to those derived by Bostrom for two especially famous problems of self-locating belief for which, curiously, this has not yet been done: the Doomsday Argument (Gott 1993, Leslie 1996) and the Sleeping Beauty (SB) problem (Elga 2000). I introduce versions of these problems for which reasoning along the lines of David Lewis' halfer view of SB (Lewis 2001) recommends credences that are as if someone had anomalous causal powers. Choosing Beauty (CB), introduced here, is a novel version of SB that exhibits this feature.

The second aim of the contribution is to highlight the implausibility of any such recommendation and to turn this into an argument against Lewisian halfer-style reasoning as applied to these problems.

Finally, my third aim is to show that the prospects for third-style reasoning—one of the main alternatives to Lewisian halfer-style reasoning—are better than widely assumed. The main problem for third-style reasoning, it is usually believed, is that it yields catastrophic recommendations in *Presumptuous Philosopher*-type scenarios (Bostrom 2001, Leitgeb 2010). However, as I argue, these scenarios differ in crucial ways from the Doomsday Argument and Sleeping Beauty as regards the appearance of apparent anomalous causal powers. Accordingly, there is little reason to suppose that they call for analogous answers as the Doomsday Argument and Sleeping Beauty, opening up possibilities for a successful defense of third-style reasoning as applied to the Sleeping Beauty problem.

P 1.2

Garcia-Odon

Counterfactuals

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Subjunctive conditionals are often used as premises of *modus tollens* arguments ($A \rightarrow B, \neg B \mid \therefore \neg A$) (Stalnaker 1975). For example, a speaker who wants to convince her interlocutor that A is false might use the following argument: *If it had been the case that A, it would have been the case that B. But it is not the case that B. Therefore, it is not the case that A.* Let $A > B$ represent the conditional premise of the argument, where $>$ is Stalnaker's (1968) conditional connective. Though $A > B$ is in the subjunctive mood, the speaker should not presuppose that A is counterfactual (i.e. A should not be incompatible with the presuppositions that hold in the worlds of the context set), for this is precisely what she wants to demonstrate, as is argued by Stalnaker (1975). Stalnaker also argues that the most similar A-world to the actual world is outside the context set, not because A is incompatible with the presuppositions of the context (it is not), but because by the time the second premise ($A > B$) is provided, the first one ($\neg B$) should have been already accepted. However, I argue that since A must be compatible with the presuppositions of the context, the closest A-world to the actual world must be within the context set, and since the closest A-world to the actual world is a B-world (assuming that $A > B$ is true), there must be some B-world in the context set. But then, it remains to be explained how the speaker achieves the (seemingly) contradictory goals of not presupposing that B is false in the actual world (at least, for as long as the conditional premise lasts), and asserting that B is false. I argue that the reference world (the world of evaluation) cannot be the same for the two premises of the argument. The speaker takes her addressee's point of view, considering the world the addressee thinks is actual as if it were the actual world, for the sake of the argument, and for as long as the conditional premise lasts. In this non-actual world considered as actual (Davies & Humberstone 1980), or »counterfactual« world (to use Yablo's (2002) term), B is not presupposed to be false, which results in the original context set being initially enlarged. However, the speaker's assertion that B is false (on the assumption that it is accepted by the addressee) eventually reduces the number of ways the world might be for all the addressee accepts. Thus, the addressee ends up centering herself in the actual world, and the context set returns to its original size.

P 11.2 **Gersbach**

Praktisches Schließen: Vergleichen von Optionen oder Vereinbarkeit von Zwecken?

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Eine Grundidee in der aktuellen Debatte um praktische Rationalität und praktisches Schließen ist, dass wir dabei Optionen vergleichen. Ich möchte zeigen, dass wir, um diese Idee des Vergleichens überhaupt verständlich zu machen, diese auf eine noch grundlegendere Idee zurückführen müssen: auf die Idee übereinstimmender Zwecke. Der Zweckbegriff eignet sich besonders gut als Grundlage für eine Theorie praktischen Schließens aus zwei Gründen: Durch seinen teleologischen Bezug zum Handeln ist der Begriff des Zwecks ein praktischer Begriff. Außerdem lässt sich am Verhältnis von Zwecken – das Verhältnis der Übereinstimmung und der hinreichenden Spezifizierung – die Idee der Gültigkeit praktischen Schließens entwickeln. Der teleologische Handlungsbezug ist jedoch gleichzeitig ein Problem, da er scheinbar die Anwendung des Zweckbegriffs auf instrumentelle Rationalität beschränkt.

Um den Zweckbegriff als Grundbegriff praktischen Schließens verfügbar zu machen, werde ich ihn deshalb in einem ersten Schritt mit Hilfe von Kant erweitern um dann in einem zweiten Schritt zwei Arten von Zwecken zu unterscheiden: *endliche* und *unendliche*. Wobei unendliche Zwecke durch ihre besondere Zeitlichkeit über ein bloß instrumentelles Verhältnis zu den Handlungen, die sie verwirklichen, hinausgehen.

Auf der Grundlage dieses so erweiterten Zweckbegriffs werde ich dann die Idee übereinstimmender Zwecke einführen. Dazu müssen wir zunächst untersuchen in welchen Verhältnissen Zwecke zueinander stehen können. Dabei können wir zwischen vertikalen und horizontalen Zweckrelationen unterscheiden. Mit der vertikalen Zweckrelation meine ich das Verhältnis »Ich will A tun indem ich B tue«. Hier bestimmt der Zweck B den Zweck A näher, er spezifiziert ihn indem er hinreichende Mittel für seine Verwirklichung bestimmt. Die horizontale Zweckrelation finden wir einerseits im Verhältnis in dem Teilzwecke oder wir können auch sagen Schritte einer Handlung zueinander stehen. Andererseits stehen sowohl endliche wie auch unendliche Zwecke (allerdings auf eine je eigene Weise) in einem horizontalen Verhältnis welches verlangt, dass sie einander nicht ausschließen. Im Kontrast dazu werde ich die Idee des Vergleichens von Optionen beschreiben und aufzeigen, weshalb sie nicht hinreichend ist um praktisches Schließen zu beschreiben.

P 2.1 **Göhner**

What Is the Proper Subject Matter of a Scientific Metaphysics?

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Throughout the last decade, philosophers of science have demonstrated renewed interest not only in meta-

physical questions, but also in philosophical method. Such interest has been accompanied by attempts at naturalizing metaphysics as a discipline. If science is the supreme source of reliable beliefs about the world, the argument goes, scientific methods and their results must be granted precedence over metaphysical speculation. Mainstream analytic metaphysics is hence to be rejected and needs to be replaced by a scientific metaphysics worthy of the name.

Opinions diverge over what form the new, scientific metaphysics should take. To some, the task of metaphysics is to bridge explanatory gaps between uninterpreted scientific theories on the one hand and everyday conceptions of the world on the other. More radically inclined authors argue that modern science has shown our pre-scientific conceptions to be, by and large, grossly misguided. They advise metaphysicians to pursue unification of our best scientific theories instead. Apparently, even among its champions there is no unanimity with respect to the proper subject matter of scientific metaphysics.

What kinds of questions or topics are legitimate objects of metaphysical discourse? Which sorts of metaphysical debate are admissible? I argue that if metaphysics is denied a genuine subject matter (such as transcendental or fundamental reality) along with a genuinely metaphysical or philosophical method (such as conceptual analysis), and if, in addition, it is ascribed no task beyond that of unification (which is a universal desideratum with respect to the acquisition of knowledge), then »scientific *metaphysics*« is a misnomer. There must, after all, be something genuinely metaphysical about scientific or naturalistic metaphysics if we do not strive for eliminative naturalism.

P 12.1 **Grahle / von Maur**

Social Critique, Suffering, and Emotional Involvement

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Sally Haslanger (2012: 16, 2013: 1, 2015: 1) argues that ethicists working in the Analytic tradition tend to over-emphasize the role of the individual, while being widely insensitive to the fact that, often, people act as occupiers of *nodes* within social structures. While social structures frequently provide the best explanantia for persons' choices, they can (and often should) be made the target of social critique. We try to make sense of the idea that critique should not just aim at analyzing its object adequately, but also at contributing to the change or abolishment of it. While Haslanger (2012: 21ff.) suggests that this means assisting the explication of complaints made within existing social movements, we do not think that this is always possible or necessary wherever critique is due. Instead, we argue that critique should aim at building up its transformative impact in three steps. First, it should aim at describing the defect of a node by way of establishing *structural contradictions*, which we take to be instances of two structures belonging to the same node that have diametrically op-

posing properties. If people strive for consistency in their ways of living, making them aware of such contradictions may help initiate transformation. Second, critique should aim at identifying these contradictions as a source of suffering, as people tend to share a disposition to overcome suffering, at least when they know the cause of it. Third, we argue for an ideal of a critic, who becomes practically and emotionally involved rather than remaining distant and impartial within the narrow realm of the academy. Through her compassion she gives sufferers a sense of being taken seriously, and thus contributes to an atmosphere of trust. The latter, we argue, is a prerequisite for people to overcome their anxieties and to develop the typical kinds of unifying and forward-looking attitudes in support of social change, most notably love, hope, and courage.

P 5.6

Gouvea

The Problem of Social Entities for Physicalism

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Physicalism states that there is nothing over and above the physical. Doubts arise from our ordinary belief that there are things that do not seem to be physical. Conscious or mental states in general are the usual examples of problematic cases. They seem to exist, but they do not easily fall in any notion of the strictly physical. Social entities, such as cultural artifacts, joint actions and institutions are also *prima facie* non-physical. Although most of them have physical parts, the distinctive properties of social entities are not the obvious subject matter of any known physical theory. Thus, physicalism must be able to offer an account on how the physical and the social are related, just as it offered accounts on the mind-body relation. In my talk, I argue that none of the traditional physicalist theories offers an adequate account of the social. Based on the results of an investigation on the conditions of constitution of social entities, I present arguments against three physicalist theories. I call the collection of the mentioned arguments 'the problem of social entities', which states that social entities are neither identical with physical entities, as asserted by token and type physicalism, nor realized by them in the way suggested by realization physicalism. Since the supervenience-based theses of physicalism are rejected for other reasons, I argue that none of the traditional characterizations of this metaphysical doctrine offers an adequate account of the social entities.

P 11.3

Guinebert

Where the Buck Stops: Obedience and Final Authority

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Should I? Am I allowed to? Do I even want to? And actually, why should it be *my* wants that count? Making your own decisions can be exhausting; wouldn't it be wonderful if there were someone to make them for you? Sometimes it seems tempting to let oneself be directed by others. However, obedience can't be taken unreservedly as a good strategy: There are, on the face of things, too many cases in which we condemn obedience. The case of Adolf Eichmann, as well as that of the test subjects in the Milgram experiments shows that we don't always evaluate obedience positively. And on the other hand it is obvious that obedience isn't always wrong; there are orders it is rational to follow; we don't want forego the advice, or even the influence, of our fellow man. So how are we to assess obedience?

I want to recommend an analysis of obediently performed actions that addresses the question of what exactly it is we can blame an obedient person for, and under what conditions. Accordingly we will focus on subjects who explain their actions as the decisions of others. The proposal that will be elaborated is: A person who acts out of obedience in a specific sense acts wrongly insofar as (inter alia) she doesn't ascribe final authority to herself. Thereby she violates a duty to herself.

The analysis of obedient actions allows us to distinguish between *obedience* and *subjugation*. In obedience, the attitude of an authority figures into one's own practical reasoning; in subjugation, one's own practical reasoning is suspended. A person who is under someone else's spell mistakenly ascribes final authority to someone else—she passes the buck. Whether or not such a person acts wrongly towards others, she is at fault in her relation to her own attitudes. Ascribing final authority to oneself is significant for one's self-constitution, in that the organization of one's value depends on it. A person individuates herself by way of her system of values. Therefore, treating oneself as the locus of final authority—as being where the buck stops—is a duty one owes to oneself.

P S.3

Heil

Meaning the Same: Churchland on Meaning Similarity

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How is communication possible? A necessary condition for mutual understanding seems to be that the words of the communicating individuals mean roughly the same. However, since the individuals differ in their learning histories of the deployed words and of the concepts these words express, this similarity in meaning demands explanation.

Such an explanation can be given by Paul Churchland within his *state space semantics*. It is based on the thesis that all human cognition processes, e.g. the identification and representation of a particular face, can be modelled and understood by employing (artificial) neural networks. In this approach, the basic representational unit is an activity pattern of the network which can alternatively be expressed as a point in the so-called state space of the network. According to Churchland, concepts should simply be understood as volumes in the state spaces of the respective individuals. These volumes are structured by similarity relations which connect the possible instances of the concept within the volume.

Understanding concepts this way offers great explanatory power. It enables Churchland to introduce a measure of similarity to compare concepts across different networks (i.e. different individuals) via their relative position in their respective state spaces. According to Churchland, the measure thereby abstracts from individually different learning histories as well as network architectures and seems to be able to meet the stated explanatory challenge.

On my poster, the basic properties of networks will be quickly elucidated with an example. Subsequently, Churchland's thesis and its advantages will be presented. In conclusion, one objection to his *state space semantics* will be discussed.

P 7.2 Jonas

**Abstract Belief and its Rational Acceptability:
Religion in Light of Mathematics**

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The rational acceptability of a belief depends on whether we are justified in holding it. Ordinary beliefs such as ›The cat is on the mat‹ are typically justified perceptually (›I see the cat sitting on its mat‹). Claims quantifying over abstract concepts, such as ›The density of a substance equals its mass divided by its volume‹, are typically not justified perceptually. Rather, the rational acceptability of abstract belief systems such as physics depends on the fulfilment of four conditions:

- (1) Immediate acceptability of the system's axioms
- (2) Consistency
- (3) Applicability
- (4) Predictability

If an abstract belief system fails to meet at least one of these criteria, belief in the system's claims will not be considered justified. Physics is widely thought to meet all four criteria; belief in the claims of physics is therefore considered rational. Astrology is widely agreed not to meet these criteria; therefore belief in the claims of astrology is considered irrational.

In this paper, I argue that any two abstract belief systems that fail in similar ways to meet these criteria must be considered equally irrational. This sounds obvious enough—yet it entails that belief in mathematics is just as irrational as belief in religion.

The paper examines to what extent two diametrically opposed abstract belief systems—mathematics and

religion—meet the four criteria for the rational acceptability of abstract belief systems. I show that the reasons belief in mathematics is generally considered rational (e.g. its widespread applicability) apply to religion as well; likewise, the reasons belief in religion is considered irrational (e.g. the obscurity of its objects and how we can have knowledge about them) apply to mathematics. From this, I infer that their epistemic status is formally equivalent and that their rational acceptability or unacceptability should thus be equal. My argument is directed against a widespread view according to which belief in mathematics is clearly rationally acceptable whereas belief in religion is not.

P 1.3

Kremling

DenkWelt Descartes

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Das Poster mit dem Titel »DenkWelt Descartes« stellt in einer Größe von ca. 2 x 4 Metern die argumentative Rekonstruktion der Meditationen von Descartes durch Gregor Betz (Reclam, 2011) grafisch dar. Neben einer vollständigen Visualisierung der inferentiellen Struktur der Meditationen in Argumenten und darin enthaltenen Prämissen in einem Netzwerk vollständig einsehbarer, verbundener Argumente ist die »DenkWelt Descartes« auch eine exemplarische, anschauliche Darstellung analytischen philosophischen Denkens überhaupt – dabei einerseits des Ziels argumentativer Klarheit, andererseits der enormen Komplexität philosophischer Denkbewegungen.

Die »DenkWelt Descartes« ist als Exponat für DenkWelten, einem sich im Aufbau befindenden Museum philosophischer Ideen, konzipiert worden (siehe www.denkwelten.net) und kann auf der GAP.9 erstmalig ausgestellt werden.

P 1.4

Landig

Starrheit verstehen

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Das Ziel dieses Vortrags lautet, ein neues Verständnis eines der zentralen Begriffe in der Sprachphilosophie zu skizzieren: dem der *Starrheit*. Ich werde dafür zunächst drei gängige Konzeptionen von Starrheit vorstellen: die hartnäckige (*obstinate*), moderate und konditionale Auffassung von Starrheit. Eine Diskussion über die Wechselbeziehungen dieser Varianten wird aufzeigen, dass sie weder miteinander kompatibel, noch begrifflich exakt sind: alle drei gängigen Formulierungen haben mit störenden Gegenbeispielen zu kämpfen. Ich werde danach argumentieren, dass die hartnäckige Auffassung von Starrheit wiederum zwei Lesarten hat, von welcher eine in der Literatur bisher nicht berücksichtigt wird. Die Ausarbeitung dieser Lesart wird zeigen, dass es möglich ist, Starrheit als Relation von Referenz und *Bedeutung* zu rekonstruieren. Demnach ist ein Ausdruck starr genau

dann, wenn der Referent des Ausdrucks ein Teil der Bedeutung des Ausdrucks ist. Obwohl John Stuart Mill wohl etwas ähnliches in Bezug auf Eigennamen vorschlug, wurde Saul Kripke (bspw.) immer so interpretiert, dass er *zusätzlich* die Starrheit von Eigennamen entdeckte. Das ändert sich mit meiner Rekonstruktion: die Frage, worauf sich ein Ausdruck in einer möglichen Welt bezieht, wird mit ihr (glücklicherweise) sinnlos. Das kann man sich leicht klar machen: wenn wir Aussagen auf ihre (metaphysische) Möglichkeit und Notwendigkeit hin untersuchen, dann dürfen wir in kontrafaktischen Auswertungssituationen nicht die Bedeutung der involvierten Ausdrücke verändern. Sind Referenten *Teile* der Bedeutung eines Ausdrucks, ist die Frage, worauf er sich in einer möglichen Welt bezieht, im Vorhinein beantwortet. Starrheit wird somit zu einem theoretischen Begriff, den man streng genommen nicht benötigt (in der Semantik), da er vollständig von anderen Eigenschaften erfasst wird. Ich werde argumentieren, dass diese Auffassung von Starrheit eine wunderbare konzeptuelle Ökonomie zur Folge hat, dass sie auch nicht mit den Problemen der anderen Definitionen zu kämpfen hat und zudem als einzige der Forderung Kripkes gerecht wird, dass sich die Unterscheidung von Starrheit und nicht-Starrheit auch in *simplen* Sätzen zeigen muss (d.h. auch in Sätzen, die kein modales Vokabular enthalten). Am Ende des Vortrags werde ich noch skizzieren, welche theoretischen Implikationen die von mir beschriebene Auffassung von Starrheit bietet (z.B., dass starre Bezeichner dann *identisch* mit *direkt referierenden* Ausdrücken sind).

P 5.7

Lindner

Shared Intention and Small Children's Joint Activities

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Regarding joint action, the majority of researchers in the field assumes that underlying collective or joint intentions are the glue that holds the respective actions of the participants together (Searle 1990; Bratman 1993; Tuomela 1988). A major part of the debate thus focuses on the nature of these particular intentions. In this talk, I will outline one major account of collective intentions by Michael Bratman (1993, 2014). His account is constructivist in nature and characterizes ›shared intention‹ as he calls it as a complex of interrelated individual intentions and attitudes. If this complex plays a specific functional role, so he argues, it can be identified with a shared intention on behalf of the participants in joint action. Although Bratman's account has a lot of advantages, it also has some serious flaws. Following this descriptive part, I will thus criticize that this account cannot explain joint action as displayed by small children. Based on this critique, I will formulate an alternative view, which suggests that some non-demanding cases of (seemingly) joint action (including those displayed by small children) are rather effects of the lack of representing one's own intentions *as one's own* (it is just represented as an intention that is there). This account has the advantage of offering a way to specify the pivotal role that joint action is supposed to play in the acquisition of socio-cognitive abilities. This role of joint action has recently been underlined by many different researchers and is most prominently advocated by Mi-

chael Tomasello (2005). The claim that joint action plays a crucial role in our cognitive and socio-cognitive development both phylogenetic and ontogenetic is highly plausible. Thus, any approach to joint action and collective intentionality should take this aspect into account and cover it with its theoretical considerations.

P 9.1

Lyreskog / Nagel

Understanding Pre-Frailty

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Age-related neural decline is an increasing problem in an ageing society. Manifold emerging technologies promise help to prevent and treat neural decline and disease. These technologies ask for a timely ethical assessment. However, ethical assessment is currently complicated due to terminological inaccuracy. The term ›frailty‹ is commonly used as a label for a set of typical symptoms of physical and neural decline related to aging. Symptoms include weakness, feelings of exhaustion, unintentional weight loss, and lowered levels of physical activity. Numerous diseases are closely associated with frailty, including neurological conditions such as Parkinson's and Alzheimer's disease. Relating to frailty, one can distinguish three groups of people: the frail, who show several symptoms of decline; the pre-frail, who run the risk of becoming frail and who are showing one or two symptoms, and the robust, who show no symptoms. Moreover, there are discussions surrounding the term ›cognitive frailty‹, focusing on cognitive capabilities. We scrutinize this established terminology, as it does not satisfyingly help to understand the development and treatment of (age-related) neurological diseases. This in turn makes accurate ethical assessments of the emerging neurotechnologies difficult. For example, many promising emerging neurotechnologies for preventing neural decline require early intervention. Thus, diagnosis and treatment initiation potentially has to be applied in populations that today would be classified as ›robust‹, although they risk frailty. An applicable conceptual framework needs to account for populations that have yet to show any symptoms, but that nonetheless risk frailty. We argue that this is an essential ground for ethical assessment. Particularly, employing a more fine-grained terminology concerning neural pre-frailty could help to effectively detect, prevent, and treat neural decline associated with frailty, and to facilitate ethical assessment of available and emerging neurotechnologies. Early detection poses another class of ethical and social questions. The terminology that we propose aims to more accurately describe frailty, by adding a number of important parameters, including, but not limited to: (1) type of frailty—as some populations risk muscular decline without suffering neural decline, and vice versa; (2) biomarker detection—as one might detect biomarkers associated with a certain neural disease without the patient showing any symptoms; (3) genetic dis-

position—if genetic dispositions increasing the risk of a certain disease are identified, this could help determine whether a patient is pre-frail or robust. By enriching the terminology considering frailty, we aim to provide a more accurate conceptual basis for how to ethically assess emerging neurotechnologies for an aging population.

P 2.2

Mahoozi

Bitter and Sweet: A Defense of Vague Existence

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The thesis I would like to defend is this: Existence can sometimes be vague. Specifically, I consider »argument from vagueness« proposed by Lewis (1986) and generalized by Sider (2001; 2003; 2009) in favor of universalism and four-dimensionalism respectively. Universalism is the thesis according to which considering any two objects there is a new object composed of them. To support this thesis, Sider (2003) argues that the ones who accept that a predicate is vague if it has multiple admissible precisifications are not entitled to endorse that existence is vague since »exists« is a natural language counterpart of unrestricted existential quantifier which cannot be vague. Sider argues that unrestricted existential quantifiers do not admit multiple precisifications while a predicate such as »bald« has at least two admissible precisifications; mainly because it has a metric like »having less than 100 hairs« that identifies the extension of the set of all bald persons.

The aim is showing that to have different precisifications it is not always necessary to have a specific metric. Topology is an appropriate tool to be employed in describing precisifications of existence. Topology is a branch of mathematics with characteristics that would encompass part of the complexity of the issue at stake. Topology studies properties of space that are independent of a metric. Furthermore, in topology objects can be bent or twisted and they can be deformed while topologically remain the same, as far as they are not ripped a part. For example, a doughnut and a coffee cup are topologically the same while they are different from a cube which does not have a hole. Moreover, using topology makes us capable of talking about the properties of an object in the absence of it. The notions such as open sets, neighborhood, and continuity illustrate the notion of proximity without requiring means to measure distances or to have a metric.

All these characteristics would be explained in a non-technical way, and the attempt would be to justify why topology provides a perspicuous tool to (at least partially) provide explanations for admissible precisifications for existence.

P 4.1

Masterton / Zenker / Gärdenfors

**From Classical Mechanics, to Special Relativity Theory, and Quantum Mechanics
Or: Why Structural Realists Would Profit from Studying Structural Continuity by Means of Conceptual Spaces**

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A viable realist position in the philosophy of science should be clear on the questions what theoretical »structure« is, and how continuity of such structure can be judged? Addressing both these question against the background of the debate among proponents of structural realists, we argue for two theses: the theory of conceptual spaces provides a rich non-symbolic framework to identify the structures of scientific theories as spatial entities. This framework serves to study the types of changes in the underlying conceptual space that occur when one theory is historically replaced by another; thus the continuity in structure that in fact obtains becomes more apparent than in extant accounts, which invariably proceed on the symbolic level of representation. Starting with a brief outline of how conceptual spaces apply to the reconstruction of empirical theories, we identify the types of change-operations that systematically transform a prior conceptual space into the successor space, and go on to present three key physical theories in their phase-space formulations: Classical Mechanics (CM), Special Relativity Theory (SRT), and Quantum Mechanics (QM). By treating the transitions from CM to SRT and QM, the similarities between their conceptual spaces allows for first assessment of the similarity between their theoretical structures. As this comparison makes (painfully) clear, judgments of conceptual similarity and continuity depend on assumptions that remain largely unaffected by, and hence are prior to, applying the spatial framework; they must therefore be established (or criticized) on independent grounds. This result goes some way towards explaining varying intuitions as to whether CM is more similar to SRT than SRT is to QM, for instance. Phrased more positively, whether a given historical transition constitutes a mild (»conservative«) or a more radical (»revolutionary«) change thus turns into a better defined disagreement.

P 5.8

Mölder

Folk Psychology and the Second-Person Perspective

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According to the traditional ›theory of mind‹ view, understanding other people means ascribing mental states to them from the third-person perspective. More recently, however, several philosophers and psychologists have stressed the importance of interaction in understanding others and have urged that we should acknowledge a distinctive mode of relating to other people, namely the second-person perspective. Some authors describe this mode in terms that does not presume *mentalizing* or reasoning about the mental states of others. Instead, various non-mentalistic explanatory constructs such as ›attunement to other's emotions,‹ ›mutual coordination,‹ ›direct perception,‹ ›resonance‹ and ›mirroring‹ are used. In short, the second-person perspective is meant to cover the relation to other people that involves interaction and reciprocity.

This raises the question of what role do mental states play in the second-person perspective. I proceed from the assumption that mental states are conceptualised in terms of folk-psychology. This leads to a more general question about the place of folk psychology in understanding others from the second-person perspective. In this regard, two sub-questions can be distinguished:

(a) *The ›understanding‹ question:* When we relate to others from the second-person perspective, do we still *understand* other people through folk psychology or is our relation to them independent from the folk psychological conception of the mental?

(b) *The ›explanation‹ question:* Can the second-person involvement with others itself be adequately characterised and *explained* in folk psychological terms, or do we require a new theoretical vocabulary and explanatory constructs for this?

The first question concerns the proper way of describing the information about others that becomes available from the second-person perspective, the second question concerns the proper way of conceiving the distinctive intersubjective competence that enables one to adopt the second-person perspective.

In my presentation, I will provide my answers to both of these questions and outline the possible roles of folk psychology with respect to the second-person perspective.

P 2.3

Mulamustafić

Sind der naive Realismus und der wissenschaftliche Realismus kompatibel?

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Der Physiker Arthur Eddington unterscheidet zwei Tische: einen makroskopischen Tisch, der ausgedehnt, farbig und fest ist, und einen Tisch, der größtenteils aus Leere besteht, die bespickt ist mit ein paar Mikropartikeln. Den ersten Tisch (den *manifesten Tisch*) kennen wir aus dem Alltag und von dem zweiten Tisch (dem *wissenschaftlichen Tisch*) wissen wir aufgrund von naturwissenschaftlichen Untersuchungen. Vor diesem Hintergrund stellt sich die Frage: Welcher der zwei Tische existiert objektiv, d. h. geistunabhängig?

Die verbreitetste Antwort auf diese Frage besagt, dass beide Tische objektiv existierten. Im Kontext unseres Problems läuft diese Antwort auf die Behauptung hinaus, dass der manifeste Tisch aus den von der Wissenschaft postulierten Entitäten *besteht*. Somit sind der manifeste und der wissenschaftliche Tisch numerisch identisch. Also gibt es eigentlich nur einen Tisch, der aber aus zwei Perspektiven betrachtet wird: Aus einer *Alltagsperspektive* besitzt der Tisch die wahrnehmbaren Eigenschaften, die wir ihm für gewöhnlich zuschreiben; aus einer *wissenschaftlichen Perspektive* hingegen ist er ein System von nicht-wahrnehmbaren Entitäten.

Ich möchte ein Argument vorstellen, das genau diese Antwort ausschließen soll. Das Argument soll zeigen, dass der manifeste und der wissenschaftliche Tisch ontologisch inkompatibel sind. Da das Tischbeispiel nur ein willkürliches Beispiel ist, können wir auch *allgemein* sagen, dass das Argument zeigen soll, dass die Existenz von *manifesten Entitäten* inkompatibel ist mit der Existenz von *wissenschaftlichen Entitäten*. Das Inkompatibilitätsargument besagt mit anderen Worten, dass der naive Realismus und der wissenschaftliche Realismus unvereinbar sind.

Auf meinem Poster befindet sich eine detaillierte Darstellung des Arguments sowie Hinweise darauf, wie umstrittene Prämissen des Arguments begründet werden können.

Meine zentrale These lautet: Das Inkompatibilitätsargument ist unter Annahmen schlüssig, die der Großteil der gegenwärtigen Philosophen und Philosophinnen vertritt. Somit gilt, dass der Großteil der gegenwärtigen Philosophen und Philosophinnen im Kontext unseres Problems inkompatible Ansichten vertritt.

P 5.9

Paskaleva-Yankova

An Examination of Influences and Reliability of Autobiographical Accounts of Depression

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Autobiographical accounts of mental illness in general and depression in particular have been considered an important source of insight into mental illness and have been frequently deployed for the study of experience

and processes of identification associated with it. However, their reliability and epistemological value in such endeavours have not remained uncontested. It has recently been argued that autobiographical accounts of depression should be approached with great caution as they are representative of the literary, social, and cultural contexts and meanings associated with depression rather than of the (phenomenal) experience individuals afflicted with the disorder are subjected to.

The goal of this paper is to argue that some of the influences impacting and shaping descriptions of depressive experience as reported in autobiographies operate at the level of individual subjective experience, as well. Thereby, first-person autobiographical accounts might by appropriate and reliable sources for the study of the experience of depression as they already incorporate the social and cultural embeddedness of the experience of mental illness. Depression, by virtue of being a mental illness, is not to be dissociated from the larger context of one's life and its social and cultural environment. The experience of depression, I would like to argue, does not happen in isolation and is shaped by a myriad of factors and influences, such as currently prevalent conceptions of depression, cultural and social meanings of depression and its symptoms and the respective interpretations related to these that impact the specific requirements posed by autobiographical accounts, as well. In order to examine these influences in more detail, I would like to focus on a comparative study of some of the most prominent memoirs of depression and anonymous responses provided by individuals suffering from depression to an online survey of the experience of depression. In doing this, I would aim at analysing the impact these influences exert on the most frequently reported affective phenomena (e.g. feelings of diminished self-worth, suicidal feelings and thoughts, and feelings of hopelessness) and the way these experiences are described in both formats.

P 2.4

Petersen

The Grounding Problem for Four-Dimensionalism

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In this talk, I develop a problem for *four-dimensionalism*, which is similar to the widely discussed grounding problem for *presentism*. It has recently been argued by many that presentism—the doctrine that only the present exists—should be rejected on grounds that its sparse ontology is not suited to underwrite the healthy dose of realism we share about the past. My aim basically is to add a new twist to the debate, by showing that four-dimensionalism—which roughly says that concrete objects are spatially as well as temporally extended and is typically to necessitate eternalism—is no better off than presentism. In particular, I argue that an ontology of four-dimensional objects does not have the appropriate *shape* to ground true propositions about the past.

P 11.4

Pfister

Verantwortung für Handlungen und Einstellungen

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Der Beitrag beschäftigt sich mit dem Begriff der grundlegenden Verantwortung für Handlungen und Einstellungen. Als Personen verfügen wir über eine grundlegende Fähigkeitsverantwortung, d.h. über die Fähigkeit, Gründe für unsere Handlungen und Einstellungen (Überzeugungen, Wünsche, Emotionen) anzugeben. Nur wer über diese Fähigkeit verfügt, kann auch (in einem grundlegenden Sinn) verantwortlich für etwas sein. Es stellt sich nun die Frage, wofür wir in diesem Sinn verantwortlich sind. Die voluntaristische Antwort lautet, dass wir nur für diejenigen Handlungen und Einstellungen verantwortlich sind, die wir absichtlich herbeigeführt und vorausgesehen haben. Ich werde gegen diese Auffassung argumentieren und die attributionistische Gegenposition vertreten. Demnach können wir auch für Dinge verantwortlich sein, die wir nicht absichtlich herbeigeführt und vorausgesehen haben, die uns jedoch zugeschrieben werden können. Ich werde dafür argumentieren, dass wir dafür verantwortlich sind, weil dies zu unserem Selbstverständnis als handelnde Personen gehört.

P 6.2

Poljanšek

Sinn und Referenz: Die erlebniskonstitutive Dimension von Antizipationen

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In meinem Beitrag werde ich dafür argumentieren, dass wir im Hinblick auf unser alltägliches, gegenständliches Weiterleben zwischen ›Sinn‹ und ›Referenz‹ unterscheiden sollten. Als was wir einen Gegenstand erleben, hängt nicht allein von dessen deskriptiven Eigenschaften, sondern auch und vor allem von spezifischen ›Erwartungshorizonten‹ ab, die wir im Erleben dieses Gegenstandes direkt mitvergegenwärtigen oder ›appäsentieren‹ (Husserl). Diese Erwartungshorizonte sind es, die ich den ›Sinn‹ oder die ›Sinngegenständlichkeit‹ einer Sache nenne.

Während nun der Referent des Erlebens von diesem Erleben weitestgehend unabhängig ist und Beschreibungen seiner natürlichen Eigenschaften folglich legitimerweise Anspruch auf Objektivität erheben können, gehören die appäsentierten Sinne zum jeweiligen, subjektiven Erleben. Die mit einem Gegenstand appäsentierten Sinne können also sowohl von Subjekt zu Subjekt als auch historisch divergieren. Gleichzeitig findet durch soziale Interaktion stets eine wechselseitige Angleichung von Erwartungshorizonten statt, die spezifischen Sinn spezifischen Gegenständen relativ stabil zuschreibbar macht. So ist etwa eine Tasse ein Gegenstand, aus dem (unter anderem) für gewöhnlich keine Kaltgetränke getrunken werden (wenn dies auch in der Tat möglich ist). Bricht jemand in einem entsprechenden

Kontext mit dieser Erwartung, so wird dieser Bruch mitunter als Überraschung oder gar »Fehlgebrauch« erlebt und entsprechend sanktioniert (z.B. durch Stirnrunzeln). Sozial Stabilisierung von Sinn macht dann etwa im Fall von Tassen Aussagen der Form »Aus Tassen trinkt man aber kein Mineralwasser!« möglich.

Die Unterscheidung von Sinn und Referenz soll es dann ermöglichen, den historischen Wandel von Sinnphänomenen angemessen zu beschreiben, ohne dabei in eine relativistische oder konstruktivistische Position abzugleiten. Was sich historisch wandelt sind mit dem Erleben von Gegenständen (aber nicht nur mit diesen) appresentierte Erwartungshorizonte, die sich mitunter aber sozial so stabilisieren, dass die Zuschreibung von spezifischen Erwartungshorizonten zu spezifischen Gegenständen in überschaubaren Kontexten relativ stabil möglich ist.

Am Ende des Vortrags werde ich dann zeigen, ob und inwiefern diese Beschreibung unseres alltäglichen Erlebens mit Searles Sozialontologie kompatibel ist. Dabei werde ich die These begründen und vertreten, dass die vorgeschlagene Ontologie des alltäglichen Erlebens mit Searles Sozialontologie kompatibel und diese jedoch zugleich wesentlich zu erweitern imstande ist.

P 11.5

Reinmuth

Zur moralischen Beurteilung von Regeln als gegenständlichen Mitteln

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Eine Beschäftigung mit Regeln unter sprechakttheoretischen Voraussetzungen erlaubt die Feststellung, dass Regeln bzw. Regelaussagen in *regelsetzenden*, *-akzeptierenden*, *-anziehenden*, *-befolgenden* und *-gewinnenden* Akten zur Realisierung von Zwecken verwendet werden können. Greift man den Unterschied zwischen Mitteln im Handlungssinn und gegenständlichen Mitteln auf (vgl. dazu Tönnies 1923 und Ebert 1977), so scheinen Regeln als gegenständliche Mittel in Regelverwendungen genutzt zu werden.

Anhand des Posters wird dargelegt, dass i) es plausibel ist, Regeln als gegenständliche Mittel aufzufassen, die in Regelverwendungen genutzt werden, ii) Regeln als gegenständliche Mittel, die zur Erreichung von Zwecken genutzt werden können, beurteilt werden können, wobei iii) für Regeln und Regelverwendungen verschiedene Beurteilungsprädikatore anzusetzen sind. Da normalerweise Mitteln im Handlungssinn zu- oder abgesprochen wird, als Mittel gerechtfertigt zu sein, verdient die in der Literatur vorzufindende Rede von der (moralischen) Rechtfertigung von Regeln als Mitteln besondere Aufmerksamkeit. So wird deutlich, dass es sich häufig um eine verkürzende Rede handelt, wobei eine Vielzahl an Regelverwendungen in den expliziteren Formulierungen auszumachen ist. Weiterhin soll aufgezeigt werden, welche Konsequenzen diese Resultate für eine moralische Beurteilung von Regeln und Regelverwendungen haben.

Mit dem Poster werden im Anschluss an (Black 1962) und (Siegwart 2011) ein nicht-sanktionistisches Regelverständnis ausgezeichnet und die Ausdrücke »Regel«, »Regelaussage« und »Regelsatz« geklärt. Weiterhin wird der Unterschied zwischen Mitteln im Handlungssinn und

gegenständlichen Mitteln erläutert. Letztere werden in ersteren verwendet, gebraucht, eingesetzt usw. Sodann werden solche Beurteilungsausdrücke in den Blick genommen, die für gewöhnlich in Hinblick auf gegenständliche Mittel oder aber in Hinblick auf Mittel im Handlungssinn verwendet werden. Außerdem sollen die Ergebnisse der begrifflichen Annäherung an die Zweck-Mittel-Unterscheidung auf die Rede von Regeln als Mittel für Zwecke übertragen werden. Dazu werden Regelverwendungen unterschieden, in denen Regeln als gegenständliche Mittel verwendet werden, und die für Regeln bzw. für Regelverwendungen einschlägigen Beurteilungsprädikatore thematisiert. Abschließend wird der Zusammenhang zwischen guten und richtigen Regeln und gerechtfertigten Regelverwendungen behandelt. Da Technik häufig als »Mittel zur Erreichung von Zwecken« (Ott 1996: 652) charakterisiert wird und oftmals hervorgehoben wird, dass Gegenstände hinsichtlich ihrer instrumentellen Güte (vgl. dazu Wright 1996) beurteilt werden, sollen hierbei Standpunkte in der »gut«-Debatte und zu technethischen Überlegungen berücksichtigt werden.

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P 5.10

Reuter / Sytsma

Unfelt Pains: An Experimental-Philosophical Investigation into the Concept of Pain

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The standard view of pain holds that pains are phenomenal mental states (experiences) with a particular type of phenomenal character (unpleasant). For instance, Kripke (1980, 152) asserts that »pain... is not picked out by one of its accidental properties; rather it is picked out by the property of being pain itself, by its immediate phenomenological quality.« The standard view of pains has a number of implications, including that pains are private, subjective states, and that pain hallucinations are impossible. The idea here is that while it is possible to distinguish the appearance from the reality of objects and

events, pains do not allow for such a distinction. As Dretske (2006, 59) succinctly puts it, »you can't be in pain without feeling it.« Philosophers have justified these claims by arguing that the standard view is grounded in the common-sense conception of pain. For example, Tye confidently asserts that it is »part of our folk conception of pain« that »pains are necessarily private and necessarily owned« (2006, 100).

In this paper we present the results of two new empirical studies indicating that the common-sense conception of pain is in fact at odds with the view that unfelt pains do not exist. In the first experiment, we investigated whether people consider a pain to be ongoing, despite the fact that an injured person has taken a painkiller and hence didn't feel it. Quite strikingly, 70.7% of 67 participants answered that there was a pain in the injured hand, even though the person didn't feel it. This provides fairly direct evidence that native English-speakers tend to hold that unfelt pains are possible. In Experiment 2, we were interested to know what would happen, if the mechanism preventing the pain from being felt was still more radical. For example, what if the injured limb were disconnected from the person's body? Interestingly, 43.6% of the participants responded that there was a pain in the hand, when the hand was not connected to any person. While this is below the midpoint, significantly more than one in three participants answered that there was a pain in the hand when it was completely detached, giving an especially striking example of acceptance of an unfelt pain.

P S.4

Salimkhani

On the Fundamentality of Space-Time

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In the canonical interpretation of General Relativity (GR) gravity reveals itself as a geometrized pseudo force. In my presentation, I will argue that this is a perfectly feasible—although not necessary—interpretation of GR on its own which ceases to be plausible if one includes a broader view on fundamental physics as a whole. In fact, usually perceived in close connection with a geometrization of gravity, the Principle of Equivalence turns out to be the link between a theory of gravitation and particle physics. Furthermore, the argumentation illustrates that unification in modern high energy physics is not an aesthetic or metatheoretic principle, but an inevitable result of an immanent analysis of our best physical theories.

P 2.5

Salis

On the Nature of Coincidental Events

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It is a common opinion that chance events could not be understood according to causal explanations. Conversely, according to a causal view of chance, intersections between independent causal chains originate accidental events, called »coincidences«.

The present study takes into proper consideration this causal conception of chance and tries to shed new light on it. More precisely, this paper investigates the role of the epistemic aspects in our understanding what coincidences are.

In fact, although the independence between the causal lines involved plays a crucial role to understand coincidental events, that condition does not seem sufficient to give a satisfactory definition of coincidences.

The main target of the present work is to prove that the epistemic aspects of coincidences are, together with the independence between the intersecting causal chains, a constitutive part of coincidental phenomena.

Many examples will be discussed throughout this work to highlight the role of epistemic aspects in our understanding the nature of coincidental events.

P S.5

Schmidt

Warum es keinen Schleier der Wahrnehmung gibt

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Der Indirekte Realist behauptet, dass wir unsere Umwelt niemals unmittelbar wahrnehmen, sondern stets nur durch die Vermittlung mentaler Repräsentationen (sogenannter Ideen, (Sinnes)Eindrücke, Empfindungen oder Sinnesdaten). Angefangen bei Descartes über Locke, Hume und Berkeley bis hin zu Ayer und sogar bei zeitgenössischen Neurowissenschaftlern ist die Rede von »Bildern im Kopf«, die einen Schleier zwischen uns und der Welt erzeugen.

Der Direkte Realist, dessen Position ich auf dem Plakat verteidigen möchte, meint hingegen, dass wir einen unmittelbaren Zugang zur Außenwelt in der Wahrnehmung haben. Das heißt hier leidlich, dass er *leugnet*, dass es in gewöhnlichen Wahrnehmungssituationen irgendwelche Dinge gibt, die die Wahrnehmung vermitteln: Wenn ich einen Tisch sehe, muss ich nicht zugleich die unmittelbare Erfahrung eines Sinnesdatums des Tisches haben. Ich sehe den Tisch nicht, *indem* ich etwas anderes als ihn sehe oder erfahre.

Auf systematischer Ebene lassen sich zwei Argumente gegen den Indirekten Realismus darstellen, die sich ergänzen. (1) Der ontologische Status von Sinnesdaten, insbesondere ihre Räumlichkeit, ist äußerst rätselhaft. Wir wissen daher nicht wirklich, worum es sich bei Sinnesdaten handelt. Uns fehlt ein Vergleichsobjekt, mit dem wir uns diese Räumlichkeit *sui generis* verständlich machen könnten. (2) Es ist überhaupt nicht klar, was die

Annahme von Sinnesdaten erklärt. Das Nennen von Sinnestäuschungen als Explanandum ist unbefriedigend, da nicht zu sehen ist, wie Sinnesdaten den phänomenalen Charakter bei Sinnestäuschungen erklären sollen. Dies wird deutlich, wenn man etwas genauer fragt, *was* an Sinnestäuschungen eigentlich erklärt werden soll. Damit versagt das klassische *argument from illusion* für den Indirekten Realismus.

Die Plausibilität, die der Indirekte Realismus für viele zu haben scheint, ist letztlich auf die Nachwirkung eines cartesischen Dualismus zwischen Innen- und Außenwelt zurückzuführen, da die von mir angeführten Argumente ihre Überzeugungskraft zu verlieren scheinen, sobald wir dieses Welt- und Menschenbild voraussetzen. Befreien wir uns aber von diesem Bild, so verstehen wir weder, was Sinnesdaten sind, noch, warum wir annehmen sollten, dass es sie gibt. Der Indirekte Realismus muss in einem Zuge mit dem cartesischen Dualismus aufgegeben werden.

P 2.6

Schmoranzer

De Facto Dependence Revisited

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How are we to define singular causation? It is well known that on the one hand Lewis-style counterfactual analyses of singular causation capture our causal intuitions with respect to a lot of cases. Very often we think of the causes as an event without which the effect would not have occurred. On the other hand there are cases where that is not true. Cases of preemptive causation illustrate that step-wise counterfactual dependence does not seem to be necessary for an event to cause another. Furthermore, alleged counter-examples to the claim that causation is a transitive relation seem to show that step-wise counterfactual dependence is not sufficient either.

Yet, given that counterfactual approaches work so well in a large array of situations, it seems a good idea to try to formulate a counterfactual theory that can deal with the two problems without giving up on its key idea.

Stephen Yablo proposes a counterfactual analysis of singular causation that is supposed to achieve these goals. His idea is that (1) effects counterfactually depend on their causes given a further fact without (2) the cause rendering itself counterfactually necessary for the effect only by occurring in the first place.

Unfortunately, the latter part of his definition does more harm than good. In order to show why, I will begin by presenting Yablo's theory and his solutions to the preemption- and the transitivity-problem in more detail. (Sections I to III) Yet, situations of multiple late preemption show that Yablo's definition in its original version cannot be maintained. In defense of Yablo we can modify the second part of his definition. (Section IV)

However, there is a second kind of complex late preemption that cannot be adequately dealt with by means of the modified definition, which is why we have to give up on the second condition in the original as well as in the modified definition of singular causation. (Sections V and VI)

P 5.11

Schomäcker

Can our Phenomenal Concepts Change?

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Phenomenal concepts play an important role in the arguments against materialism. They are the concepts from which we draw our judgments in the crucial thought experiments. David Chalmers argues that they are among the few things that distinguishes us from Zombies and bases his argument against the phenomenal judgment problem on them. The basic idea is that these concepts imply an essential difference between the phenomenal nature of our experiences and the functional roles they play. However, in general most people agree that concepts can change: the concept of a planet changed with the adoption of a heliocentric world view, the theory of relativity changed our concept of space and the concept of life has been influenced by the scientific progress in biology. Thus, the question arises whether our phenomenal concepts can change and thereby cease to support the anti-materialist arguments.

Phenomenal concepts differ in many respects from the theoretical concepts that usually feature in examples of conceptual change. Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that they can be influenced by experience and new insights. As an example, the changes that underlie the increased discriminatory abilities of wine sommeliers can be described as a change of phenomenal concepts. Additionally, there is no reason to assume that phenomenal concepts cannot imply functional features, as is maybe most obvious for pain experiences. A development that brings these two aspects together is the discovery of the asymmetry of the color space: understanding the relational features of our color experiences means to add functional knowledge to out phenomenal concepts. Taken together, these examples indicate that our phenomenal concepts are not only open to change, but that they might change in a way that denies the difference between functional and phenomenal features. Such a change would undermine the anti-materialist arguments.

P 5.12

Seitz

Hunting Made us Rational: The Evolution of a Logical Mind in the Hominin Lineage

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I shall offer an evolutionary explanation of domain-general and norm-guided reasoning in the hominin lineage, based on the idea that cognition is both embedded and contextualized. It is embedded, because cognition is there to allow agents to cope with their environments successfully. Thus, the demands on the cognitive abilities of an agent can vary with different environments. The specific cognitive requirements of an agent depend

(at least in part) on this environmental context. In the case of the hominins, as I shall demonstrate, their need to plan extended behavior sequences within their niche—especially in cooperative hunting activities—necessitated the cognitive ability to reason both domain-generally and in accordance with intersubjective norms in the first place, in order to plan these very behavior sequences required. Archeological evidence, mainly from tool manufacture, will be compared in order to show the model just sketched at work. Given that this model is true and thus my interpretation of the archeological record sound, a ›logical mind‹ already came into being with the appearance of *Homo Heidelbergensis*, the first species of large-brained hominins, 500.000 years before the present. Finally my position in relation to two kinds of theories will be discussed: the first one claiming that late cultural inventiveness in *Homo Sapiens* depended on late cognitive achievement, the second one claiming that population size is the crucial factor here, not cognition. My model vindicates the latter.

P 2.7

Storm-Henningsen

**Mereological Decomposition:
A Novel Approach to Complex Systems**

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The mereology commonly used to map complex systems, is either one of two kinds, inherited from works of ontology. The first is usually coined as classical extensional mereology (CEM), the second we may label ›the constitution view‹. Central to these thoughts are, that either you follow CEM arguing that the whole is nothing more than the sum of the parts, or you follow the constitution view arguing that the whole must be more than the sum of its parts.

The notion of mereological decomposition involve three principles, first, composition and decomposition are considered inverse relations. Second, mereological decomposition cannot involve a disintegration of the whole decomposed. Third, we can distinguish between mereological decomposition simpliciter, and »sortal-governed decomposition«, the latter decomposing wholes into a certain kind of parts, giving rise to the notion of levels.

When the concern is specifically on complex systems, it would then seem reasonable to suggest, that if an object is produced as the result of mereological decomposition, be that decomposition simpliciter or a sortal governed decomposition, this object considered as a part would seem to involve a property of ›participation‹ i.e. contributing to the whole in such a way, that the whole would be in a different state if the part was changed or removed. Hence, a complex system seems to involve both upwards and downwards dependence of wholes and parts, but furthermore the participation of these parts in the whole, can be construed axiologically, i.e. that the parts participation could be seen as some kind of value-generating process.

Hence, cause and effect can be seen as depending on a sortal decomposition, which is henceforth not exhaustive, but do pinpoint a certain interest and possibly sys-

temic level as an outset for identifying causes and effects.

P 5.13

Strasser

Do Social Interactions Generate a Special Kind of Knowledge? What Kind of Knowledge we Cannot Gain without Interacting with Others

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Numerous disciplines in the cognitive sciences now study the nature of human interactions for which we need social cognition. A functional role of social cognition is to enable us to gain and apply knowledge about others for the purpose of understanding, predicting or manipulating other minds or behaviors. Our abilities for social cognition can be innate, learned through an observational perspective, or gained through interaction with others.

I will focus on the last of these possibilities and argue for the claim that certain important kinds of social knowledge can only be gained through social interaction. This does not mean that some important socio-cognitive abilities are not innate or learned through observation. All three components contribute in a complementary way to our socio-cognitive development.

So far there is no systematic account of just what can be learned through interactions but not outside of interactions. To understand what properties the relations between social agents in interaction have I will address a developmental question: How do we learn about social cognition in interaction?

The claim I want to argue for is two-fold: first I want to show that some kinds of social knowledge do not arise outside interaction. I will argue that the relations between social agents in an interaction—in particular in interactions characterized by a high degree of reciprocity—are highly context-dependent and at the same time highly context-shaping, and, crucially, that knowledge is thereby created in interaction. Without participating in social interaction we would miss an essential part in our socio-cultural development. It may be an objection that this knowledge could be gained by observing other people interacting. But, in a second step, I will argue that not everything that we experience and learn by an interaction can be replaced by observing interaction. I will focus on implicit reciprocal processes occurring within social interactions. As we are not able to access such implicit cues through mere observation of social interactions, active participation in interaction is necessary to enable us to attain full-blown social cognition abilities.

P 6.3

Strößner

The Rationality of Conceptual Change

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We often change our mind, and sometimes we even change our concepts. This happened for example when Linnaeus re-classified whales as mammals. I will argue that conceptual dynamics follow rational rules and that these rules make up a large part of the explication of conceptual change in history of science as well as in the development of children. My main thesis is that concepts need to comply with the laws we believe. I will spell out this idea by applying formal epistemology, which usually addresses belief change and takes concepts as pre-existing and fixed. My poster, however, will show how to understand conceptual change as a rational procedure that can be normatively assessed by the tools of formal epistemology.

The view that concepts follow laws brings a new perspective on the problem of induction: Philosophy usually took concepts as a basic foundation of our cognition but contested the justification of our believe in laws. I will shed some light on the opposite direction by contesting concepts and taking inductive habits as cognitive primitives.

P 5.14

Stühling

Can Nominalism Save Anomalous Monism from Epiphenomenalism?

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One of the major questions that Davidson strives to answer with his anomalous monism is how the mental can be causally efficacious given that there are no strict psychophysical laws and that causation is governed by strict laws. His answer is, essentially, that every individual mental event is identical with an individual physical event. Due to this identity the strict physical laws that govern causation also govern the behavior of mental events. Davidson's answer raises several questions. For instance, why are there no strict psychophysical laws? Why is causation governed by strict laws? And does anomalous monism provide an adequate answer to the question how the mental can be causally efficacious? Various philosophers have argued that anomalous monism does not adequately address the issue of mental causation. The criticism is that although anomalous monism can explain how mental events can be causally efficacious, it implies that mental properties are epiphenomenal. Call this the ›epiphenomenalism argument.‹

A promising defense against the epiphenomenalism argument was mounted by Norman Melchert, Neil Campbell, and Sophie Gibb. The basic idea is that anomalous monism does not imply any form of mental property epiphenomenalism for the simple reason that (1) mental property epiphenomenalism presupposes realism about mental properties, and that (2) anomalous monism is based on nominalism about mental properties.

Call this the ›nominalism argument.‹ In response, I will make two claims. First, although Davidson clearly endorses nominalism it is not clear that nominalism is essential to anomalous monism. In fact, introductory textbooks and articles often discuss anomalous monism without mentioning nominalism. Secondly, and more importantly, I tentatively argue that anomalous monism does in fact imply that causal explanations in mental terms are necessarily incomplete in a sense in which causal explanations in physical terms are not. Thus, I suggest that anomalous monism does indeed imply a sort of explanatory mental property epiphenomenalism.

P 13.2

Tatievskaya

Moore (1944) on Analysis

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In his 1944 paper on Russell's theory of definite descriptions Moore sets forth his characterization of analysis to meet the criticism presented two years earlier by Langford. According to Moore the analysandum is a sentence and to define its meaning or to determine the relation between the concepts mentioned separately by the analysandum in terms of the relation between the concepts mentioned separately by the analysans is the main task of analysis. Moore's conception of analysis as well as the popular treatment of his analyses as compositional causes two questions: what is the character of the analysis described by Moore and whether it can be correct and non-trivial at the same time.

I argue that insofar as a particular analysis serves to define the meaning of the analysandum the concept of analysis can be considered as delimiting a ›hermeneutic circle‹ by means of a series of questions which in their turn permit to represent Moore's conception as a list of requirements that should be fulfilled to answer the main question of analysis.

The analysis described that way is compositional with respect to its aim insofar as the concepts to be mentioned by the analysans are ›parts‹ of the ›whole‹ of the relations which constitute the truth conditions of the analysandum. To identify such a whole the analysandum needs to be transformed. Besides, different semiotical dimensions of both the analysandum and a supposed analysans should be fixed. Such dimensions are a sort of ›parts‹ which together determine how the analysandum and the analysans function as signs. Hence with respect to its instruments Moore's analysis is both transformational and semiotical.

Due to Moore's discrimination between sentences and propositions as well as to the definition of necessary and sufficient conditions which two different sentences should fulfill to mean the same or not the same a correct analysis which satisfies requirements formulated by Moore is non-trivial. This result is confirmed by the impossibility to identify the sentence that fixes the result of analysis and defines the meaning of the analysandum with the sentence that asserts that the analysandum and the analysans mean the same.

P 5.15

Tillas

Intuitions & Philosophical Inquiry

Alexandros Tillas

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Intuitions feature prominently in philosophical inquiry (conceptual analysis) and their epistemic authority is most often considered infallible. However, recent developments in various behavioural sciences often challenge established intuitive arguments, and in turn question the epistemic authority of intuitions (e.g. Weinberg, Nichols and Stich, 2001). In this paper, I present a view of intuitions that openly questions their apriority and in turn their epistemic authority. Starting from the hypothesis that concepts are the building blocks of thoughts, I look into the relations obtaining between concepts in order to shed light upon the nature of intuitions. Assuming a lighthearted reductionism, concepts are grounded in neuronal activation. According to the widely accepted Hebbian rule of learning, whenever two neurons x & y , become frequently co-activated, the connection between them is strengthened. In turn, the stronger their connection, the greater the probability that activation of neuron x , will trigger activation of neuron y . At the supervening level (broadly construed), concepts become connected to each other in the light of experiences with our natural as well as sociocultural environment, while connections between certain concepts become strengthened if these concepts become frequently co-activated. Once a given concept in a set of strongly associated concepts becomes activated, the concepts strongly connected to it become sub-activated. These sub-activated concepts drive the activation pattern of the network towards the ideas that the mind will explore next. Once again, this driving force is (partly) the strength of the connections between concepts. Against this background, I argue that intuitions are precisely constellations of strongly associated concepts. Thus, the stronger the connection between a set of concepts, the stronger the relevant intuitive pull towards certain ideas, implemented in terms of these concepts, will be. Crucially, these interconnected representations are nothing but the ›crystallizations‹ of our subjective experiences (Hebbian learning) and hence can never be universally shared. Hence the apriority or intuitions is directly questioned, which in turn casts doubt upon their epistemic authority.

References

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P 5.16

Welpinghus

Implizite Einstellungen und die Herausforderung für Theorien personaler Autonomie

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Empirische Arbeiten zu impliziten Einstellungen und deren Einfluss auf unsere Handlungen stellen eine Herausforderung an philosophische Konzeptionen von personaler Autonomie, also der Fähigkeit, selbstbestimmt zu handeln, dar. In diesem Vortrag wird insbesondere das Phänomen der impliziten diskriminierenden Einstellungen (implicit biases) betrachtet, das in der Psychologie recht gut untersucht ist (Jost et al. 2009): solche impliziten Einstellungen sind evaluative Assoziationen, die eine Person mit einer sozialen Gruppe verbindet. Sie sind automatisch hervorgerufen, und zwar ohne dass sich die Akteurin dessen Gewahr ist. Sie können in Konflikt zu expliziten Einstellungen stehen und unser Verhalten beeinflussen, ohne dass dieser Einfluss erkannt wird. Wenn implizite Einstellungen unser Handeln beeinflussen, fehlt häufig das Wissen über die eigenen Handlungsgründe. Solches Wissen ist nötig für Autonomie, um über diese Gründe zu reflektieren und Konflikte zwischen unseren Zielen auf kohärente Weise zu lösen. Daher muss personale Autonomie als prekäre Fähigkeit verstanden werden, die auf unterstützende Umweltbedingungen angewiesen ist. Unter guten Umweltbedingungen ist der Einfluss impliziter Einstellungen minimiert oder nicht in Konflikt mit authentischen Zielen. Diese Diagnose fügt sich in eine neuere Denkrichtung ein, die Kognition als situierten bzw. in die Umwelt eingebetteten, ausgedehnten Prozess versteht (z.B. Hurley 2011). Wenn personale Autonomie eine Eigenschaft ist, die prekärer ist als gemeinhin angenommen, stellt dies die praktische Philosophie vor Herausforderungen, da viele politische und moralische Prinzipien mit Bezug auf Autonomie als robuste Fähigkeit von Personen begründet werden.

Workshops (Übersicht) / workshops (overview)

Logical and Metaphysical Perspectives on Grounding	W1	Freitag, 18.09.2015, 9.30–18.00 Uhr Friday, Sept 18, 2015, 9:30 a.m. –6:00 p.m. 15/133
Disagreement: Epistemology and Applications	W2	Freitag, 18.09.2015, 10.00–18.00 Uhr Friday, September 18, 2015, 10:00 a.m.–6:00 p.m. 15/131
Material Metaphysics	W3	Freitag, 18.09.2015, 9.30–16.30 Uhr Friday, Sept 18, 2015, 9:30 a.m.–4:30 p.m. 15/105
Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? Dynamic and Pragmatic Aspects of Conditionals	W4	Freitag, 18.09.2015, 10.00–17.30 Uhr Friday, Sept 18, 2015, 10:00 a.m.–5:30 p.m. und / and Samstag, 19.09.2015, 9.00–12.30 Uhr Saturday, Sept 19, 2015, 9:00 a.m.–12:30 p.m. 15/111

Workshops (Abstracts) / workshops (abstracts)

W1

Logical and Metaphysical Perspectives on Grounding

Freitag, 18.09.2015, 9.30–18.00 Uhr, 15/133
Friday, September 18, 2015, 9:30 a.m.–6:00 p.m., 15/133

Recent years have seen a significant rise of interest in the concept of grounding, witnessed by a quickly growing literature on the subject. In this literature, grounding is mostly described as the ›in virtue of‹-relation, as in

the claim that a sentence is true or false in virtue of how the world is. But grounding comes in many guises, it has become a sort of ›umbrella concept‹ for different kinds of non-causal dependence, such as ontological dependence, semantic dependence, or the kind of dependence relevant for metaphysical explanation. Given this wide scope of concepts, it is hardly surprising that grounding finds applications in almost all areas of philosophy, from ethics over aesthetics to metaphysics. In this workshop, however, we plan to focus particularly on the logical and the metaphysical perspective on grounding.

Organisation / organization: **Johannes Korbmacher, Jan Plate, Norbert Gratzl, Benjamin Schnieder**

9.30 Uhr 9:30 a.m.	Fabrice Correia (Neuchâtel) Semantics for the Impure Logic of Representational Ground Commentator: Alexander Skiles
11.15 Uhr 11:15 a.m.	T.B.A. T.B.A. Commentator: Lorenzo Casini
12.45 Uhr 12:45 p.m.	<i>lunch</i>
14.30 Uhr 2:30 p.m.	Benjamin Schnieder (Hamburg) Fundamental Parts and Fundamental Truths Commentator: Robert Michels
16.15 Uhr 4:15 p.m.	Stephan Krämer (Hamburg) The Pure Logic of Ground in Raising Semantics Commentator: Jonas Werner
20.00 Uhr 8:00 p.m.	<i>workshop dinner</i>

W1 Correia

**Semantics for the Impure Logic of
Representational Ground**

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I propose a semantics for an impure logic of ground of the sort defended by Kit Fine in his »Guide to Ground« (2012). The semantics integrates elements taken from Fine's truth-maker semantics for the pure logic of ground, as well as the view that facts can have logical complexity.

W1 Krämer

The Pure Logic of Ground in Raising Semantics

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In a recent manuscript, I develop a semantics for the propositional logic of ground which I call Raising Semantics. Its most important feature is that it renders sound the rules of the Impure Logic of Ground described by Kit Fine in his »Guide to Ground«. However, it turns out that there are also interesting and substantive differences between Fine's Pure Logic of Ground and the Pure Logic of Ground that my semantics yields, especially concerning the somewhat controversial notion of weak ground. I examine some of these differences.

W1 Schnieder

Fundamental Parts and Fundamental Truths

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The talk explores two views held by Bernard Bolzano:

- The first view is an important tenet in his theory of grounding: He believed that the Principle of Sufficient Reason fails because there are brute, fundamental truths.
- The second view is an important tenet in his theory of mereology: He believed that there must be mereological atoms.

While Bolzano himself addressed the issues only independently from each other, there are actually interesting connections between his views on the topics, which also bear on the current debate about grounding.

W2

**Disagreement:
Epistemology and Applications**

Freitag, 18.09.2015, 10.00–18.00 Uhr, 15/131
Friday, September 18, 2015, 10:00 a.m.–6:00 p.m., 15/131

Some disagreements among people are neither due to errors in reasoning, nor to insufficient information, nor to talking past one another. The first part of this workshop is devoted to the epistemology of such disagree-

ments, in particular to the puzzling question of whether we are rationally required to abandon views that are persistently contested by epistemic peers. The second part of the workshop extends the relevant considerations to the fields of politics and religion, where we are confronted with the special problem of deeply-rooted, but highly contested convictions that are held by large groups of people.

Organisation / organization: **Geert Keil, Christoph Schamberger, Andree Weber**

10.00 Uhr	Thomas Grundmann (Köln)
10:00 a.m.	Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Defeat
11.15 Uhr	Jonathan Matheson (University of North Florida)
11:15 a.m.	The Epistemology of Disagreement and the Ethics of Belief
12.00 Uhr	Marc Andree Weber (Freiburg)
noon	Comment on Matheson
15.00 Uhr	Christoph Schamberger (Berlin)
3:00 p.m.	Political Disagreement
16.15 Uhr	Bryan Frances
4:15 p.m.	Religious Disagreement

W2 Frances

Religious Disagreement

Bryan Frances

I will motivate what I take to be the primary epistemological questions about religious disagreement. Among other things, I will suggest that the peer problem is almost never applicable and the epistemological questions that apply in real life almost always refer to many-on-many disagreements, and not one-on-one disagreements.

W2 Grundmann

Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Defeat

Thomas Grundmann
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Currently, it is highly controversial whether and why one should suspend belief when facing peer disagreement. According to one recent suggestion (Christensen 2010), registering peer disagreement provides us with a special kind of defeater—a higher-order defeater. The evidence about disagreement seems to suggest, with a probability of .5, that one's own reasoning involves some kind of performance error. However, the dignity of higher-order defeaters has come under attack. Lasonen-Aarnio (2013), e.g., argues that higher-order evidence about disagreement is distinct from ordinary defeaters. Moreover, she doubts that the working of higher-order defeaters can be coherently explained. In my talk I will address both objections and try to defend the view that evidence about disagreement generates higher-order defeat.

W2 Matheson

**The Epistemology of Disagreement
and the Ethics of Belief**

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The Equal Weight View (EWV) claims that none of our controversial beliefs are epistemically justified. If we follow the prescriptions of EWV, the original disagreements disappear—having split the difference, the parties to the disagreement would now adopt the very same doxastic attitude toward the originally disputed proposition. However, the idea that we should abandon controversial beliefs and eliminate the disagreements surrounding them is challenged by psychological evidence about group inquiry. There is evidence that groups with members who genuinely disagree about a proposition, do better with respect to determining whether that proposition is true. This evidence is evidence that the elimination of disagreements is epistemically bad. So, the prescriptions of EWV appear to be in tension with psychological findings regarding group inquiry. In this paper, I explain this challenge to EWV and evaluate its merits.

W2 Schamberger

Political Disagreement

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Political disagreement is so pervasive that it raises two major philosophical questions. Are there—apart from the psychological and the sociological—any systematic reasons why politicians and citizens disagree on almost every political issue? And is it epistemically rational to take part in political discussions even though there is so little chance of convincing all or a majority of people? Regarding the first question, it will be argued that political arguments comprise a peculiar mixture of philosophical premises and highly disputable empirical claims and forecasts, so making disagreement an expected element of politics. The second question can be answered by pointing to the benefits people gain from following and participating in political debates, such as improving the justification of one's political views by clarifying and prioritising various interests and beliefs.

W3

Material Metaphysics

Freitag, 18.09.2015, 9.30–16.30 Uhr, 15/105
Friday, September 18, 2015, 9:30 a.m.–4:30 p.m., 15/105

This workshop explores metaphysical aspects of our best theories of the material world. In contrast to more conventional philosophy of physics workshops the goal of this workshop is focusing on those issues that have a particularly strong bearing on fundamental metaphysical questions. Moreover, the aim is to do so in a manner

that allows a fruitful discussion between philosophers of physics and general metaphysicians. One of the most prominent issues in this workshop concerns the question whether modern physics suggests an ontology in which structures play the fundamental role. Another predominant topic is the question whether there is ultimately just one thing, more than one thing or even a vast multitude of coexisting universes.

Organisation / organization: **Meinard Kuhlmann**

9.30 Uhr	Michael Esfeld (Lausanne)
9:30 a.m.	Matter Points and their Dynamics: A Proposal for a Fundamental Ontology
10.30 Uhr	Holger Lyre (Magdeburg)
10:30 a.m.	Structural Realist Views on Elementary Particles: a Critical Assessment
11.30 Uhr	Meinard Kuhlmann (Mainz)
11:30 a.m.	Why Structures Collapse into Properties
12.15 Uhr	<i>lunch</i>
12:15 p.m.	
13.45 Uhr	Jonathan Schaffer (Rutgers)
1:45 p.m.	Monistic Structural Realism
14.45 Uhr	Bryan Roberts (London)
2:45 p.m.	Why Is there more than One Kind of Thing?
	Simon Friederich (Groningen)
15.45 Uhr	The Fine-Tuning Argument for the Multiverse and the Reality of the
3:45 p.m.	Constants

W3 Esfeld

**Matter Points and their Dynamics:
A Proposal for a Fundamental Ontology**

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In my talk, I seek to combine atomism with structural realism, proposing a fundamental ontology of matter points that are structurally individuated: all there is to them are the spatial relations in which they stand; neither a commitment to intrinsic properties nor to an absolute space is required. The spatial relations change. All that is needed to capture change is a dynamical structure, namely dynamical relations as expressed in terms of the dynamical parameters of a physical theory. I sketch out how this parsimonious ontology is able to match both classical and quantum mechanics, including quantum field theory.

W3 Friederich

**The Fine-Tuning Argument for the Multiverse
and the Reality of the Constants**

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According to the laws of physics as presently known, had the values of some constants of nature been slightly different, life could not have existed. The fine-tuning argument for the multiverse concludes that our universe is just one among vastly many in an encompassing multiverse where the values of the constants differ in the different subuniverses. The present contribution reviews and assesses three objections against this argument: first, that it commits the inverse gambler's fallacy; second that it involves fallacious double-counting; third, that it presupposes an absent physically well-motivated probability distribution over possible values of the constants. I propose novel responses to the first and the second objection and assess the third in the light of the metaphysical distinction between constants of nature and derived computational artefacts.

W3 Kuhlmann

Why Structures Collapse into Properties

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I will show that although there are good reasons for considering the revisionary ontology of structural realism, in the end this position is either untenable or it collapses into a less revisionary ontology in which properties are at centre stage. I will support this claim by considering the role of symmetry arguments in the formation of physical theories: Although symmetry groups are of paramount importance in the characterization of fundamental physical theories they are best construed not as themselves representing but rather as a means to identify the basic items of reality.

W3 Lyre

**Structural Realism and Elementary Particles:
A Critical Assessment**

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What is the structural realist's view on elementary particles? Since structuralists take structure to be fundamental, they must reconstruct or re-conceptualize elementary particles in (more elementary) structural terms. I assess several routes of re-conceptualizing particles from structure such as the much discussed (non-) individuals route and group constitution route, but I also supplement some new routes: the route from mass-energy equivalence, the zero-value properties route and the route from particle oscillations. I shall critically assess and evaluate all of these routes. I will further address questions about ontological priority and shall deal with recent criticisms raised by McKenzie (2014) and Nounou (2015) against my 2004 group constitution argument.

W3 Roberts

Why Is there more than One Kind of Thing?

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We show a sense in which, if the particle ontology of the world consists in only one kind of thing, then the theory governing those particles is time symmetric. Any evidence that the world fails to be time symmetric thus indicates that there is more than one kind of thing. This provides one answer to the question, ›Why is there more than one kind of particle?‹ namely, ›Because the motion of fundamental particles distinguishes an arrow of time.‹

W3 Schaffer

Monistic Structural Realism

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Ontic structural realists have claimed that insights from physics require radical revisions to metaphysics, which eliminate or at least downgrade the priority of objects and intrinsic properties, and upgrade the priority of relations. I develop a view—monistic structural realism—which draws on the classical monistic idea that the whole is prior to its parts, and treats intrinsic structural properties of the whole cosmos as fundamental. Monistic structural realism is said to reconcile structuralist insights about physics with a classical perspective in metaphysics.

W4

Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? Dynamic and Pragmatic Aspects of Conditionals

Freitag, 18.09.2015, 10.00–17.30 Uhr, 15/111
 Friday, September 18, 2015, 10:00 a.m.–5:30 p.m., 15/111
 Samstag, 19.09.2015, 9.00–12.30 Uhr, 15/111
 Saturday, September 19, 2015, 9:00 a.m.–12:30 p.m., 15/111

The title question »Do conditionals have truth conditions?« addresses an important and still unsettled foundational topic in the theory of conditionals. If the answer is an unrestricted yes, then various things should work, which do not seem to work: such as unrestricted embeddability of conditionals, unrestricted assignment of probabilities to conditionals, etc. If the answer is an unrestricted no, as expressivists might have it, then we seem to have no embeddability at all (Frege-Geach problem), no assignments of probabilities, etc. The answer might be a restricted yes and no, by distinguishing between different kinds of conditionals. Conditionals about the future that are anchored in time, for example, might require a different treatment than tenseless, law-like conditionals. Yet, it may be doubtful whether such

an intermediate account solves the problems of an unrestricted yes and an unrestricted no or whether it accumulates them. So what does the meaning of conditionals consist in? Do they have truth conditions? Do conditionals correspond to facts in the world or in alternative possible situations? On which parameters do the truth values of conditionals depend? To what extent are truth values that are relativized to a similarity ordering between worlds, a possible future course of events, a possible context of assessment or other pragmatic factors still objective? Which role do pragmatic factors play in determining the meaning of a conditional? Is there a clear division between semantics and pragmatics when it comes to conditionals? Is the meaning of conditionals to be understood in terms of their contribution to the conversational context rather in terms of their truth conditions? Lots of questions, and important questions with important consequences, on which the philosophical community is still entirely split. The workshop aims at furthering our understanding of those questions by focusing on the dynamic and pragmatic aspects of conditionals.

Organisation / organization: **Arno Goebel, Thomas Müller, Antje Rumberg, Wolfgang Spohn**

Freitag / Friday	10.00 Uhr 10:00 a.m.	Frank Veltman (Amsterdam) Indicatives, Counterfactuals, ... How many Kinds of Conditionals Are There?
	11.00 Uhr 11:00 a.m.	<i>Break</i>
	11.15 Uhr 11:15 a.m.	Robert Stalnaker (MIT) Counterfactuals and Probability
	12.15 Uhr 12:15 p.m.	<i>lunch</i>
	13.45 Uhr 1:45 p.m.	Wolfgang Spohn (Constance) What Are Conditional Beliefs, and to which Extent May they Be True?
	14.45 Uhr 2:45 p.m.	<i>break</i>
	15.00 Uhr 3:00 p.m.	Daniel Rothschild (London) Are Conditionals Dynamic?
	16.00 Uhr 4:00 p.m.	<i>coffee break</i>
	16.30 Uhr 4:30 p.m.	Anthony Gillies (Rutgers) Some Truth(s) about ›if‹
Samstag / Saturday	9.00 Uhr 9:00 a.m.	Arno Goebel (Constance) Conditionals and Irrelevance
	10.00 Uhr 10:00 a.m.	<i>break</i>
	10.15 Uhr 10:15 a.m.	Janneke van Wijnbergen-Huitink (Groningen) Inferentialism and Truth Conditions
	11.15 Uhr 11:15 a.m.	<i>Break</i>
	11.30 Uhr 11:30 p.m.	Karolina Krzyżanowska (Munich) A New Kind of a Metalinguistic Theory of Conditionals

W4 Gillies

Some Truth(s) about ›if‹

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There are various questions about the kind of things ›if‹ might mean, and just about every answer has staunch defenders. Do conditionals have truth-conditions? Express conditional propositions? Something more? Something less? Something else entirely? And is there, really, a difference between answering ›yes‹ versus ›no‹? Where there are questions in philosophy, there are debates. This paper will explore some of the logical landscape for saying what ›if‹ might mean and ultimately suggest that while these questions are real the debates they encourage aren't so much.

W4 Goebel

Conditionals and Irrelevance

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Relevance plays a crucial role in the interpretation of conditionals. First, I would like to scrutinize the notion of relevance in discourse and conditionals and suggest the adoption of a probabilistic notion. Second, cases of irrelevance in different kinds of conditionals, especially biscuit conditionals, are taken to present counterexamples to analyses operationalizing relevance. I will argue that this is not obviously so.

W4 Krzyżanowska

A New Kind of a Metalinguistic Theory of Conditionals

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One way to find out what conditions need to be satisfied for an indicative conditional to be true, if it can be true at all, is to answer the following question: what do we learn when we learn a conditional? I will argue that this path leads to a new kind of a metalinguistic theory of conditionals that takes the existence of a connection between a conditional's antecedent and its consequent seriously. On this account, indicative conditionals are analysed as conveying the existence of an inference from their antecedents to the consequent and, consequently, their truth conditions are defined as depending on the validity of corresponding arguments. Importantly, however, since, as I shall argue, indicative conditionals do not constitute a homogeneous class, those arguments do not have to be all of the same, deductive, type.

W4 Rothschild

Are Conditionals Dynamic?

Daniel Rothschild
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I will assess some of the major motivations for a dynamic account of the meaning of conditionals, trying to assess how the dynamic story compares to truthconditional accounts (such as Kratzer's) and other revisionary accounts (such as expressivist and trivalent theories).

W4 Spohn

What Are Conditional Beliefs, and to which Extent May they Be True?

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The first point I would like to make is that since its beginnings the rich discussion about conditionals very often talks about conditional belief, but misses an adequate notion of it. This is a major obstacle of progress. My second point will be that ranking theory provides an adequate notion of conditional belief. Unconditional beliefs can be true or false. Can conditional beliefs be so as well? Only to a limited extent. This will be my third point. It is closely related to the issue whether conditionals can be true or false. My final point will be to explain this relation.

W4 **Stalnaker**

Counterfactuals and Probability

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Dorothy Edgington has been a resolute defender of an NTV account of conditionals, according to which a conditional does not express a proposition that makes a categorical claim about the world, but instead make a qualified claim, or express a conditional belief, qualified by or conditional on the proposition expressed by the antecedent. Unlike some philosophers who defend an NTV view for *indicative* conditionals, but not for subjunctive or counterfactual conditionals, Edgington argues for the more radical thesis that both kinds of conditionals should be given a nonpropositional analysis. In a previous paper I have considered the relation between a propositional and a conditional assertion account of indicative conditionals, arguing that the latter is usefully seen as a special case of a version of the former. In this talk, I will consider Edgington's NTV account of *subjunctive* conditionals, the role of objective probability in the account, and its relation to the possible-worlds propositional analysis of subjunctive conditionals.

W4 **Veltman**

**Indicatives, Counterfactuals, ...
How many Kinds of Conditionals Are There?**

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T.B.A.

W4 **van Wijnbergen-Huitink**

Inferentialism and Truth Conditions

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Inferentialistic approaches to conditionals are prominent in linguistics (e.g. Kratzer) and they have recently been gaining popularity in philosophy as well (e.g. Douven). The main idea is that a conditional is true iff its consequent follows from its antecedent (plus the contextually relevant background knowledge). This talk will compare different explications of this idea with respect to how they restrict the truth conditions of conditionals.

Vortragende A–Z / speakers A–Z

- K** Hauptvorträge / keynote lectures
F Frege-Preis-Kolloquium /
 Frege award colloquium

Kolloquien / colloquia

- K1 Selbst- und Fremdverstehen:
 Philosophische und
 Kognitionswissenschaftliche
 Untersuchungen
 K2 Philosophy in the Face of
 Peer-Disagreement
 K3 Does Metaethics Rest on a Mistake?
 Anti-Archimedeanism and the
 Conception of Metaethics
 K4 Meta-physics: Analytic versus
 Naturalized Metaphysics
 K5 Logical Pluralism and the Status of
 Logic
 K6 Imagination and Fiction
 K7 Medical Ethics: Can the Moral
 Philosopher Help?
 K8 Whither Conceptual Analysis?
 K9 Varieties of Explanation

Sektionen / sections

- 1 Sprachphilosophie /
 philosophy of language
 2 Metaphysik und Ontologie /
 metaphysics and ontology
 3 Logik / logic
 4 Wissenschaftstheorie /
 philosophy of science
 5 Philosophie des Geistes und der
 Kognition /
 philosophy of mind and cognition
 6 Erkenntnistheorie / epistemology
 7 Religionsphilosophie /
 philosophy of religion
 8 Ästhetik / aesthetics
 9 Angewandte Ethik /
 practical ethics
 10 Normative Ethik /
 normative ethics
 11 Metaethik, Handlungs- und
 Entscheidungstheorie /
 metaethics, action theory and
 decision theory

- 12 Politische Philosophie, Rechts- und
 Sozialphilosophie /
 political philosophy, philosophy of
 law and social philosophy
 13 Geschichte und Methode der
 Analytischen Philosophie /
 history and methods of analytic
 philosophy

- S Zweiter Studierendenkongress für
 Philosophie
 P Poster / posters

Workshops / workshops

- W1 Logical and Metaphysical
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 Applications
 W3 Material Metaphysics
 W4 Do Conditionals Have Truth
 Conditions? Dynamic and Pragmatic
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